Concept
Applying the Test
Regulation of expressive conduct
Applying the Test
O’Brien asks four questions of a regulation that reaches expressive conduct: whether it lies within the government’s constitutional power, whether it furthers an important or substantial interest, whether that interest is unrelated to the suppression of free expression, and whether the incidental restriction on First Amendment freedoms is no greater than essential. O’Brien burned his draft registration certificate “in demonstration against the war and against the draft,” and argued that the act was symbolic speech, a mode of “communication of ideas by conduct.”1 The cases in this section are less dramatic than a burning certificate. They involve a rule about where protesters may sleep, a statute about what dancers may wear, and a prosecution of someone who broke an ordinary law to make a point. Each shows what the test does once a court decides that the government’s interest does not depend on the message.
The Court has paid close attention to the line between content-based and content-neutral laws, and every case below turns on which side of it the law falls.2 On the content-neutral side, the O’Brien test is applied so favorably to the government that it makes very little difference in most cases whether the conduct counts as speech, and a general regulation unrelated to the protester’s message can be enforced even against conduct that does.3 A challenger who cannot tie the government’s interest to the message is left to argue about degree: whether the interest is weighty enough and whether the fit is close enough. The fit need not be the least restrictive one, so those arguments are hard to win.4 The park case comes first because it shows the test at its most ordinary. The nude-dancing cases then ask how far the framework bends when the harm a law targets is bound up with what a performance communicates. The enforcement cases ask what a protester must show to claim that a valid law is being used against protest.
Park Sleeping and Clark
Clark v. Community for Creative Non-Violence applies the content-neutral track to facts that look nothing like a flag burning. In 1982 the Park Service gave the Community for Creative Non-Violence (CCNV) a renewable permit for a wintertime demonstration in Lafayette Park and the Mall to dramatize the plight of the homeless. The permit allowed two symbolic tent cities, but the Service refused to let demonstrators sleep in the tents, and CCNV and several individuals sued to stop the anti-camping regulations from being applied to the demonstration.5 The Court held that applying the camping prohibition to bar sleeping in the park and on the Mall did not violate the First Amendment.6 Because the demonstration took place on government land, the place and the nature of the government’s action also bear on the claim, as they do in public-property cases such as United States v. Grace.7
The Court assumed, without deciding, that overnight sleeping in connection with the demonstration was expressive conduct protected to some extent, and it added that this assumption “only begins the inquiry.”8 The assumption was easy to make. As Justice Marshall’s dissent pointed out, these areas “have served as the sites for some of the most rousing political demonstrations in the Nation’s history,” and the demonstrators made sleep part of the protest “to re-enact the central reality of homelessness.”9 But the label did little work. When a regulation is content neutral, the government is not hampered in enforcing a general rule unrelated to the protester’s message, even if the conduct is classified as speech.10
The Court treated the sleeping ban as a limit on the manner of demonstrating. That sleeping, like the symbolic tents, may be part of the message does not make the ban any less a limit on manner, because reasonable time, place, and manner regulations normally have the purpose and direct effect of limiting expression and are valid anyway.11 Nor does it matter that sleeping may be expressive conduct rather than oral or written expression; the prohibition is no less a time, place, or manner regulation.12 The Court then found the same regulation sustainable under the four-factor O’Brien standard for regulating expressive conduct.13 Because the Court sustained the ban under both formulations, a student can treat them, for a content-neutral rule, as leading to the same place: a means-ends inquiry not unlike mid-level scrutiny.14
The Court conceded that its purposes might be achieved more effectively, if less clumsily, by banning tents and twenty-four-hour vigils in the core areas altogether. It held that the Service’s decision to permit non-sleeping demonstrations did not impugn the camping ban as a “valuable, but perhaps imperfect,” protection for the parks.19 The question is whether the government has a legitimate interest in protecting the parks and whether the parks would be more exposed to harm without the sleeping prohibition than with it; if so, the ban is safe from invalidation as a reasonable regulation of the manner of a demonstration.20 The government need not choose the least restrictive or least intrusive means.21 The Court reasoned the same way when it upheld the Solomon Amendment: any incidental burden on speech was no greater than essential, because disadvantaging military recruiting would impair Congress’s ability to raise and support the Armed Forces and the interest would be served less effectively without the regulation.22
That leniency has a price. The demonstrators chose sleeping to re-enact the central reality of homelessness, and a neutral ban removes that form of the message while leaving the tents, signs, and vigil in place.23 The fourth requirement, one commentator observes, can be read so that it has no teeth: in O’Brien itself, Chief Justice Warren did not require the least burdensome means and merely recited the conclusion that the amendment effectively furthered the government’s interest.24
Protesters do not always lose when they challenge regulations. In the civil rights era, demonstrators used sit-ins, demonstrations, parades, and picketing to protest Jim Crow legislation, and when states and municipalities answered with legislation of their own, the demonstrators usually found successful refuge in the First Amendment.25 Clark’s lesson is narrower. A rule that applies to everyone who wants to use the space, whatever they say, is judged by whether it serves a substantial interest and leaves the message other routes.
Both ordinances regulate the same act in the same place. The classification of sleeping as speech decided neither one, since Clark assumed that it was speech and still upheld the ban. What decided them was whether the rule reached campers because of what they were saying.
Nude Dancing Cases
The nude-dancing decisions show how far O’Brien bends when the regulated conduct is erotic performance and the government’s reason is morality. In Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., the respondents objected to enforcement of Indiana’s public indecency statute, which made it a misdemeanor to appear knowingly or intentionally in a state of nudity in a public place. The statute defined nudity as showing the genitals, pubic area, or buttocks with less than a fully opaque covering, or the female breast with less than a fully opaque covering of any part of the nipple. The respondents argued that the prohibition against complete nudity in public places violated the First Amendment.28 Under that definition, a dancer who wore a G-string and pasties complied.29 The statute survived, but no single opinion commanded a majority.30
The plurality, led by Chief Justice Rehnquist, conceded that nude dancing of this kind is expressive conduct within the outer perimeters of the First Amendment, though only marginally so, and it applied the four-part O’Brien test. The statute, it found, is clearly within the State’s constitutional power, furthers substantial governmental interests, and is justified despite its incidental limits on some expressive activity.31 Indiana kept no legislative history, but the plurality found the statute’s purpose of protecting societal order and morality clear from its text and history. Public indecency statutes of this kind are of ancient origin and exist in at least 47 states, and public nudity was a common-law offense, considered an act malum in se.32
The third requirement carried the argument. Indiana had not banned nude dancing as such; it had proscribed public nudity across the board. The plurality therefore located the evil in public nudity, which the statute bars whether or not the nudity conveys an erotic message, and it observed that dancers in pasties and G-strings could still convey that message, only slightly less graphically.33 The fourth requirement was easy to meet. Given the statute’s definition, pasties and a G-string were the “bare minimum” needed to serve the State’s purpose,34 and the fit inquiry in these cases is the less onerous alternative to a least-restrictive-means test, requiring only that the means directly and effectively further the State’s substantial interest.35 The reasoning answers the gatekeeping question from earlier in the chapter. A ban on all public nudity reaches the dancer, the beachgoer, and anyone else who appears unclothed in public, so the interest it serves exists whatever message the nudity carries.
Because no opinion commanded a majority, the separate rationales have to be kept apart:
- The plurality treated nude dancing as marginally expressive, applied O’Brien, and found the interest in order and morality unrelated to suppression because the law targets public nudity and not erotic dancing.36
- Justice Scalia, concurring in the judgment, would have applied no First Amendment scrutiny at all. As a general law regulating conduct and not specifically directed at expression, the statute belongs to a long tradition of laws against public nudity that were never thought to violate the traditional understanding of “the freedom of speech.”37
- Justice Souter accepted that nude dancing receives a degree of First Amendment protection but would not treat morality as a substantial interest sufficient in itself. He rested the law on the secondary effects of adult entertainment, of the type associated with City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., which let Indiana rely on the public interest in deterring prostitution, sexual assault, and associated criminal conduct.38
Justice Scalia attached a caveat to his position. If Indiana in practice had targeted only expressive nudity while turning a blind eye to nude beaches and unclothed purveyors of hot dogs and machine tools, a law posing as a regulation of conduct in general might in reality regulate only communicative conduct. The respondents offered no evidence of that, and Indiana officials had brought many public indecency prosecutions for activities with no communicative element.39
Schad v. Mount Ephraim shows the other side of the line. A zoning ordinance there excluded all commercial live entertainment, including non-obscene nude dancing, while permitting other commercial activity, and the First Amendment barred it. The ordinance was not limited merely to liquor control; it was an overbroad intrusion on protected First Amendment activity.40 In the nude-dancing cases through Schad, the Court had accepted, without much enthusiasm, that First Amendment concerns were implicated even by barroom nude dancing.41 Indiana’s statute left dancing available in minimal covering, while the Mount Ephraim ordinance shut out all commercial live entertainment, and that is the difference between a nudity rule and a sweeping exclusion.
The secondary-effects doctrine comes from City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc. The Renton ordinance, like the one in American Mini Theatres, did not ban adult theaters altogether; it provided that they could not be located within 1,000 feet of any residential zone, dwelling, church, park, or school, and so it was analyzed as a time, place, and manner regulation.42 The ordinance treated adult theaters differently from other theaters, but it was aimed not at the content of the films but at the secondary effects of such theaters on the surrounding community, and the City Council’s predominate concerns were with those effects.43 That made it consistent with the definition of content-neutral regulations as those justified without reference to the content of the regulated speech.44 A content-based law, by contrast, applies to particular speech because of the topic discussed or the idea or message expressed.45
City of Erie v. Pap’s A.M. carried the same analysis to a nude-dancing restriction, and again no single opinion commanded a majority. A plurality led by Justice O’Connor and joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices Kennedy and Breyer declared that nude dancing of the type at issue was expressive conduct within the “outer ambit” of First Amendment protection.46 Justice Scalia, joined by Justice Thomas, concurred in the judgment on the ground that the law was not subject to “First Amendment scrutiny at all” because it was generally applicable and not targeted against expressive conduct. Justice Stevens, joined by Justice Ginsburg, protested the “dramatic changes” the Court endorsed. The secondary-effects doctrine had been used only to justify regulating the location of indecent entertainment businesses, but it was now being used to justify the “total suppression of protected speech.”47
The standing criticism of these decisions is that the third requirement proved easy to satisfy, because the interest could be described in whatever terms kept the case on the lenient track. Justice Souter’s approach raises the problem most directly: if the harms of prostitution and assault are a product of the persuasive effect of the erotic message, the interest relates to expression. His answer was to deny any chain of causation between the secondary harms and the persuasive effect of the dancing’s expressive message.48 The dissent in Renton made a structural objection. The Court let the city rely on the fact that other communities had adopted similar restrictions, and a municipality can always find other ordinances to cite, so the approach “largely immunizes such measures from judicial scrutiny.” In that dissent’s view, the ordinance should be treated like any other content-based restriction on speech.49 A dissent in a case about Detroit’s ordinance had put the objection at its starkest: the case involves selective interference with protected speech whose content is thought to produce distasteful effects, which the First Amendment exists to guard against, and time, place, and manner regulations that affect protected expression must be content neutral except in the limited context of a captive or juvenile audience.50 On an exam, state the plurality’s O’Brien analysis as the reasoning that upheld the law and note that Justice Souter reached the same result through secondary effects and Justice Scalia through the absence of any First Amendment scrutiny. Identify the characterization of the government’s interest under the third requirement as the point at which challengers attack.
Protest and Selective Enforcement
A person who breaks a valid law to make a point may fairly say that the decision to break it was symbolic speech, yet the claim buys no immunity from prosecution. Wayte v. United States states the enforcement-side rule: the government commits selective prosecution in violation of the First Amendment only if its enforcement policy is discriminatory against the First Amendment on its face, or has a discriminatory effect and was motivated by a discriminatory purpose.52 The government’s mere knowledge of the discriminatory effect does not call an otherwise valid enforcement scheme into question; the government must actually have intended the discrimination.53 Earlier sections asked what a law is for. This one asks the same question about the choice of whom to charge.
Wayte challenged the government’s enforcement of the registration requirement. After a grace period ended and a procedure called the “beg policy” had been ignored, the Department of Justice began to prosecute. An internal memorandum acknowledged that those prosecuted were “liable to be vocal proponents of nonregistration” or people holding “religious or moral objections,” and that the prosecutions would “undoubtedly result in allegations” that the cases were brought in retribution for the exercise of First Amendment rights.54 Wayte showed that the government was aware of the likely effect of its program and of the claims of vocal protesters. He did not show that the government intended any discriminatory effect or “prosecuted him because of his protest activities.”55
Awareness of an effect is not purpose. Officials who know that a neutral enforcement system will predictably reach vocal protesters have not thereby chosen those protesters because of what they say. If awareness sufficed, almost any enforcement scheme that reached a protester would be open to challenge without proof that anyone wanted to punish speech. Requiring purpose separates enforcement that happens to land on protesters from enforcement chosen because of the protest. An exam stem on this topic usually reduces to one question: why did the prosecutor choose this defendant?
The effect on outspoken critics is the same in both offices, which is why effect alone cannot decide the claim. The first office resembles the government in Wayte, which acted on a neutral system while aware of where it would fall. The second is the case that Wayte’s standard leaves open: a prosecution selected because of the protest. Some programs write neutrality into the rules themselves. In the federal trademark registration scheme, an examiner may not reject a mark based on the viewpoint it appears to express and does not ask whether a mark’s viewpoint fits Government policy; if the mark meets the viewpoint-neutral requirements, registration is mandatory.56
Having rejected the claim of discriminatory purpose, the Court also tested the enforcement system under O’Brien. It was undisputed that the governmental interest was unrelated to the suppression of free expression, and the fourth requirement was met because the incidental restrictions on First Amendment freedoms caused by the interim enforcement system were no greater than necessary to ensure registration for the national defense.57 That is the mark of the content-neutral track described earlier: the interest concerns how the program operates, and the fit is judged leniently.
The Court added that Wayte’s position proved too much. It “would allow any criminal to obtain immunity from prosecution simply by reporting himself and claiming that he did so in order to ‘protest’ the law.”58 Protest motive is the one fact a defendant controls completely, so a rule that rewarded it would let each defendant decide which laws bind him.