Concept
Blaisdell and Reserved Power
Contracts Clause
Blaisdell and Reserved Power
Article I, Section 10 forbids any State to pass a “Law impairing the Obligation of Contracts” and names no exception for emergencies, public needs, or reasonable regulation.1 Read literally, those words would freeze every private contract against legislative change, and the Court has not read them that way. In Home Building & Loan Association v. Blaisdell, it sustained Minnesota's temporary extension of the time to redeem foreclosed property and explained why an apparently absolute text gives way to a balancing inquiry: a state law may alter existing private contracts when it is addressed to a legitimate end and the measures it takes are reasonable and appropriate to that end.2
The Court asked whether “temporary and conditional relief” exceeded the State's power. It said the answer required weighing four things: the relation of emergency to constitutional power, the clause's historical setting, the Court's own decisions, and the principles of construction already established.3 The subsections below follow that path. The first sets out what Minnesota's law did and what the Court held. The second explains why a State keeps authority over the vital interests of its people even inside private contracts. The third gathers the features that made this use of that authority reasonable, features that later cases refined into the modern test.
The Mortgage Moratorium
The Blaisdells mortgaged a Minneapolis lot in 1928 and later defaulted. The lender foreclosed and bought the property at the sale on May 2, 1932. Minnesota law gave the Blaisdells one year to redeem, so their right would expire on May 2, 1933, and the Depression had left them unable to find a new loan or to redeem. Two weeks before that deadline, on April 18, 1933, Minnesota enacted its Mortgage Moratorium Law. The Minnesota Supreme Court conceded that the statute impaired the mortgage contract and upheld it anyway, as an exercise of the police power called into play by the economic emergency.
The statute let the county's district court extend the redemption period for whatever additional time it thought just and equitable, but never past May 1, 1935.4 Each extension had a price. The court fixed the property's reasonable rental value and directed the mortgagor to pay it, in whole or in part, toward carrying the property and toward interest.5 The district court gave the Blaisdells until May 1, 1935, on condition that they pay $40 a month.
The Court held that the statute, as applied, did not violate the Contracts Clause, and it added that whether the law was wise policy was not a question before it.6 The mortgage dated from 1928 and the statute from 1933, so a state law was changing a contract already in force, and both threshold requirements from the last section were met. The case therefore turned on the merits.
The relief took little from the lender, and it took that only for a time. While the extension ran, the lender could not take possession or obtain title in fee. Everything else stood: the mortgage debt, the obligation for interest, the validity of the sale, and the lender's right to title in fee or to a deficiency judgment if the Blaisdells failed to redeem in time. The Blaisdells' payments went to carrying the property and to interest, so the lender was “not left without compensation for the withholding of possession.”7 The relief also limited itself. The court could shorten the extension if circumstances changed, and the statute could not validly outlast the emergency.8
That structure separates the law from what the clause was written to stop. The framers feared that in a recession or depression legislatures would protect debtors who could not pay at their creditors' expense. The clause aimed to block such debtor relief and to encourage credit by assuring lenders that they would be repaid.9 Minnesota's law delayed the lender's remedy but left the value of the bargain in place. Under Blaisdell as later applied, a State may alter remedies for debts when the legislation reasonably relates to a public purpose and protects the basic value of creditors' claims. Emergency debtor relief that totally exempted major assets from creditors, or eliminated remedies without protecting creditors' rights, violated the clause.10
Four Justices dissented. Justice Sutherland, joined by Justices Van Devanter, McReynolds, and Butler, read the clause as absolute in its terms, so that an economic emergency could not justify impairing the mortgage contract, and he warned that the majority's approach would permit gradual encroachment on contractual sanctity.11 The majority rejected that reading, for reasons the next subsection takes up.
Police Power Within Contracts
Finding a contract does not finish the analysis. When Vermont, acting through its courts, converted a company's bridge into a free public highway and compensated the company for its extinguished franchise, no one doubted that the company's charter was a contract the State could have no power to impair.12 The Court nonetheless said that this shared premise “determines nothing as to the real merits.”13 The merits depend on what power the State kept, and Blaisdell located that power inside the contract itself.
Apart from the control a State retains over remedies, it keeps authority to safeguard the vital interests of its people, and legislation appropriate to that end may modify or abrogate contracts already in effect.14 The Court read the reservation of essential attributes of sovereign power into contracts “as a postulate of the legal order.”15 Because the reservation is deemed part of the contract, a State that exercises it is applying a condition the agreement always carried.16
Two ideas support the reservation. The first is that contracts are made inside a legal order. The laws in force at the time and place of contracting enter into the contract as if the parties had written them in, and they govern its validity, construction, discharge, and enforcement.17 Protecting contracts presupposes a government under which contractual relations are worth while, a government that keeps adequate authority to secure the peace and good order of society.18 A reading that stripped the State of that authority would undermine the very order in which promises are worth enforcing.
The second idea is that private agreement cannot buy immunity from regulation. If a contract could take a regulated activity out of the legislature's reach, the power to regulate would belong to whoever contracted first. The Court therefore insists that States keep broad power to adopt general regulatory measures without worrying that private contracts will be impaired or even destroyed, since otherwise immunity from state regulation could be purchased by private arrangement.19
Hudson Water Co. v. McCarter shows the idea at work. New Jersey prohibited transporting the State's water into any other State, and the Court sustained the statute against the objection that it impaired existing contracts to furnish that water to persons outside the State.20 The power at stake was the police power, the sovereign right to protect the lives, health, morals, comfort, and general welfare of the people, which the Court has called paramount to rights under contracts between individuals.21
The same reasoning binds the State when it is the promisor. In Stone v. Mississippi, Mississippi chartered a company in 1867 to run a lottery for twenty-five years, and in 1868 the State's voters amended the state constitution to outlaw lotteries.22 The company had paid the State a valuable consideration for its charter, yet the Court held that the charter did not stop the State from ending the lottery. “No legislature can bargain away the public health or the public morals,” and government, being organized to preserve them, “cannot divest itself of the power to provide for them.”23 Stone and Hudson Water close the same loophole from opposite sides. In Stone the State was the promisor, and the question was whether one legislature could bind its successors by promising not to act. In Hudson Water the promisors were private parties, and the question was whether they could take a regulated subject beyond the State's reach by contracting about it. The answer in each case is no.
Blaisdell gathered more examples. A State may end a lottery it once authorized, regulate the sale of intoxicating liquors, and abate nuisances that threaten public health despite existing contracts, and the same reserved power covers legislation to protect public safety.24 Rate regulation shows the effect on a single contract most plainly. In Union Dry Goods Co. v. Georgia Public Service Corp., a statute fixing reasonable electricity rates displaced lower rates that a company and a consumer had agreed on for a definite term, and the Court sustained the statute.25 It was argued that in such cases contracts were affected only incidentally. The Court called that argument a misconception. The question is not whether legislation affects contracts incidentally, directly, or indirectly, but whether it is addressed to a legitimate end and the measures taken are reasonable and appropriate to that end.26
The reserved-power reasoning also fixes what an emergency does and does not do. Emergency does not create power, increase granted power, or diminish the restrictions imposed on it. It may, however, furnish the occasion for exercising a power the State already holds.27 Blaisdell took the idea from Wilson v. New: “Although an emergency may not call into life a power which has never lived, nevertheless emergency may afford a reason for the exertion of a living power already enjoyed.”28 The federal war power illustrates the point. War does not create it, but it is a power given to meet that emergency.29 The Depression therefore gave Minnesota no new power. The police power, read into every mortgage, already existed, and the constitutional question was whether it embraced this response to these conditions.30 The Court added that if a State may give temporary relief from the enforcement of contracts after a fire, flood, or earthquake, that power does not disappear when the urgent need springs from economic causes.31 Students often summarize the case as holding that an emergency suspends the clause. It does not, because emergency diminishes no constitutional restriction, so the analysis must find a reserved power and cannot simply excuse a violation.32
Justice Sutherland's dissent called the distinction between creating power and furnishing an occasion for it a verbal circle. To say that an emergency does not diminish a restriction but furnishes an occasion for diminishing it, he wrote, merely says the same thing in other words while affirming what had just been denied.33 The statute either impairs the obligation of contracts or it does not. If it does not, the emergency is immaterial, because the statute is then an ordinary exercise of state power that needs no special occasion. If it does, the emergency furnishes no better occasion than if none existed.34 The majority's answer lies in its premise that the reservation of state power is part of every contract. That premise turns the question into what the contract's obligation includes, and it makes the reserved power and the clause two parts of one construction.35
The reserved power has a limit, because the passage that recognizes it also demands harmony with the clause. The reserved power cannot be construed to destroy the limitation, and the limitation cannot be construed to destroy the reserved power in its essential aspects.36 That harmony rules out a construction that would let the State adopt as its policy the repudiation of debts, the destruction of contracts, or the denial of means to enforce them. It does not rule out limited, temporary interpositions in enforcement when a great public calamity makes them necessary.37 The boundary protects the clause's purpose, since a reserved power that could swallow the clause would leave no contract safe from a legislature that wanted to cancel it.
The contrast tracks the limit's own language, which tolerates temporary restraints on enforcement in a great public calamity and withholds support from a policy of repudiating debts.38 The analysis shifts when the State is itself a party to the contract, because the scope of the State's reserved power depends on the nature of the contractual relationship, a point a later section takes up.39 The next subsection collects the features Blaisdell used to decide whether a particular exercise of the reserved power stays within the harmony this boundary requires.
The Blaisdell Criteria
Recognizing a reserved power does not approve every use of it, so Blaisdell closed by testing Minnesota's law against criteria drawn from the Court's decisions.41 The Court found five things. An emergency existed that furnished a proper occasion for exercising the reserved power. The legislation addressed a legitimate end. The relief fit the emergency and came on reasonable conditions. And the law was temporary, limited to the exigency that called it forth. Each finding explains part of why the moratorium survived and why other relief laws did not.
The emergency finding rested on facts and not on a label. The Court held that the declarations of the legislature and of the Minnesota Supreme Court could not be regarded as a subterfuge or as lacking in adequate basis.42 The insistence on a basis matters, because if a preamble reciting the word “emergency” sufficed, any legislature could escape the clause by drafting alone. A legislative declaration deserves great respect but is not conclusive, and a law resting on an emergency may stop operating when the emergency ends, even though it was valid when passed.43 Minnesota met that standard. The economic emergency threatened “the loss of homes and lands which furnish those in possession the necessary shelter and means of subsistence,” and the Court found the urgency of the conditions beyond cavil.44
The second finding concerns whom the law serves. A statute that rescues a favored group of borrowers resembles the debtor relief the clause targeted. A statute aimed at a threat spread across a community, here the loss of homes by many families, looks like the general-welfare protection the reserved power exists to secure.45 The Court observed that mortgagees are predominantly corporations such as insurance companies, banks, and investment and mortgage companies, whose chief concern is the reasonable protection of their investment security, and that the legislature was entitled to deal with the general or typical situation.46 That is the sense in which the law was addressed to a legitimate end.47
The third and fourth findings describe the shape of the relief. It had to fit the emergency and come on reasonable conditions, and these conditions were reasonable because they kept what the lender had bargained for and changed only the timing. The owner kept possession but had to pay the premises' rental value as ascertained in judicial proceedings, and the payment went to carrying the property and to interest.48 Blaisdell distinguished Bronson v. Kinzie on this very point. Apart from a requirement about the amount bid at the sale, the extension of redemption in Bronson was unconditional, and nothing secured the mortgagee the property's rental value in the meantime.49
The Court also placed the statute in a familiar tradition. The equity of redemption was an equitable principle that won out against the strong opposition of the common-law judges, and it endured even against an agreement the debtor made when giving the mortgage, under the maxim “once a mortgage, always a mortgage.” A court could not alter a statutory redemption period, but this law let courts extend it within limits and on equitable terms, a procedure and relief cognate to the historic equitable jurisdiction.50 If the clause is not an absolute and utterly unqualified restriction of the State's protective power, the Court concluded, this legislation was clearly so reasonable as to be within legislative competency.51
The fifth finding was that the law was temporary and limited to the exigency. The extension ran no later than May 1, 1935, a court could shorten it if circumstances changed, and the statute could not validly outlast the emergency or be so extended as virtually to destroy the contracts.52 Duration matters because a postponement for a stated period leaves the bargain intact once the period ends, while an open-ended postponement replaces the bargain with a different one.
The criteria had force, because decisions after Blaisdell struck down relief laws that were not so limited.53 W. B. Worthen Co. v. Thomas involved an Arkansas exemption of life insurance proceeds from creditors, relief not limited as to time, amount, circumstances, or need.54 The measure in Treigle v. Acme Homestead Assn. was neither an emergency response nor temporary.55 Minnesota's law ended by 1935 and paid the lender rental value, while a blanket exemption of major debtor assets resembles the emergency measures the Court held to violate the clause.56 In W. B. Worthen Co. v. Kavanaugh, another Arkansas law diluted the rights and remedies of mortgage bondholders, and the Court held it invalid. Justice Cardozo wrote that even when the public welfare is invoked as an excuse, the security of a mortgage cannot be cut down “without moderation or reason or in a spirit of oppression.”57
The Court later loosened two of the features. Later decisions, including Veix v. Sixth Ward Building & Loan Assn. and East New York Savings Bank v. Hahn, abandoned the limitations Blaisdell noted as absolute requirements. The existence of an emergency and the limited duration of a relief measure remain “factors to be assessed in determining the reasonableness of an impairment, but they cannot be regarded as essential in every case.”58 A lasting problem can justify regulation as readily as a brief one, and a sunset requirement would push States to describe permanent problems as temporary. What survives is the underlying concern: an emergency and a short duration still count in the State's favor, and their absence counts against it.
The features now sit inside the single inquiry Blaisdell itself stated: whether the legislation is addressed to a legitimate end and whether the measures taken are reasonable and appropriate to that end.59 The legitimate-end finding is the ancestor of the significant-public-purpose step in the modern test, and the findings on fit and reasonable conditions are the ancestors of the reasonable-and-appropriate-means step. A student who knows where those questions came from can see why a court asks them.