Concept
Two Tracks of Review
Content-neutral regulation of protected expression
Content-Neutral Speech Regulation
Two Tracks of Review
First Amendment challenges to laws that burden expression run on two tracks, and the track a court selects largely decides the outcome. If the government is aiming at the message, review is strict and the law rarely survives. If the government is aiming at something else and the burden on speech is a by-product, review is intermediate and the law is far more likely to stand. The first question to ask of any speech restriction is therefore the sorting question: is the regulation directed at what the speech says?
The sorting question arises whenever any level of government acts. The text of the First Amendment speaks to Congress, but in 1925 the Supreme Court declared that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment protects freedom of expression against state infringement, so both tracks govern state statutes and city ordinances as well as federal law.1 The Court laid out the contrast in Turner Broadcasting System, Inc. v. FCC, the challenge to the must-carry rules imposed on cable operators, which it treated as content-neutral.
Track one: laws aimed at the message
A regulation is content-based when it targets speech or expression because of its message or subject matter.2 Subject only to narrow and well-understood exceptions, the First Amendment does not countenance governmental control over the content of messages expressed by private individuals, and the Court applies its most exacting scrutiny to regulations that suppress, disadvantage, or impose differential burdens on speech because of its content.3
Strict scrutiny begins with a presumption that the regulation is invalid. The government must rebut that presumption by showing that it is using narrowly tailored, or necessary, means to achieve a compelling interest.4 The test is extremely demanding, although in rare cases a sufficiently powerful justification can let a content-based law survive.5 The requirement applies with full force in the traditional public forum. Streets and similar places are natural and proper places for the dissemination of information and opinion, so a restriction there that is based on the content of the message must be narrowly tailored to serve a compelling state interest.6
The severity of the test follows from what lies at the heart of the First Amendment: each person should decide for himself or herself which ideas and beliefs deserve expression, consideration, and adherence.7 A message-based line lets the government override that choice by removing particular ideas or viewpoints from public dialogue. Because the danger lies in the line itself, the Court puts the burden on the government to prove that the line is necessary.
Track two: regulation unrelated to content
Regulations that are unrelated to the content of speech receive an intermediate level of scrutiny, because in most cases they pose a less substantial risk of excising certain ideas or viewpoints from the public dialogue.8 The government may regulate in this way if the regulation is narrowly tailored to serve a significant governmental interest. That standard is met when the interest is sufficiently substantial and the restriction is not substantially broader than necessary to protect it.9 The contrast with strict scrutiny is visible in the wording. The first track asks whether the means are necessary to a compelling interest, and the second asks only whether the interest is sufficiently substantial and the restriction not substantially broader than necessary.
Part of the reason for the lighter review is political. A separate opinion in Turner observed that laws treating all speakers equally are relatively poor tools for controlling public debate, because their very generality creates a substantial political check that keeps them from becoming unduly burdensome. The same opinion warned that laws singling out particular speakers are substantially more dangerous, even when they do not draw explicit content distinctions.10 The warning shows that the line between neutral and suspect laws does not always coincide with the line between laws that mention content and laws that do not.
Two ordinances, two tracks
Suppose a town bars picketing within 150 feet of a school while classes are in session but exempts peaceful labor picketing. To enforce the exemption, an officer must ask what the picketers are picketing about, and that inquiry is content-based. The town's wish for quiet around its schools may be legitimate and unconnected to any viewpoint, yet the ordinance faces strict scrutiny and its presumption of invalidity.11 The ordinance in Mosley followed the same pattern. Now suppose the town caps amplified sound near its hospital at a fixed decibel level, at all hours and for every message. The rule never asks what anyone is saying. It is content-neutral, and its validity turns on the intermediate test.
The setting of the speech does not change the classification. When applying a rule requires asking what the speech is about, the inquiry is content-based, and it does not evade strict scrutiny simply because an event such as an election is involved.12
Neutral does not mean harmless
Intermediate scrutiny is lighter than strict scrutiny, but it is real review. The interest must be sufficiently substantial, and the restriction must not be substantially broader than necessary.13 Schneider shows that a neutral rule can fail. An ordinance forbidding all handbilling in public streets was not justified by the city's concern over street littering, even though it applied to every leaflet whatever its message.14 A content-neutral label therefore selects the test and leaves the inquiry open, because a flat ban can still sweep in far more speech than the interest requires.
The classification is itself often contested, and the sections that follow work through it in order: how courts decide whether a law is aimed at content, and then how the intermediate test operates. The cases that supply and apply the neutral-regulation test, including O'Brien and Ward, appear in those sections.