Concept
Alternative Constitutional Challenges
Privileges and Immunities Clauses
Alternative Constitutional Challenges
A plaintiff who loses an Article IV claim often has another constitutional claim against the same discrimination. The clause guarantees privileges and immunities to “the Citizens of each State,” and that choice of beneficiary leaves gaps.1 Corporations are not protected by the clause. It covers only fundamental interests, so lesser interests, such as those of a recreational nature, fall outside it. And it does not come into play when a state discriminates against people who were formerly citizens of another state but are now citizens of the discriminating state, such as newer residents.2 Purpose supplies a fourth limit. A provision adopted for a nonprotectionist aim, like the rule in McBurney that gave only in-staters access to certain government records under the state’s Freedom of Information Act, is not subject to scrutiny under the clause at all.3
A gap in Article IV does not make the discrimination lawful, because other provisions may reach it.4 Two of them matter here. The Equal Protection Clause protects every “person,” and the dormant Commerce Clause protects interstate commerce itself, so each asks a different question from Article IV and each reaches plaintiffs that Article IV does not. Both get fuller treatment elsewhere in the Constitutional Law course.5 This unit covers them only enough to keep you from confusing their role with the role of the Privileges and Immunities Clause.
Equal Protection
The Equal Protection Clause forbids a state to “deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws,” and “person” reaches plaintiffs that “citizen” leaves out.6 A corporation is not a citizen for purposes of Article IV, § 2, but it is a person within the meaning of § 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment, so out-of-state corporations and individuals can invoke the clause against discriminatory state laws.7 In Metropolitan Life Insurance Co. v. Ward, the Court applied the clause to invalidate an Alabama law that taxed out-of-state insurance companies at a higher rate than domestic companies.8 That outcome is the exception. In most cases where out-of-state corporations invoke the clause, only a low-level, rational basis standard of review applies.9
Individuals face the same low standard when Article IV does not apply. A natural person is protected by the Privileges and Immunities Clause only as to sufficiently fundamental interests. When the discrimination falls outside the clause, the person can still raise an equal protection challenge, but it will typically trigger only rational basis review and will not often succeed.10 Baldwin v. Fish & Game Commission of Montana shows the pattern: a discriminatory fee schedule for recreational elk hunting neither triggered the Privileges and Immunities Clause nor violated equal protection.11 The Court framed the Article IV question by observing that some distinctions between residents and nonresidents merely reflect that the Nation is composed of States, while others are prohibited because they hinder the formation, purpose, or development of a single Union. Only privileges and immunities bearing on the vitality of the Nation as a single entity must be shared equally, and the question was where recreational big-game hunting falls.12
There is a strong argument that discrimination against people from other states should receive heightened scrutiny, because the group targeted is not represented in the political process that produced the measure.13 The Court has not used strict or intermediate scrutiny in this setting. It has occasionally used an enhanced rational basis test for laws that discriminate against current or former out-of-staters, as in Metropolitan Life.14 Williams v. Vermont is the other example. Speculation about the state’s purposes clearly supplied a rational basis for the Vermont tax scheme, yet the Court, ostensibly applying the traditional test, struck the scheme down as “an arbitrary distinction that violates the Equal Protection Clause.” One explanation for the result is that the Court applied an enhanced form of rational basis review.15
Newcomers present the third Article IV gap, and for them equal protection can matter far more. Article IV does not reach a state that discriminates against people who were formerly citizens of another state but now belong to the discriminating state, so the claim must rest elsewhere.16 When the benefit denied to a newcomer is sufficiently vital and important, the discrimination draws strict scrutiny under equal protection, because it penalizes the exercise of the fundamental right to migrate or travel from one state to another.17 Shapiro v. Thompson invalidated a one-year durational residency requirement for welfare assistance. Attorney General of New York v. Soto-Lopez invalidated a civil service employment preference limited to resident veterans who had lived in the state when they entered military service.18 A benefit that is not vital can still be enough. Zobel v. Williams held that an Alaska statute paying annual dividends to residents according to how long they had lived in the state violated equal protection, and Williams v. Vermont held the same of a state auto registration tax that discriminated against newcomers.19
Not every residency rule draws that treatment, and the standard for durational residency requirements is less than clear. The Court has said that a waiting period for basic welfare benefits must be narrowly tailored to a compelling government interest. It has also indicated that waiting periods that do not deter migration might be upheld, either because the law does not impair the right to travel or because it survives some type of intermediate scrutiny.20 Laws that encourage people to stay, rather than deter them from entering, escape strict scrutiny. A state may refuse a government job to a person who does not reside in the state, a city or state may refuse a public school education to a child who is merely a temporary resident, and a state may punish a parent’s abandonment of a child more seriously when the parent leaves the state.21
Equal protection is not the only route for a newcomer who is a citizen of the burdening state. Under the Fourteenth Amendment’s Privileges or Immunities Clause, a state law that discriminates against some of its citizens because they have been domiciled in the state for less than a specified period is subject to strict scrutiny, regardless of how “incidental” the effect of the discrimination.22 That is the rule the discussion of Saenz covered, and a newcomer can plead it while keeping equal protection in reserve.
The contrast with Article IV is the point to carry into an exam. Once a claim clears Article IV’s threshold, the state must show a substantial reason for the discrimination: some demonstration that out-of-staters are a peculiar cause of the mischief and that treating them unequally is the only reasonable remedy.23 Under equal protection, a claimant who can point neither to a vital benefit nor to a penalty on newcomers will usually face only rational basis review and lose, as the Montana elk hunters did.24
Dormant Commerce Clause
The dormant Commerce Clause is the principle that state and local laws are unconstitutional if they place an undue burden on interstate commerce.26 No constitutional provision says so expressly. The Supreme Court inferred the principle from Article I, § 8, which grants Congress the power to regulate commerce among the states.27 The clause is “dormant” because the question it raises arises when Congress has not acted. Congress always has authority to preempt state or local regulation of commerce, so the issue is whether the judiciary, without congressional action, should invalidate state and local laws for burdening interstate commerce.28
The dormant Commerce Clause protects plaintiffs that Article IV does not. Corporations and aliens can sue under it but not under the Privileges and Immunities Clause, because that clause is expressly limited to “citizens” and the dormant Commerce Clause has no such limit.29 Corporate plaintiffs have used it against laws that favor local business, in cases such as Dean Milk Co. v. City of Madison and Lewis v. BT Investment Managers, Inc. Out-of-state individuals and noncorporate entities can use it as well, in addition to any Article IV argument.30 The two clauses also reinforce each other. Like the dormant Commerce Clause, Article IV restrains state efforts to bar out-of-staters from local resources, a “mutually reinforcing relationship” that stems in part from their shared vision of federalism.31
The overlap should not hide four differences that decide which clause a plaintiff can use and what the state may say in reply.
- Article IV protects only “citizens,” while the dormant Commerce Clause has no citizenship limit, so corporations and aliens may sue under the latter.32
- Article IV applies only to discrimination against out-of-staters and safeguards only fundamental rights. The dormant Commerce Clause reaches laws that burden interstate commerce whether or not they discriminate against out-of-staters, though discriminatory laws are much more likely to be invalidated.33
- Congress may approve a state law that would otherwise violate the dormant Commerce Clause, but congressional approval does not excuse a violation of Article IV.34
- A state acting as a market participant escapes dormant Commerce Clause review, but the market participant exception does not apply to Article IV.35
The third and fourth differences matter most when a state defends itself. If Congress approves a state law, the law does not violate the dormant Commerce Clause, because Congress’s commerce power is no longer dormant.36 Article IV is arguably a rights provision that Congress may not waive, and another source states outright that Congress could not waive the Article IV guarantee.37 The market participant exception lets a state favor its own citizens in receiving benefits from government programs and in dealing with government-owned businesses.38 That doctrine interprets the Commerce Clause, not Article IV. A state acting as a market participant therefore escapes dormant Commerce Clause review, but it must still show a substantial reason for discriminating against out-of-staters in a protected privilege, such as employment by the state or “earning a livelihood.”39
Two decisions a year apart show the split. In White v. Massachusetts Council of Construction Employers, Inc., a city law requiring that 50 percent of those hired for city construction projects be city residents survived a dormant Commerce Clause challenge because of the market participant exception.40 The next year, in United Building & Construction Trades Council v. Mayor & Council of Camden, an ordinance requiring that at least 40 percent of the employees of contractors and subcontractors on city construction projects be city residents met an Article IV challenge. The Court rejected the claim of market participant exemption and remanded the case.41
On an exam, an out-of-state corporation belongs under the dormant Commerce Clause, with equal protection as a second route, because Article IV is closed to it.42 A natural person may use all three routes, so the answer should say what defense each one lets the state raise. Market participation and congressional approval defeat only the Commerce Clause claim, while under Article IV the state must show a substantial reason.43