Concept
The Chicago Ordinance
Vagueness
The Chicago Ordinance
City of Chicago v. Morales shows the vagueness doctrine at work, and the rest of this chapter returns to it often. The Court held Chicago's Gang Congregation Ordinance unconstitutionally vague.1 That is a due process holding, and the Court expressly declined to rest it on the First Amendment overbreadth doctrine.2 The case still belongs in a chapter on expression, because its two concerns, fair notice to citizens and limits on police discretion, return when the law regulates speech and carry more weight there. Tracing the ordinance from its text through its enforcement shows how each feature fed the Court's conclusion.
The Chicago City Council enacted the ordinance in 1992 after hearings showing that gang members intimidated residents by loitering in public places.3 The text prohibited "criminal street gang members" from "loitering" with one another or with other persons in any public place, and it defined loitering as remaining in any one place with no apparent purpose.4 Enforcement ran in two steps. An officer who reasonably believed that a gang member was loitering with one or more persons had to order the entire group to disperse, and disobeying the order was itself a violation.5 The penalty could reach a fine of up to $500, six months in jail, or 120 hours of community service.6 Because the order was mandatory, the officer's on-the-spot judgment about whether the group had an "apparent" purpose decided everything that followed, and the people on the sidewalk simply received that judgment as a command.
The police department added guidance of its own, but only inside the department. After it issued an internal memorandum describing the ordinance's enforcement requirements, Morales and others were charged.7 The department's order directed district commanders to designate the areas where gang presence had a demonstrable effect on law-abiding persons in the surrounding community, and it provided that the ordinance would be enforced only within those areas.8 The city did not release the locations of those designated areas to the public.9 A resident standing on a corner therefore had no way to learn whether the corner was covered.
Officers used the ordinance heavily. During its three years of enforcement, police issued over 89,000 dispersal orders and arrested over 42,000 people for violating it.10 The Illinois courts held the ordinance invalid on its face, and the Supreme Court granted certiorari and affirmed.11 Those numbers matter doctrinally because they show how often officers actually exercised the judgment the ordinance handed them, and standardless discretion does its damage in just that setting.
The Court accepted the city's premise before it reached the flaw. Intimidating conduct, it recognized, imperils residents' sense of safety and security, detracts from property values, and can destabilize entire neighborhoods, and the ordinance's findings show that these concerns motivated it.12 The Court said it had no doubt that a law directly prohibiting such intimidating conduct would be constitutional. The ordinance, however, broadly covered a significant amount of additional activity, and uncertainty about the scope of that coverage supplied the basis for the vagueness claim.13 The city's goal was never the problem. The means were, because the definition of loitering swept in people who happened to stand near a suspected gang member.
The Court then explained why overbreadth did not fit. It agreed with the city that the ordinance does not have a sufficiently substantial impact on conduct protected by the First Amendment, because the ordinance does not prohibit speech.14 Loitering means remaining in one place with no apparent purpose, so the ordinance also reaches no conduct apparently intended to convey a message, and by its terms it does not apply to assemblies designed to demonstrate support for or opposition to a point of view.15 Vagueness still had something to protect, because the freedom to loiter for innocent purposes is part of the liberty guaranteed by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, and the Court has called the right to remove from one place to another according to inclination an attribute of personal liberty.16 With no speech regulated but a real liberty interest at stake, the holding rests on vagueness alone.
Counting the votes matters when you cite the case. Justice Stevens delivered the opinion of the Court in Parts I, II, and V, and Part V is the arbitrary-enforcement ground. Justices Souter and Ginsburg joined him in Parts III, IV, and VI, which speak only for a plurality and add that the ordinance is also vague because it fails to give the ordinary citizen adequate notice of what is forbidden and what is permitted and reaches a substantial amount of innocent conduct.17 The arbitrary-enforcement ground therefore stands on majority footing, while the notice ground carries a plurality's weight. Justices O'Connor, Kennedy, and Breyer wrote separately in concurrence, and Justices Scalia and Thomas dissented; those opinions matter again in the discussion of facial challenges below.18