Concept
The Modern Three-Part Test
Contracts Clause
The Modern Three-Part Test
Article I, Section 10 forbids any State to pass a “Law impairing the Obligation of Contracts,” and its text lists no exception for reasonable regulation or public need.1 The Court reads that absolute language to give way to the State’s inherent police power “to safeguard the vital interests of its people.”2 Energy Reserves Group, Inc. v. Kansas Power & Light Co. began from that premise, and from it comes the working test for any state or local law that interferes with existing private contracts: three questions, asked in order.3 The test carries forward the balancing that Blaisdell started. Its legitimate-end finding became the question about purpose, and its reasonable-conditions finding became the question about means.
The sequence follows from what the clause protects. It guards bargains already made, so a law that leaves an existing bargain substantially intact gives the challenger nothing to complain about, and the State never has to justify itself.4 The two justification steps answer a real burden on a contract, which is why they come second and third. The first step also sets the stakes, since the more severe the impairment, the more closely a court examines the State’s purpose and means.5
Two features of the test need a word before its parts. The first is its intensity. When the State is not a party to the contract, courts follow the usual practice in reviewing economic and social regulation and defer to the legislature’s judgment about the necessity and reasonableness of a particular measure.6 That deference is why the test has been called very similar to traditional rational-basis review.7 The Allied decision discussed below shows that the deference can fail on a bare record, and it shrinks further when the State is itself a contracting party, as a later section explains. The second feature is the count of steps. In Sveen v. Melin, eight Justices endorsed a two-part version that asks whether the law substantially impairs a contractual relationship and then whether it is drawn in an appropriate and reasonable way to advance a significant and legitimate public purpose.8 The second part folds purpose and means together, so two steps or three describe one inquiry.
The last two steps carry different labels in different sources, and both are worth recognizing. The case law asks for a significant and legitimate public purpose and then for reasonable and appropriate means.9 Study summaries often say an important and legitimate public interest and a reasonable and narrowly tailored measure.10 Both wordings identify the same two steps, but the case-law wording is the safer choice on an exam, because “narrowly tailored” suggests a tighter fit than courts demand when they defer to a legislature acting outside its own contracts.
Substantial Impairment
The first question is graded, and every later step depends on the grade. Allied Structural Steel Co. v. Spannaus asked “whether the state law has, in fact, operated as a substantial impairment of a contractual relationship,” and it treated the severity of the impairment as the height of the hurdle the law must clear.11 A minimal alteration of contractual obligations may end the inquiry at this first stage, while a severe impairment calls for a careful examination of the nature and purpose of the legislation.12
Severity is graded because the clause protects reliance. Contracts let people order their personal and business affairs, and once those rights and obligations are arranged the parties are entitled to rely on them.13 A law disturbs that reliance in proportion to what it takes from what the parties counted on, so severity tracks the value of the interest the clause protects. Grading also answers a problem raised earlier, that nearly every regulation alters someone’s contractual position. Trivial alterations drop out at this step, and only real disruptions of reliance make the State justify itself.
Severity is a matter of degree at both ends. Total destruction of contractual expectations is not necessary, and a regulation that restricts a party to the gains it reasonably expected from the contract does not necessarily substantially impair it.14 Courts rarely call a clear alteration too slight to count; they measure how severe it is and set the intensity of review to match.15 What they measure is how far the State has upset the parties’ reasonable expectations, and four considerations feed that judgment: what the parties expected, how central the altered term was to the bargain, how heavy the economic consequence is,16 and whether the industry was already regulated.17
Allied is the model of a severe impairment. The employer maintained a pension plan as part of its employees’ compensation, and the plan let it amend or terminate the plan at any time and vest employees’ rights only on the plan’s own terms.18 Minnesota’s 1974 Private Pension Benefits Protection Act then imposed a funding charge on a covered employer that terminated its plan or closed a Minnesota office, computed as though employees with ten years of service had vested rights, and it counted service before the Act toward the ten.19 When the employer closed its Minnesota office, the State assessed about $185,000.20
Each consideration pointed toward severity. The vesting term was basic, the employer had relied on it for ten years in setting its annual contributions, and the Act recalculated contributions that had been adequate when made.21 Pension funding is an area where reliance is vital, because the sums set aside rest on a careful estimate of foreseeable liability, and nothing beyond the federal tax code had regulated the plan, so the employer had no reason to expect a change.22 The Act also allowed no grace period, which forced the whole retroactive charge into a single payment, and the record showed no necessity for so severe a disruption of expectations.23
Two lessons follow. A worthy aim, such as protecting employees’ pensions, does not by itself clear a severe and retroactive impairment, because the severity raises the hurdle. And the impairment came from a law that imposed new duties on the employer instead of relieving it of old ones. The Court rejected, over the dissent’s objection, the narrow view that the clause forbids only laws that diminish a contracting party’s duties, since in a bilateral contract lessening one side’s duties effectively raises the other’s.24
Energy Reserves reached the opposite result on a different consideration, the history of regulation in the parties’ industry. A natural gas producer’s contracts contained escalator clauses that raised the price whenever government regulators set a higher one, and Kansas adopted a law barring any contract price increase based on prices set by federal authorities.25 Kansas had not regulated gas prices specifically when the contracts were signed, yet its supervision of the industry was extensive and intrusive.26 The contracts also provided that their terms were subject to present and future state and federal law, and the escalator clauses themselves showed that the parties drafted against a background of regulated prices.27 The Court concluded that the producer’s reasonable expectations had not been impaired.28 A party that enters a field the State has long regulated cannot reasonably expect a contract to insulate it from continued regulation, so the more foreseeable the change, the weaker the claim of substantial impairment.29 Set beside Allied, the two decisions turn on foreseeability: nothing had warned the pension plan’s sponsor that state law would reach vesting, while the gas producer worked in an industry whose prices the State could always regulate.
A term the parties had little reason to treat as permanent is also a weak basis for a claim of severe impairment. In El Paso v. Simmons, which Allied discussed, Texas sold public land under contracts that let a defaulting buyer reinstate a forfeited claim at any time by paying delinquent interest, so long as no third party’s rights had intervened.30 Thirty years later Texas limited the reinstatement period to five years from forfeiture.31 The Court found no violation. No buyer could seriously claim to have been substantially induced to contract by a defeasible right to reinstatement, or to have read it as everlasting, because state policy was to resell forfeited land quickly, and the measure was mild yet important to the State’s interest.32 The reinstatement right was a term the parties had little basis to treat as permanent, while the vesting schedule in Allied was fixed in the plan and funded around for a decade.
A challenger must also identify a contractual term that the law actually alters. In General Motors Corp. v. Romein, Michigan overturned a judicial reading of its workers’ compensation statute and required employers to make retroactive payments that the earlier reading had let them reduce.33 The employers invoked the clause, and the Court rejected the claim because there was no contractual agreement on the specific workers’ compensation terms at issue and the new statute did not change the legal enforceability of the employment contracts.34 Reading every workplace regulation into the private arrangements of employers and employees would stretch the word contract until the clause protected against all changes in legislation.35 Whether a contract exists, and the nature and extent of its obligation, are federal questions, so the Court gives great weight to a State’s highest court yet decides for itself whether a contract was made.36 In Irving Trust Co. v. Day, the Court rejected a challenge because expectations of succession to a living person’s property do not vest until the person dies, and the new statute operated only through the owner’s own voluntary act.37
An obligation includes the contract’s express terms and also the state law on interpretation and enforcement that was in force when the parties agreed.38 That idea produced the old line between obligation and remedy. The parties’ own act created the obligation and government supplied the remedy, so a State could abolish a remedy such as imprisonment for debt without impairing the underlying obligation.39 The line was never absolute. A change in remedy that effectively reduced the value of substantive rights was held unconstitutional, and a law that amounts to a denial or obstruction of contract rights falls within the clause even if it professes to act only on the remedy.40 Recent decisions treat the distinction as largely an outdated formalism that roughly approximates a more particular inquiry into the parties’ legitimate expectations.41 Parties may count on adequate remedies continuing to exist, but they are unlikely to expect state law to stay entirely static, so a reasonable modification of remedies is much less likely to upset expectations than a law that adjusts an express term.42
Sveen shows how a significant change can still fall short of severe. Minnesota’s law provided that on divorce a spouse named as revocable beneficiary of a life insurance policy ceased to be the beneficiary unless re-named, and it applied retroactively to existing designations.43 Eight Justices endorsed a first step that looks to the extent to which the law undermines the contractual bargain, interferes with a party’s reasonable expectations, and prevents the party from safeguarding or reinstating rights.44 Justice Kagan acknowledged that revoking a designation is a significant change, since the point of buying life insurance is to deliver the proceeds to the named beneficiary, yet three features together defeated the claim of severe impairment: the statute reflected the policyholder’s likely intent, it did no more than a divorce court could always have done, and it supplied a default rule that the policyholder could undo in a moment.45 Each feature answers one of the three considerations. The first speaks to the bargain, the second to expectations, and the third to the ability to safeguard rights. Justice Gorsuch, dissenting alone, questioned whether a test that tolerates substantial impairments can be squared with a text that bars any impairment, but no other Justice joined him.46
One more limit concerns the kind of law being challenged. A statute that lays down a generally applicable rule of conduct to advance a broad societal interest, and that touches existing contracts only as a byproduct, is not treated as an attempt to alter contract rights.47 A law that operates prospectively on everyone’s activities may likewise fall outside the clause even when it makes performing a particular contract difficult or impossible.48
Steps two through four supply the facts from which severity is judged, so argue them from the contract’s own text and the history of regulation in the field. An answer that moves straight from a retroactive law to the State’s purpose omits the finding that sets the intensity of review. An answer that admires the State’s purpose and stops omits the finding that can still doom a severe impairment. When severity is hard to measure, a court may assume the worst and move on. In Keystone Bituminous Coal Association v. DeBenedictis, the record did not show how much of the coal companies’ support estate the damages waivers covered, and the Subsidence Act survived even on the assumption of a total impairment.49
Significant Public Purpose
A substantial impairment does not condemn a law; it obliges the State to justify it, and the first part of the justification is purpose. The State must show a significant and legitimate public purpose, typically the remedying of a broad and general social or economic problem.51 The inquiry looks at the character of the law and the problem it answers. A court asks what the legislature was trying to fix and for whom, and it does not ask whether the legislation is wise.
The requirement guarantees that the State is exercising its police power, the source of its authority to alter existing contracts, and is not handing a benefit to special interests.52 A law that only moves value from one private party to another reads the same on the page whatever label the legislature gives it: one side of a bargain is rewritten in favor of the side the legislature prefers, and that is the problem this step screens for. Blaisdell applied the idea when it counted the Minnesota moratorium as addressed to a legitimate end, because the law protected a basic interest of society and was not for the mere advantage of particular individuals.53 A purpose of simply benefiting one side of the contracts therefore does not qualify.
Two features of the requirement are easy to overlook. First, no emergency is needed. Since Blaisdell the Court has indicated that the public purpose need not address an emergency or a temporary situation, and the existence of an emergency and the limited duration of a measure remain factors in judging reasonableness without being essential in every case.54 A lasting problem can call for regulation as much as a short-lived one, and a rule demanding a declared emergency would push legislatures to describe permanent problems in temporary terms. Second, a legitimate purpose can consist of correcting a gain nobody bargained for, because eliminating unforeseen windfall profits is a legitimate state interest.55 A party that never expected a gain cannot claim to have relied on it, so a legislature that removes the gain corrects a distortion in the bargain and does not hand a prize to a favored party.
Energy Reserves itself supplies a purpose that met the standard without any emergency. A natural gas contract contained an escalator clause that raised the price whenever government regulators set a higher one, and Kansas barred any contract price increase based on prices set by federal authorities.56 Even assuming the Act impaired the producer’s contract, the Court found that it rested on significant and legitimate state interests. Kansas used its police power to protect consumers from gas price escalation caused by deregulation, and it could reasonably find hardship among households that heat with gas but live on limited fixed incomes.57
Environmental harm supplies the same kind of purpose. In Keystone, coal companies held damages waivers from surface owners, and Pennsylvania’s Subsidence Act removed the surface owners’ obligation to waive damages and required the companies to repair subsidence damage or pay for its repair. The Court agreed that the Act substantially impaired the waivers and then identified the justification: the Commonwealth’s strong public interest in preventing this type of harm, whose environmental effect transcends any private agreement between contracting parties.58 The word “transcends” carries the reasoning. A waiver between a coal company and one surface owner allocates the cost of damage between those two and leaves out the public’s stake in the land and buildings above the mines. The harm the legislature addressed was general, and no private bargain could settle it on the public’s behalf.
Allied Structural Steel shows the step failing. Minnesota’s pension statute applied only to private employers with at least 100 employees, at least one of whom worked in the State, that had established voluntary qualified pension plans, and it operated only when such an employer closed its Minnesota office or terminated its plan.59 The Court said the law could hardly be described, as the Blaisdell moratorium had been, as enacted to protect a broad societal interest and not a narrow class, and it found that the law was not even purportedly enacted to deal with a broad, generalized economic or social problem.60 The only indication of legislative purpose in the record was a statement that the problem reached the legislature when one company closed a Minnesota plant and tried to end its plan, and the burden fell on a self-selected group, the employers who had volunteered to provide pensions. Purpose was not the whole of the Court’s reasoning, since it also noted the absence of an emergency, the entry into a field the State had never regulated, and the permanent and retroactive character of the change. The three dissenters would have accepted protecting employees near vesting from unforeseen plant closings as a sufficient purpose,61 which shows that the step turns on how the statute’s coverage and the legislative record describe the problem.
Set beside Kansas and Keystone, Allied turns on who is described as the problem and who bears the burden. The Kansas cap addressed price escalation across a market and protected consumers generally, and the Subsidence Act answered physical damage to land and buildings across the Commonwealth, while Minnesota’s statute answered one firm’s plant closing by burdening a small class defined by a voluntary choice. A worthy goal named in the abstract therefore does not settle the question, because a court tests the goal against the statute’s coverage and the record.
Rent control rollbacks show how a law can favor one side of every affected contract and still serve a general purpose. A rollback sets rent by reference to an earlier base period, so it can reduce the rent in a lease already in force. Courts have generally held that rollbacks do not violate the Contracts Clause, even when they reach leases signed before the ordinance, reasoning that where a public housing emergency exists, rights under a private contract must yield to rational legislative protection of the public interest.62 Tenants gain and landlords lose, yet what carries the purpose step is the scope of the problem, a shortage that affects the whole rental market.
Because the test is very similar to traditional rational-basis review, the purpose step is a threshold the State usually crosses, and nearly any regulation aimed at a real, general problem will clear it.63 Allied marks the exception, where the record shows a targeted burden and no broad problem. The step never decides a case alone. A significant and legitimate purpose does not justify the impairment unless the court also finds that the adjustment of the parties’ rights rests on reasonable conditions and fits the purpose, and the next subsection takes up that fit.64 The scrutiny at this step also changes when the State is itself a party to the contract, as a later section explains.
Reasonable and Appropriate Means
A legitimate purpose cannot end the analysis, so the third step asks whether the legislature’s way of adjusting the parties’ rights is justified by that purpose. In the formulation Energy Reserves used, the adjustment must rest on “reasonable conditions” and be “of a character appropriate to the public purpose” justifying the law.66 Blaisdell put the same inquiry in slightly different words, asking whether the measures taken are “reasonable and appropriate to that end.”67 The step is the modern form of the Blaisdell findings on reasonable conditions and appropriate relief, compressed into one question about fit.
The step exists because a legitimate purpose does not make every means legitimate. Keystone put the point directly: a finding of significant and legitimate public purpose is not, by itself, enough to justify impairing contractual obligations, and a court must also satisfy itself about the legislature’s adjustment of the parties’ rights and responsibilities.68 Without the step, nearly any rewriting of a bargain could be defended by naming some public good it advances, and a legislature that wished to favor one side could attach a respectable goal to a law that takes far more from the other side than the goal requires. The fit step is where a court compares the size and shape of the burden with the problem. A law aimed at a specific harm should reach the contracts connected to that harm and carry conditions that match it, and a law that wipes out terms unrelated to the harm makes an adjustment the stated purpose cannot account for.
How closely the court looks depends on who the parties are. Unless the State is itself a contracting party, courts properly defer to the legislature’s judgment about the necessity and reasonableness of a particular measure, as is customary in reviewing economic and social regulation.69 In a dispute between private parties the legislature acts as a balancer of competing private interests, deciding how to spread a burden among people it is not contending against, and courts leave that kind of economic judgment to elected bodies in other fields as well. The State has no financial stake in which private party wins, so nothing in the situation gives a court special reason to suspect that the legislature chose its means in bad faith. When the State is the promisor, the legislature would be judging its own cause, which is why the deference falls away there and why a later section treats those cases separately.70
Deference is why the three-part test has been described as very similar to traditional rational-basis review, with the third question reduced to whether the measure is reasonably related to achieving the goal.71 Two decisions show the step applied in that spirit. In Keystone, the Commonwealth had determined that guidelines and restrictions were not enough to deter harmful mining and that imposing liability was necessary. The Act required coal companies either to repair subsidence damage or to give the surface owner funds to repair it, which the Court observed accomplishes both deterrence and restoration of the environment to its previous condition.72 The Court declined to second-guess the Commonwealth’s view that these were the most appropriate ways of dealing with the problem, so it never weighed the Act against gentler alternatives.73 In Energy Reserves, Kansas barred contract price increases based on federal price-setting, and the Court found the means not deficient, particularly in light of the deference owed to the Kansas Legislature, because the cap answered the escalation in gas prices that deregulation had caused for households living on limited fixed incomes.74 In each case the remedy matched the harm the legislature identified, and the inquiry ended there.
Allied Structural Steel is the decision where this deference failed, and it shows what replaces deference when the record is bare. The Court found no showing that the severe disruption of contractual expectations was necessary to meet an important general social problem, and it concluded that the presumption favoring legislative judgment on necessity and reasonableness “simply cannot stand in this case.”75 The statute nullified express terms of the employer’s pension contracts, applied only to employers that ended their plans or closed Minnesota offices, and imposed an immediate charge of about $185,000 with no gradual phase-in or grace period.76 Both Allied and Keystone involved substantial impairments, so severity alone does not separate them. What separates them is fit. Pennsylvania’s remedy was matched to a documented environmental harm that affected thousands of structures, while Minnesota’s retroactive charge fell on a narrow group, arrived all at once, and was never shown to be needed. Allied is the outlier, the rare case in which the State lost, and it stands for a refusal to abdicate the judicial role in enforcing the clause, not for a revival of the pre-1937 model of broad judicial protection of economic interests.77 The usual expectation in a private-contract case is that the State prevails at this step.
A challenger who concedes the purpose will usually argue that the State could have done the job more gently, and that is the argument to expect on an exam.
As the opening of this section noted, the third step is often restated as a reasonable and narrowly tailored measure, but the case-law wording is the safer one to write.78 In practice, apply the step as Keystone and Energy Reserves do: ask whether the measure is reasonably related to the problem the legislature identified, and defer on whether some other method would have been better. The harder look at necessity belongs to the contracts the State itself makes, where the deference described above is withdrawn.79