Concept
Wisconsin v. Yoder
Free exercise
Wisconsin v. Yoder
Wisconsin v. Yoder held that the Free Exercise Clause bars a State from compelling Amish parents to send their children to formal high school until age 16.1 The parents belonged to the Old Order Amish religion and the Conservative Amish Mennonite Church. Their beliefs led them to keep their children out of school after the eighth grade, and Wisconsin convicted them of violating its compulsory school-attendance law, which required children to attend public or private school until age 16.2 Each parent was fined $5.3 The Wisconsin Supreme Court reversed the convictions,4 and the United States Supreme Court, in an opinion by Chief Justice Burger, agreed, recognizing the Amish claim to an exemption from the general attendance law.5
Yoder is an exemption case, not a targeting case. Smith later observed that a State would prohibit the free exercise of religion if it banned acts only when they are engaged in for religious reasons, or only because of the religious belief they display; a ban on casting statues for worship, or on bowing before a golden calf, would be an example.6 A court weighing that kind of claim starts with the text, since the minimum requirement of neutrality is that a law not discriminate on its face.7 Words with religious connotations do not settle the question, because current usage can give them secular meanings, and a facially neutral text does not end it either, because the Clause protects against hostility that is masked as well as overt.8 Wisconsin's statute was a general requirement, and the Amish claimed that applying it to them violated the First and Fourteenth Amendments.9 The Court therefore asked how heavily that requirement pressed on the Amish faith and whether the State's interests justified the pressure.
Religious motivation alone does not shield conduct from regulation. The Court has rejected free exercise challenges to regulation of overt acts prompted by religious belief, because even action in accord with religious conviction is not totally free from legislative restrictions, and the conduct so regulated has invariably posed some substantial threat to public safety, peace, or order.10 The Amish record showed no threat of that kind. The Court found that accommodating their objections by forgoing one or, at most, two additional years of compulsory education would not impair the child's physical or mental health or materially detract from the welfare of society.11
Yoder belongs to the period when a neutral law of general applicability drew strict scrutiny if it had the effect of prohibiting a religious practice. Today heightened scrutiny is available only if the challengers also assert the infringement of a separate fundamental right,12 and that change governs how Smith later reads Yoder, as the last subsection explains. Wisconsin's law falls within the category the Free Exercise Clause reaches when the government requires conduct that a person's religion prohibits.13 The Court's analysis followed the Sherbert-Yoder sequence, and the three subsections below follow the Court: the burden on the Amish faith, the State's interest weighed against the exemption sought, and the limits of the holding.14
Burden on Amish Faith
The Free Exercise Clause forbids laws “prohibiting the free exercise” of religion,15 so the Amish first had to show that their objection was religious rather than personal. The Court drew the line with Thoreau. A claim that rests on a subjective rejection of the majority's secular values, as Thoreau rejected the values of his time and isolated himself at Walden Pond, does not rest on a religious basis, because his choice was philosophical and personal and does not meet the demands of the Religion Clauses.16
The State did not dispute that the Amish claim was religious. It challenged neither the trial court's findings nor the Amish account of their faith, and it made no attempt to meet the claim that the Amish mode of life and education is inseparable from the basic tenets of their religion, as much a part of their belief and practice as baptism, the confessional, or a sabbath may be for others.17 Its position was that its interest in universal compulsory education to age 16 was so great that it prevailed over claims it left undisputed.18 The case therefore turned on the weight of the burden and the weight of the interest.
The record the Amish built shows what a well-developed burden looks like. The Court relied on the unchallenged testimony of acknowledged experts in education and religious history, almost 300 years of consistent practice, and strong evidence of a sustained faith that pervades and regulates the respondents' entire mode of life.19 A faith that governs this much of daily life meets general law at many points, and the Court explained why those meetings had grown more frequent. As the society around the Amish became more populous, urban, industrialized, and complex, government regulation became more detailed and pervasive, and the Amish mode of life came into conflict with requirements exerting a “hydraulic insistence on conformity to majoritarian standards.”20
The conflict centered on high school. So long as compulsory education laws stopped at eight grades of elementary education, taught in a nearby rural schoolhouse with many Amish students, the Old Order Amish had little reason to fear that school attendance would expose their children to the worldly influence they reject.21 The Amish did not oppose education beyond the eighth grade as such. They opposed conventional formal education of the type a certified high school provides, because it comes at the child's crucial adolescent period of religious development.22 The Court concluded that secondary schooling exposes Amish children to attitudes, goals, and values contrary to their beliefs and substantially interferes with their religious development and their integration into the faith community at the crucial adolescent stage, and so contravenes the basic tenets and practice of the faith for parent and child alike.23 A faith that brings its young into the community during adolescence loses that stage when a school built on contrary values claims it.
The law pressed directly on that practice. It compelled the parents, under threat of criminal sanction, to perform acts undeniably at odds with fundamental tenets of their religious beliefs, and laws of that kind are especially coercive of religious liberty.24 Compliance also carried a very real threat of undermining the Amish community and religious practice as they exist today, leaving the Amish to abandon their belief and be assimilated into society at large or to migrate to a more tolerant region.25 The penalty itself was small, a $5 fine for each parent,26 so the weight of the burden came from what the law demanded and from what compliance would do to the community.
Sherbert v. Verner supplies the comparison. The claimant there could keep her unemployment benefits only by working on her Sabbath, so she had to choose between a precept of her faith and a critical government benefit, and the Court looked to the severity of that choice rather than to whether the burden was direct or indirect.27 Indirect burdens suffice to invoke strict scrutiny, and direct burdens, which compel acts at odds with a tenet, are especially coercive.28 Yoder sits at the heavy end of that range, with compelled conduct, a criminal sanction, and a threat to the community's survival. It sets a ceiling for what a record can show, not a floor for what a claimant must show.
A claim aimed at how the government runs its own affairs stands differently. In Bowen v. Roy the claimants' religious objection was to the government's use of Social Security numbers in administering its system, and the Court found no significant burden, because religious belief does not entitle a claimant to dictate the internal processes of government.29 The Amish in Yoder faced a different demand, since the law compelled them to act.
Students often treat sincerity as the end of the burden inquiry. Sincerity shows that the belief is genuine; severity asks what the law makes the believer do and what follows if the believer complies. The Amish satisfied both, so the opinion moves to the interest side, where only interests of the highest order that are not otherwise served can overbalance a legitimate free exercise claim.30
State Interest and Alternative
Wisconsin could enforce its attendance law against the Amish only if its interest outweighed the burden just described. The Court never doubted the strength of that interest, which it called “admittedly strong.”32 It held, however, that the interest is “by no means absolute to the exclusion or subordination of all other interests,” because only interests of the highest order and those not otherwise served can overbalance legitimate claims to the free exercise of religion.33
The Court refused to judge the interest at the level of the statute as a whole. Where fundamental claims of religious freedom are at stake, a court must “searchingly examine” the interests the State seeks to promote by compulsory education to age 16 and the impediment to those objectives that would flow from recognizing the claimed Amish exemption.34 The first half of that examination asks what compulsory schooling is for, and the second asks how much of that purpose an exemption would sacrifice. The second half does the decisive work. Every exemption departs from a universal rule, so an interest defined as universal education would suffer from any exemption at all, and the State would win each case by restating its statute. The Court instead measured the cost of exempting the Amish, not the cost of disregarding compulsory education laws in general.35 That focus matches the final requirement of the Sherbert-Yoder test: if government can exempt the claimant and others similarly situated without causing serious harm, leaving the law applicable to other cases, the exemption is a less restrictive means to the end.36
The State's case rested on the welfare of the child and of society. Compelled attendance, it argued, was needed so that children could support themselves, discharge the duties and responsibilities of citizenship, and avoid becoming burdens on society.37 The Amish answered each concern with evidence about their own system of education. Dr. Donald Erickson testified that their system of learning by doing was an “ideal system” for preparing Amish children for life as adults in the Amish community, and added, “I would be inclined to say they do a better job in this than most of the rest of us do.”38 Two more years of formal school may be necessary when the goal is preparing a child for life in modern society as the majority live it, the Court reasoned, but the goal differs when the child is being prepared for life in the separated agrarian community that is the keystone of the Amish faith.39 The State's picture of the Amish as providing no education past the eighth grade was therefore mistaken. They continued to provide what undisputed expert testimony called an “ideal” vocational education during the adolescent years.40
History answered the citizenship concern. The independence and successful social functioning of the Amish community for almost three centuries, and more than 200 years in this country, were strong evidence that an additional one or two years of compulsory formal education offered at best a speculative gain in meeting the duties of citizenship.41 The Court added that compulsory attendance beyond the elementary grades is a recent development: less than 60 years earlier, the requirements of almost all States were satisfied by completing the elementary grades, at least where the child was regularly and lawfully employed.42 Against that background, the State needed a more particularized showing to justify the severe interference with religious freedom that the extra years of attendance would entail.43
The State's last argument was predictive: Amish children who left the community would be ill-equipped for life without more schooling. The Court called that argument highly speculative on this record. There was no specific evidence of the loss of Amish adherents by attrition, and no showing that children who left, with their practical agricultural training and habits of industry and self-reliance, would become burdens on society because of educational shortcomings.44 Absent contrary evidence from the State, the Court would not assume that persons with such valuable vocational skills were doomed to become burdens on society, or that one or two more years of formal schooling would eliminate any such problem.45 A State that defends a burden on religion with a predicted harm must therefore bring evidence of the harm.
The State also invoked its parens patriae authority to protect the child. In the face of its consistent emphasis on the central values underlying the Religion Clauses, the Court declined to accept “a parens patriae claim of such all-encompassing scope and with such sweeping potential for broad and unforeseeable application” as the State urged.46 The parents' right to direct their children's education, which Smith later used to classify Yoder, is taken up in the last subsection.47
Braunfeld v. Brown points the other way, and the comparison clarifies the test. Braunfeld had concluded that an exception would undermine the State's interest in a uniform day of rest. In Yoder, the State's interest in self-reliant and self-sufficient participants in society was not undermined by an exemption for the Amish, because most Amish children stayed in the community and were well suited to life in it.48 A uniform day of rest depends on general observance, so each exempted merchant takes something from it. The goal of producing self-sufficient citizens is measured by outcomes, and the Amish community already produced those outcomes by its own means.
The Court gathered these threads in its conclusion. Beyond establishing the burden, the Amish carried what the Court called the even more difficult burden of demonstrating the adequacy of their alternative mode of continuing informal vocational education in terms of precisely those overall interests the State advanced for compulsory high school education.49 In light of that showing, “one that probably few other religious groups or sects could make,” and weighing the minimal difference between what the State would require and what the Amish already accept, the State had to show with more particularity how its admittedly strong interest in compulsory education would be adversely affected by an exemption.50 The Amish proof of their alternative is what shifted to the State the task of showing particular harm.
The fourth step is where Wisconsin's case failed. The Court was cautious about its own role: courts are not school boards or legislatures and are ill-equipped to determine the “necessity” of discrete aspects of a State's program of compulsory education, so they must move with great circumspection when weighing a State's legitimate social concern against a claim for exemption.51 That caution explains why the record carried so much weight. The Court reasoned from a detailed and largely unchallenged record of Amish education and community life, and the State answered with conjecture.
Reach and Limits of Yoder
The Court held, with the Supreme Court of Wisconsin, that the First and Fourteenth Amendments prevent the State from compelling the Amish parents to cause their children to attend formal high school to age 16.53 Three features confine that holding: the unusual record the Amish made, the fact that the claim belonged to the parents, and the way Smith later classified the case.
The record carried the case. The Court relied on almost 300 years of consistent practice, a sustained faith pervading the entire mode of life, and unchallenged expert testimony,54 and the Amish also carried the even more difficult burden of showing that their informal vocational education served the very interests the State invoked.55 The Court described that combined showing as one that probably few other religious groups or sects could make, and it drew the boundary of its holding itself: it was not dealing with a group claiming to have recently discovered some “progressive” or more enlightened process for rearing children for modern life.56 Justice Douglas, dissenting in part, called the Court's emphasis on the “law and order” record of the Amish quite irrelevant, since a religion is a religion irrespective of the criminal records of its members.57 His objection shows how much of the decision rested on proof of this kind.
That proof matters because of how the State's interest is measured. The inquiry asks what exempting this claimant, and others similarly situated, would cost while the law stays in force for everyone else.58 A claimant whose own practice already produces the self-supporting citizens the State wants from schooling shows that the cost is small, while a claimant who offers only sincere belief leaves the State's interest unanswered.
The claim also belonged to the parents. The State had never tried the case on the theory that the parents were keeping their children out of school against the children's expressed wishes, and the record was to the contrary.59 From the outset the State maintained that it could apply the attendance law to Amish parents exactly as to other parents, without regard to the wishes of the child, and the Court rejected that claim.60 Frieda Yoder, the only child who testified, said that her own religious beliefs guided her decision to stop attending school after the eighth grade, and neither side called the other children.61
Justice Douglas would have heard the children. Parents, absent dissent, normally speak for the family, he wrote, but education is a matter on which a child will often have decided views, and a child who wants to be a pianist, an astronaut, or an oceanographer “will have to break from the Amish tradition.” The future imperiled by the decision, he thought, was the student's rather than the parents'.62 The majority did not reach the question. Its holding “in no way determines” how the competing interests of parents, children, and the State should be resolved where the State proceeds on the theory that Amish parents are keeping their minor children from high school despite the children's expressed desires to the contrary.63 The Court added that recognizing the State's claim in such a proceeding would call into question traditional concepts of parental control over the religious upbringing and education of minor children, and would raise grave questions of religious freedom comparable to those in Yoder itself.64 A child's contrary wish therefore remains an open question under Yoder, and an answer that treats it as settled in either direction misreads the case.
Smith recast Yoder. Employment Division v. Smith held that the Free Exercise Clause does not excuse compliance with neutral, generally applicable laws, yet Yoder had applied strict scrutiny to such a law, so Smith had to account for it. Under today's doctrine, heightened scrutiny is available only if the challengers also assert the infringement of a separate fundamental right.65 Smith observed that the decisions barring application of a neutral, generally applicable law to religiously motivated action involved the Free Exercise Clause in conjunction with other constitutional protections,66 and for the parental branch of that category it cited Yoder together with the right of parents, acknowledged in Pierce v. Society of Sisters, to direct the education of their children.67 A litigant who cites Yoder for the proposition that free exercise alone defeats a neutral law will meet that reading.
Smith's own future is uncertain. Some members of the Court have called for reconsideration, though there is no indication that five would overrule it.70 One later concurrence found the textual and structural arguments against Smith compelling but agreed with the Court's disposition without resolving whether Smith should be overruled.71 A later section takes up those challenges.
Finally, Yoder gave the Amish no standing exemption from general law. The Court wrote that nothing in its holding was intended to undermine the general applicability of compulsory school-attendance statutes or to limit the State's power to promulgate reasonable standards that, while not impairing the free exercise of religion, provide for continuing agricultural vocational education under parental and church guidance by the Old Order Amish or others similarly situated.72 It noted that States have long had amicable and effective relationships with church-sponsored schools.73 Those relationships have limits of their own: the role of a teacher in a church-affiliated school has formed the basis for invalidating some state laws that would have subsidized teachers of subjects that were not sectarian in nature.74
A decade after Yoder, United States v. Lee upheld the federal government's refusal to exempt an Amish employer from the Social Security system. The Court accepted that the law significantly burdened a sincerely held religious belief, but the government showed that denying the exemption was essential to accomplish an overriding governmental interest, because mandatory and continuous participation was vital to the system's integrity and “it would be difficult to accommodate the comprehensive social security system with myriad exceptions flowing from a wide variety of religious beliefs.”75 An exception would also be hard to cabin, since the tax system could not function if denominations could challenge it because tax payments were spent in ways that violated their beliefs.76 The risk of multiplying claims is greater for tax exemptions, where self-interest may encourage many claims, though the argument was questionable even in Lee.77 The Court likewise found an overriding interest in Bob Jones University v. United States, which upheld the IRS's withdrawal of tax-exempt status from private schools that practiced racial discrimination, after suggesting that the loss of exemption was not a serious burden and finding compelling the interest in denying public support to racial discrimination in education.78 The same sincere faith lost in Lee because the State's loss from an exemption differed. The Amish record answered the purposes of schooling at the margin, while a tax system works only if participation is uniform.