Concept
The Takings Clause
Takings
Takings Under the Fifth Amendment
The Takings Clause
The Fifth Amendment ends its list of individual protections with a sentence about property: “nor shall private property be taken for public use without just compensation.”1 The sentence assumes that the government will sometimes take private property, and it sets two conditions on doing so. The taking must be for a public use, and the owner must be paid.
A state takes property through eminent domain by filing a condemnation action in state court. If it wants a new road, jail, or park, it can force the owners of the land to “sell” at a price the court determines.2 The constraints are thin: if the government wants your property, it almost certainly can have it.3
The two conditions guard against different things. Public use limits the purposes for which the government may take: a taking that is not for public use must be undone, and the government must give the property back.4 Just compensation limits who bears the cost, because a principal purpose of the clause is to bar the government from forcing some people alone to bear public burdens that, in all fairness, the public as a whole should bear.5 Neither condition stops a determined government in practice. The Court has defined public use so broadly that almost any taking qualifies, and a government willing to pay can acquire nearly any parcel it wants.6
The clause binds state and local governments as well as the federal government. It applies to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment, as the Court held in Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co. v. Chicago (1897). A state may prescribe its own procedure for taking property, but the procedure is not due process of law unless it provides for compensation.7 Local governments are legal instrumentalities of the states, so zoning, subdivision, site-plan, and other land-use regulations answer to the clause too.8 State constitutions add their own protection: forty-seven expressly prohibit taking private property for public use without just compensation.9
Both conditions presuppose that the government has taken something, and that threshold question is the hard part of takings law. The power to take, so long as the government pays, is conceptually straightforward; the harder problem is deciding when the government has acted in a way that requires it to pay.10 The clause creates that problem by reaching beyond condemnation. It limits the government’s freedom to regulate as well as its right to take, because a zoning rule or other regulation may expropriate what the government claimed only to control.11 A few categorical rules exist, such as the rule for laws that require a permanent physical occupation of land, but those laws make up only a small fraction of the claims the clause can generate, and much ambiguity remains.12 A development moratorium shows the difficulty. Whether a moratorium imposed while a government devises a comprehensive land-use plan is a per se taking reached the Supreme Court in a dispute over moratoria at Lake Tahoe, where the Ninth Circuit had held that a regulation with only a temporary impact on the owners’ fee interests produced no categorical taking.13 The later sections of this reading take up those questions. The two subsections below handle the clause’s two named conditions, starting with compensation.
Just Compensation
The compensation condition answers one question: who pays for a public project? A highway benefits every driver in the state, but the land it needs belongs to a few owners along the route. If the government could take that land for nothing, those few would pay for a benefit everyone enjoys. The clause forbids that result, and a good motive does not excuse it. As the Court said in Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, “[a] strong public desire to improve the public condition is not enough to warrant achieving the desire by a shorter cut than the constitutional way of paying for the change.”15 The Constitution requires that costs be borne by the public at large, not by a few targeted citizens.16
The condition is a price, not a prohibition. Mahon observed that the Fifth Amendment presupposes that property may be wanted for public use but provides that it shall not be taken for that use without compensation, and the Court saw no more authority for supplying a missing right of support without compensation than for taking a right of way and refusing to pay “because the public wanted it very much.”17 Brown v. Legal Foundation of Washington put the point in a single line: the Fifth Amendment “does not proscribe the taking of property; it proscribes taking without just compensation.”18 An owner who is paid has no complaint under this condition. An owner whose property has in effect been taken, and who is not paid, has a constitutional claim, and most of the later sections of this reading concern when government action counts as a taking.
The procedure follows the same logic. Jurisdictions differ on whether a condemnation action carries a jury trial (the United States Constitution requires none), but where there is one, the jury typically determines just compensation while the court decides public use and necessity.19 The government must pay the award plus any interest accrued from the time of the taking, and condemnees generally cannot recover attorneys’ fees or other litigation expenses.20 When the government has not condemned but the owner claims that a government action amounts to a taking, the owner can bring an inverse condemnation suit to obtain just compensation.21
That leaves the amount, and here the government owes the owner’s loss, not its own gain. Justice Holmes’s formulation in Boston Chamber of Commerce v. Boston is the one most often cited: “the question is what has the owner lost, not what has the taker gained.”22 The reason is that the clause compensates a deprivation, and what a project is worth to the government says nothing about what the owner gave up. United States v. Causby applied the same measure to flights over the respondents’ property. The government conceded at argument that if the flights made the property uninhabitable there would be a compensable taking, and the Court stated that the owner’s loss, not the taker’s gain, measures the value of the property taken.23
Brown shows the principle producing a payment of zero. Interest on funds in client trust accounts once stayed with the banks; IOLTA programs now send it to charities that provide legal services for the poor, every state has adopted one, and the contributions apparently exceeded $200 million in 2001.24 By a 5–4 vote the Court held that the program had taken property belonging to the clients, but not “without just compensation.” The clients would have earned no interest on their funds without the program, so their loss was zero, and compensation is measured by the owner’s loss rather than the government’s gain.25 Nor is anything owed for the nonpecuniary consequences of using the interest for purposes other than those the owner might have chosen.26 The government’s gain was large, the owners’ loss was nothing, and only the loss counted.
In practice the loss is valued at market price. Just compensation generally means fair market value, paid in cash,27 and Horne v. Department of Agriculture states the rule: just compensation is normally measured by the market value of the property at the time of the taking.28 The government there had already calculated that figure when it fined the Hornes the fair market value of the raisins, $483,843.53, so the Court saw no need for a remand and relieved the Hornes of the obligation to pay the fine and the associated civil penalty.29 Because raisins are personal property, Horne also shows that the clause protects more than land: the Court treats physical appropriations of personal property the same as appropriations of real property.30
The Court has refused to make the owner’s asking price the constitutional minimum measure of just compensation, because an owner’s asking price is too hard to figure out while market value can be determined relatively objectively.31 Subjective losses therefore go unpaid. In Kimball Laundry, the Court treated loss from an owner’s unique need for property or idiosyncratic attachment to it as part of “the burden of common citizenship.”32
Market value reflects what the land could readily become as well as what it is. The value may reflect the use to which the land could readily be converted, as well as the existing use.33 Property is valued at the highest and best use for which it could be adapted, but the potential use must be reasonably probable, and the owner’s fantasy or speculation about possible uses is irrelevant. Courts look to the land’s physical condition, its current and reasonably probable future zoning, and the market demand for the future use.34 A possible rezoning, say from agricultural to residential use, is the usual battleground, and in most jurisdictions only a reasonably probable zoning change may be considered.35 When the government takes only part of a parcel, severance damages may be awarded in addition to compensation for the part taken, to account for the effect on the land that remains.36
Public Use
Public use asks whether a taking serves the community at all, and the Court’s answer is generous. If a taking is not for public use, the government must give the property back. But the Court has defined public use so broadly that almost any taking passes: a taking is for public use as long as it is “rationally related to a conceivable public purpose,” which is the rational basis test.38 The test asks for a public purpose, and it can be satisfied even when the property ends up in private hands.
Kelo v. City of New London shows how far the test reaches. The owners argued that a taking for private development violated the public-use requirement, and the Court again rejected the argument, though this time it divided 5–4, with Justice O’Connor, the author of Hawaii Housing Authority v. Midkiff, leading the dissenters.39
The majority’s reasoning explains the result. It treated the city’s plan as a whole. Given the comprehensive character of the plan, the thorough deliberation that preceded its adoption, and the limited scope of judicial review, the majority resolved the owners’ challenges “not on a piecemeal basis, but rather in light of the entire plan,” and because the plan unquestionably served a public purpose, the takings satisfied the public-use requirement.40 It also left the plan’s details to the legislature. Quoting Berman v. Parker, it said that courts do not oversee the choice of boundary line or sit in review on the size of a project area, and that once the question of public purpose has been decided, the amount and character of the land taken and the need for a particular tract to complete the integrated plan rest in the discretion of the legislative branch.41
Deference has a floor. The doctrine still asks, in Justice Thomas’s description of it, whether the taking has a “purely private purpose,”42 and a taking that fails the public-use condition must be undone.43 Payment cannot repair the defect, because public use and just compensation are separate conditions: the clause prohibits taking private property except for public use even when the government offers just compensation.44
The difference from Kelo is the plan. The Kelo majority relied on a plan of comprehensive character, adopted after thorough deliberation, and judged the owners’ challenges in light of the entire plan.45 A single transfer to a single beneficiary has no plan to look to, and nothing in the record points to a public purpose, conceivable or otherwise.
The dissenters read the clause more narrowly. Justice O’Connor tried to distinguish Kelo from Berman and Midkiff on the ground that in those cases the precondemnation use of the targeted property inflicted affirmative harm on society: blight resulting from extreme poverty in Berman, and oligopoly resulting from extreme wealth in Midkiff.46 The distinction invites a question. Why don’t holdouts, whose refusal to sell blocks development that cannot proceed around them, inflict a similar affirmative harm?47 Justice Thomas, in a separate dissent, would go further. Berman and Midkiff, he argued, erred by equating the eminent domain power with the police power. Traditional police-power uses, such as abating a nuisance, required no compensation at all, while the takings power has always required it, so whether a state can take property is a different question from whether it can regulate property. A public-purpose test also cannot be applied in a principled way, because it is far easier to ask whether the government owns the taken property or the public has a legal right to use it than to ask whether the taking has a purely private purpose. He would return to the original meaning of the clause: the government may take property only if it actually uses the property or gives the public a legal right to use it.48 Justice O’Connor would keep a purpose test and ask whether the existing use harmed society; Justice Thomas would replace the test with actual or legally guaranteed public use. Thomas pressed the same concern in Horne, where he joined the Court’s opinion but doubted that the raisin committee acts for public use when it takes raisins and in some instances gives them away or sells them to exporters, foreign importers, and foreign governments. To the extent its actions are not for public use, he noted, calculating just compensation on remand would be a potentially fruitless exercise.49
Whatever the federal standard permits, states may demand more. The Kelo majority stressed that nothing in its opinion precludes any State from placing further restrictions on its takings power, and it observed that many states already impose public-use requirements stricter than the federal baseline, some by state constitutional law and others by eminent domain statutes that carefully limit the grounds for takings.50 It added that the necessity and wisdom of using eminent domain to promote economic development are matters of legitimate public debate, and that the Court’s own authority extends only to deciding whether a taking is for a “public use” within the meaning of the Fifth Amendment.51 State courts have used that freedom. The Ohio Supreme Court’s decision in City of Norwood v. Horney rested on the Ohio constitution, and the rule applied in County of Wayne v. Hathcock permits condemnation for the benefit of private entities only if one of three conditions holds: the entities are public utilities that operate highways, railroads, canals, power lines, gas pipelines, or other instrumentalities of commerce; the property remains under the supervision or control of a governmental entity; or the condemnation itself accomplishes the public concern, as when blighted housing has become a threat to public health and safety.52 A federal claim therefore gets the deferential rational basis test, while a claim under a state’s own constitution or statute may get something stricter.