Concept
Defining Commercial Speech
Regulation of commercial speech
Defining Commercial Speech
A grocer's price list and a newspaper advertisement protesting the treatment of civil rights leaders are both advertisements, and both were paid for. The First Amendment treats them very differently, and classification explains why: whether a message counts as commercial speech decides which test a court applies. Commercial speech receives the intermediate review taught in the sections that follow; other speech receives the full protection given to noncommercial expression. Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. Public Service Commission supplied the Court's best-known phrase, describing the Commission's order as restricting “only commercial speech, that is, expression related solely to the economic interests of the speaker and its audience.”1 The phrase arrived with little history behind it. In 1942 Valentine v. Chrestensen had read “purely commercial advertising” out of the First Amendment without explaining the exclusion and without defining commercial speech, so the Court had to build the category as it moved from Valentine to Virginia Pharmacy.2
Virginia Pharmacy supplied the narrower formulation, under which speech is commercial when it proposes a commercial transaction. Justice Stevens, concurring in Central Hudson, described what that concept covers: a salesman's solicitation, a broker's offer, a manufacturer's price list or standard warranty terms, and advertising that tells possible buyers a specific product is available at a specific price and describes the advantages of buying it. He suggested that it may also reach communications that do little more than make a product's name more familiar to the public.3 Price advertising for a specific product is the obvious instance, and a political appeal that seeks money is the obvious counterexample, because the first invites the reader to buy a product and the second invites the recipient to invest in a political debate.4 A court applies the idea by reading the message as a whole. If its purpose and content are “strictly business,” designed to propose or facilitate a commercial transaction, the speech is commercial.5 City of Cincinnati v. Discovery Network, Inc. later returned to the same proposal-of-a-transaction idea.
The broader phrase fails because economic subject matter and economic motive describe far more than commercial speech. Justice Stevens called that definition “unquestionably too broad”: a labor leader's exhortation to strike and an economist's dissertation on the money supply concern only the economic interests of the audience, yet neither deserves lesser protection, and a speaker's economic motivation cannot lower the protection either, since even Shakespeare may have written for pecuniary reward.6 Later decisions agree with him. Corporate speech can be political or otherwise fully protected speech even when the speaker acts out of commercial self-interest, and economic motivation does not automatically lower the level of scrutiny.7 The Court also declined to push the line the other way. In Central Hudson itself it rejected an approach that would give broad protection to any advertising linking a product to a current public debate, because many if not most products can be tied to public concerns about the environment, energy, economic policy, or individual health and safety, and the approach would blur the line further.8 Neither a profit motive nor a link to public debate settles the classification. The message itself does.
Two corollaries follow from the narrow definition. Payment does not make speech commercial: speech keeps its protection even when money is spent to project it, so any kind of commercial speech that lacks protection must be distinguished by its content.9 New York Times Co. v. Sullivan applied that principle to an editorial advertisement protesting Alabama's treatment of civil rights leaders. The advertisement kept its protection despite payment, because the contrary rule would inhibit newspapers from carrying editorial advertisements and would close outlets for the interchange of ideas to speakers who are not members of the press.10 Profit does not make speech commercial either. Books, newspapers, and movies are largely published for gain, yet they are not treated as commercial speech, because the profit motive runs parallel to expressive content that is not necessarily commercial. A film made for profit may tell the story of a little pig and her friends on the farm, and it is that expressive content that defines the character of the speech.11 The price list and the film may both be made for gain, but only the price list proposes a sale.
Some messages fall between the clear cases. The invitation to transact may be implicit yet still at the heart of the speech; it may be so closely tied to a matter of public import as to negate any inference that the speech is merely commercial; or commercial speech may be combined with speech of another kind.12 Bolger v. Youngs Drug Products Corp. shows how the Court sorts such a blend. A contraceptive manufacturer mailed unsolicited flyers promoting a range of drugstore products, flyers devoted to its prophylactics, and informational pamphlets about venereal disease and family planning that referred to its own condoms, and a federal statute barred the mailings. The Court placed the flyers within the core of commercial speech but treated the pamphlets as a closer question, because they could not be characterized merely as proposals to engage in commercial transactions. It then examined three features: the pamphlets' status as advertisements, their reference to a specific product, and the manufacturer's economic motivation. None of the three was enough alone, but the combination gave strong support for classifying the pamphlets as commercial speech. Their discussion of public issues did not change the result, because a company has full protection for its direct comments on public issues but no claim to that protection when it makes such statements in the context of a commercial transaction. Classification as commercial did not doom the mailings, however. The Court gave them the qualified but substantial protection accorded commercial speech and found the sweeping prohibition unjustified.
Importance to the public is not the test, and Virginia Pharmacy explains why. The advertisement in Bigelow, which announced the availability of legal abortions in New York, “did more than simply propose a commercial transaction” and “contained factual material of clear ‘public interest,’” which left room for an argument that a commercial speech exception might survive.13 The Court nonetheless declined to sort advertising by public importance. No line between publicly “interesting” or “important” commercial advertising and the opposite kind could ever be drawn, it reasoned, because advertising, however tasteless or excessive it may seem, still disseminates information about who produces and sells what product, for what reason, and at what price.14
The category's edges stay soft, and the consequences of drawing them are real. The intermediate test has force: a majority of the Court disapproved the analysis of Posadas in 44 Liquormart, and a later decision on a federal ban on casino advertising endorsed reasoning similar to the speech-protective critique of Posadas.15 The medium does not settle the classification either. Some attorneys have used social media to pressure or influence a judge about a pending legal matter, as in In re McCool, and a post of that kind proposes no transaction however public the forum.16 A mixed message therefore calls for weighing every feature together, beginning from the core definition. On an exam, commit to a classification and name the features that drive it.