Concept
Article IV Versus the Fourteenth Amendment
Privileges and Immunities Clauses
Article IV Versus the Fourteenth Amendment
Two clauses promise “privileges and immunities,” and students routinely cite the wrong one. Article IV, § 2 provides that “[t]he Citizens of each State shall be entitled to all Privileges and Immunities of Citizens in the several States.”1 The Fourteenth Amendment provides that “[n]o State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States.”2 The clauses divide by plaintiff. Nonresidents whom a state is merely hosting invoke Article IV, and recently arrived residents invoke the Fourteenth Amendment against their new home state.3 The plaintiff’s domicile therefore decides which clause applies, against whom the plaintiff is compared, and what the state must show.
Article IV protects the visitor: a citizen of one state who is temporarily present in another has the right to be treated as a welcome visitor rather than an unfriendly alien.4 The visitor is an outsider, so the comparison runs between the host state’s treatment of citizens of other states and its treatment of its own citizens. The protected interests include earning a livelihood. In Supreme Court of New Hampshire v. Piper, for example, the Court struck down a state supreme court rule that limited bar admission to state residents.5 The protection is not absolute, however. The clause bars discrimination against citizens of other states only “where there is no substantial reason for the discrimination beyond the mere fact that they are citizens of other States,” so the host state defends by offering such a reason.6
The newcomer claims from a different status. The Fourteenth Amendment’s first sentence makes every person born or naturalized in the United States and subject to its jurisdiction a citizen “of the United States and of the State wherein they reside.”7 A person who has moved to a state and settled there thus holds citizenship in “two political capacities, one state and one federal,” and that dual status adds force to her claim to the same rights as the state’s other citizens.8 Her interest is the third component of the right to travel: the right of the newly arrived citizen to the same privileges and immunities that the state’s other citizens enjoy, protected by her status as a citizen of the United States as well as of the state.9 The comparison here runs between newcomers and citizens who have lived in the state longer.10 In Saenz v. Roe, the plaintiffs were California citizens, albeit relatively new ones. They could not invoke Article IV, which protects the interests of citizens of other states, so they invoked the Fourteenth Amendment.11
The two clauses demand different showings from the state because the plaintiffs stand in different positions. Against an outsider, the state may defend with a substantial reason beyond the plaintiff’s citizenship in another state. Against a newcomer, the usual justifications for treating residents and nonresidents differently have nothing to say, because they are simply inapplicable to a person’s decision to move into the state and become a resident.12 Review of a rule that disadvantages citizens because they have lived in the state for less than a year is accordingly strict. Neither mere rationality nor an intermediate standard will do, and the appropriate standard may be more categorical than the one in Shapiro v. Thompson but is surely no less strict.13 California’s defense in Saenz shows the standard at work. The state sought to save about $11 million a year in welfare costs, a legitimate goal, but a minuscule across-the-board reduction in monthly benefits would have achieved it without discriminating, so the interest in saving money gave no justification for discriminating among equally eligible citizens.14
The clauses also reach different rights, and only Article IV depends on discrimination against outsiders. It appears settled, as one opinion put it, that Article IV neither limits federal power nor prevents a state from distinguishing among its own citizens; it “prevents a State from discriminating against citizens of other States in favor of its own.”15 The Louisiana butcher monopoly in the Slaughter-House Cases shows the consequence. The right to pursue one’s trade is a privilege of state citizenship protected by Article IV, but the clause was not triggered because the monopoly burdened every independent butcher regardless of state citizenship. The Fourteenth Amendment gave the butchers no relief either, because the interest in pursuing a trade is not a privilege of national citizenship.16 The Slaughter-House Court held that the privileges the Fourteenth Amendment protects absolutely form a completely different list from those Article IV protects, and it refused to read the Amendment as adding protection for the privileges of state citizenship by eliminating Article IV’s discrimination requirement.17
The exam question, then, is where the plaintiff lives and against whom the plaintiff measures the burden. A fact pattern about someone who is visiting the state, commuting into it, or doing business there from a home elsewhere points to Article IV. A fact pattern about someone who has relocated to the state and plans to stay points to the Fourteenth Amendment. Either mistake costs the answer its foundation. A visitor who invokes the Fourteenth Amendment has not become a citizen of the burdening state, so no group of longer-term citizens exists for the visitor to compare with. A newcomer who invokes Article IV is already one of the state’s own citizens, so the clause supplies no outsider comparison.
Domicile does the sorting, so the earlier discussion of citizenship and domicile carries over to the close cases. The Court’s description of the right fits the line: a traveler who is temporarily present in another state is a visitor, and a traveler who elects to become a permanent resident has the right to be treated like the state’s other citizens.18 Saenz left one question open. The Court had no occasion to consider what weight a citizen’s length of residence might carry if the bona fides of her claim to state citizenship were questioned, so a fact pattern that doubts the newcomer’s commitment to stay deserves a note on that gap.19 The Court found no such doubt in Saenz. The plaintiffs would consume their benefits while they remained in California, so recognizing their claim posed no danger that citizens of other states would establish residency just long enough to acquire a portable benefit, such as a divorce or a college education, and then return to their original domicile.20
Some plaintiffs fit neither clause. A corporation is not a citizen under either provision, an alien is not a citizen of the United States, and a law that burdens residents and nonresidents alike draws no line for Article IV to correct. Those claimants turn to equal protection and the dormant Commerce Clause, which the next sections develop.