Concept
Exclusion Versus Regulation
Right to Vote
Exclusion Versus Regulation
The voting cases seem to pull in two directions. Under Harper, even rational restrictions on the right to vote are invidious if they are unrelated to voter qualifications. Yet Anderson v. Celebrezze confirmed the general rule that “evenhanded restrictions that protect the integrity and reliability of the electoral process itself” are not invidious and satisfy the Harper standard.1 The lead opinion in Crawford v. Marion County Election Board set the two statements side by side, and they reconcile once we see that each governs a different kind of law.2 Harper governs conditions on the ballot that have no bearing on who is qualified to vote. Anderson governs evenhanded rules that protect the election process itself. A court that sorts the law before it knows which doctrine applies, and it does so before it weighs a single state interest.
The sorting turns on what the law says to the voter. A law of the form “No person of this description may vote” receives strict scrutiny. A law that requires all persons to prove their eligibility in a prescribed way receives a lesser standard.3 The first kind of law declares a person ineligible, and the second kind enables a legal voter to cast a ballot.4
An exclusion denies the vote completely to selected people.5 The Court has held that “any classification restricting the franchise on grounds other than residence, age, and citizenship cannot stand unless the…State can demonstrate that the classification serves a compelling state interest.”6 Kramer shows the test at work. The law there limited school board voting to persons who had school-aged children or who owned or leased property in the district, so everyone else was told they could not vote at all. Chief Justice Warren's majority opinion declared that any denial of access to the ballot must be “necessary to promote a compelling state interest.”7 That test has led courts to strike down almost every restriction on access to the ballot, with the notable exception of laws barring convicted felons from voting.8
A regulation leaves every eligible voter eligible and asks only how that voter proves it and casts the ballot. Indiana's law in Crawford required voters to present photo identification.9 Three Justices sustained it because the restriction was evenhanded and the state's interests outweighed the burden on the voter. Three others would have asked only whether such evenhanded regulations are rational, and no Justice in the majority required the state to show a compelling interest.10 The method on this track is balancing. The court must “weigh the asserted injury to the right to vote against the ‘precise interests put forward by the State as justifications for the burden imposed by its rule,’” and the scrutiny varies with the effect of the regulation.11 Even the Crawford dissenters used this track. Justices Souter and Ginsburg agreed with the plurality that a balancing analysis applies.12 Justice Souter found Indiana's law unconstitutional under the balancing standard of Burdick because a state may not burden the right to vote merely by invoking abstract interests. It must make a particular, factual showing that threats to its interests outweigh the particular impediments it has imposed.13 The Justices disagreed about how heavy the burden was and how weighty the state's interests were, and later sections take up that disagreement.
State A's rule shows why the form of a law does not settle its track. Virginia's poll tax in Harper was a payment required of every voter, yet the lead opinion in Crawford explains that it was invidious because wealth or fee paying has no relation to voting qualifications.14 The working question is whether the condition relates to voter qualifications. The Court has used strict scrutiny to evaluate poll taxes, property ownership requirements, and durational residency requirements.15 In Hill v. Stone it applied the strictest scrutiny to a city law that limited the vote in certain elections to registered property owners.16 The Court has declined to apply strict scrutiny to literacy tests, to felon disenfranchisement, and to photo identification.17 For photo identification the reason is that the rule regulates how eligible voters establish who they are.
Step two does the real work, because it stops a state from turning an exclusion into a regulation by phrasing it as a universal condition. Step three has one notable exception, felon disenfranchisement, which the earlier subsection on permitted eligibility limits discussed.21 Step four does not leave the regulation track toothless. The lead opinion identified no litmus test and insisted that, however slight a burden may appear, it must be justified by relevant and legitimate state interests “sufficiently weighty to justify the limitation.”22 That demand is more than the mere-rationality review most social welfare classifications receive. The balancing approach can also climb the scale. Depending on the severity of the burden, it may call for the strictest scrutiny, as in Hill v. Stone, and the next section develops that possibility.23
The usual exam error is to apply strict scrutiny to a voter identification requirement because voting is a fundamental right. The fundamental status of the right explains why a court takes any burden seriously, but it does not make compelling interest the test. Three Justices in Crawford sustained the law because the restriction was evenhanded and the state's interests outweighed the burden. Three would have asked only whether such evenhanded regulations are rational. No Justice in the majority required the state to show a compelling interest.24