Concept
Attainder and Ex Post Facto
Bills of Attainder
Attainder and Ex Post Facto
Article I bans bills of attainder and ex post facto laws in a single sentence. Section 9 says “No Bill of Attainder or ex post facto Law shall be passed,” and section 10 forbids each state to pass any bill of attainder, ex post facto law, or law impairing the obligation of contracts.1 Congress and every state legislature are therefore bound by both bans, and many state constitutions repeat one or both.2 The bans overlap without meaning the same thing, and the task in this section is to decide which one a statute offends, or whether it offends both.3
History explains the pairing. In Dobbert v. Florida, the Court recalled Justice Chase’s view, written a few years after ratification, that the prohibition probably answered the ex post facto laws and bills of attainder passed in England. With very few exceptions, he said, their advocates were “stimulated by ambition, or personal resentment, and vindictive malice.”4 A legislative denunciation and condemnation of an individual often worked as retroactive punishment, so the two devices tended to appear together.5 In Ogden v. Saunders, the Court located the injustice of ex post facto laws entirely in their retrospective operation, and said that reasoning applies “with equal force, although not exclusively, to bills of attainder.”6 The words “not exclusively” matter, because attainder has a concern that retroactivity does not capture.
The ex post facto clause protects reliance. It assures that legislative acts give fair warning of their effect and lets individuals rely on their meaning until explicitly changed, and it restrains arbitrary and potentially vindictive legislation.7 The Court’s long-standing list names four kinds of ex post facto law: a law that makes criminal, and punishes, an act that was innocent when done; a law that aggravates a crime; a law that inflicts a greater punishment than the law attached to the crime when it was committed; and a law that alters the rules of evidence so as to receive less, or different, testimony than the law required when the offense was committed.8 The first three are substantive and the fourth is procedural. In every case the person acted under one rule and is judged under another. The clause restrains legislatures, not courts, and it applies only to criminal matters.9
The attainder clause protects the allocation of decision. The Court has defined a bill of attainder as “a legislative act which inflicts punishment without a judicial trial,” and more recently as legislative acts, “no matter what their form,” that apply to named individuals or to easily ascertainable members of a group so as to inflict punishment on them without a judicial trial.10 “Punishment” here reaches well beyond criminal sanctions. Denying someone the right to practice a profession, or to hold government or private employment, qualifies, and it does so whether the legislature meant to punish past conduct or to discourage future conduct it dislikes.11 Attainder therefore needs no retroactivity. The first clause asks whether the person had notice, and the second asks who decided guilt.
A statute can violate both clauses. Suppose it provides that named individuals who once did something the legislature thought bad, but which was not criminal, shall be fined or imprisoned. It singles out persons, punishes them without a trial, and reaches conduct that was innocent when done, so it is a bill of attainder and an ex post facto law, and doubly unconstitutional.12
Removing one feature at a time shows each clause working alone. Take a general statute that raises the punishment for grand theft from one to five years to two to ten years and applies the increase to thefts committed before the amendment. It violates the ex post facto clause as applied to those thefts. Courts still try and sentence the defendants, however, so no legislature has pronounced anyone guilty, and the attainder clause is not engaged.13 The same is true of a change from life imprisonment or death to a mandatory death penalty, or from a fine or imprisonment to a fine and imprisonment. A retroactive lessening of punishment is not prohibited, so a change from the death penalty to life imprisonment may be applied to past crimes.14 Now reverse the exercise. A statute providing that any public official found guilty of misconduct in office by his superiors shall be fined or imprisoned is unconstitutional as a bill of attainder.15 The defect is the missing judicial trial, not any backward reach.
Retroactivity alone does not condemn a statute. A retroactive civil statute escapes the ex post facto clause, though it has sometimes been held unconstitutional on another ground, usually as a taking of property without due process of law.16 In Bank Markazi v. Peterson, the Court listed the specific provisions that police retroactive laws. Among them are the attainder prohibitions of sections 9 and 10, which bar legislatures from singling out disfavored persons and meting out summary punishment for past conduct. Absent a violation of one of those provisions, the Court said, the arguable unfairness of retroactive civil legislation is not enough to deny a clearly retroactive law its intended scope.17 The statute there changed the law by setting new substantive standards and left the district court to apply them to the facts, so a court still decided the case under a rule.18 That is the reverse of a legislature pronouncing guilt.
Combined fact patterns tempt students to treat the two clauses as one. A student who finds retroactivity and stops has not asked who decided guilt, and a student who finds a skipped trial and stops has not asked whether the conduct was already past. The answers are independent, and a complete analysis records both.