Concept
The Gatekeeping Question
Regulation of expressive conduct
The Gatekeeping Question
Showing that conduct is expressive brings a challenger within the First Amendment but does not choose the standard of review. One question does, and it is the third part of the test in United States v. O'Brien: is the governmental interest unrelated to the suppression of free expression?1 Chief Justice Warren built that test for conduct that combines speech and nonspeech elements, reasoning that a sufficiently important governmental interest in regulating the nonspeech element can justify incidental limitations on First Amendment freedom.2 A regulation passes if it is within the government's constitutional power, furthers an important or substantial governmental interest, serves an interest unrelated to the suppression of free expression, and restricts First Amendment freedoms no more than is essential to further that interest.3 The third part gets separate treatment here because it works as a gate: a regulation reaches O'Brien's balancing only if its interest is unrelated to expression.
The gate sorts cases three ways. If the interest is unrelated to expression, O'Brien's intermediate standard governs. If the interest is related, the case leaves O'Brien and the regulation is treated as content-based, and regulations enacted to restrain speech because of its content presumptively violate the First Amendment.4 The third outcome comes from Texas v. Johnson, where the Court also set aside an interest that the facts did not implicate. An interest of that kind drops out, and the court classifies whatever interests remain.
The Court pays close attention to the line between content-based and content-neutral laws,5 and the reasons for the two tracks point in opposite directions. Regulations unrelated to the content of speech receive intermediate scrutiny because in most cases they pose a less substantial risk of excising certain ideas or viewpoints from the public dialogue.6 Government action that stifles speech on account of its message carries the inherent risk that the government seeks not to advance a legitimate regulatory goal but to suppress unpopular ideas or manipulate public debate through coercion rather than persuasion.7 The conduct standard also tracks the familiar standard for time, place, or manner restrictions, which survive only if justified without reference to the content of the regulated speech. Clark v. Community for Creative Non-Violence noted that the O'Brien test differs little from that standard.8
The draft-card case shows the first track at work. The Court found that both the government's interest and the operation of the statute were limited to the noncommunicative aspect of O'Brien's conduct, namely preventing harm to the smooth and efficient functioning of the Selective Service System. O'Brien was convicted for the noncommunicative impact of his conduct and for nothing else.9 The interest had a concrete source in the certificates' function. A registration certificate proves that its holder has registered, and both certificates are receipts showing that the registrant has done what the law requires, so the efficient administration of the system calls for their continual availability.10 The Court accordingly held the 1965 Amendment constitutional as enacted and as applied.11
Flag burning shows the second track, and there the law and its interest differ while the act stays the same. Burning a flag in violation of an ordinance against outdoor fires could be punished, but burning one in violation of an ordinance against dishonoring the flag could not, because nonverbal expressive activity can be banned for the action it entails and not for the ideas it expresses.12 Texas v. Johnson falls on the second side of that line. Liability under the Texas statute depended on whether the treatment of the flag would seriously offend others, and so on the burning's likely communicative impact. The State's interest in the flag as a symbol of national unity was therefore related to expression, since that concern arises only when someone's treatment of the flag communicates a message, and the case stood outside O'Brien.
A workable way to sort a case starts with the interest the government actually asserts and asks whether the harm it describes exists only because onlookers understand what the conduct says. A burned draft certificate frustrates the Selective Service System whether or not anyone reads the burning as protest, so that interest is unrelated to expression.13 The offense Texas feared from a burned flag vanishes if nobody grasps what the burning means, so that interest is related.
Two shortcuts lead students astray. The first is the speaker's motive. O'Brien refused to accept that an apparently limitless variety of conduct becomes speech whenever the actor intends to express an idea, and the real question is not the speaker's motive but the purpose of the governmental regulation.14 The second is the label conduct. In Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, the Government argued that its material-support statute deserved intermediate scrutiny because it generally functions as a regulation of conduct, and the Court rejected the argument as contrary to precedent, most prominently Cohen v. California. Cohen involved a generally applicable ban on breaches of the peace, yet when Cohen was convicted for wearing a jacket bearing an epithet, the Court did not apply O'Brien.15
Drafting form does not control in either direction. Content-neutral regulations are those justified without reference to the content of the regulated speech, while regulations enacted to restrain speech on the basis of its content presumptively violate the First Amendment.16 Neutral wording therefore cannot rescue a law whose manifest purpose is to regulate the message. In United States v. Eichman, the Court observed that although the Flag Protection Act contained no explicit content-based limitation, the Government's asserted interest was related to the suppression of free expression.17 The inquiry looks to the interest asserted and the way the law operates, and stray remarks by individual legislators do not decide it. O'Brien declined to void a facially valid statute on the basis of what a handful of Congressmen had said, because what motivates one legislator is not necessarily what motivates the scores who enact a law.18
The third outcome removes an interest and does not choose a track. Texas also invoked an interest in preventing breaches of the peace, but nothing in the record showed that a disturbance occurred or threatened to occur because of the burning, and the only evidence of audience reaction came from witnesses who were seriously offended. Offense alone did not establish a likely disturbance. The breach-of-the-peace interest therefore dropped out, which left the interest in the flag as a symbol of national unity to be classified, and that interest was related to expression.
On an exam, the question which standard governs once conduct is shown to be expressive is answered by what the government says its law is for and by what the law actually does.
In the second town the analysis ends at the gate and never reaches O'Brien's fourth part. In the first town it continues through the remaining parts, which the sections on the O'Brien test take up.