Concept
Discrimination Against Out-of-Staters
Privileges and Immunities Clauses
Discrimination Against Out-of-Staters
Article IV, § 2 promises that “[t]he Citizens of each State shall be entitled to all Privileges and Immunities of Citizens in the several States.”1 The promise is a comparison. A state must give citizens of other states what it gives its own, so the clause protects them only against laws that discriminate in favor of the state’s own citizens.2 That showing comes on top of the earlier elements: an interest sufficiently “fundamental” to fall within the clause3 and a significant burden on it.4 Even a fundamental interest does not make every distinction between residents and nonresidents suspect. Some distinctions merely reflect that the Nation is composed of individual States, and only privileges bearing on the vitality of the Nation as a single entity must be shared equally.5
Three questions organize the rest of this element. Does the law favor the state’s own citizens over citizens of other states, or does it fall on everyone alike? Does a line drawn in terms of residence or city boundaries still operate against outsiders? And did the state draw the line to shield local people from out-of-state competition? A claim that fails the first or third question ends before the state must justify anything. A claim that passes all three still leaves the state free to show a “substantial reason” for the difference.6
No Protection Against Home States
Because the clause compares a state’s treatment of outsiders with its treatment of insiders, it gives a state’s own citizens no shelter from their own government. A rival reading would have changed that. If the clause protected the “fundamental” privileges and immunities themselves, a state could not deny them to anyone, whether or not it discriminated against out-of-staters, and any denial would be invalid either as a matter of natural law or as a violation of Article IV.7 Under that reading, a state’s own citizens could invoke Article IV against it.
The Court read the clause as a comparison instead. In the Slaughter-House Cases, it said the clause’s “sole purpose was to declare to the several States, that whatever those rights, as you grant or establish them to your own citizens, or as you limit or qualify, or impose restrictions on their exercise, the same, neither more nor less, shall be the measure of the rights of citizens of other States within your jurisdiction.”8 The state’s treatment of its own citizens sets the measure. An outsider receives what those citizens receive and bears what they bear, no more and no less.
Two considerations support confining the clause this way. A construction that policed every state restriction on fundamental rights would “constitute this court a perpetual censor” of how states treat their own citizens.9 And inequality, not burden as such, is the harm the clause answers: when a state burdens its own citizens, they can seek redress through the state’s political process, while citizens of other states cannot vote there.10
A facially neutral law that burdens residents and nonresidents alike therefore falls outside the clause, however heavy the burden. The Slaughter-House Cases themselves show the point. The right to pursue one’s trade is a privilege of state citizenship protected under Article IV, § 2, yet the clause was not triggered when Louisiana enacted a butchering monopoly, because the monopoly law affected all independent butchers regardless of their state of citizenship.11 The burden on butchers was severe, but it created no disparity between insiders and outsiders to correct. Had the law left Louisiana butchers in business and excluded only butchers from other states, it would have drawn exactly the line the clause forbids.
One question at the margin remains open: whether a law that is neutral on its face but falls harder on outsiders in practice can trigger the clause. In Hillside Dairy Inc. v. Lyons, the Court said that the absence of an express statement identifying out-of-state citizenship as a basis for disparate treatment does not by itself defeat a claim. It left open whether the clause reaches only “classifications that are but proxies for differential treatment of out-of-state residents” or also “classifications with the practical effect of discriminating against such residents.”12 At least one court has held that an as-applied challenge may be made to a facially neutral state law.13 An exam answer should present the point as unsettled.
The same logic governs a complaint by a newcomer. A person who has settled in a state with the intent to remain is a citizen of that state,15 so a complaint about the state’s treatment of new arrivals is a citizen’s complaint against the home state, and Article IV has no out-of-state benchmark to apply. In Saenz v. Roe, the plaintiffs were California citizens, albeit relatively new ones, so they could not invoke Article IV, § 2, which protects citizens of other states. They could invoke the Fourteenth Amendment, whose Privileges or Immunities Clause protects all persons, including citizens of the state in question, and the Court concluded that California’s scheme implicated “the right of a newly arrived citizen to the same privileges and immunities enjoyed by other citizens of the same State.”16 Laws that discriminate against new residents may thus be challenged under the Fourteenth Amendment, through either the Equal Protection Clause or the Privileges or Immunities Clause.17
Other opinions say the same about laws that sort a state’s own citizens. An opinion in Shapiro v. Thompson described it as settled that the clause “neither limits federal power nor prevents a State from distinguishing among its own citizens, but simply ‘prevents a State from discriminating against citizens of other States in favor of its own.’”18 A dividend scheme that ranks residents by how long they have lived in the state, like the one in Zobel v. Williams, draws a line among a state’s own citizens and is tested under the Fourteenth Amendment instead.19
Residency and Municipal Classifications
Legislatures seldom write in the vocabulary of state citizenship. They write “residents,” “bona fide residents,” or “persons living in the city,” and a challenger meets the argument that a law drawn in the vocabulary of residence falls outside a clause that speaks of “Citizens of each State.”21 The Court has refused to let the label decide.
The refusal rests on how the two lines sort people. A person is a citizen of a state if he or she is a United States citizen and a bona fide resident of that state, which means a domiciliary who has taken up residence there with the intent to remain indefinitely.22 A law that limits a privilege to the state’s bona fide residents therefore tracks state citizenship almost exactly, and a rule that turned on the label would let a legislature escape the clause by changing one word and leaving the excluded group where it was. In Toomer v. Witsell, the Court dismissed that argument, saying that the contention that a statute “couched in terms of residence” is outside a clause that speaks of citizens would be “without force.”23 An older case, LaTourette v. McMaster, upheld a requirement that licensed insurance brokers reside in the state partly because the statute drew its line at residence rather than citizenship. That ground is unpersuasive and no longer should be followed.24
The residence shorthand identifies discrimination; it does not prove the claimant’s standing. The claimant must still be a United States citizen domiciled in a state other than the one whose law is under attack, because a litigant who cannot show citizenship of another state would be asserting the constitutional rights of others.26
The same reasoning carries the clause below the state level. In United Building and Construction Trades Council v. Mayor and Council of Camden, a city ordinance required that at least 40 percent of the employees of contractors and subcontractors on city construction projects be Camden residents. The Court found potential merit in the challenge, rejected a claim of market-participant exemption, and remanded.27 Its reason was that “what would be unconstitutional if done directly by the State can no more readily be accomplished by a city deriving its authority from the State,” so even an ordinance adopted by Camden alone had to comport with the clause.28
A person who lives outside a state lives outside every city within it, so a city residence rule excludes the out-of-stater as surely as a state residence rule would. It also excludes some of the state’s own citizens, and that overlap might seem to take the ordinance outside a clause about outsiders. It does not, for two reasons. If every city could adopt a residents-first rule, each would exclude all out-of-staters and only a fraction of the state’s citizens, and the cities together would exclude all out-of-staters and no in-staters; reviewing municipal rules closes that route to evasion.29 And in-staters burdened by a city rule can obtain redress by securing a state law that prohibits local favoritism, while citizens of other states cannot vote in the state where the discrimination occurred.30
Applying the clause does not invalidate the ordinance. The conclusion that Camden’s ordinance discriminates against a protected privilege “does not, of course, end the inquiry,” because discrimination against citizens of other states survives where there is a “substantial reason” for the difference, and Camden contended that its ordinance was necessary to counteract grave economic and social ills.32 The Court remanded, leaving that justification to the next section’s test.33 Article IV also reaches only one kind of local preference. A municipal contracting preference that sorts bidders by a characteristic other than state lines, such as a set-aside for minority- or women-owned businesses, is tested under equal protection.34
Protectionist Purpose
A law that leaves outsiders worse off does not violate Article IV, § 2 by that fact alone. The clause was designed to prohibit state laws that seek to shield in-staters from out-of-state competition, so it does not ban every law that may impose greater burdens on out-of-staters, only those enacted for protectionist reasons.36 The earlier elements ask who is burdened and how heavily; this one asks why the legislature drew the line.
For most of the clause’s history the requirement stayed implicit, because every Supreme Court decision enforcing the clause involved a state or local law that clearly met it.37 The Court stated it outright in McBurney v. Young. The discrimination must significantly burden a fundamental interest, and the state must have enacted the law “for the protectionist purpose” of “intentionally giving its own citizens a competitive advantage in business or employment.”38 If both triggering requirements are met, the discrimination is upheld only if the state shows a “substantial reason” for treating out-of-staters differently.39
McBurney shows the requirement at work. The Virginia provision at issue gave only citizens of the Commonwealth access to certain government records under the state’s Freedom of Information Act. The Court found a “distinctly nonprotectionist aim”: the provision supplied a “mechanism by which those who ultimately hold sovereign power (i.e., the citizens of the Commonwealth) may obtain an accounting from the public officials to whom they delegate the exercise of that power.” With no suggestion of a protectionist purpose, the provision was not subject to scrutiny under the clause at all.40
That aim counts as nonprotectionist because the line it draws runs between the governing citizens and everyone else, not between competing sellers in a market. A records-access right of that kind is an instrument the citizens use to supervise officials who act on power they delegated, and no rival gains a market advantage from it. A license fee that prices outsiders out of an occupation works the other way, handing locals an edge over competitors, which is why earlier decisions never needed to discuss purpose.41
The requirement can defeat a claim even when the burdened interest is plainly protected. In Schoenfeld v. Schneiderman, the Second Circuit held that a New York statute governing nonresident lawyers did not violate the clause because it lacked a protectionist purpose; its aim was to ensure that nonresident lawyers maintained sufficient physical presence in the state for service of process.42 The rule burdened nonresidents and touched the practice of law, a professional pursuit of the kind the clause protects,43 yet the claim failed at this element because the rule’s function had nothing to do with sheltering local lawyers from competitors. A state’s admission requirements must still meet the rational-basis requirement of the Due Process Clause.44
Legislatures often act for more than one reason, and the requirement accommodates that. The question is whether the provision was adopted at least in part to shield locals from the competition that out-of-staters pose.45
Failing this element ends the claim before the state must justify anything, so the question is best asked early and answered from the law’s function.