Concept
Physical Versus Regulatory Takings
Takings
Physical Versus Regulatory Takings
Takings law runs on two tracks, and nearly every problem begins with deciding which track the facts belong on. Condemnation and physical takings doctrine is old and often per se: once the government is shown to have taken or occupied the property, compensation is owed and the court does not weigh the government's reasons. Regulatory takings doctrine is more recent and proceeds by ad hoc factual inquiry, in which a court examines the circumstances of the particular case and weighs every relevant consideration.1 A third term, categorical, describes any rule that applies without balancing once its trigger is met. For physical appropriations the trigger is the taking itself; for the narrow total-loss rule of Lucas it is the loss of all economically beneficial use of the land.2
The government owes compensation whenever it physically takes possession of an interest in property for a public purpose, and it makes no difference whether the interest is an entire parcel or only part of one.3 In Cedar Point Nursery v. Hassid the Supreme Court called condemnation, possession without title, and occupations such as recurring flooding the clearest sorts of takings.4 The size of the intrusion does not change the answer. In Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., a New York law required landlords to admit cable companies' facilities into their apartment buildings, and the Court found a taking even though the facilities occupied at most about 1½ cubic feet. For permanent invasions, no matter how minute the intrusion and no matter how weighty the public purpose, the Court has required compensation.5
Benefits to the owner do not offset the loss. A landlord may profit because cable service attracts tenants, but once the invasion is physical the court does not balance the statute's benefits against its burdens, and that absence of balancing is what distinguishes a categorical taking from a regulatory one.6 Nor is the rule limited to land: the government has a categorical duty to pay when it takes your car, just as when it takes your home.7 The raisin reserve requirement in Horne v. Department of Agriculture illustrates the point. Actual raisins passed from the growers to the government, title passed to the Raisin Committee, and the Court called the requirement a clear physical taking.8
A flat rule fits physical appropriations because they are relatively rare and usually a greater affront to individual property rights than a restriction on use.9 Paying every time therefore does not carry the cost that a flat rule would carry for ordinary regulation, as the next paragraphs show.
Regulatory takings law begins with Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, where Justice Holmes stated the general rule that property may be regulated to a certain extent, but that if regulation goes too far it will be recognized as a taking.10 Mahon offered little insight into when a regulation goes “too far,” and in the 70-odd years since, the Court has generally eschewed any set formula in favor of essentially ad hoc, factual inquiries.11 Those inquiries are organized by the factors from Penn Central Transportation Co. v. New York City: the economic impact of the regulation on the claimant, the extent to which it interferes with distinct investment-backed expectations, and the character of the governmental action.12 The third factor carries the physical-versus-regulatory contrast inside it. A taking may more readily be found when the interference is a physical invasion than when it arises from a public program adjusting the benefits and burdens of economic life to promote the common good.13
Regulation receives weighing instead of a flat rule because of scale. Land-use regulations are ubiquitous and most of them affect property values in some way, so treating each as a per se taking would turn government regulation into a luxury few governments could afford.14 Mahon itself recognized the limit: government hardly could go on if values incident to property could not be diminished without paying for every such change in the general law.15
Fairness supplies a second reason. Weighing rests on the usual assumption that the legislature is simply adjusting the benefits and burdens of economic life in a manner that secures an “average reciprocity of advantage” to everyone concerned. That assumption becomes less realistic in the extraordinary circumstance when no productive or economically beneficial use of land is permitted, and the Court's categorical rule for total losses rests on that weakness.16
Because the two tracks ask different questions, the rules of one do not decide claims on the other. A physical-takings case asks whether the government took something; a regulatory case asks how heavy a burden a use restriction placed on the owner in light of the public purpose.17 Tahoe-Sierra Preservation Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency shows the separation at work. The question was whether a moratorium on development, imposed while a regional agency devised a comprehensive land-use plan, was a per se taking.18 The owners wanted the Lucas rule applied to moratoria that barred any economic use of their land for 32 months. Lucas did not answer that question. It involved a permanent deprivation, and it confined its categorical rule to the “extraordinary circumstance when no productive or economically beneficial use of land is permitted.” A diminution in value of 95 percent rather than 100 would itself call for Penn Central analysis, so a 32-month moratorium belonged on the balancing track.19
The opposite mistake is to treat a physical appropriation as a mere regulation because of the form it takes, and Cedar Point corrected it. A California regulation gave union organizers a right to enter agricultural employers' property for up to three hours a day, 120 days a year.20 The lower courts applied balancing, reasoning that the access was not permanent and continuous.21 The Supreme Court held the regulation a per se physical taking.22 Intermittent access could not save it, because the Court treats occupations such as recurring flooding as among the clearest takings. The question is whether the government has physically appropriated property or has only restricted what the owner may do with it. Regulatory-takings doctrine governs restrictions on use, while a direct physical appropriation is a per se taking, whatever name the measure bears.23
At the other end of the line, a restriction that acquires nothing and admits no one is weighed, however painful the loss. In Penn Central the city's landmark restrictions barred the owner from using the air space above its building, which seemingly deprived that space of any economic value. The owner argued that the airspace was a distinct property interest that could be taken regardless of the rest of the property. The Court rejected the argument, holding that takings jurisprudence does not divide a single parcel into discrete segments and ask whether rights in one segment have been entirely abrogated.24 Put the two cases side by side. About 1½ cubic feet of cable equipment required compensation because the invasion was physical, while the loss of valuable airspace was weighed against the parcel as a whole because it was a restriction. Size of loss therefore matters differently on each track: it is irrelevant on the physical track and one factor among several on the other.
The fourth step is where most claims land and where owners most often lose. Because the government rarely loses under the Penn Central test, owners' lawyers work to fit their facts into the physical or complete-destruction categories.27 Each later section develops one branch of the checklist, and the discipline stays the same throughout. A physical claim cannot be defeated by pointing out that the loss was small or the public purpose weighty, and a use-restriction claim cannot succeed merely by pointing out that the loss was large.