Concept
Incorporated Bill of Rights Guarantees
Other rights and interests
Incorporated Bill of Rights Guarantees
The Bill of Rights was written to restrain the national government, yet police officers, prosecutors, and trial judges in most criminal cases work for states and cities. Two guarantees show the gap. The Fourth Amendment protects the people’s persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures, and it allows warrants only upon probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, that particularly describe the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized.1 The Sixth Amendment gives the accused in a criminal prosecution the rights to a speedy and public trial by an impartial jury, to be informed of the accusation, to confront the witnesses, to compel favorable witnesses to appear, and to have the assistance of counsel.2 By their own force, though, the first ten Amendments apply only to the federal government, so a person arrested by a city police officer would have no federal protection against an unreasonable search unless some doctrine carried the Fourth Amendment to the states.3
The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment supplies that doctrine. The Court has held that the Clause incorporates most of the Bill of Rights against the states, absorbing the fundamental guarantees one at a time.4 Incorporated guarantees differ from the unenumerated liberties discussed earlier in this chapter, because each has a textual home in the Bill of Rights.
Two limits frame what follows. These guarantees restrain government action only, so a private employer who searches an employee’s locker has not violated the Fourth Amendment, however intrusive the search. And incorporation decides which rule binds a state or local official without fixing how much protection a guarantee gives; that depends on the guarantee’s own doctrine. The First Amendment shows the difference. The Court has rejected the notion that the Constitution gives the same freedom to those who communicate ideas by conduct, such as picketing, as to those who communicate by pure speech, so a legislature may proscribe picketing that unreasonably interferes with ingress or egress to public buildings.5
This section first explains how the Court chooses which guarantees cross to the states. It then follows two of them, the Fourth Amendment’s protection of privacy and the Sixth Amendment’s trial rights, and it ends with the rule that keeps a specific guarantee from being displaced by a general claim to liberty.
Selective Incorporation
Under Barron v. Baltimore, the Bill of Rights bound only the federal government, so a person’s protection against a state depended on whatever that state’s own constitution provided.6 The Fourteenth Amendment changed the footing, but it says only that no state may deprive a person of life, liberty, or property without due process of law, and it does not say which federal guarantees those words carry across. Duncan v. Louisiana states the Court’s answer: the Court has looked increasingly to the Bill of Rights for guidance, and many of its guarantees now protect individuals against state action through the Due Process Clause.7 Three positions competed along the way.
- Total incorporation, Justice Black’s position in dissent in Adamson v. California, holds that the Fourteenth Amendment applies every provision of the Bill of Rights to the states exactly as it applies to the federal government.8
- The fundamental-fairness view, which Justice Frankfurter defended in the same case, defines due process to include only the rights necessary to the fundamental fairness of a scheme of ordered liberty.9
- Selective incorporation, the approach the Court came to follow, identifies the Bill of Rights provision in dispute and asks whether that provision is essential to fundamental fairness.10
The fairness view found its classic statement in Palko v. Connecticut. Justice Cardozo required that a right be “implicit in the concept of ordered liberty,” so rooted in the traditions and conscience of the people that abolishing it would violate a principle of justice ranked as fundamental, and so necessary that a fair and enlightened system of justice would be impossible without it.11 By that standard, jury trial, prosecution only upon indictment, and freedom from compelled self-incrimination fell outside due process. Each may have value and importance, Cardozo reasoned, but none is of the very essence of a scheme of ordered liberty.12 Later decisions placed the jury and the privilege against self-incrimination on the protected side. History and tradition nonetheless remain a touchstone of due process in criminal matters: in Medina the Court declined to apply the Mathews balancing test to criminal process, partly because that test did not acknowledge the role of history and tradition in defining due process.13
Adamson sharpened the disagreement, and each side drew on the text, the history, and the logic of the Constitution.14 Black’s total incorporation never prevailed in that form, because the Court has held that the Due Process Clause incorporates most of the Bill of Rights, not all of it.15 The Court has likewise refused the converse view, associated with Black’s Adamson dissent, that liberty encompasses no more than the rights the first eight Amendments guarantee.16 Incorporation therefore sets a floor and does not mark the ceiling of liberty.
Selective incorporation also changed the question the Court asks. Under Palko and Adamson, the Court examined the facts of a case and asked whether the state’s action offended fundamental fairness. The later approach identifies the relevant Bill of Rights provision and asks whether that provision is itself essential to fundamental fairness, so that it should apply to the states.17 Duncan illustrates the method. Louisiana charged Duncan with battery, a misdemeanor punishable by up to two years in prison, and denied his request for a jury because its constitution granted juries only where capital punishment or hard labor could be imposed; he received sixty days and a $150 fine.18 The Court held criminal jury trial fundamental to the American scheme of justice and concluded that the Fourteenth Amendment guarantees a jury in every criminal case that would come within the Sixth Amendment if tried in federal court.19 The violation lay in refusing the jury, not in any showing of unfairness at Duncan’s trial, and that is the practical difference between asking about the provision and asking about the trial.
The dissent in Duncan shows what the older view would have done with the same case. It invoked the observation that great diversities in procedure may exist in two states “separated only by an imaginary line,” with a jury on one side and none on the other, because each state prescribes its own modes of judicial proceeding.20 Selective incorporation answers that objection provision by provision. Where the Court finds a guarantee fundamental, the guarantee does not change at the state line, and where it does not, the states remain free to differ.
Almost every guarantee an exam is likely to invoke now binds the states. Duncan’s own list began with the First Amendment freedoms and the Fourth Amendment’s protection against unreasonable searches, included the Fifth Amendment’s privilege against self-incrimination and its just-compensation requirement, and ended with the Sixth Amendment rights to counsel, to a speedy and public trial, to confrontation, and to compulsory process.21 The list has kept growing. McDonald v. City of Chicago applied the Second Amendment to the states, reasoning that a Bill of Rights guarantee that is fundamental from an American perspective is fully binding on the states.22 Timbs v. Indiana reached the same result for the Excessive Fines Clause, and its evidence was historical: by 1868 the constitutions of 35 of the 37 states expressly prohibited excessive fines, and today all 50 states prohibit them, directly or by requiring proportionality.23 That is the kind of showing the Glucksberg method demands when a claimant asserts an unenumerated liberty: the right must be deeply rooted in the Nation’s history and tradition and implicit in the concept of ordered liberty.24 One idea of fundamentality therefore runs through both incorporation and the recognition of unenumerated rights.
Some guarantees remain on the federal side of the line, because the Court has incorporated most of the Bill of Rights and not all of it.25 The standard examples are the Fifth Amendment’s grand jury indictment requirement and the Seventh Amendment’s guarantee of a jury in civil cases. Palko itself treated prosecution upon indictment, like jury trial, as a protection that has value and importance without being of the very essence of ordered liberty, and Duncan’s jury holding reached only criminal prosecutions, the subject of the Sixth Amendment’s text.26 The question is also asked clause by clause and not amendment by amendment, since the Fifth Amendment’s privilege against self-incrimination is on the incorporated list while its indictment clause is not.27
Incorporation doctrine keeps developing, so take the status of a guarantee from what the Court has actually held about that provision, and do not assume the status of one the problem leaves unaddressed.
Once a guarantee is incorporated, it means the same thing against a state that it means against the federal government. Duncan measured the state’s duty by the Sixth Amendment itself, extending the jury right to every criminal case that would come within the guarantee in federal court.28 McDonald stated the principle generally: a provision protecting a right that is fundamental from an American perspective is fully binding on the states, and it limits, but by no means eliminates, their ability to devise solutions that suit local needs and values.29 The rule works in two stages. Fundamentality decides which guarantees cross to the states and leaves the states free to differ on procedures that are not essential to fairness. After a guarantee crosses, the same-content rule keeps a state from honoring the right in name while supplying a thinner version, which would make the same search or trial procedure lawful or unlawful depending on whether a federal or a state officer carried it out. Fundamental status does not make a guarantee absolute, either: the right to vote, for instance, is a fundamental individual right that exists alongside a compelling government power to regulate elections.30 What a state may do under an incorporated guarantee therefore comes from that guarantee’s own doctrine.
Two errors recur. Candidates ask whether the state’s proceeding was fair overall, which imports the older fairness inquiry into a question the Court now decides provision by provision. And they treat a whole amendment as incorporated or unincorporated, overlooking that the Fifth Amendment is split between a clause that binds the states and a clause that does not.
Fourth Amendment Privacy
The Fourth Amendment joins two commands. It forbids unreasonable searches and seizures of persons, houses, papers, and effects, and it allows a warrant to issue only upon probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized.32 Each warrant condition does its own work. Probable cause demands a factual basis before the intrusion, the oath or affirmation makes someone answerable for the truth of that showing, and the particular description confines officers to the place and items an issuing official approved, so that a warrant cannot become a license to search anywhere for anything. The law of when a search is unreasonable belongs to criminal procedure. This subsection asks how the guarantee reached state police and what enforces it there.
The Court first applied the Fourth Amendment to the states in Wolf v. Colorado in 1949, holding the basic prohibition on unreasonable searches enforceable against state officers through the Due Process Clause.33 Wolf stopped short of a remedy. It said that the Due Process Clause does not itself require state courts to adopt the exclusionary rule of Weeks, the rule that barred evidence from an unconstitutional federal search from federal courtrooms.34 A state was therefore forbidden to search unreasonably and yet free to use everything the search produced.
Mapp v. Ohio closed that gap in 1961. The Court held that all evidence obtained by searches and seizures in violation of the Constitution is inadmissible in a state court.35 Its reasoning started from what Wolf had already accepted: once the right to privacy is enforceable against the states through the Due Process Clause, it is enforceable by the same sanction of exclusion used against the federal government, because exclusion is an essential part of the right.36 To concede the right and deny the sanction would “grant the right but in reality to withhold its privilege and enjoyment,” and without the rule the freedom from unreasonable searches would be “a form of words.”37
A remedy belongs inside the right because of incentives. A prohibition that cost officers nothing when they broke it would operate as a suggestion: officers and prosecutors would lose nothing by ignoring the Amendment, and the unlawful search would deliver its fruit to the courtroom intact. Mapp adopted the purpose the Court had recognized the year before, that the exclusionary rule exists “to deter—to compel respect for the constitutional guaranty in the only effectively available way—by removing the incentive to disregard it.”38 Exclusion takes away what the unlawful search was meant to produce, and it does so at the criminal trial, where the incentive operates.
Mapp thus leaves state and federal officers under one Fourth Amendment. The Court described itself as extending the substantive protections of due process to all constitutionally unreasonable searches, state or federal, and it attached the same sanction in both courtrooms.39 Whether a search was unreasonable is decided by the Fourth Amendment’s own doctrine, with no softer version for state officers, and the consequence of a violation does not change at the courthouse door. A state prosecutor who offers evidence that city officers seized unreasonably faces the objection a federal prosecutor would face.
The result follows from what the exclusionary rule is built to do. A sanction designed to remove an official’s incentive to disregard the Amendment has nothing to act on when no official acted, and excluding the jewelry would deter no one the Amendment governs. Mapp’s two halves stay distinct: the Fourth Amendment’s own doctrine decides whether government conduct was unreasonable, and exclusion follows a violation.
Sixth Amendment Trial Rights
Every protection in the Sixth Amendment attaches to a criminal prosecution, the setting in which the government accuses and the defendant’s liberty is at stake.41 The Amendment was written to restrain the national government, so it reaches a state courtroom only through the Fourteenth Amendment, by the method of selective incorporation.
Each right does a separate job in the contest between the accused and the state, and seeing those jobs explains why a state defendant needs them as much as a federal one does. A speedy and public trial keeps the government from holding a person indefinitely or in secret without proving anything. Notice of the accusation tells the defendant what must be answered. Confrontation lets the defendant test an accuser’s account before the factfinder, compulsory process lets the defendant put on helpful witnesses who would never volunteer, and counsel evens a contest in which the prosecutor is trained and the defendant usually is not. The jury stands between the accused and the state, so that conviction requires the agreement of ordinary citizens and cannot rest on the unchecked judgment of officials. Each right answers the danger of arbitrary punishment, and that danger is the same in a state courtroom, where the prosecutor, the judge, and the jail also belong to the government.
In Duncan the Court noted that its decisions had phrased the test in several ways: whether a right is among the fundamental principles of liberty and justice at the base of all civil and political institutions, whether it is basic in the system of jurisprudence, and whether it is essential to a fair trial.42 Louisiana argued that the Constitution imposes no duty on the states to provide a jury in any criminal case, whatever the seriousness of the crime or the severity of the punishment.43 The Court rejected that argument. Because criminal jury trial is “fundamental to the American scheme of justice,” the Fourteenth Amendment guarantees it in every criminal case that would come within the Sixth Amendment’s guarantee if tried in federal court, and Duncan’s own prosecution was such a case.44
The Court found the jury fundamental because of what the jury does. Criminal jury trial had existed in England for centuries when the Constitution was written, and it was valued as a protection against arbitrary rule.45 Fundamentality is thus a judgment about function. The jury is essential because it stands between the accused and the prosecuting power of the government, and that power exists wherever a state prosecutes.
Duncan also listed the Sixth Amendment rights that the Fourteenth Amendment already protected against state action before the jury was added: the rights to counsel, to a speedy and public trial, to confront opposing witnesses, and to compulsory process for obtaining witnesses.46 Those four, with the criminal jury, are the Sixth Amendment guarantees this chapter treats as incorporated on the Court’s own statement. The right to be informed of the accusation appears in the text but not on Duncan’s list, so an answer that turns on it should begin from the text. Once a guarantee crosses to the states, it carries the same content it has in federal court, which is why Duncan measured Louisiana’s duty by asking whether the case would come within the Sixth Amendment if tried in federal court.47 A state defendant has a jury right exactly when a federal defendant would.
Where does that benchmark stop? An examiner who wants to test it will usually put a jury demand in a case that is not a criminal prosecution.
The two cases involve the same parties, the same work, and the same dollar amount, and only the type of proceeding differs. The text of the Sixth Amendment limits its guarantees to criminal prosecutions, and Duncan’s holding is keyed to that text.48 Its reasoning points the same way, since it rests on the jury as a check on the government’s power to prosecute, and a suit between private parties does not put that power before the court. The usual slip is to reason from the amount at stake or the importance of the interest, when the question is whether the proceeding is a criminal one that would carry the right in federal court. A second slip is to treat the incorporated jury right as general and conclude that every state trial needs a jury.
Specific Guarantees Over General Liberty
A person hurt by government conduct can often describe the injury two ways: as an unreasonable seizure under the Fourth Amendment, or as a deprivation of liberty without due process. The second description adds nothing the first lacks. Where one of the specific constitutional guarantees, such as the Fourth Amendment, deals with the general type of conduct at issue, the challenge must be analyzed under that provision, and if no violation is found there, substantive due process cannot be used to expand constitutional protection, a rule the Court announced in Graham v. Connor.50
The reason lies in what a specific guarantee already contains. Each reflects a deliberate balance between the individual’s interest and the government’s need to act, and each comes with standards of its own, such as the reasonableness requirement for searches and seizures.51 A claimant who lost under that standard and could replead the same facts as an offense against generalized liberty would ask judges to apply a second and vaguer test to the same conduct, and the balance in the specific text would hold only until a plaintiff chose a different label. The general clause is also the harder one to apply: where a challenge rests only on a broadly stated interest such as “liberty,” the Court is especially cautious.52 Reserving substantive due process for conduct that no specific provision covers confines the open-ended standard to the narrow space where it is needed.
Police use of deadly force to stop a suspect shows the rule at work. The force is a seizure of a person, so the challenge is reviewed under the Fourth Amendment and not as a free-standing due process claim.53 The choice of provision changes the question. A Fourth Amendment claim asks whether the officer’s conduct was objectively reasonable, and malice or good faith does not matter, while a substantive due process claim asks whether official conduct shocks the conscience. In Albright v. Oliver, a plurality reasoned the same way about a prosecution without probable cause, pointing to the Fourth Amendment, which separately protects against unjustified restraints that follow from a charge, and declining to treat the claim as one of generalized substantive due process. Bell v. Wolfish reflects a similar reluctance to stretch general due process. Procedural due process requires fair procedures for determining guilt before someone is punished, but the Court found no general substantive due process right to have the government create the best possible conditions for holding persons awaiting trial.54
Substantive due process keeps real work to do where no specific provision applies. The cases that remain typically involve bodily integrity. In Riggins v. Nevada, the defendant objected to being forced to take antipsychotic drugs during his trial, an intrusion that no search or seizure clause describes.55 Apart from any specific guarantee, due process also demands fair notice before punishment, and an award of punitive damages must satisfy three guideposts for that reason: the defendant must be on notice of the conduct that is subject to sanction and of the potential severity of the penalty. This chapter takes up that doctrine later.56
Even in that open space, the Court asks narrow questions. Some cases ask whether the practice is so egregiously abusive that it shocks the conscience, a standard first formulated in Rochin v. California, the stomach-pumping case. Others ask whether the practice is clearly unacceptable under a historically recognized prohibition.57
County of Sacramento v. Lewis supplies the working form of the conscience-shocking test when the claim attacks an officer’s act and not a statute. The distinction between legislative and executive action is necessary to keep constitutional claims in proportion, lest the Constitution be demoted to “a font of tort law.”58 In a due process challenge to executive action, the threshold question is whether the officer’s behavior is so egregious and outrageous that it shocks the contemporary conscience, and if it does not, the harm must be redressed through whatever statutory or common-law remedies exist.59 Negligence never suffices. Conduct intended to injure without any justification by a government interest is the kind most likely to qualify, and recklessness or gross negligence falls between, depending on how much opportunity the officer had for deliberation.60 Lewis itself arose from a high-speed chase that killed a passenger in the pursued vehicle, and the officer’s recklessness fell short because he acted on an instant judgment and without any harmful purpose.
The two police scenarios therefore travel on different tracks, and the officer’s conduct decides which one applies. Force used to seize a suspect is judged under the Fourth Amendment, while an injury that results from a pursuit is judged by the conscience-shocking inquiry of Lewis. Outrageous facts tempt a writer toward the general clause, so an answer should first ask whether a specific provision speaks to the conduct. If one does, the claimant must meet that provision’s standard and cannot start over under substantive due process. If none does, the claim reaches the conscience-shocking inquiry, which carelessness will not satisfy.