Concept
Limits of Heightened Scrutiny
Classifications subject to heightened scrutiny
Limits of Heightened Scrutiny
Heightened scrutiny stops somewhere, and City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, Inc. shows both where it stops and what the Court still demands beyond that point. The Court refused to treat classifications based on intellectual disability as suspect or quasi-suspect, so it reviewed the city’s zoning decision only for a rational basis. It nonetheless held that denying a special use permit for a group home violated equal protection, because the sole reason for the denial was the residents’ mental condition, and that reason supplied no legitimate governmental interest.1 The holding has two halves: one marks the edge of the skeptical tiers, and the other marks the floor beneath the deferential one.
The classes that do draw a skeptical look show what a challenger must match. Racial classifications imposed by any governmental actor, whether federal, state, or local, are constitutional only if narrowly tailored to further compelling governmental interests.2 Equal application does not rescue them, and a state cannot defend one by pointing to some conceivable rational purpose.3 Gender classifications require “an exceedingly persuasive justification,” a demand the Court rests on the nation’s long and unfortunate history of sex discrimination.4 That skepticism responds to history, and it demands proof: the Court has refused to accept offered statistics as showing that sex is a legitimate, accurate proxy for regulating drinking and driving.5
Scrutiny attaches to the classification, not to the sympathy of the claimant. The right to be free of gender discrimination in jury selection extends to men as well as women,6 and the Court has described the harm that such discrimination does to litigants, to the community, and to the jurors excluded.7 Heightened review also tests fit instead of condemning every line. In Sugarman v. Dougall, the Court invalidated New York’s rule that only citizens could hold permanent competitive civil service positions, because the rule covered a number of menial positions yet not all high policymaking ones, and so bore little relationship to the state’s interest in undivided loyalty. The Court cautioned that a state may still require citizenship for an appropriately defined class of positions.8
Age falls outside this group. In Massachusetts Board of Retirement v. Murgia, the Court reaffirmed that equal protection analysis requires strict scrutiny of a legislative classification only when the classification impermissibly interferes with the exercise of a fundamental right or operates to the peculiar disadvantage of a suspect class, and mandatory retirement at age fifty under the Massachusetts statute involved neither.9 Cleburne holds the same line for intellectual disability.
Cleburne and Disability
The Fifth Circuit held that intellectual disability is a “quasi-suspect” classification and that the zoning ordinance violated equal protection because it did not substantially further an important governmental purpose. The Supreme Court held that a lesser standard of scrutiny was appropriate, and under that standard it held the ordinance invalid as applied.10 The opinions use the term “mental retardation”; this chapter uses the current term except in quotations.
The Fifth Circuit’s reasoning is the best case for heightened scrutiny, and it is worth knowing because the Supreme Court rejected it. The court pointed to a history of “unfair and often grotesque mistreatment” of the retarded, which made discrimination against them “likely to reflect deep-seated prejudice.” It added that the retarded lacked political power and that their condition was immutable. It also stressed that the ordinance withheld a benefit that, although not fundamental, was very important, because without group homes the retarded could never hope to integrate themselves into the community.11
Justice Marshall, joined by Justices Brennan and Blackmun, agreed that the ordinance was invalid but disagreed with the Court’s route and remedy, and his objections show where the majority and the minority part ways. He attacked the assertion that the standard of review must be fixed by the number of classifications to which a characteristic would validly be relevant. The assertion is not logical, he wrote: relevance under some or even many circumstances gives no reason to presume relevance where there is reason to suspect it is absent, and a sign that says “men only” looks very different on a bathroom door than on a courthouse door.12 He also denied that legislative change weakens a constitutional principle. Even when judicial action has catalyzed legislation, the legislation does not eviscerate the underlying principle, and the Court has never suggested that race classifications became less suspect once extensive legislation had been enacted on the subject.13
In Marshall’s view, the importance of the interest at stake and the history of discrimination against the retarded meant that the Equal Protection Clause required more than review of the ordinance as if it were a taxing statute or economic legislation.14 The method he described is skeptical without being intrusive. The government must establish that the classification is substantially related to important and legitimate objectives, so that valid and sufficiently weighty policies actually justify the departure from equality. Courts do not second-guess reasoned legislative or professional judgments tailored to the unique needs of a group like the retarded; they ask whether hostility or thoughtlessness has carried the day.15 Applying that method, he found that Cleburne’s vague generalizations, which classified the “feeble-minded” with drug addicts, alcoholics, and the insane while allowing the elderly, the ill, the boarder, and the transient, were too weak to overcome the suspicion that the ordinance rested on impermissible assumptions or outmoded and perhaps invidious stereotypes.16
Justice Stevens, joined by Chief Justice Burger, questioned the framework from the opposite direction. He argued that the entire notion of levels of scrutiny was wrong and that a single test should govern: whether there is a rational basis for the classification.17 In his approach, “rational” means that an impartial lawmaker could logically believe the classification would serve a legitimate public purpose that transcends the harm to the disadvantaged class, so the word carries elements of legitimacy and neutrality. He joined the Court’s opinion.18
These opinions press on the majority from two sides, but the majority’s holding is the rule, and where the record shows no irrational prejudice or other illegitimate purpose, the Court has upheld classifications that burden the mentally retarded. In Heller v. Doe, it upheld Kentucky involuntary commitment procedures that made it easier to commit the mentally retarded than the mentally ill.19
Rational Basis With Teeth
Under the ordinary rational basis test, nothing in the record need support the classification, and mere speculation will suffice.27 Cleburne did not proceed that way. The Court seemed to apply a form of heightened scrutiny, later dubbed “rational basis with bite,” by placing the burden of proof on the party defending the ordinance, contrary to traditional practice.28 The city’s objections to the home’s location show the difference. The home stood across the street from a junior high school and on a flood plain, and a court willing to speculate could easily have found a rational basis for treating residents with intellectual disabilities differently, since teenagers might harass them and they might be less able to care for themselves in a flood. The Court set those concerns aside, apparently because the city had offered no proof to support the different treatment.29
The ordinance’s own text gave the Court reason for that skepticism. It barred homes “for the insane or feeble-minded or alcoholics or drug addicts,” a strong indication that the actual goal was illegitimate, and the Court accordingly showed less than the usual deference to the hypothetical purposes the ordinance’s defenders offered.30
The Court then tested each of the council’s stated reasons against the uses that the zoning allowed without a permit, and each reason failed in the same way, by describing a risk that a permitted use presented just as much as the home did:
- The negative attitudes of nearby property owners and the fears of elderly neighbors, unsubstantiated by factors properly cognizable in a zoning proceeding, could not justify treating the home differently from apartment houses and multiple dwellings.31
- The fear that junior high students would harass the residents rested on vague, undifferentiated fears, and the school itself enrolled about thirty mentally retarded students.32
- The home’s location on a five-hundred-year flood plain could not distinguish it from nursing homes, homes for convalescents or the aged, sanitariums, or hospitals, any of which could locate on the site without a permit.33
- Doubts about legal responsibility for the residents’ actions applied equally to boarding houses and fraternity houses, which needed no permit.34
- Concerns about concentration of population, street congestion, fire hazards, neighborhood serenity, and danger to other residents failed to explain why apartment houses, fraternity and sorority houses, and hospitals could locate freely in the area.35
With those reasons removed, nothing but the residents’ status separated the home from the permitted uses, and the Court concluded that the permit requirement appeared to rest on an irrational prejudice against the mentally retarded.36
The first two reasons state a rule that reaches beyond zoning. The electorate as a whole, whether by referendum or otherwise, could not order city action that violates the Equal Protection Clause, and a permit denial founded on vague, undifferentiated fear lets some portion of the community validate what would otherwise be an equal protection violation.37 The mechanism is easy to trace. If a council could cite voters’ discomfort as a legitimate interest, any prejudice held widely enough would become a valid reason for a law, and the groups most likely to be disliked would get the least protection from a test meant to screen out prejudiced lines.
The majority called its review rational basis review and disclaimed anything special, and Marshall objected to the label although not to the result. The ordinance, he wrote, surely would be valid under the traditional rational basis test applicable to economic and commercial regulation, and it fell only because of the searching review that he would have called heightened scrutiny.38 The method might hereafter be called “second order” rational basis review, he said, but however labeled it is “most assuredly not” the traditional test.39 The label mattered to him for two reasons. It invites lower courts to subject economic and commercial classifications to similarly searching “ordinary” review, a small and regrettable step back toward Lochner v. New York, and it gives them no principled way to tell when more searching inquiry applies, leaving lower courts in the dark and the Court unaccountable for its choices.40
The Court also chose a narrow remedy. It affirmed the judgment insofar as it invalidated the ordinance as applied to the Featherston home, vacated it in other respects, and remanded.41 Marshall would have struck the ordinance on its face, because it swept too broadly to dispel the suspicion that it rested on a bare desire to treat the retarded as outsiders. The Court, he noted, reached the same conclusion about the ordinance while disclaiming special scrutiny. Its as-applied ruling defines no principle for deciding which retarded people the ordinance might validly reach, so future applicants face the standardless discretion of low-level officials who have already shown a readiness to be captured by vague, undifferentiated fears.42 He added that deciding only as applied, rather than on the face of the ordinance, radically departs from the Court’s equal protection precedents.43 His objection prices the narrow ruling, and it also marks the scope of the holding: a permit denial resting on this kind of record fails.
Cleburne’s refusal to credit prejudice belongs to a longer line. Justice O’Connor’s concurrence in Lawrence v. Texas states the premise: some objectives, such as “a bare . . . desire to harm a politically unpopular group,” are not legitimate state interests, and when a law exhibits such a desire, the Court has applied a more searching form of rational basis review to strike it down. She traced the premise to Department of Agriculture v. Moreno, to Cleburne, and to Romer v. Evans.45 Romer reasoned that laws of that kind raise the inevitable inference that the disadvantage imposed is born of animosity toward the class of persons affected.46 O’Connor then asked whether moral disapproval alone can justify a statute that bans homosexual sodomy but not heterosexual sodomy, and answered that it cannot: moral disapproval of a group, like a bare desire to harm it, is insufficient under rational basis review.47
The reach of this reasoning remains unsettled. It is unclear whether Romer is limited to settings where government imposes a “broad and undifferentiated disability” on a group, or whether enhanced review applies whenever a court believes the discrimination was the product of animus. If the latter, no one has explained how a court is to ascertain animus, and the poor fit of a classification cannot answer the question, since a court has no business testing fit unless it has first decided that some mode of enhanced scrutiny is called for.48 Same-sex marriage cases such as United States v. Windsor sit on this unsettled ground. At most, an elevated or meaningful rational basis test may apply in a narrow set of cases dealing with the unpopular and vulnerable, and review of those claims has not risen to the intermediate level.49
The deferential baseline still governs most challenges to government lines. The classic application of judicial deference to a zoning ordinance is Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, where the ordinance allowed any number of related persons but no more than two unrelated adults to live in a single-family home, with the effect and likely purpose of keeping groups of students from living together in the village.50 The Court has not clarified since how the Equal Protection Clause applies to land use regulations generally.51 O’Connor herself cautioned that striking the Texas law as applied to private, consensual conduct did not mean that other laws distinguishing heterosexuals from homosexuals would fail, since reasons to promote the institution of marriage exist beyond moral disapproval of an excluded group.52