Concept
Facially Neutral Laws and Intent
Classifications subject to heightened scrutiny
Facially Neutral Laws and Intent
Every tier of review attaches to a classification, so a court must first decide whether the government has classified at all.1 The answer comes easily when the text names the trait. A statute requiring elementary school teachers to be citizens burdens aliens and no one else, and its text alone establishes the prima facie case of discrimination.2 The answer is harder when the text names nothing yet the results fall unevenly. The stakes are high, because only racial classifications trigger strict scrutiny, while a law viewed as race neutral draws only rational basis review.3
Washington v. Davis supplies the governing answer. Black applicants to the District of Columbia police force challenged a verbal-skills examination that a higher percentage of Black than white applicants failed. Because the District is federal, the claim arose under the Fifth Amendment, and the Court analyzed it under equal protection principles. The Court agreed that the central purpose of the Equal Protection Clause is to prevent official conduct that discriminates on the basis of race.4 It refused, however, to hold that a law or official act is unconstitutional solely because it has a racially disproportionate impact, meaning a heavier burden on one race than on another. Disproportionate impact is not irrelevant, but it is not the sole touchstone of invidious discrimination, and standing alone it does not trigger strict scrutiny.5
Intent carries this weight because it separates a law that sorts people by a protected trait from a neutral law whose consequences happen to fall unevenly. Heightened scrutiny rests on a suspicion that a classification by race or sex reflects prejudice rather than a legitimate goal, and only that suspicion justifies reversing the presumption of validity and putting the burden on the government. A rule that sorts applicants by test score raises no such suspicion merely because more members of one group than another land on the wrong side of the line. The score draws the line, and the group's share is a byproduct.
A challenger to a neutral law must therefore prove two things: that the law burdens the group more heavily than others, and that the burden comes from discriminatory purpose.6 Each element covers a gap the other leaves open. Davis shows impact without purpose failing, and Palmer v. Thompson is the decision usually cited for the converse. After a federal court ordered Jackson, Mississippi, to desegregate its public pools, the city closed them all. Everyone recognized that Jackson meant to forestall integration, yet a 5 to 4 majority found no equal protection violation because the closing kept everyone out of the water, and Justice Black wrote that no case had held that a legislative act may violate equal protection solely because of the motivations of the men who voted for it.7 Davis later read Palmer narrowly. The ordinance's legitimate purposes were not open to impeachment by evidence of the councilmen's motives, and the case did not involve a law with neutral purposes but disproportionate racial consequences.8 A law that names the trait on its face supplies both elements at once, because its text shows who is burdened and why.9
Purpose can be proved in three ways. The text can draw the line, which requires no proof of intent and explains why the sex cases earlier in this chapter asked only whether the line was justified. Officials can apply a neutral law unequally. Or lawmakers can adopt a neutral law, applied as written, in order to produce its effect on a group.
Yick Wo v. Hopkins illustrates the second route. San Francisco forbade operating a laundry in a wooden building without the consent of the Board of Supervisors, and the Board granted consent to all but one of the non-Chinese applicants and to none of the Chinese applicants.10 The Court held that a law fair on its face and impartial in appearance, but applied by public authority with an evil eye and an unequal hand so as to make unjust discriminations between persons in similar circumstances, still denies equal justice and falls within the constitutional prohibition.11 The Court found hostility to the applicants' race and nationality to be the only explanation left for the pattern. In that setting the unequal administration is itself the proof of purpose, although the government may still try to rebut it with a neutral explanation.
The third route is the hardest, because lawmakers rarely announce a discriminatory purpose and a court must infer it. Davis permits the inference to rest on the totality of the relevant facts, including the fact that the law bears more heavily on one race than on another, while insisting that impact standing alone does not trigger strict scrutiny.12 The purpose need not be the only one, or even the primary one. It is normally enough that a discriminatory purpose was a motivating factor in the decision.13 Race-based electoral districting is the lone exception, because there the challenger must show that race was the predominant factor.14 Once a motivating purpose is shown, the burden shifts to the government to prove that it would have taken the same action anyway.
The inquiry ends in one of two ways. If the court accepts the government's proof, or the challenger never showed a motivating purpose, no discriminatory purpose exists, only rational basis review applies, and the government wins. If the court finds discriminatory purpose, a racial classification exists and strict scrutiny technically applies, but in practice the law always falls, because a purpose to harm racial minorities is not even legitimate, let alone compelling.15 The same demand for proof of motive governs a town's refusal to rezone for low-income housing: an adverse effect is not enough.16 Statutes can reach what the Constitution does not, since some federal circuits have held that discriminatory effect alone may establish a violation of the Fair Housing Act, though they apply different tests.17
Personnel Administrator of Massachusetts v. Feeney applies the same method to sex and states the purpose requirement at its sharpest. Massachusetts gave veterans an absolute preference in civil service hiring, and more than 98 percent of the state's veterans were men, so the preference operated overwhelmingly in men's favor.18 The Court asked two questions. The first was whether the preference is a gender-based classification at all, and the Court said it is not, because it is not a law that can plausibly be explained only as one. Had the impact been impossible to explain on a neutral ground, the impact itself would have signaled that the real classification was not neutral.19 The second question was whether the harm to women nonetheless reflected invidious discrimination, and the answer turned on what purpose means. Discriminatory purpose implies more than intent as volition or awareness of consequences. The decisionmaker must have selected or reaffirmed a course of action at least in part because of, and not merely in spite of, its adverse effects on an identifiable group.20 Nothing in the record showed that the preference was devised or re-enacted to keep women in a stereotypic and predefined place in the civil service.21 The distinction between foreseeing a harm and wanting it lets a legislature pursue a legitimate goal, such as rewarding military service, without being treated as a discriminator.
Courts scrutinize sex lines because they so often rest on stereotypes rather than important governmental interests.22 A plurality of the Court once traced the pattern to an attitude of romantic paternalism that, in practical effect, put women “not on a pedestal, but in a cage.”23 The threshold question therefore matters for sex as well: before intermediate scrutiny applies, the rule must classify by sex. Geduldig v. Aiello shows how that question can end the case. California's disability insurance program covered nearly all disabilities but excluded those accompanying normal pregnancy and childbirth. The Court held that the exclusion was not a classification based on gender as such. Pregnancy is an objectively identifiable physical condition, and the program divided potential recipients into pregnant women and nonpregnant persons, a group that includes both sexes. Lawmakers may include or exclude pregnancy on any reasonable basis, so long as the distinction is not a mere pretext designed to effect invidious discrimination against one sex. Three Justices dissented, reasoning that singling out a disability peculiar to women while covering disabilities peculiar to men creates a double standard that is sex discrimination. Congress responded for employment purposes with the Pregnancy Discrimination Act, but Geduldig remains the constitutional rule, and the Court relied on it to reject an equal protection challenge to abortion regulation in Dobbs v. Jackson Women's Health Organization.
An exam stem on this topic will rarely contain an express racial or sexual classification, yet it will describe one group faring worse than another. That pattern is the cue for the purpose inquiry, and the usual error is to treat the disparity as the classification and jump straight to strict or intermediate scrutiny.