Concept
Scope of the Clause
Free exercise
Free Exercise of Religion
Scope of the Clause
The Free Exercise Clause bars Congress from making any law “prohibiting the free exercise” of religion, and it completes a sentence whose first half bars laws “respecting an establishment of religion.”1 As enacted, the First Amendment, like the rest of the Bill of Rights, applied only to the federal government.2 It now binds states and cities too, because the Supreme Court has held that the religion and speech clauses are “incorporated” into the Fourteenth Amendment’s provision that no state may deny any person liberty without due process of law, and Cantwell v. Connecticut is the free exercise decision.3 A school board policy, a city ordinance, and an act of Congress therefore meet the same Clause, and the doctrine in this chapter governs at every level of government.
The Clause protects a fundamental liberty. Like freedom of speech and freedom of the press, it limits the government’s power to restrict people who engage in an activity of great importance to them.4 Some of the rules are uncontroversial: government may not interfere with religious belief, may not restrict religious expression without meeting the strict standards of free speech law, and may not restrict religiously motivated conduct in a discriminatory fashion.5 The far more common—and controversial—question is whether government may restrict religious conduct under a generally applicable law that does not discriminate against religion.6
Two threshold questions come first. One asks where the line falls between belief, which government may not regulate, and conduct, which it often may. The other asks what a claimant must show to hold a religious belief the Clause protects: that a religion or religious belief is burdened, and that the claimant holds the belief sincerely.7 Because these showings are preconditions to invoking the Clause, a court takes them up before it asks whether government has burdened the practice or can justify the burden.
The Court’s approach to religious conduct has shifted over time, which is why the starting points matter. Beginning in the 1960s, the focus turned to the nature and severity of the burden, and the Court increasingly asked whether the state had a compelling justification for any significant burden, direct or indirect. Starting in 1990, the Court came almost full circle: an incidental burden imposed by a religiously neutral law normally requires no special compelling justification.8 Later sections trace those stages. The two subsections below fix the starting points.
Belief Versus Conduct
Free exercise protects more than thought. The Court has said the Clause protects not only the right to harbor religious beliefs inwardly and secretly; it does perhaps its most important work by protecting the ability of believers of all kinds to live out their faiths in daily life through “the performance of (or abstention from) physical acts.”9 The Clause thus covers two freedoms, to believe and to act, and the law treats them very differently.
The freedom to believe receives the stronger protection. In Employment Division v. Smith, the Court said that free exercise means, first and foremost, the right to believe and profess whatever religious doctrine one desires, so the First Amendment excludes all “governmental regulation of religious beliefs as such.”10 Four prohibitions follow:
- Government may not compel affirmation of religious belief. In Torcaso v. Watkins, the Court struck down a Maryland requirement that all holders of public office declare a belief in the existence of God, because neither a state nor the federal government can constitutionally force a person “to profess a belief or disbelief in any religion.”11
- Government may not punish the expression of religious doctrines it believes to be false, a rule Smith traced to United States v. Ballard.12
- Government may not impose special disabilities on the basis of religious views or religious status, a rule Smith traced to McDaniel v. Paty.13
- Government may not lend its power to one side in a controversy over religious authority or dogma.14
The protection of belief is absolute in a precise sense. The inquiry asks a single question, whether the contested government action was aimed at a religious belief, and an affirmative answer leads directly to a finding of unconstitutionality, with no balancing of interests, strict or otherwise.15 The question looks to what the law is aimed at, not to how the legislature labeled it. The state law in West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette required saluting the flag and reciting the Pledge, which is in a sense a rule about conduct. The Court read it as directed primarily at public affirmation of what an individual believed, and it held that the law violated the First Amendment by compelling the Witnesses to affirm a belief they did not share with the community.16 A unanimous result does not guarantee a single rationale, however. The Court unanimously found the statute in McDaniel unconstitutional, but no opinion commanded a majority because the Justices could not agree on exactly why.17
Conduct is where the hard cases arise. Free exercise includes assembling with others for worship, using bread and wine sacramentally, proselytizing, and abstaining from certain foods or certain modes of transportation.18 Law collides with such acts in two ways. A law may forbid what a faith commands: in Reynolds v. United States, the Court rejected the claim that criminal laws against polygamy could not be applied to those whose religion commanded the practice.19 Or a law may demand what a faith forbids: the Court rejected a challenge by Amish individuals who said that obtaining Social Security numbers and paying Social Security taxes violated their religious beliefs.20 It likewise upheld the federal government’s refusal to exempt an Amish employer from the social security system.21
Reynolds drew the line this way: “Laws are made for the government of actions, and while they cannot interfere with mere religious belief and opinions, they may with practices.” To excuse a practice because of religious belief, the Court reasoned, would make professed doctrines superior to the law of the land and permit every citizen to become a law unto himself.22 Smith kept that reasoning alive. It refused to hold that, when otherwise prohibitable conduct is accompanied by religious convictions, the conduct itself must be free from governmental regulation, and it quoted the principle that conscientious opposition does not relieve an objector “from any colliding duty fixed by a democratic government.”23 The decisions barring application of a neutral, generally applicable law to religiously motivated action, Smith added, had involved the Free Exercise Clause in conjunction with other constitutional protections, such as freedom of speech and of the press.24 A later section takes up those hybrid claims.
A rule that put all religiously grounded conduct outside the Clause would be easy to apply, and Wisconsin v. Yoder rejected it. Wisconsin conceded that religious beliefs are absolutely free from state control but argued that actions, even religiously grounded ones, fall outside the First Amendment. The Court answered that its decisions have rejected the idea that religiously grounded conduct is always outside the Clause, while acknowledging that such activities are often subject to regulation under the State’s undoubted power to promote health, safety, and general welfare.25 Religiously motivated conduct is thus sometimes protected and often regulable, and the working question becomes how and why government burdens it.
At the floor, a state cannot ban conduct only because it is religious. The Court has said that a State would be “prohibiting the free exercise [of religion]” if it sought to ban acts or abstentions only when they are engaged in for religious reasons, or only because of the religious belief that they display, and that it would doubtless be unconstitutional to ban the casting of statues used for worship or to prohibit bowing down before a golden calf.26 The same opinion contrasts a tax collected from everyone. Citizens who believe that supporting organized government is sinful must pay it, because if prohibiting the exercise of religion is not the object of the tax but merely the incidental effect of a generally applicable and otherwise valid provision, the First Amendment has not been offended. The Court compared the tax to one paid by publishers, which does not abridge freedom of the press.27 A worship-statue ban and a general tax both reach religious conduct, so the difference lies in what each law is aimed at. Whether the Clause ever requires an exemption from a law of the second kind is the question on which the Court’s decisions have turned over time.28
A court finds the object of a law by beginning with its text, because the minimum requirement of neutrality is that a law not discriminate on its face, but it cannot stop there. In Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. Hialeah, the Court agreed that the words “sacrifice” and “ritual” in the ordinances were consistent with a claim of facial discrimination, since they have a religious origin, but found the argument not conclusive because current use also admits secular meanings. It held that facial neutrality is not determinative, because the Clause protects against governmental hostility that is masked as well as overt.29 Later sections develop the neutrality inquiry.
Sincere Religious Belief
A claimant who invokes the Clause must assert something religious, because the Clause protects the free exercise “thereof,” meaning of religion.32 Two showings follow. The claimant must show that a religion or religious belief is burdened, and must establish that the belief is sincerely held.33 Each showing is modest. The first screens out claims built on secular preference, and the second screens out claims that are feigned. Neither lets a judge ask whether a faith is true, sensible, or important within its own tradition, and the cases forbid those further questions.
The Constitution nowhere defines religion, and the Supreme Court has avoided giving the word any formal constitutional definition.34 The decisions nonetheless show that the concept is wide. Construing the conscientious-objector exemption in the Selective Service Act in United States v. Seeger, the Court asked whether a belief is sincere and meaningful and occupies a place in the believer’s life parallel to the place that orthodox belief in God occupies for a religious person who would qualify. In Welsh, another objector actually crossed out the references to religion on the government form, and the Court still concluded that his sincere beliefs against participating in war were “in his own scheme of things, religious.”35 Those were statutory holdings, but they show how wide the Court has been willing to read the idea of religion.
The outer edge of that breadth appears in Yoder. A determination of what is a religious belief or practice may present a most delicate question, the Court said, but the very concept of ordered liberty precludes allowing every person to make his own standards on matters of conduct in which society as a whole has important interests.36 If the Amish had asserted their claims because of their own evaluation and rejection of the secular values of the majority, as Thoreau rejected the social values of his time and isolated himself at Walden Pond, the claims would not have rested on a religious basis. Thoreau’s choice was philosophical and personal rather than religious, and such a belief does not rise to the demands of the Religion Clauses.37 The threshold also has a practical function: courts have felt a need to defeat some free exercise claims at the threshold, lest a host of government policies be subjected to the demanding test of serving a compelling interest.38
The Amish record in Yoder shows what a religious claim looks like when the evidence supports it. The Court found that the traditional way of life of the Amish was “not merely a matter of personal preference, but one of deep religious conviction, shared by an organized group, and intimately related to daily living,” and that their daily life and practice stemmed from a literal interpretation of the injunction in Paul’s Epistle to the Romans, “be not conformed to this world.”39 The reference to an organized group describes the Amish record and sets no requirement for later claimants. In Frazee v. Illinois Department of Employment Security, the state courts had limited a religious exemption from a work availability requirement to members of an organized church, sect, or denomination. The Justices unanimously held that requiring membership in a recognized church or sect violated the Free Exercise Clause, while the Court’s opinion added that only beliefs rooted in religion are protected and purely secular views do not suffice.40
The religious screen also tolerates unfamiliar and disputed belief. Courts usually cannot use the strangeness of a claimant’s belief, or the fact that other adherents of the faith disagree with it, to doubt whether the believer is sincere or properly understands the faith.41 Thomas v. Review Board of the Indiana Employment Security Division shows the rule at work. Thomas, a Jehovah’s Witness, quit his job when his employer transferred him to a department that produced military equipment and gave him no chance to move to another job. The state court denied him unemployment compensation after finding that his belief was no more than a personal choice, and Thomas admitted that he was “struggling” with his beliefs and that other members of his religion did not think such work barred. The Supreme Court nevertheless held that the state could not deny compensation, because his resignation was mandated by his religious beliefs.42 The Court acknowledged that one can imagine a claim “so bizarre, so clearly nonreligious in motivation, as not to be entitled to protection,” but said that the guarantee of free exercise is not limited to beliefs shared by all members of a sect.43 The screen is loose, not empty.
A government’s disagreement about what a belief means does not defeat a sincere claim either. In Fulton v. City of Philadelphia, the City’s action forced CSS to choose between curtailing its mission and approving relationships contrary to its beliefs. CSS believed that certification amounts to endorsement, and the City disputed that characterization, but the Court held that CSS’s sincere belief was entitled to protection.44
Sincerity is the showing a court may actually probe. Courts have been willing to examine the sincerity of the religious claim in determining the burden on free exercise.45 The Court’s unemployment compensation decisions appear to assume that testing sincerity is valid.46 Sincerity does not depend on how long the claimant has held the faith. The Court set aside the denial of unemployment compensation to a Seventh-Day Adventist who was discharged for refusing to work certain hours on Friday night and Saturday, and it did not matter that she embraced the faith after she began the job: she still faced the coercive choice between faith and employment struck down in Sherbert.47
The line between testing sincerity and testing truth runs through Ballard. The Court there indicated that the judiciary can determine only whether views are sincerely held, not whether they are true or false.48 A jury makes the point concrete. It may examine a defendant’s good faith, meaning whether the defendant actually entertained the professed beliefs, but it may not determine whether those beliefs are true or false, because doing so would give government the power to determine the truth of religious belief and doctrine and then punish those found to hold false beliefs.49 Whether sincerity itself may go to a jury in a fraud prosecution has been more controversial, because the conflicting considerations are the incongruity of secular courts deciding the sincerity of religious beliefs and the undesirability of creating a religious safe harbor for con men. Current law nonetheless seems clear that anyone seeking to take advantage of a religious exemption, whether grounded in statute or constitutional law, can be required to establish the existence of a sincere religious claim.50
Centrality follows the same logic. Courts were once willing to inquire into how central a belief or practice is to a religion, and Yoder is the example.51 Smith ended that practice: it is no more appropriate for judges to determine the “centrality” of religious belief before applying a compelling interest test in the free exercise field than to determine the “importance” of an idea before applying that test in the free speech field.52 The Court asked, “What principle of law or logic can be brought to bear to contradict a believer’s assertion that a particular act is ‘central’ to his personal faith?” Judging centrality is akin to the unacceptable “business of evaluating the relative merits of differing religious claims,” and courts must not presume to determine the place of a particular belief in a religion or the plausibility of a religious claim.53 A response that rejects a claim because the practice is optional in the claimant’s denomination, uncommon, or unreasonable therefore misapplies the threshold, which asks only whether the belief is religious and sincerely held.