Concept
Kennedy v. Bremerton
Free exercise
Kennedy v. Bremerton
In Kennedy v. Bremerton School District (2022), the Court held 6–3 that a public school district violated the Free Exercise and Free Speech Clauses when it fired a high school football coach, Joseph Kennedy, for praying at midfield after games.1 The case earns separate treatment because the government's defense was itself a constitutional claim. Fearing liability under the Establishment Clause, the District told Kennedy that he must yield his free exercise rights in order to “avoid school endorsement of religious activities.”2 The framework therefore ran in two stages: the plaintiff had to show enough to shift the burden, and the government then had to justify a burden it had imposed in the name of another religion guarantee.
Kennedy had offered prayers after games for many years.3 After receiving a letter from the District, he offered a brief prayer following the October 16 game. As he bowed his head at midfield, most Bremerton players were singing the school fight song to the audience; Kennedy was alone when he began, but players from the other team and members of the community joined him before he finished.4 Shortly after the October 26 game, the District placed him on paid administrative leave and prohibited him from participating, in any capacity, in football program activities.5 The superintendent's letter criticized “public and demonstrative religious conduct while still on duty as an assistant coach,” citing prayers after the games on October 16, 23, and 26.6 The letter did not allege that Kennedy prayed with students,7 and it acknowledged that the prayers took place while students were engaged in unrelated postgame activities.8 A performance evaluation after the season then advised against rehiring him for failing to supervise student-athletes after games.9 The lower federal courts denied him relief; the Supreme Court reversed.10
Three questions follow from that posture. What must the plaintiff show before the government has to justify anything? Can fear of an Establishment Clause violation supply the justification? And what does the decision leave open for public employees? The Court also held that the firing violated the Free Speech Clause, which gives overlapping protection to expressive religious activity;11 that holding lies outside this chapter.
Plaintiff's Showing
A free exercise plaintiff proceeds first. The Clause forbids any law “prohibiting the free exercise” of religion,12 and Kennedy describes one way a plaintiff can prove a violation: by showing that the government burdened a sincere religious practice through a policy that is not neutral or not generally applicable.13 Failing either requirement is enough to trigger strict scrutiny.14 Once the plaintiff carries that burden, the defendant must show that its actions were nonetheless justified and appropriately tailored.15 A court cannot reach the question that decided Kennedy, whether the District's justification was adequate, until the threshold showing is complete.
The threshold exists because the Clause has never made religiously motivated conduct immune from regulation. The Court has rejected free exercise challenges to regulation of overt acts prompted by religious belief, noting that the regulated conduct had invariably posed some substantial threat to public safety, peace, or order.16 A sincere practice and a burden therefore show only that something is at stake. The neutrality and general applicability requirements ask whether the government has singled religion out.
The showing has three parts: a sincere practice, a burden, and a policy that fails neutrality or general applicability. The burden need not be a criminal penalty. In Sherbert the state exacted a penalty, the loss of unemployment compensation, for the exercise of a religious choice; that penalty arguably sets Sherbert apart from Braunfeld, where the adherent was free to close on Saturday and lost no government benefit for doing so.17 Kennedy paid a comparable price: the District placed him on paid leave, barred him from football program activities, and advised against rehiring him.18
The Sherbert dissent saw that decision differently. It charged that the State had to “single out” for financial assistance those whose behavior is religiously motivated, even as it denied assistance to others whose identical behavior is not.19 Kennedy's two requirements point the other way. They ask whether the government has singled religion out for worse treatment than comparable secular conduct receives, and on the general applicability route the plaintiff asks only for the treatment that secular conduct already enjoys.
The practice must be defined by the conduct the government actually punished. The contested exercise in Kennedy did not involve leading prayers with the team or before any other captive audience, and Kennedy's “religious beliefs do not require [him] to lead any prayer . . . involving students.”20 At the District's request he voluntarily discontinued the school tradition of locker-room prayers and his postgame religious talks to students, and the District disciplined him only for persisting in praying quietly, without his players, after three games in October 2015.21 The holding therefore rests on the quiet prayers, not on the earlier practices.
Neutrality asks what the policy targets. A policy fails the requirement if it discriminates on its face or if a religious exercise is otherwise its object.22 A government that bans acts only when they are engaged in for religious reasons, or only because of the religious belief they display, prohibits the free exercise of religion.23 Courts can find that object in direct and circumstantial evidence, including the events leading to a policy and the contemporaneous statements of the decisionmakers, as in Lukumi.24 Kennedy required no inference. The District explained that it could not allow an on-duty employee to engage in religious conduct even though it allowed other on-duty employees to engage in personal secular conduct,25 so prohibiting a religious practice was its unquestioned object, and the District conceded below that its policies were “not neutral” toward religion.26 The District's reason for acting, fear of Establishment Clause liability, did not make the policy neutral. That reason bears on the justification stage, which the next subsection takes up.
General applicability asks whether the government applies its rule evenhandedly. A policy fails the requirement if it prohibits religious conduct while permitting secular conduct that undermines the government's asserted interests in a similar way, or if it provides a mechanism for individualized exemptions.27 Kennedy fits the first route. The District permitted other coaches to forgo supervising students briefly after games in order to visit with friends or take personal phone calls, so no postgame supervisory requirement was applied in an evenhanded, across-the-board way, and the District conceded before the Ninth Circuit that its directives were not “generally applicable.”28 The same flaw undercut the evaluation that advised against rehiring Kennedy for failing to supervise student-athletes.29 A coach on a personal call leaves students as unsupervised as a coach at prayer, so the supervision interest cannot explain why only the prayer drew discipline.
Kennedy sits on the second set of facts. The District's own statements singled out religious conduct, and it tolerated secular absences while disciplining the prayer.
In Kennedy the District's concessions made the last two steps easy. It acknowledged below that its policies were “not neutral” and told the Ninth Circuit that they were not “generally applicable,” so the claim triggered strict scrutiny and the burden of justification passed to the District.30
An exam stem will rarely hand over concessions. It will supply facts: an official statement singling out the religious character of the conduct, or a rule enforced against the religious claimant while comparable secular conduct goes unremarked. An answer that notes a sincere prayer and a lost job but never says which requirement the policy failed has skipped the step that carries the claim past Smith.
Establishment Clause Justification
The District defended its discipline as something the Establishment Clause required. After Kennedy made his threshold showing, the District had to show that its actions were justified and appropriately tailored,33 and it offered its fear of liability under that Clause as the justification.34 The Court held that the District could not sustain its burden under any standard.35 Its reasoning answered three arguments: that the Clauses conflict, that the prayer would appear to be endorsed, and that it would coerce students.
The text answers the claim of conflict first. The Amendment places the three Clauses in a single sentence: Congress shall make no law “respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech.”36 A natural reading of that sentence suggests complementary purposes, not warring ones in which one Clause is always sure to prevail over the others.37
The endorsement argument fails because the test behind it no longer governs. In place of Lemon and the endorsement test, the Court has instructed that the Establishment Clause be interpreted by reference to historical practices and understandings, and the line between the permissible and the impermissible must accord with history and faithfully reflect the understanding of the Founders.38 On that reading the Clause contains nothing like a “modified heckler's veto” that lets religious activity be proscribed because of perceptions or discomfort, and a violation does not follow automatically whenever a public school fails to censor private religious speech.39 A school that suppresses a coach's prayer to avoid appearing to endorse it therefore invokes a violation the Clause, so read, does not recognize.
The coercion argument was the District's next attempt, and it failed for want of evidence. The Ninth Circuit had not adopted the theory, and evidence of coercion in the record was absent.40 The record points the other way on the one prayer it describes in detail: on October 16 most Bremerton players were singing the fight song, and the people who joined Kennedy were players from the other team and members of the community.41
The District then argued that any visible religious conduct by a teacher or coach should be deemed impermissibly coercive on students without more and as a matter of law. The Court rejected that rule. A rule that the only acceptable government role models are those who eschew any visible religious expression would undermine a long constitutional tradition in which learning to tolerate diverse expressive activities has been “part of learning how to live in a pluralistic society,” and no historically sound understanding of the Establishment Clause makes it necessary for government to be hostile to religion in this way.42
The Establishment Clause still limits what schools may do, and the Court drew the line at required attendance. It distinguished Santa Fe Independent School District v. Doe on the ground that, although student attendance at football games was not required there, cheerleaders, band members, and team members were required to attend, whereas students were neither required nor expected to attend the coach's postgame prayers.43 The distinction turns on whether the setting obliged any student to be present for the prayer.
The Court found no conflict between the commands of the First Amendment in this case, only the “mere shadow” of one, a false choice premised on a misconstruction of the Establishment Clause. It held that a government's concern about phantom constitutional violations does not justify actual violations of an individual's First Amendment rights.44 The District's mistake, as the Court described it, was to believe it had to suppress religious observances while permitting comparable secular speech, a discrimination the Constitution neither mandates nor tolerates.45 Equal treatment was all Kennedy needed, and the District's own tolerance of secular personal conduct on the same occasions showed that it could supply it.
Two questions press on public schools from opposite directions. Does any breach in the wall of separation resulting from the recognition of religion by public education violate the Establishment Clause? And does denying the ability to pray in the classroom amount to hostility to religion that violates the Free Exercise Clause and establishes a religion of secularism?46 Kennedy resolves the problem on its facts by finding the feared violation phantom; it does not say what weight a real violation would carry. The same interaction appears when a state defends a burden on religion as an antiestablishment measure. In a Washington scholarship case, the Ninth Circuit held that the State had singled out religion for unfavorable treatment by excluding theology majors, so that under Lukumi the exclusion had to be narrowly tailored to a compelling state interest; finding the State's antiestablishment concerns not compelling, it declared the program unconstitutional, and the Supreme Court granted certiorari and reversed.47 The Locke v. Davey discussion below takes up that case.
An exam stem in which a school disciplines an employee's private prayer to avoid appearing to endorse religion invites two wrong answers: that Establishment Clause concerns automatically defeat the employee, or that free exercise automatically wins. A better answer asks whether the feared violation is real, tests any endorsement theory against historical practice, and tests any coercion theory against record evidence of pressure on students.
Public Employees and Open Questions
Kennedy decides the District's case and leaves three matters for later public-employee cases.
The first is the standard of review. The District asked the Court to apply the more lenient second-step Pickering-Garcetti test or, alternatively, intermediate scrutiny. The Court answered that it did not matter which standard applied, because the District could not sustain its burden under any of them.50 The decision therefore shows that this discipline fails under every proposed standard without choosing among them. The choice would matter only on a record in which the employer's justification is stronger.
The second is how far the facts carry the holding. The postgame period was time in which the coach could attend to personal matters such as phone calls or greeting friends and family in the stands, and the Court held that using it for prayer “does not transform his speech into government speech.”51 The contested exercise did not include leading prayers with the team or before any other captive audience,52 and the District's own letter acknowledged that the prayers occurred while students were engaged in unrelated postgame activities.53 An employee who prays while leading or addressing students on duty presents different facts, which the Court's description of the contested exercise excludes.
The third is whether Smith survives. Classification under Smith decides these cases: in the dispute between Catholic Social Services and the City, the district court and the Third Circuit held the City's contract provision and nondiscrimination ordinance neutral and generally applicable under Smith and rejected the free exercise claim on that basis.54 A concurring opinion in that case, Fulton, found the textual and structural arguments against Smith compelling and acknowledged the vigor of the debate, yet agreed to dispose of the case without resolving whether Smith should be overruled.55 Kennedy did not need to reach the question either, because the District's concessions took its policies outside the protection of a neutral, generally applicable rule. The Challenges to Smith section below takes up the debate.
A stem about an employee's religious expression at work should run through the framework in order: identify the exercise the employer punished, test neutrality and general applicability against the employer's statements and its treatment of secular conduct, and then test the employer's justification. The answer should add that the Court has not chosen among the standards a public employer might urge, since the District in Kennedy lost under all of them. It should also tie the result to the facts that kept the holding narrow: a quiet prayer, no students led, and postgame time spent on personal matters.