Concept
Compelled Affirmation of Belief
Licenses or benefits
Compelled Affirmation of Belief
Government can also demand speech, and one way to demand it is to make a benefit depend on a declaration. The foundation case is West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette. The state board there ordered a flag salute and pledge of allegiance as a regular part of the program of activities in public schools. Children who refused were to be deemed insubordinate and expelled, their absence was to count as unlawful, and they and their parents or guardians were to be subject to punishment.1 The Court described the state as asserting power to “condition access to public education on making a prescribed sign and profession” while coercing attendance by punishing both parent and child.2 Because refusal brought expulsion and punishment, compliance was in effect compulsory and not optional.3 Public schooling was a state-supplied benefit tied to a required affirmation, so the case belongs in this chapter: it applies the conditions principle to belief itself.
The Court’s reasoning has two steps. First, the salute is speech. A flag is a symbol, and symbolism is “a short cut from mind to mind,” so saluting and pledging are a form of utterance.4 Second, forcing a person to speak is a different injury from forbidding speech. Justice Stone, dissenting alone from the earlier Gobitis decision that had sustained a salute requirement, wrote that such a law “does more than suppress freedom of speech and more than prohibit the free exercise of religion,” because the state “seeks to coerce these children to express a sentiment which, as they interpret it, they do not entertain, and which violates their deepest religious convictions.”5 Barnette overruled that decision just three years after it was handed down.6 Modern doctrine keeps Stone’s insight: strict scrutiny of content-based speech compulsions is at least as strong as the test for content-based speech restrictions, although the protection is presumptive and a sufficiently compelling justification can override it.7
West Virginia’s justification, national unity, did not save the requirement. The Court did not question that officials may foster national unity by persuasion and example; it asked whether compulsion is a permissible means of achieving it, and held that it is not.8 The state kept its ordinary tools of teaching and persuasion. As the Court noted, a state may “require teaching by instruction and study of all in our history and in the structure and organization of our government, including the guaranties of civil liberty, which tend to inspire patriotism and love of country.” What it may not do is short-cut that slow route by substituting a compulsory salute and slogan, because the students were no longer being informed about the flag. They were being compelled to declare a belief.9
In the opinion’s most-quoted language, Justice Jackson wrote that “no official, high or petty, can prescribe what shall be orthodox in politics, nationalism, religion, or other matters of opinion or force citizens to confess by word or act their faith therein.” The challengers were Jehovah’s Witnesses, who insisted that the pledge would violate the biblical prohibition on worshiping “graven images,” but the decision protects every child who refuses to take part, whatever the reason.10
Decades later, in Wooley v. Maynard, another case brought by Jehovah’s Witnesses, the Court reaffirmed the principle.11 New Hampshire required drivers to display its motto, “Live Free or Die,” on their license plates and prosecuted drivers who covered it. The Court held that the state could not make a private car carry the state’s ideological message. As in Barnette, the individual was forced to serve as an instrument for the state’s point of view.
The demand to affirm has also been attached to public office. Maryland barred Roy Torcaso from taking office as a notary public because he would not declare his belief in God, as the Maryland Constitution required. The Court held that the provision violated the First Amendment and, more broadly, that the First Amendment categorically forbids religious oath requirements for state officeholders. Article VI of the original Constitution already bans religious tests for federal office; the Free Exercise Clause, incorporated through the Fourteenth Amendment, carries the same prohibition to the states.12
Funding conditions raise the same problem, and later sections of this chapter treat them at length. In Agency for International Development v. Alliance for Open Society International, Inc., Congress denied funds under an anti-HIV program to organizations that lacked a policy explicitly opposing prostitution. The Court held that the requirement demanded a pledge of allegiance to the government’s policy rather than merely limiting how program money could be used. Justice Scalia, joined by Justice Thomas, dissented, viewing the requirement as the government’s choice of suitable agents for its strategy. Where a condition that defines a program ends and a demand for belief begins is the question the funding sections take up.
The rule has limits, and the first is a threshold question: does the law compel speech at all? If it does not, no special First Amendment scrutiny applies and rationality review suffices; if it does, the law is analyzed as a law forbidding the same speech would be.13 A rule that only governs conduct, such as the park regulation permitting camping only in designated campgrounds, asks no one to say or sign anything, so compelled-speech doctrine has nothing to work on.14
Nor does every required pledge count as a forbidden affirmation. Florida required applicants for public employment to pledge to support the Constitution of the United States and of the State. The Court treated that clause as settled, because it asks no more of public employees than Article VI, clause 3 asks of all state and federal officers, and a separate opinion agreed fully with that ruling.15 The next section takes up oaths in detail.
The recruiting case draws the line more finely. In Rumsfeld v. Forum for Academic and Institutional Rights, Inc., the Solomon Amendment required law schools that wanted to keep certain federal funds to give military recruiters the same access other employers received, and the schools argued that hosting recruiters compelled them to speak. The Court rejected the argument. Schools are not speaking when they host interviews and recruiting receptions, and unlike a parade organizer’s choice of contingents, a school’s decision to allow recruiters on campus is not inherently expressive. Nothing about recruiting suggests that the schools agree with the recruiters, and nothing in the Solomon Amendment restricts what the schools may say about the military’s policies.16 Set beside Barnette, the contrast is concrete. There the state prescribed the sign and profession each student had to make;17 here government prescribed nothing for the schools to say, and the schools stayed free to criticize the military. Whether a condition dictates the recipient’s message or only requires the recipient to accommodate someone else’s is a question the funding sections pursue.
The principle also reaches compelled financial support, a subject that belongs with freedom of association and is noted here only to show how far the principle travels. In Janus, the Court used the compelled-speech doctrine to overturn Abood, in a case where public employees’ union was the exclusive bargaining agent for all employees and nonmembers had to pay a fee for its bargaining and related activities.18 In Davenport, the Court upheld a Washington law that barred public-sector unions from spending nonmembers’ agency fees on political or electoral matters without their consent.19 When government instead funds private speakers, the Court has treated viewpoint neutrality as the controlling standard. In a university program that funded student speech, a viewpoint-neutrality requirement generally protected objecting students, though the program’s student-referendum feature appeared inconsistent with it.20