Concept
Notice and Hearing Basics
Procedural due process
Notice and Hearing Basics
Once a claimant has shown a protected interest and a qualifying deprivation, the command that no one be deprived of life, liberty, or property “without due process of law” calls for some procedure to accompany the taking.1 The Fifth Amendment binds the federal government, and the Fourteenth binds the states. In Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., the Court said that the clause at a minimum requires that a deprivation by adjudication be preceded by “notice and opportunity for hearing appropriate to the nature of the case.”2 Three safeguards make up that core, and government must always supply them when due process applies: notice of the charge or issue, a meaningful opportunity to be heard, and an impartial decisionmaker.3
Mullane’s closing phrase, “appropriate to the nature of the case,” explains why each safeguard can take many forms. Notice may be served personally, posted, or published, and a hearing may be a full adversarial trial or an informal exchange.4 Litigation over a deprivation of property therefore tends to turn on seven procedural items, any of which a claimant may say was owed:5
- adequate notice to the person affected;
- a neutral decisionmaker;
- an opportunity to be heard, either before or after the deprivation;
- an opportunity to present evidence;
- an opportunity to confront adverse witnesses and to contest the evidence against the claimant;
- the assistance of an attorney;
- a formal decision on a fixed record, with a statement of reasons that can support an appeal.
Courts do not require every item in every case. Notice, a hearing, and an impartial decisionmaker are the constant core. How much of the rest a setting demands follows from three factors the Court weighs: the private interest affected; the risk of erroneous deprivation under the procedures used, together with the probable value of added safeguards; and the government’s interest, including the fiscal and administrative burdens that more process would bring.6 The later sections on Goldberg and Mathews take up that balancing. This section covers the three constant safeguards.
A teacher’s dismissal shows where the menu comes from. Helen’s contract lets the city fire her only if the superintendent determines that dismissal is in the city’s best interests, and it promises prompt post-termination notice of the reasons and a chance to respond in writing.7 Two questions arise, and they should be kept apart. The first is whether Helen has a protected interest at all. A benefit is property when rules or mutually explicit understandings support a claim of entitlement that the person may invoke at a hearing, which is how the nontenured teacher in Perry v. Sindermann avoided dismissal of his claim.8 David Roth, hired for a single academic year with no tenure rights to continued employment, had no comparable footing.9 The second question is what process Helen is owed if she has such an interest, and her contract’s procedures do not answer it. One view, associated with Arnett v. Kennedy, would make a claimant take “the bitter with the sweet” and accept only the procedures that came with the grant, and the Court did not adopt that view as the rule. Helen can therefore argue that written notice and a written response after she is fired fall short of what the Constitution requires, and a court will measure the contract’s procedures against constitutional standards.
Adequate Notice
Notice comes first because every other procedural right depends on it: without proper prior notice to those a government decision may affect, the remaining safeguards can be nullified.11 The Court set the standard in Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co.: “An elementary and fundamental requirement of due process in any proceeding which is to be accorded finality is notice reasonably calculated, under all the circumstances, to apprise interested parties of the pendency of the action and afford them an opportunity to present their objections.”12 The reason is practical. The right to be heard “has little reality or worth unless one is informed that the matter is pending and can choose for himself whether to appear or default, acquiesce or contest.”13
The standard asks for reasonableness, not certainty, because two interests pull against each other. The individual needs to learn of the matter in time to decide whether to contest it. The State has a vital interest in bringing disputes to a final settlement, which can be served only if the claims of people outside the State can somehow be determined, and the Court refused to read the Due Process Clause to place “impossible or impractical obstacles” in the way.14 Personal service of written notice within the jurisdiction remains the classic form that is always adequate, but personal service has not been treated as indispensable in every circumstance.15 Reasonableness is the compromise: actual notice is not required, but the notice must be delivered by means that one desirous of actually informing the person might reasonably adopt.16 This balancing lives inside the notice standard itself. The three-factor test used later in this chapter to decide how much process is due does not decide whether a given notice suffices, because the Court treats Mullane as a separate test for that question.17
The Court measures each component “with due regard for the practicalities and peculiarities of the case,” and the constitutional requirement is satisfied when the components are reasonably met.19 That flexibility cuts both ways. Due process does not require “heroic efforts” to give notice, and the government need not prove that the person actually received it,20 yet “process which is a mere gesture is not due process.”21 The line falls between a genuine, reasonable effort to inform and a formality the government has no reason to expect will work.
The content component asks whether the notice tells the person what is happening and how to respond. In Goldberg v. Kelly, the Court found no constitutional deficiency in the content or form of New York’s notice to welfare recipients and declined to call its seven-day notice period insufficient per se, though it acknowledged that fairness in some cases might require a longer time.22 A reasonable time is thus measured against the case and not against a fixed number of days. Two later decisions show content failing and succeeding. In Memphis Light, Gas & Water Division v. Craft, a municipal utility’s notice threatening a customer with termination of service was held inadequate because it did not spell out the procedures available to protest.23 In Atkins v. Parker, the Court sustained a form letter that told food stamp recipients of a statutory change that could reduce or eliminate their benefits, even though the letter did not state each recipient’s new benefit level.24 The Atkins letter gave recipients enough general awareness of the new law to make further inquiry and to challenge the computations in their own cases if they wished. The Memphis Light notice withheld the path to a protest, so a customer who read it carefully would still not have known how to contest the decision.
The means component asks what a person genuinely trying to reach the absentee would do. The Court heavily scrutinizes notice by publication and generally upholds notice by certified mail,25 a pattern that follows from the Mullane standard. When the government has a feasible and customary way to reach a person, such as a known mailing address, a line in a newspaper is hard to call a means that one desirous of actually informing the person would adopt.26 Where conditions do not reasonably permit better notice, a lesser method suffices if it is not substantially less likely to bring home notice than the feasible and customary substitutes.27 What the government knows also matters. In one case, mailing, posting, and publication together were inadequate because town officials knew the property owner was incompetent and had no guardian’s protection, so notice sufficiency is a case-by-case assessment of the totality of the circumstances, including unique circumstances known to the government.28
Two mistakes recur on exams. Students run the three-factor balancing test on a notice problem, when the reasonably-calculated standard governs whether notice is sufficient. They also treat nonreceipt as the end of the inquiry. A person who never saw a properly addressed and properly worded notice has not necessarily been denied due process, because the question is whether the method was reasonably calculated to inform, judged by what the government knew and could feasibly do.
Opportunity to Be Heard
Notice tells a person that a deprivation is pending, and the hearing lets the person do something about it. The standard legal definition describes the opportunity as a chance to appear before a court or other tribunal and present evidence and argument before being deprived of a right by governmental authority, and it calls that opportunity a fundamental requirement of procedural due process.30 Courts usually summarize the requirement as an opportunity to be heard at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner. Each phrase guards against a different failure.
The first phrase, meaningful time, asks when the hearing occurs. A hearing exists to influence a decision, so it works only while the decision can still change, and the definition builds that timing in by placing the opportunity “before being deprived of a right.”31 At a minimum, the hearing must come before the deprivation becomes final. In Mathews v. Eldridge, the claimant had an effective process for asserting his claim before any administrative action and was assured an evidentiary hearing and judicial review before the denial became final, and against that background the Court concluded that an evidentiary hearing was not required before the agency acted.32 Whether a hearing must also precede the first interruption of a benefit or the first seizure of property is harder. Goldberg treated termination of aid pending resolution of an eligibility dispute as especially harsh because it may deprive an eligible recipient of the very means by which to live, while Calero-Toledo accepted postponement of notice and hearing for a seizure that served significant governmental purposes and that advance warning might have frustrated.33 Later sections work through both. The floor is simpler: a chance to speak after the decision is final is not a hearing in any useful sense.
The second phrase, meaningful manner, asks whether the person can use the opportunity offered. Goldberg supplies the governing statement that the opportunity “must be tailored to the capacities and circumstances of those who are to be heard.”34 New York let a welfare recipient present a position in writing or secondhand through a caseworker, but it did not let the recipient appear personally, with or without counsel, before the official who finally determined continued eligibility. A recipient therefore could not present evidence orally or confront or cross-examine adverse witnesses, and the Court held these omissions fatal.35 The secondhand route had its own flaw, since the caseworker usually gathers the facts on which the charge of ineligibility rests and the recipient’s side cannot safely be left to that person.36 A hearing serves accuracy by letting the person expose a mistake and serves participation by giving the person a real voice, and a format the person cannot operate delivers neither.
Tailoring runs in both directions, which is why the form of a hearing varies from setting to setting. Goldberg itself said that informal procedures will suffice and that due process does not require a particular order of proof or mode of offering evidence.37 The legal definition’s list of what the opportunity ordinarily includes, fair notice of the hearing, counsel, and cross-examination of adverse witnesses, is therefore best read as the full-dress version, not as a floor every hearing must meet.38 Mathews shows the other end of the range. Eldridge received a letter stating a tentative determination that his disability had ceased and giving reasons for the proposed termination, and the procedures also gave him a way to assert his claim before the agency acted.39 The format that failed the welfare recipients in Goldberg is thus not an automatic failure everywhere, and the Goldberg and Mathews sections explain how the Court sorts one setting from the other, starting from the precise nature of the government function involved and of the private interest affected.40
Students often treat any chance to say something as a hearing, and two questions screen out that mistake. The first asks whether what the person says can still change the result, which tests the timing. The second asks whether this person can use the format offered, given who the person is and what the dispute turns on, which tests the manner. The listening session fails the first question, and a written-only process for recipients who cannot write effectively fails the second. Passing both questions does not end the analysis, because they do not say which further safeguards a hearing must contain, such as confrontation of witnesses, counsel, or a record. Those depend on the balancing taken up in later sections, apart from the neutral decisionmaker, whom the next subsection addresses.
Neutral Decisionmaker
The third core safeguard concerns who decides, because a hearing before someone who cannot be fair gives the person little of what the hearing was meant to supply. An impartial decision maker is among the core elements of due process, alongside notice and a meaningful hearing.42 The requirement attaches to the role and not to a particular office. In the welfare setting the decisionmaker was a welfare official, an administrator and not a judge, and the Court asked whether that official was impartial.43 Neutrality serves accuracy, since a decisionmaker who has settled on an answer tends to credit the evidence that fits it, and it serves acceptance of the result, since a loser who sees a committed decisionmaker has little reason to trust the outcome. In the Court’s words, neutrality preserves both the appearance and the reality of fairness.44
The hard cases concern officials who already knew something about the matter. Goldberg agreed with the lower court that prior involvement in some aspects of a case will not necessarily bar a welfare official from acting as decisionmaker, but it added that the official should not have participated in making the determination under review.45 The line follows what the hearing is for. The hearing tests one particular determination, so the person who made that determination would be asked to grade their own work and would have every reason to defend it. An official who dealt with the recipient’s file at some earlier stage knows the case but is not committed to the decision now being challenged, and can weigh it fresh.
Beyond any one official’s role, adjudicators are presumed impartial, and the claimant bears the burden of rebutting that presumption.46 Proof of actual bias is the usual way to do so, though a showing of a high probability of actual bias may suffice.47 The second path exists because bias lives in a person’s mind and is rarely provable from a single ruling, so the inquiry can look to circumstances that make bias likely. Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co. is the familiar example, where a litigant’s outsized campaign spending to help elect a judge created a serious risk of actual bias and due process required recusal. Bias can also be systemic. Lack of agency independence may qualify where adjudicators have incentives to rule in favor of the agency, as when administrative law judges who rule for claimants in a high proportion of disability cases are subjected to special job performance reviews.48
On an exam, the usual errors run in two directions. Some students treat any prior contact with the file as disqualifying, which Goldberg rejects. Others treat an adverse ruling or the decisionmaker’s employment by the agency as proof of bias, which the presumption of impartiality defeats unless incentives to favor the agency are shown. The question to ask is whether the decisionmaker helped make the determination under review, or has a stake or commitment that creates a serious risk of actual bias.