Concept
Students at the Schoolhouse Gate
Public school students
Compelled Speech and Protecting Minors
Students at the Schoolhouse Gate
A student who challenges a school rule on First Amendment grounds first meets a threshold objection: the First Amendment restrains Congress, and a local school board is not Congress. West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette rejected that objection. The Fourteenth Amendment, the Court said, protects the citizen against the State itself and all of its creatures, “Boards of Education not excepted.”1 The reasoning runs in three links. The Fourteenth Amendment carries First Amendment limits to the States, a public school board is one of the State's creatures, and the board therefore takes those limits with it. Boards keep their “important, delicate, and highly discretionary functions,” but they may perform none of them outside the limits of the Bill of Rights. And although the Fourteenth Amendment is what bears directly on the State, the Court added, “the more specific limiting principles of the First Amendment” are what finally govern the case.2
Barnette gave two reasons for holding boards to the Bill of Rights, and both explain why later school cases are handled so carefully. The first concerns what a school is for. A board that educates the young for citizenship has special cause to protect constitutional freedoms scrupulously, because a school that coerces its pupils teaches them to discount the principles of their government as mere platitudes.3 The second concerns accountability. School boards are numerous and their territorial jurisdictions often small, and a small local authority may feel less responsibility to the Constitution while the agencies of publicity are less vigilant in calling it to account.4 Congress, by contrast, had made flag observance voluntary and had respected the conscience of the objector even in raising the Army, whereas the local boards imposed compulsion in matters relatively trivial to the welfare of the nation.5 When the public's check is weak, the check falls to the courts.
The Court's account of the students themselves rests on the same premise. In Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School District, the Court said that students in school as well as out of school are “persons” under our Constitution, possessed of fundamental rights that the State must respect, just as they must respect their obligations to the State.6 A separate opinion in Wisconsin v. Yoder collected the decisions behind that proposition. It noted that the Court had “over and over again” held children to be persons within the Bill of Rights, extending Fourteenth Amendment protection to a 15-year-old in a state trial in Haley v. Ohio and holding in In re Gault that “neither the Fourteenth Amendment nor the Bill of Rights is for adults alone.”7 Student personhood is therefore settled. What remains open in every later case is how much room the school's custodial role leaves for restriction.
Tinker supplies the ordinary answer. Students who wore black armbands to protest the Vietnam War were suspended, and the Court held that First Amendment rights, applied in light of the special characteristics of the school environment, are available to students and teachers, who do not shed them at the schoolhouse gate.8 The qualifier about the school environment marks the limit of that holding. The same opinion that affirmed student rights also stressed the comprehensive authority of States and school officials, consistent with fundamental constitutional safeguards, to prescribe and control conduct in the schools.9 The Court resolved the tension by asking what a school must show before it may silence an opinion. The school must be able to show that its action rested on something more than a desire to avoid the discomfort and unpleasantness that accompany an unpopular viewpoint, and the usual form of that showing is a reasonable forecast that the expression would “materially and substantially interfere with the requirements of appropriate discipline in the operation of the school.”10 Student conduct that materially disrupts classwork, or involves substantial disorder or invasion of the rights of others, receives no constitutional shelter, whatever its time, place, or form.11
The burden of that showing falls on the school, and the reason lies in how disturbance works. Any word that deviates from another person's views may start an argument, and any departure from the majority's opinion may inspire fear, so a rule that let officials act on undifferentiated apprehension would let them suppress every unpopular message in advance.12 Demanding concrete evidence shifts the inquiry from what officials feared to what the record shows. The record in Tinker showed no interference with schoolwork. It showed a ban aimed at one symbol of opposition to the war while other political symbols were tolerated, and that selectivity pointed to disagreement with the message as the real motive.13
The disruption showing is the default for ordinary student opinion, and the recognized exceptions mark the places where the school's custodial interest weighs more. In Morse v. Frederick, a principal saw students unfurl a banner reading “BONG HiTS 4 JESUS,” construed it as advocacy of drug use, ordered it down, and suspended the student who refused.14 The Court upheld the suspension. The special characteristics of the school environment and the government's interest in preventing student drug use, it said, allow schools to restrict student expression that they reasonably regard as promoting drugs.15 Justices Alito and Kennedy supplied the necessary votes, and they joined the majority on the understanding that such regulation stands “at the far reaches of what the First Amendment permits.”16 The armbands in Tinker were a silent, passive political opinion whose only feared cost was the discomfort of an unpopular view. Morse involved a different message and a different interest, and the Court did not make the school prove disruption.17
The later cases show a Court pulled in two directions. It has generally sided with the government when expression is regulated in the military, in prisons, and in schools, because those settings call for great deference.18 Bethel School District No. 403 v. Fraser upheld punishment for a sexually suggestive speech at a school assembly, and Hazelwood School District v. Kuhlmeier let a principal exercise editorial control over a school-sponsored newspaper.19 The degree of deference matters more than the name of the test. Hazelwood accepted that a pregnancy article's anonymity might not have been adequately protected and that its discussions of birth control might have been inappropriate for younger students, which are possibilities and not demonstrated harms.20 The opposite edge appears in Mahanoy Area School District v. B.L., where the Court declined to strip schools of all power over off-campus speech but held that their leeway there is diminished, and it found a First Amendment violation in the discipline of a student for a private Snapchat posting.21
Tinker and its successors all concern a school stopping a student from speaking, but the rest of this chapter takes up two different problems. The first is whether a school may force a student to voice or affirm a belief. Barnette posed that question as whether a ceremony touching matters of opinion and political attitude may be imposed on the individual by official authority, and the Court examined whether the State holds that power at all instead of assuming it.22 The inquiry runs in reverse in a compelled-speech case, because the school demands a statement the student may reject, so the court asks whether the power exists before it weighs any burden. The second problem leaves the schoolhouse altogether. It asks whether the government's interest in shielding minors can justify a content-based restriction on speech, the question tested in Reno v. American Civil Liberties Union.