Concept
Offensive Political Speech
Content-based regulation of protected expression
Offensive Political Speech
Governments seldom admit that they are punishing speech because they dislike the idea. They point to a harm instead: an audience’s anger, a family’s grief, a diplomat’s wounded dignity. This section asks whether harms of that kind can justify a burden on political speech in public places. It works through two cases in which the injury was real and the speech was unwelcome.
The Court’s selectivity cases show how little room offensiveness leaves, even for speech the government may prohibit outright. A State may regulate some offensive instances of a proscribable category and leave other, equally offensive instances alone, but only if there is no realistic possibility that official suppression of ideas is afoot.1 A State might therefore ban only the obscenity that is most patently offensive in its prurience, yet it may not ban only the obscenity that includes offensive political messages.2 The cases below sit on the far side of that line. The speech is fully protected, and the question is whether the pain it causes can justify a burden anyway.
Public protest has long put that question to the courts. In the fifties and sixties, civil rights demonstrators used sit-ins, parades, and picketing to attack Jim Crow legislation, and when states and municipalities answered with legislation of their own, the demonstrators usually found successful refuge in the First Amendment.3 Boos v. Barry arose from picketing outside embassies, and Snyder v. Phelps from picketing at a funeral. In each, the harm the government invoked was someone’s reaction to the message. Boos comes first because it presents the question as a legislative classification. Snyder then carries the question into tort liability.
Boos v. Barry
Boos v. Barry holds that a ban on signs critical of a foreign government near its embassy is a content-based restriction on political speech in a public forum, and that the government’s interest in the dignity of diplomats cannot save it. Congress enacted the statute, D.C. Code § 22-1115, in 1938 under its constitutional power to “define and punish ... Offenses against the Law of Nations.”4 Its display clause completely prohibited signs or displays critical of foreign governments within 500 feet of embassies.5 Its congregation clause authorized orders to disperse.6 The Court of Appeals found the display clause content based but upheld it as justified by a compelling governmental interest and narrowly drawn to serve that interest.7 The Supreme Court started from three features of the clause that raise the stakes:
- The clause operates at the core of the First Amendment because it prohibits classically political speech, and the First Amendment reflects a “profound national commitment” to the principle that “debate on public issues should be uninhibited, robust, and wide-open.”8
- The clause bars that speech on public streets and sidewalks, traditional public forums where the government’s ability to restrict expressive activity “is very limited.”9
- The clause is content based, because whether individuals may picket in front of a foreign embassy depends entirely on whether their signs are critical of the foreign government.10
The first two features raise the stakes, and the third selects the standard of review. A content-based restriction on political speech in a public forum “must be subjected to the most exacting scrutiny.” The government must show that the regulation is necessary to serve a compelling state interest and is narrowly drawn to achieve that end.11 The Court of Appeals had used the same standard, so the dispute in the Supreme Court concerned the strength of the government’s interest and the fit between that interest and the clause.
It is no answer that the clause takes no side. The Court has held that a regulation that “does not favor either side of a political controversy” is nonetheless impermissible, because the First Amendment’s hostility to content-based regulation “extends ... to prohibition of public discussion of an entire topic.”12 Here the government determined that an entire category of speech, signs or displays critical of foreign governments, is not to be permitted.13 A law that takes no side among viewpoints can therefore still be content based.
The government’s asserted interest was the dignity of foreign diplomats, and the Court’s general rule cuts against it. In public debate, American citizens must tolerate insulting, and even outrageous, speech to give the freedoms the First Amendment protects “adequate ‘breathing space.’” A “dignity” standard, like the “outrageousness” standard rejected in Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell, is so inherently subjective that it conflicts with the Court’s “longstanding refusal to [punish speech] because the speech in question may have an adverse emotional impact on the audience.”14 The mechanism is easy to see. Whether a sign impairs a diplomat’s dignity depends on how the diplomat feels about the criticism, so the sharpest criticism of a government is the likeliest to fall under the ban.
The Court did not rest its holding on that general rule. It said it need not decide whether, or to what extent, the dictates of international law could ever require that First Amendment analysis be adjusted to accommodate the interests of foreign officials. It assumed for argument’s sake that international law recognizes a dignity interest and that the interest is sufficiently compelling to support a content-based restriction. The clause still failed, because it is not narrowly tailored to serve that interest.15 The holding therefore rests on tailoring and leaves the compelling-interest question open.
The Court measured the clause against an analogous statute that Congress itself had adopted. Congress is the body primarily responsible for implementing the nation’s obligations under the Vienna Convention, and 18 U.S.C. § 112(b)(2) punishes willful acts or attempts to “intimidate, coerce, threaten, or harass a foreign official or an official guest or obstruct a foreign official in the performance of his duties.”16 That provision protects officials from what a speaker does to them. The display clause reaches signs because of what they say about a government. The comparison exposes the tailoring defect: a rule aimed at intimidation, coercion, threats, and harassment can serve the protective interest without singling out critical messages.
Nor does a secondary-effects label rescue the clause. The Court drew the line with the facts of Renton. Had the Renton ordinance been justified by the city’s desire to prevent the psychological damage associated with viewing adult movies, analysis as a content-based statute would have been appropriate. Such a regulation targets the direct impact of a particular category of speech, not a secondary feature that happens to be associated with that type of speech.17 Injury to a diplomat who reads a critical sign is the direct impact of the message, so the dignity rationale keeps the display clause in the content-based category.
The cap and the display clause regulate the same sidewalk and the same signs. They differ in the harm each addresses. Blocked entrances arise whatever a sign says, while injury to dignity arises only when a sign criticizes. A tort verdict can burden speech in the same way, and that is the question in Snyder.
Snyder v. Phelps
Snyder v. Phelps applies First Amendment scrutiny to a private lawsuit for damages. The Court held that there cannot be liability for intentional infliction of emotional distress for speech that is otherwise protected by the First Amendment, even though the picketing at issue hurt a grieving father.19 A suit between private parties can seem to fall outside a clause that restrains government. Yet civil liability for speech, even in private civil litigation, interferes with speech and must meet First Amendment scrutiny.20
The reason is chill. In New York Times v. Sullivan, Justice Brennan declared that what a State may not bring about by a criminal statute is likewise beyond the reach of its civil law of libel, because the fear of damage awards may be markedly more inhibiting than the fear of prosecution.21 The Free Speech Clause therefore serves as a defense in state tort claims, including claims for intentional infliction of emotional distress.22 The Internet cases later in this chapter voice a related worry. There the statute offered age verification only as an affirmative defense, so speakers who dutifully placed their content behind age screens might still find themselves in court, forced to prove the lawfulness of their speech on pain of criminal conviction.23
Marine Lance Corporal Matthew Snyder was killed in action in Iraq, and his father, Albert Snyder, arranged for the funeral to be held in Westminster, Maryland.24 Members of the Westboro Baptist Church, an unincorporated association founded by Fred Phelps, learned of the funeral from local newspapers and decided to picket it. Westboro is a small congregation that believes God punishes the United States for its tolerance of homosexuality, particularly in America’s military. It frequently communicates that view by picketing military funerals, and in the months before this funeral its members posted messages on the Internet saying they planned to picket it.25 Snyder’s claims included intentional infliction of emotional distress, intrusion upon seclusion, and civil conspiracy.26 The District Court held Westboro liable for millions of dollars in compensatory and punitive damages, and the Fourth Circuit reversed, holding that Westboro’s speech was protected by the First Amendment.27
Whether the First Amendment bars liability here turns largely on whether Westboro’s speech is of public or private concern, as determined by all the circumstances of the case.28 To decide, a court independently examines the “content, form, and context” of the speech “as revealed by the whole record.” No factor is dispositive, so the court must evaluate all aspects of the speech.29
On this record the majority gave the speech full protection. Westboro may have chosen the picket location to increase publicity for its views, and its speech may have been particularly hurtful to Snyder. Neither point means the speech receives less than full First Amendment protection under the circumstances of this case.30 If hurtfulness lowered protection, the speech that most disturbed its listeners would be the speech most exposed to punishment, which is the objection to the dignity standard in Boos. Snyder also argued that he was a member of a captive audience at his son’s funeral. The Court declined to expand the captive audience doctrine, which has been applied sparingly, see Rowan v. Post Office Dept. and Frisby v. Schultz. Westboro stayed well away from the memorial service, Snyder could see no more than the tops of the picketers’ signs, and nothing indicates that the picketing interfered with the funeral service itself.31
The dissent read the record the other way. Westboro chose Matthew Snyder’s funeral over the countless other available venues, so a reasonable person would have assumed a connection between the placards and the deceased. A church funeral naturally brings to mind thoughts of the afterlife, so signs such as “God Hates You,” “Not Blessed Just Cursed,” and “You’re Going to Hell” would likely have been read as referring to God’s judgment of the deceased.32 On that reading, the picketers had aimed at a private mourner. The majority did not treat either the choice of location or the hurtfulness of the signs as decisive.
The damages verdict was also content based. The father’s emotional distress was a direct product of the viewpoint the picketers expressed, and his suit sought redress for the consequences of that expression, so the damage award is a content-based restriction.33 A tort rule that imposes damages for one sign and none for a friendly sign at the same spot burdens speech because of its message, and a content-based burden receives the demanding review this chapter has described.
The outrageousness element of the tort is where the verdict collides with the First Amendment. “Outrageousness” in the area of political and social discourse has an inherent subjectiveness that would allow a jury to impose liability on the basis of the jurors’ tastes or views, or perhaps their dislike of a particular expression. It runs afoul of the Court’s longstanding refusal to allow damages because the speech in question may have an adverse emotional impact on the audience.34 For that reason Hustler required recovery for intentional infliction of emotional distress to meet the New York Times standards, and Snyder went further by holding that such liability cannot rest on otherwise protected speech.35 A jury asked whether speech is outrageous measures the message against the community’s sense of decency, and the more unpopular the message, the more likely the answer is yes. The dignity standard rejected in Boos fails for the same reason.
The decision is tied to its record, and it leaves room for regulation. Maryland now has a law restricting funeral picketing, but that law was not in effect at the time of these events, so the Court had no occasion to consider whether it is a reasonable time, place, or manner restriction.36 A statute that bars all picketing within a set distance of a funeral, whatever the signs say, asks where the picketers stand. It would be tested as a content-neutral regulation under the framework for place-based limits discussed earlier in this chapter; compare Madsen v. Women’s Health Center, Inc. A verdict for outrageousness asks what the signs said, so it carries the presumption of invalidity. Nor does Snyder treat a message as a shield for conduct. Where the government does not target conduct on the basis of its expressive content, acts are not shielded from regulation merely because they express a discriminatory idea or philosophy.37 Here nothing in the record indicated that the picketing interfered with the funeral service, so the verdict rested on what the signs said.