Concept
Dilution and Equal Treatment
Right to Vote
Dilution and Equal Treatment
The earlier sections of this chapter followed the voter to the ballot box and asked what a state may demand along the way. A ballot that gets there can still lose value, and this section covers two ways that happens: through the weight a vote carries and through the manner in which votes are counted. The Constitution protects the right of all qualified citizens to vote in state as well as federal elections, and the Court has long recognized that qualified voters may also have their votes counted.1 Equal protection follows the right from its grant into its exercise. Having once granted the vote on equal terms, a state may not, by later arbitrary and disparate treatment, value one person's vote over that of another.2 A state can therefore admit every qualified citizen to the polls and still violate the right if it gives their ballots unequal effect.
Reynolds v. Sims governs the first stage, and it begins with a point about representation: "Legislators represent people, not trees or acres." Legislators are elected by voters, not by farms, cities, or economic interests, and in a representative government the right to elect them in a free and unimpaired fashion is a bedrock of the political system.3 The rule follows directly. The weight of a citizen's vote cannot be made to depend on where he lives, and a qualified voter is no more or less a voter for living in the city or on the farm. Population is the starting point and the controlling criterion in apportionment disputes.4
The holding applies that rule to both houses of a bicameral legislature. The Equal Protection Clause requires that seats in each house be apportioned on a population basis, and an individual's right to vote for state legislators is unconstitutionally impaired when its weight is substantially diluted compared with the votes of citizens living in other parts of the state.5 Alabama offered the Court three plans, and none passed. The House under the proposed 67-Senator Amendment came nearest to a population basis, yet the Court could hardly conclude that even it was apportioned sufficiently. Because neither house under any plan rested on population, all three schemes were invalid.6 The Court also said that mathematical nicety is not a constitutional requisite, so the command is substantial equality and the doctrine asks how large the disparity is.7
The standard binds even a political majority, because the right belongs to the individual and a legislature's vote cannot waive it.8 How much deviation the Constitution tolerates depends on the office. Congressional districts have no de minimis level of malapportionment, and absolute mathematical equality is required so far as attainable under Karcher v. Daggett. State legislative districts receive a little more leeway under White v. Regester.9
Reynolds-type claims involve individual vote dilution, in which some people's votes carry less weight than others'. Such a scheme is normally unconstitutional, with a narrow exception for an election involving a special limited-purpose entity that does not administer normal governmental functions such as maintaining streets.10 Group vote dilution is a different claim, in which a majority group uses the machinery of election to minimize an identifiable minority's strength. It takes two forms. A governmental body may be chosen at large so that the majority outvotes the minority for every seat, or a districting plan may be purposefully drawn so that the majority controls every district or a disproportionate share of them.11
The second stage, the counting of ballots, reached the Court in Bush v. Gore, where the equal-treatment principle was applied to a recount. Florida's governing standard for a legally cast ballot was the intent of the voter. The Court called that command unobjectionable as an abstract proposition and a starting principle.12 The recount itself was therefore not the defect, and the defect lay in the absence of specific standards to ensure the command's equal application. The Court concluded that uniform rules for determining intent in recurring circumstances were practicable and necessary.13 Without them, the standard for accepting or rejecting a contested ballot shifted with the county and the recount team. Palm Beach County began with a 1990 guideline that precluded counting completely attached chads, switched to a rule that counted a vote if any light could be seen through a chad, reverted to the 1990 rule, and then abandoned any per se rule when a court ordered it to treat dimpled chads as legal. The Court found no sufficient guarantee of equal treatment in that process.14
The machinery of the recount compounded the problem. The state court's order did not say who would recount the ballots. County canvassing boards assembled ad hoc teams of judges from various circuits who had no previous training in handling and interpreting ballots, and observers were forbidden to object during the recount.15 The press of the deadline did not excuse these defects, for a desire for speed is not a general excuse for ignoring equal protection guarantees.16
The two decisions operate at different stages of an election. Reynolds concerns structure: the weight a ballot carries is fixed by where district lines fall before anyone votes. Bush v. Gore concerns administration: how a cast ballot is evaluated is decided during the recount, after the votes are in. In both, the voter's treatment turns on something other than her own vote, whether her address or the board that happens to examine her ballot. This is a different question from the burden-versus-interest balancing used for ballot regulations earlier in the chapter, because here the issue is whether the state's own rules give some ballots more effect than others.
Two errors recur. The first holds that no right is impaired because every citizen could reach the ballot box and cast a vote, which ignores that the weight of a vote and the counting of it are protected as well. The second overreads the cases. Reynolds does not require mathematically identical populations in state legislative districts, since mathematical nicety is not a constitutional requisite, though congressional districts face a stricter standard. And Bush v. Gore did not condemn recounts or the intent-of-the-voter standard but faulted the lack of uniform rules for applying it.