Concept
Rejecting the Privilege Argument
Unconstitutional Conditions
Rejecting the Privilege Argument
The government's first reply to an unconstitutional conditions claim is usually a syllogism: it need not provide the benefit at all, so it may withhold the benefit entirely, and the power to withhold entirely must include the lesser power to grant the benefit on whatever terms it names. The Court has rejected that reply. In Koontz v. St. John's River Water Management District, a water district defended a permit condition on the ground that it could have denied the permit outright, and the Court answered that even if the district could have denied the permit, that greater power did not carry a lesser power to condition approval on the owner's giving up constitutional rights.1 The rejection reverses a view that once seemed settled.
The syllogism was once the law. Holmes gave it its best-known form when he said that a policeman “may have a constitutional right to talk politics, but he has no constitutional right to be a policeman.”2 The decision that carried the remark, McAuliffe v. Mayor of New Bedford, treated the dismissal of a policeman for political activities as a matter solely of government discretion, and due process doctrine reasoned the same way: procedural fairness did not apply when the government denied benefits or privileges rather than rights.3
The Court applied the same reasoning to foreign corporations. From the premise that a state may exclude a foreign corporation altogether, it concluded that the state may impose taxes and conditions at its unfettered discretion in return for the “privilege” of doing business there.4 Justice Harlan, dissenting in Philadelphia Fire Association v. New York, insisted that the terms of entry must not be repugnant to the Constitution, and he asked whether a corporation is “estopped to claim the benefit of the constitutional provision securing to it the equal protection of the laws simply because it voluntarily entered and remained in a State.”5 The Court later stated the difficulty plainly in Western & Southern Life Insurance Co. v. State Board of Equalization. If a state cannot impose unconstitutional conditions on a privilege, its right to withhold the privilege is less than absolute; if its right to withhold is absolute, no one may challenge the terms on which it grants the privilege. Efforts to honor both principles produced results that “seem inconsistent or illogical.”6
The corporate doctrine did not last. In the first quarter of the twentieth century it suffered “an almost complete disintegration,” and in October Term 1909 the Court decided four cases in conflict with the principle that states have unlimited power to condition the entry of foreign corporations.7 Frost & Frost Trucking Co. v. Railroad Commission supplied the replacement rule. Frost conceded that, as a general rule, a state with power to deny a privilege altogether may grant it on such conditions as it sees fit, and then limited the concession: the state “may not impose conditions which require the relinquishment of constitutional rights.”8 The Court's reason was an argument from consequence. “If the state may compel the surrender of one constitutional right as a condition of its favor, it may, in like manner, compel a surrender of all. It is inconceivable that guaranties embedded in the Constitution of the United States may thus be manipulated out of existence.”9 Nothing in the power to attach conditions distinguishes one right from another, so a government that could buy the surrender of one right could buy them all.
Later decisions added a second reason: a condition on a benefit works like a penalty on the right. In Speiser v. Randall the Court struck down a condition that limited a tax exemption to claimants who affirmed their loyalty to the state. The state was under no obligation to grant the exemption, but conditioning even a gratuitous benefit inevitably deterred the exercise of First Amendment rights and threatened to “produce a result which the State could not command directly.”10 To deny an exemption to claimants who engage in certain speech “is in effect to penalize them for such speech,” and the deterrent effect is the same as if the state fined them. The argument that an exemption is a “privilege” or “bounty” whose denial cannot infringe speech was, the Court said, plainly mistaken.11
The concept doing the work is coercion. Justice Douglas, dissenting in Wyman v. James, framed the issue as whether the government “by force of its largesse” has the power to “buy up” rights guaranteed by the Constitution, and he observed that the welfare recipient in that case would have received her benefit but for asserting her constitutional right.12 The opposing view denies that the condition coerces anyone. A dissent from a decision invalidating a requirement that funding recipients adopt the government's view on an issue of public concern called the requirement no compulsion at all, only “the reasonable price of admission.”13 The dispute turns on whether the condition pressures recipients to give up a protected right, and the later discussion of coercion and voluntary exchange returns to it.
The same refusal appears outside speech cases. Goldberg v. Kelly held that constitutional objections to terminating public assistance “cannot be answered by an argument that public assistance benefits are ‘a privilege and not a right.’”14 The right-privilege dichotomy eroded as courts came to appreciate the adverse impact of government action on individuals, and today procedural due process must be afforded when an interest is intentionally denied, whether the interest is labeled a right or a privilege.15 A state license is no different. In 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, the Court said that the state's choice to license its liquor retailers “does not change the analysis,” because even though government is under no obligation to provide a particular benefit, it does not follow that the benefit may be conferred on condition that a constitutional right be surrendered.16
None of this obliges the government to confer a benefit. The Court has recognized that the government needs freedom to end relationships with employees and contractors, whether for poor performance, to improve the efficiency and responsiveness of service, or to prevent the appearance of corruption, and that absent contractual, statutory, or constitutional restriction it keeps that freedom.17 The doctrine therefore polices the terms and reasons on which a benefit is offered or withdrawn. It creates no duty to offer the benefit in the first place.
The line the doctrine draws runs between a closed door and a selectively open one. A concurring opinion in Committee to Defend Reproductive Rights v. Myers recounts the California court's statement in Danskin v. San Diego Unified School District: “It is true that the state need not open the doors of a school building as a forum and may at any time choose to close them. Once it opens the doors, however, it cannot demand tickets of admission in the form of convictions and affiliations that it deems acceptable.”18 A state that closes a forum to everyone asks no one to surrender anything. A state that keeps the forum open for those who hold approved beliefs has put a price on admission.
On an exam, dispose of the privilege argument quickly and move on. Neither the claimant's lack of an entitlement nor the government's power to withhold the benefit altogether decides the issue. The live questions are whether the claimant exercised a constitutional right and whether the benefit was denied or conditioned because of that exercise. Only one reply ends the claim: that the benefit was withdrawn from everyone on identical terms, because then no condition was imposed.