Concept
The Right to Procreate
Fundamental rights
The Right to Procreate
Skinner v. Oklahoma (1942) recognized procreation as a fundamental right, and it did so in an equal protection case rather than a due process case. The Court emphasized the “fundamental” nature of individual choice about procreation and so foreshadowed both the later prominence of procreation as a protected liberty and the standard of strict scrutiny.1 That double role makes Skinner a bridge between the two clauses compared in the last subsection.
The facts are short. Skinner was convicted again of robbery with firearms in 1934 and sent to the penitentiary, where he was confined in 1935 when Oklahoma passed its sterilization act.2 In 1936 the Attorney General began proceedings against him, and Skinner answered that the act violated the Fourteenth Amendment. The jury was told that his crimes were felonies involving moral turpitude and that its only question was whether a vasectomy could be performed without detriment to his general health. It found that it could, and the Oklahoma Supreme Court affirmed by a vote of five to four.3
The act did not reach every felon, and that omission decided the case. Under the Oklahoma code, larceny and embezzlement carried the same fines and the same imprisonment; only when it came to sterilization did the penalties differ.4 A repeat larcenist could be sterilized, and a repeat embezzler could not. The Court began with deference, acknowledging that a state may mark off classes of offenses as experience suggests. Then it turned: the legislation involved “one of the basic civil rights of man,” and “[m]arriage and procreation are fundamental to the very existence and survival of the race.” On that footing, “strict scrutiny of the classification which a State makes in a sterilization law is essential.”5
Three features of sterilization explain why deference gave way. First, the interest is basic: marriage and procreation are fundamental to the survival of the race, so the state is reaching something essential. Second, the power is open to abuse. In evil or reckless hands it can cause races or types inimical to the dominant group to wither and disappear, and strict scrutiny of the classification guards against invidious discrimination against groups or types of individuals that a state might make “unwittingly, or otherwise.” This second feature matters most for equal protection, because the danger lies in how the state sorts people into the class. Third, the harm cannot be undone. There is no redemption for the individual whom the law touches, and any experiment the state conducts is to his irreparable injury.6
Strict scrutiny asks whether the state’s line fits the reason for the burden, and Oklahoma’s line did not. The Court found no basis for inferring that the line between larceny and embezzlement had any significance in eugenics, or that the inheritability of criminal traits follows the neat legal distinctions the law draws between the two offenses. Equal protection, it said, would be “a formula of empty words” if such conspicuously artificial lines could be drawn.7 The defect was a mismatch between line and purpose.
The Court addressed Buck v. Bell only to distinguish it. Virginia’s statute applied only to feeble-minded persons in state institutions, and it was upheld because the operations let people who otherwise had to stay confined return to the world, opening the asylum to others, so that “the equality aimed at will be more nearly reached.”8 Nothing comparable explained Oklahoma’s line between larcenists and embezzlers. Buck itself has not endured, either morally or legally; within a few decades, attitudes had changed.9
Chief Justice Stone, concurring in Skinner, saw the case that way. For him the real question was not one of equal protection. It was whether the wholesale condemnation of a class to such an invasion of personal liberty, without opportunity for any individual to show that his is not the type of case that would justify resort to it, satisfies due process.10 The hypothetical statute presents his question in pure form, because it has no classification defect and still condemns a whole class without individual inquiry.
Later opinions read Skinner both ways, as authority for strict scrutiny and as a marker of procreation’s place among protected liberties. A concurring opinion in Griswold v. Connecticut cited it for the proposition that statutes regulating sensitive areas of liberty require strict scrutiny.11 A concurring opinion in Washington v. Glucksberg said that Skinner added decisions about procreation to the list of liberties recognized in Meyer and Pierce and loosely suggested a judicial duty to scrutinize any impingement on so important an interest with heightened care.12 The Court has also said that the privacy right extends to activities relating to procreation, citing Skinner.13
The right does not subject every government action that touches childbearing to strict scrutiny. The Court permits burdens on the right to procreate that are “marginal and indirect.” It invalidated a mandatory maternity-leave rule in Cleveland Board of Education v. LaFleur, but it upheld Maryland’s cap on welfare benefits for families that reached six members in Dandridge v. Williams.14 Dandridge anticipated the abortion funding cases, in which the government may not prevent a woman from seeking an abortion but need not pay for it. Government therefore has considerable freedom to decline to support procreation and much less freedom to interfere with it.