Concept
Penn Central Balancing
Takings
Penn Central Balancing
A use restriction that is neither a permanent physical occupation nor a total wipeout of value goes to the multifactor test of Penn Central Transportation Co. v. New York City.1 Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc. classified permanent physical invasions and total takings as per se regulatory takings, where the challenging owner needs much less proof.2 Those categories merely identify circumstances almost certain to be takings, so a claim that misses both may still succeed under Penn Central.3 Outside the two categories, courts have found no single theory of when a regulation goes too far.4 Government rarely loses once the reasonable-expectations test applies, which is why owners’ lawyers work to fit their claims into the categories.5
The facts of Penn Central show the test at work. New York’s Landmarks Preservation Law required owners of designated landmarks to obtain Commission approval before altering exterior architectural features and imposed an affirmative duty on them as well.6 After Grand Central Terminal was designated a landmark, its owner argued that the airspace above the Terminal was a valuable property interest, that the law had deprived it of any gainful use of those “air rights,” and that the city owed just compensation measured by the market value of the rights.7 The question was whether the restrictions on the owner’s exploitation of the Terminal site effected a “taking” for public use under the Fifth Amendment, which reaches the States through the Fourteenth.8 The Court held that no taking had occurred. Designation let the owner keep using the property exactly as it had for 65 years, as a railroad terminal with offices and concessions, and the law allowed the owner a reasonable return on its investment.9
The Court has never reduced the question of how far is too far to a formula, and two pressures explain why. Government hardly could go on if values incident to property could not be diminished without paying for every change in the general law, so government may adopt laws and programs that adversely affect recognized economic value.10 Against that, the Fifth Amendment bars government from forcing some people alone to bear public burdens that fairness says the public as a whole should bear.11 Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon offered little insight into when a regulation goes “too far,” and in the decades since, the Court has avoided any “set formula” in favor of essentially ad hoc, factual inquiries.12 The Penn Central factors give those inquiries their structure.
Two coal cases mark the poles of the test. In Mahon the claimant had sold the surface rights to particular parcels while expressly reserving the right to remove the coal beneath them, and a later statute forbade mining that caused houses to subside.13 Because the statute made mining the reserved coal commercially impracticable, it had very nearly the same effect for constitutional purposes as appropriating or destroying the coal, and the Court found the extent of the taking great.14 The Landmarks Law took nothing comparable. It left the Terminal in its existing use with a reasonable return, and the owner lost the right to occupy the airspace above.15 A severe, concentrated loss of a distinct interest the owner had reserved therefore points toward a taking, while a restriction that preserves the existing use and a reasonable return points away from one.
The Court’s decisions identify three factors of particular significance, and a court weighs them together on the facts of each case.16 The inquiry is not standardless.17
- The court asks how heavily the regulation falls on the claimant in economic terms.
- The court asks how far the regulation interferes with distinct investment-backed expectations, meaning what the owner could reasonably count on when acquiring or investing in the property.
- The court asks about the character of the governmental action, since a taking may more readily be found when the interference resembles a physical invasion than when it comes from a public program adjusting the benefits and burdens of economic life to promote the common good.
No factor decides a case alone. The claimants in Penn Central conceded that diminution in value standing alone cannot establish a taking, and the Court refused to treat the loss of one property interest, the airspace, as enough without regard to the rest of the parcel.18 The test also draws criticism as ad hoc.19 Permanent physical occupations make up only a small fraction of takings claims, so an abundance of ambiguity and uncertainty about takings law remained even after the rule for them.20
What turns on the label is compensation. Just compensation is normally measured by the market value of the property at the time of the taking,21 and in an ordinary condemnation action the government pays the award plus interest accrued from the time of the taking, generally without covering the owner’s attorneys’ fees.22 Whether a condemnation serves a public use is a separate question. One formulation of that limit permits condemnation involving private entities only where they are public utilities operating instrumentalities of commerce, where the property stays under governmental control, or where the public concern is accomplished by the condemnation itself.23 Each balancing factor gets its own subsection below, beginning with the character of the government’s action, and the last subsection takes up what counts as the parcel against which the loss is measured.
Character of Government Action
Penn Central listed the character of the governmental action as one of three factors of particular significance.25 The Court described the factor as a scale. A taking “may more readily be found” when the interference is a physical invasion by government than when it “arises from some public program adjusting the benefits and burdens of economic life to promote the common good.”26 A claim grows stronger as the government’s action moves toward the physical end and weaker as it moves toward the program end.
Each end has its own logic. When the government occupies or uses an owner’s property, it acquires the very use the owner lost, much as in a condemnation without the lawsuit. A program that adjusts benefits and burdens works differently, because it reallocates advantages among many owners at once, and no single owner is plainly the one who paid for the common good. Penn Central’s model of the first kind was United States v. Causby. Direct overflights that destroyed the land’s use as a chicken farm were a taking because the Government had not merely destroyed property but was “using a part of it for the flight of its planes.”27 Government acquisitions of resources to permit or facilitate uniquely public functions have often been held to be takings for the same reason.28
The physical label is not automatic. A permanent and absolutely exclusive occupation differs from temporary limitations on the right to exclude, which face a more complex balancing process because they do not absolutely dispossess the owner.29 Isolated invasions not made under a granted right of access are torts, not appropriations. Government-authorized invasions consistent with longstanding background restrictions, such as common-law privileges to enter in cases of necessity, are not takings. The government may also require owners to cede access as a condition of certain benefits.30 The invaded space must also belong to the owner. In a casebook problem, a law forbids a beachfront owner to deny the public the “wet sand” area in front of her house, but that strip is not part of her property.31 And a person who occupies space by arrangement with the possessor, such as a law student with limited use of his arms and legs who shares a dormitory room with a full-time attendant,32 is not a stranger entering under a government grant.
Grand Central Terminal sits at the program end. The law barred the owner and everyone else from occupying part of the airspace above the Terminal while letting the owner use the rest of the parcel gainfully. The Court called that no more an appropriation of property for the government’s own uses than a zoning law barring two or more adult theaters within an area for aesthetic reasons, or a safety rule forbidding excavation below a certain level.33 The restriction therefore fell where balancing, and not compensation by default, governs.
The factor also asks who bears the restriction. Holmes explained in Mahon why a rule that binds owners on both sides of every property line stands on firmer ground. A coal-pillar requirement of that kind secured “an average reciprocity of advantage that has been recognized as a justification of various laws.”34 Reciprocity of advantage means that each owner under a rule gives something up and gets something back. The owner in a district with a height limit cannot build as tall as desired but enjoys the light and air preserved by the same limit on every neighbor. Because the benefits partly offset the burden, no owner can say the community loaded the cost of its policy onto that owner alone. A restriction aimed at one parcel carries no such offset. A dissent in Lucas collected the decisions that follow this logic: a loss in value caused by zoning is far less likely to be a taking when it is part of a general and comprehensive land-use plan, and “spot zoning” is far more likely to be one.35
The same dissent used breadth to explain why the Court sustained the later Pennsylvania statute in Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis. The Kohler Act in Mahon simply transferred back to surface owners rights they had earlier sold to the coal companies, while the Subsidence Act affected all surface owners, the coal companies included, equally.36 Holmes found that the Kohler Act did not disclose a public interest sufficient to warrant so extensive a destruction of the coal company’s rights.37
Generality shifts the balance without settling it, and Penn Central shows why counting properties will not do. The dissent there stressed that the owner suffered a multimillion dollar loss that was uniquely felt and not offset by benefits flowing from preserving some 400 other landmarks, and that the city had imposed a substantial cost on less than one-tenth of one percent of its buildings for the benefit of all its people.38 The Court nonetheless upheld the restrictions.39 A court therefore treats generality as one indicator and still weighs economic impact and expectations.
A government that misuses its regulatory power presents a character that points toward a taking even though no one has entered the land. A taking occurs when the government, intending to condemn land, denies its owner public services to depress its value, when it rezones land to “parkland uses” to reduce its price in anticipation of condemning it, or when it conditions a construction permit on the owner’s paying for contractors to improve government land several miles away. Bad faith is frowned upon.40 The line between curbing a harm and procuring a benefit appears elsewhere in takings law. A dissent in Kelo tried to separate the earlier public-use cases on the ground that the owners’ prior uses in Berman and Midkiff inflicted affirmative harm on society.41
Economic Impact
The first factor asks how heavily a regulation falls on the claimant in economic terms, and the Court pairs it with the extent of interference with distinct investment-backed expectations.43 The two measure one burden from two sides: impact counts what the owner lost, and expectations ask what the owner could fairly have counted on keeping. The economic impact of the regulation, especially the degree of interference with investment-backed expectations, is of particular significance.44 This subsection isolates the size of the loss. A large loss carries a good deal of weight and never decides the case alone.
A loss in value, however large, does not establish a taking when it stands alone. The claimants in Penn Central conceded that decisions sustaining land-use regulations uniformly reject the proposition that diminution in value alone can establish a taking, and the Court pointed to a zoning law that cost an owner 75 percent of its land’s value in Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co. and to a brickyard ban that cost 87 1/2 percent in Hadacheck v. Sebastian.45 The Hadacheck owner had dug excavations that left the land useful for nothing but a brickyard, yet the Court upheld the ordinance because the legislature had reasonably concluded that the brickyard was inconsistent with neighboring uses.46 Another account puts that loss at 92.5 percent.47 A percentage cannot decide the matter, because almost any change in the general law lowers some owner’s values, and paying for each such loss would leave government unable to go on.48 An exam stem that recites a steep percentage and asks whether a taking occurred is testing whether you stop at the number.
The size of the loss still matters, because it shows how far a public program’s burden has landed on one owner. Mahon shows the heavy end of the scale. The reserved coal was valuable because it could be mined at a profit, and making it commercially impracticable to mine had very nearly the same effect for constitutional purposes as appropriating or destroying it.49 Penn Central read Mahon as the leading case for the proposition that a statute may so frustrate distinct investment-backed expectations as to amount to a taking, which is why impact and expectations are weighed together.50
Owners who fall just short of a complete wipeout show how far the factor can carry a claim. One account describes the impact the factor requires as “functionally equivalent to a classic taking,” leaving the owner with a value only slightly above its de minimis value, and a regulation that deprives the owner of all economically beneficial uses (with two exceptions) is a categorical taking without further consideration.51 The categorical line is sharp because statutes that use eminent domain to impose servitudes on scenic lands, or to acquire them outright, suggest the practical equivalence of negative regulation and appropriation in that setting.52 In Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council the Court acknowledged that an owner who loses 95 percent of a property’s value might not claim the benefit of the categorical rule, yet the economic impact and the interference with expectations remain keenly relevant to takings analysis generally.53 Some owners with a 95 percent loss will recover nothing while an owner with a total loss recovers in full. The Court called that result no stranger than the gap between the owner whose land is taken for a highway and the owner whose land a highway reduces to 5 percent of its value.54 Anything less than a complete elimination of value calls for Penn Central analysis.55
Palazzolo v. Rhode Island shows the same line. State wetlands law allowed the owner to build one home, which left his parcel worth $200,000, or, as he put it, “a few crumbs of value.” Those crumbs were enough to defeat the categorical claim, because the right to build a substantial residence on an 18-acre parcel does not leave the property economically idle.56 The economic-impact argument gains real force only as the loss approaches total, and an owner with a large but partial loss should expect the case to turn on the other factors.57
What counts as the loss is the net burden after the owner’s remaining rights are considered. The landmark law left Grand Central Terminal in the use it had served for 65 years and allowed a reasonable return, so the owner lost an opportunity to build above the Terminal and kept the existing use.58 No owner is guaranteed the most beneficial use of the property. A height restriction, for example, has been viewed as permissible even though it prohibits the most beneficial use.59 The Court also measured the impact against the parcel as a whole, the subject of the last subsection below.60
Investment-Backed Expectations
Penn Central paired the economic impact of a regulation with “the extent to which the regulation has interfered with distinct investment-backed expectations.”62 The preceding subsection measured what the owner lost. This factor asks what the owner could fairly have counted on keeping when committing money to the land. Penn Central answered that question for Grand Central Terminal. The landmark designation left the owner free to use the property as it had been used for 65 years, so the law did not interfere with the owner’s primary expectation about the parcel, and it allowed a reasonable return on the investment.63
Each word in the phrase does work. The investment is money spent on the land, and an owner who improves property in justifiable reliance on the regulations then in force, without notice of new ones in the offing and outside a highly regulated industry, should have the opportunity to recoup the fair market value of the improvements.64 The expectation must be distinct. The coal company in Mahon held a separate estate, the support estate, which Pennsylvania law recognizes alongside the surface and mineral estates, and Holmes saw the statute as purporting to abolish that estate entirely.65 The expectation must also be reasonable, and reasonableness is objective. Justice Kennedy, concurring in Lucas, wrote that the expectations the Constitution protects rest on objective rules and customs that all parties can understand as reasonable.66 An owner who knew of the problem that produced the regulation, could have foreseen it, or worked in a heavily regulated field, such as surface mining or the filling of wetlands that already required permits, gets little credit for expecting to be left alone.67
The objective standard answers a tension from both sides. Kennedy put it this way: “Property is bought and sold, investments are made, subject to the State’s power to regulate.” Where regulations deprive property of all value, the test is whether the deprivation is contrary to reasonable, investment-backed expectations.68 A purely subjective expectation would give every owner a veto over new regulation, while a rule that every enacted restriction fixes expectations would let legislatures erase the protection by enacting restrictions first. Kennedy conceded that the definition has some circularity but denied that it is “circular in its entirety.”69 In his view, reasonable expectations must be understood in light of the whole legal tradition, and the common law of nuisance is too narrow a confine for regulatory power.70 The Lucas majority took a different path, which the later section on total takings develops. It too treated expectation as the reason an owner cannot resist every new rule, since an owner necessarily expects the uses of land to be restricted from time to time by newly enacted measures in legitimate exercise of the police power.71
Kennedy also applied the factor in the owner’s favor. The Lucas property had been zoned for individual lot development, and the State did not act until most other parcels had been improved, which threw the whole burden of the regulation on the remaining lots.72 The means as well as the ends of regulation, he wrote, must accord with the owner’s reasonable expectations, and that burden must be measured in the balance. A general purpose such as promoting tourism should not suffice to deprive specific property of all value without compensation.73
Notice of a restriction pushes the other way. In Nollan v. California Coastal Commission the Commission required a deed restriction ensuring public access to the ocean as a condition of a new development permit. The dissent argued that the owners could have no reasonable expectation of approval without that restriction and that, under Monsanto, the force of the expectations factor was so overwhelming that it disposed of the takings question.74 It would have upheld the condition as a valid exercise of the Commission’s authority to regulate land use in the coastal zone and rejected the majority’s “essential nexus” test as unsupported by precedent.75 The logic is that an owner who buys knowing the terms of approval has no surprise left for the factor to protect. The Nollan majority refused to let notice settle the matter. As the Court later recounted, the majority reasoned that “[s]o long as the Commission could not have deprived the prior owners of the easement without compensating them,” the prior owners “must be understood to have transferred their full property rights in conveying the lot.”76
Palazzolo took up the notice question directly. The Rhode Island Supreme Court had held, on background principles of state property law and on the owner’s reasonable investment-backed expectations, that a successive title holder is deemed to have notice of an earlier-enacted restriction and is barred from claiming that it effects a taking.77 The Supreme Court reversed.78 A blanket rule that purchasers with notice have no compensation right is “too blunt an instrument to accord with the duty to compensate for what is taken.” It would strip an heir or successor of a claim the first owner could not ripen in time and so alter the nature of property by taking away the power to transfer it, and it would hand the State a windfall. It would also be capricious in effect, favoring the owner with the resources to hold over the owner who must sell.79 A pre-existing regulation is not necessarily inherent in the title a purchaser or heir takes and cannot serve as a per se device to deny compensation.80 The Court added that a regulation that would otherwise be unconstitutional is not transformed into a background principle of state law merely because title passed.81
Two concurrences mark the poles on how much the date of acquisition should weigh. Justice O’Connor wrote that the state of regulatory affairs at acquisition is not the only factor that shapes expectations. The nature and extent of permitted development under the regime, compared with what the claimant seeks, may also shape legitimate expectations without vesting any development right. She added that the Court has never held a claim defeated merely because a postenactment acquirer, such as a donee, heir, or devisee, made no personal financial investment, and that courts must attend to the circumstances probative of what fairness requires.82 Justice Scalia would give the timing no weight apart from restrictions that form part of the background principles of state property and nuisance law. The expectations the law takes into account, he wrote, do not include the assumed validity of a restriction that deprives property of so much value as to be unconstitutional, so a Penn Central taking, no less than a total taking, is not absolved by the transfer of title.83 An essay stem that says only that the owner bought after the ordinance was adopted is asking which way the date cuts, and the answer depends on what else the owner did.
The two owners differ in when each committed to the land relative to the rule, and that one fact changes the weight of the factor without deciding either case. For Justice O’Connor the regulatory backdrop at acquisition is one factor among others. For Justice Scalia it is irrelevant outside the background principles of state law.84
The third step does the most work in practice, and the second is where owners in regulated industries usually lose ground. The factor never operates alone, so a strong showing of reliance still has to be weighed against the other two factors.
Parcel as a Whole
In Penn Central the railroad argued that the airspace above Grand Central Terminal was a valuable property interest of its own, so that denying any use of it took everything, whatever the rest of the parcel was worth.86 The Court answered that takings jurisprudence does not divide a single parcel into discrete segments to ask whether rights in one segment have been entirely abrogated. It looks to the character of the action and to the nature and extent of the interference with rights in the parcel as a whole, which there meant the city tax block designated as the landmark site.87
The rule matters because the categorical rule of Lucas applies only when a regulation leaves the owner no economically beneficial use, and that phrase hides a fraction. The numerator is the value lost, and the denominator is the property interest against which the loss is measured. The denominator decides whether the claim is categorical, in which case the owner recovers unless the state proves the regulation does no more than background principles of property and nuisance law would,88 or partial, in which case the owner must win the Penn Central balance, which owners seldom do.89 The categorical rule is reserved for the extraordinary circumstance in which no productive or economically beneficial use of land is permitted, and a 95 percent loss, not 100, requires Penn Central analysis.90
The Court insists on measuring against the whole because almost any restriction can be made to look total. One often-quoted formulation, from Professor Michelman, observes that any land-use regulation can be characterized as the “total” deprivation of an aptly defined entitlement or, alternatively, as a mere “partial” withdrawal from the full landholding it affects.91 An owner who could pick the denominator would name the very slice the regulation restricts, because that slice has by definition lost everything the regulation forbids. Tahoe-Sierra Preservation Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency called defining the property interest in terms of the challenged regulation circular, because every delay would become a total ban and both moratoria and the ordinary permit process would be categorical takings.92
The choice of denominator has produced opposite results on nearly identical statutes. Holmes in Mahon saw the Kohler Act as purporting to abolish the support estate entirely.93 Justice Brandeis, dissenting, argued that the comparison should be with the value of the whole property, because an owner’s rights against the public are not increased by dividing the interests in the land into surface and subsoil, and the sum of the rights in the parts cannot be greater than the rights in the whole.94 In Keystone the Court took the broader measure. The support estate was a separate property right under state law but had no value apart from the surface or mineral estate, so the Court refused to focus on it alone.95 The 27 million tons of coal that had to stay in place were not a separate segment of property, and there was no basis for treating less than 2 percent of the owners’ coal as a separate parcel.96
The rule can fail in either direction, and the Court has criticized both. A denominator drawn too narrowly, like the air rights in Penn Central, lets the owner manufacture a total loss. A denominator drawn too broadly is no better. A Lucas footnote disapproved of the “extreme” approach of the New York Court of Appeals in the Penn Central litigation, which looked to all the land the railroad owned near Grand Central Station. The Court did not disapprove its own combination of surface and air rights in Penn Central.97
The whole-parcel rule belongs only to regulatory claims. When the government physically takes possession of an interest for a public purpose, it owes compensation whether the interest is an entire parcel or only part of one, while a regulation that merely prohibits certain private uses is not a categorical taking.98 The duty is the same for personal property, since the Government must pay as categorically when it takes your car as when it takes your home.99 A casebook example shows the contrast for land. An ordinance bars O from using a 20-foot strip of his land, and O receives no compensation even though the strip’s value is close to zero.100 A city that physically occupied the same strip would owe payment however little of the lot it covered.
Time is a second way to carve up a property interest, and the Court refused that carving too. In Tahoe-Sierra the owners sought to sever a 32-month segment from the fee simple estate and treat that segment as taken. The Court held that the district court had erred by disaggregating the property into temporal segments, because the starting point is whether the entire parcel was totally taken, and if it was not, Penn Central applies.101 The later section on temporary moratoria shows how that analysis proceeds.
The Court has not claimed to have closed the question. In Palazzolo the Court noted that the owner had not pressed in the state courts, or in his petition for certiorari, the argument that part of his land was a distinct parcel, so the case came up on the premise that the entire parcel was the basis of his claim. So framed, the total-deprivation argument failed.102
The two owners face the same ordinance, and the result turns on what each one holds. Lucas itself sat on the second owner’s side of the line, because the trial court there found that the lots subject to the regulation were valueless.103
Murr v. Wisconsin addressed how to define the parcel when an owner holds two lots. The Murr family owned two adjacent lots along the Lower St. Croix River, and a local regulation barred selling or developing them as separate lots because neither held enough buildable land on its own. The Court held that the regulation did not effect a taking.104 The property kept residential use, including an enhanced, larger residence, and lost less than 10 percent of its value, so no categorical taking occurred under Lucas.105 The majority’s test looked beyond state and local law to other considerations, beginning with the physical characteristics of the land.106
The dissent agreed with the bottom line and objected to the method. Following state property lines is consistent with Penn Central, it argued, because the parcel-as-a-whole rule responds to the risk that owners will pluck one strand from their bundle of rights, such as the air rights in Penn Central, and claim a complete taking based on that strand alone. That risk is absent when a legally distinct parcel is the basis of the claim.107 The majority worried that landowners might alter lot lines in anticipation of regulation and that States might pass laws consolidating property to avoid a takings claim, and the dissent thought such maneuvers unlikely and not hard to detect.108 Its hypothetical shows what is at stake. A buyer acquires landlocked Lot A and beachfront Lot B from two different owners, and a turtle-protection rule bars all development of Lot B. Even counting the other lot, Lot B has no remaining economic value or productive use, so the buyer would have a strong per se claim, and the dissent contended that the majority’s test puts that conclusion in doubt.109
Specialized estates invite the same maneuver, and the mineral-rights dispute in Miller Brothers v. Michigan Department of Natural Resources is an example of an owner pressing a carved-out interest as the whole property. A takings answer should therefore settle what the parcel is, and why, before it measures any loss against it. A claim of total loss against a carved-out strip, estate, or time period meets the whole-parcel rule, and a dispute over adjoining lots under common ownership turns on the Murr approach to defining the parcel.