Concept
Abortion After Dobbs
Fundamental rights
Abortion After Dobbs
Dobbs v. Jackson Women's Health Organization ended the constitutional right to abortion that Roe v. Wade (1973) had announced and Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey (1992) had reaffirmed. The case arose from Mississippi's Gestational Age Act, which prohibits abortion after fifteen weeks of pregnancy except in a medical emergency or in the case of a severe fetal abnormality. The Court held that the Constitution confers no right to abortion, overruled Roe and Casey, and returned the authority to regulate abortion to the people and their elected representatives.1
Dobbs applies this chapter's two-tier framework to its most contested subject: the classification of the liberty decides the standard of review, and the standard of review decides the case. Under the viability line of Roe and Casey, a fifteen-week ban could not stand, because it prohibits abortion before viability, the point at which a fetus can survive outside the womb. Once abortion ceased to be a fundamental right, the same ban stands unless the challenger shows that it lacks a rational relation to a legitimate state interest, a burden that rarely succeeds under the deferential test described earlier in the chapter.
Several Justices wrote, and an accurate answer assigns each position to its author. Justice Alito wrote for the majority. Justices Thomas and Kavanaugh each concurred, and Chief Justice Roberts concurred only in the judgment.2 Justices Breyer, Sotomayor, and Kagan dissented together.3 The first subsection below supplies the background in Roe and Casey. The rest follow the majority's reasoning in order: the historical inquiry, the treatment of precedent, the standard of review, and the reach of the decision to other rights.
Roe and Casey Before Dobbs
Roe v. Wade reviewed a Texas statute that made abortion illegal unless necessary to save the mother's life. By prohibiting most abortions absolutely, the statute impinged on a woman's fundamental liberty to choose an abortion, and that triggered strict scrutiny under the Due Process Clause.4 The decision belonged to a line of privacy cases that apply heightened scrutiny to laws touching decisions too personal for the state to regulate: family formation, child rearing, contraception, abortion, and sexual conduct.5 Roe described the line as covering personal decisions about marriage, procreation, contraception, family relationships, and child rearing and education,6 a family-autonomy tradition that includes Pierce's declaration that “[t]he child is not the mere creature of the State.”7
A fundamental right is not an absolute one. The contraception decisions carried the same qualification: the privacy right to make contraceptive choices does not automatically invalidate every state regulation, because the State may regulate the business of manufacturing and selling contraceptives in ways that leave individual choices alone, and even a burdensome regulation survives if a sufficiently compelling state interest justifies it.8 For abortion, Roe's trimester framework supplied the timing. In the second trimester the State acquired a compelling interest in maternal health, which allowed restrictions necessary to make the procedure safe but not a total prohibition. In the last trimester the State acquired a compelling interest in protecting the fetus, and once the fetus was viable it could restrict or outlaw nontherapeutic abortions, meaning those not medically necessary to protect the mother's life or health. It could not prevent a woman from choosing a therapeutic abortion.9
Casey reaffirmed Roe's “essential holding” in a portion of Justice O'Connor's opinion that Justices Blackmun, Stevens, Kennedy, and Souter also joined. The reaffirmation rested on an independent analysis of the concept of liberty and on stare decisis.10 The essential holding had three parts:
- A woman may choose an abortion before viability and obtain it without undue interference from the State.
- A State may restrict abortions after viability if the law excepts pregnancies that endanger the woman's life or health.
- A State has legitimate interests from the outset of pregnancy in protecting the woman's health and the life of the fetus.
Casey grounded the right in the liberty that the Fourteenth Amendment protects. The Court said that matters “involving the most intimate and personal choices a person may make in a lifetime, choices central to personal dignity and autonomy, are central to the liberty protected by the Fourteenth Amendment,” and that “[a]t the heart of liberty is the right to define one's own concept of existence, of meaning, of the universe, and of the mystery of human life.”11 Casey did not treat abortion as interchangeable with the other choices. It called abortion “a unique act,” fraught with consequences for others, and described the woman's liberty as at stake “in a sense unique to the human condition.”12 That mixture of shared and distinct features returns when Dobbs separates abortion from the other privacy decisions.
Casey kept the right but abandoned Roe's trimester framework and refused to apply the strict scrutiny normally used in fundamental rights cases. Under strict scrutiny, a law that unduly burdens a fundamental liberty survives if it is the least burdensome means of achieving a compelling interest, and the burden is not itself fatal.13 Casey asked a different question: whether a regulation unduly burdens the right. It does so if its purpose is to hinder rather than inform the woman's free choice, or if in a large fraction of the cases in which it is relevant it will operate as a substantial obstacle to a woman's choice to undergo an abortion.14
The new test favored the State. Government could adopt measures that interfered with a woman's ability to obtain an abortion as long as they did not prevent any woman from making the ultimate decision to terminate her pregnancy before viability, and a law's incidental effect of making abortion more difficult or more expensive could not alone invalidate it.15 Casey accordingly overruled the parts of Akron and Thornburgh that had invalidated waiting-period and informed-consent requirements indistinguishable from those in the Pennsylvania statute before it.16 A flat prohibition before viability sits at the far end of that range, because it forecloses the ultimate decision for every woman.
Mississippi's Gestational Age Act collided with that framework. The challengers alleged that the Act violated the precedents establishing a constitutional right to abortion, principally Roe and Casey. The District Court granted summary judgment for them and permanently enjoined the law, and the Fifth Circuit affirmed.17 Because the Act prohibits abortion at fifteen weeks, before viability, the lower courts, bound by Roe and Casey, had no room to uphold it. Mississippi therefore attacked the framework itself, arguing that Roe and Casey were wrongly decided and that the Act satisfies rational-basis review.18
Dobbs and History and Tradition
The Dobbs Court began with a question about the word “liberty” in the Fourteenth Amendment: does it protect a right to obtain an abortion? The Court held that it does not.20 The Due Process Clause has been held to guarantee some rights that the Constitution does not mention, but any such right must be “deeply rooted in this Nation's history and tradition” and “implicit in the concept of ordered liberty,” the standard of Washington v. Glucksberg.21 The dispute therefore ran through substantive due process, where the methods taught earlier in this chapter apply.
The Court first closed off a route that would avoid that standard. A challenger might argue that restricting abortion is sex discrimination under the Equal Protection Clause, which would bring heightened scrutiny without any need to call the liberty fundamental. The Court rejected the argument by applying Geduldig v. Aiello, under which regulating a medical procedure that only one sex can undergo does not trigger heightened scrutiny unless the regulation is a mere pretext designed to effect invidious discrimination against one sex, and Bray v. Alexandria Women's Health Clinic, which holds that the goal of preventing abortion is not invidiously discriminatory animus against women. Laws regulating or prohibiting abortion are therefore governed by the same standard of review as other health and safety measures.22 That forecloses the pairing of liberty with equality that supported the marriage claim in Obergefell, so a challenger must show a fundamental liberty or lose.
The historical method serves a purpose of restraint. Justice Alito accused Roe of short-circuiting the democratic process and lacking any grounding in constitutional text, history, or precedent, and he said that Casey abandoned Roe's reasoning while providing no new justification for the right.23 The opinion organized its own inquiry in three steps, and the same order works for any claim to an unenumerated liberty.24
Step two does most of the work, and the record runs one way. Until the latter part of the twentieth century, American law offered no support for a constitutional right to obtain an abortion. No state constitutional provision recognized one; until a few years before Roe, no federal or state court had; no scholarly treatise of which the Court was aware had; and the earliest article proposing one appeared only a few years before Roe.25 Chief Justice Rehnquist's dissent in Casey had already set out the core of that history. At common law, abortion after quickening, the point at which a woman first feels the fetus move, was an offense, and in 1868, when the Fourteenth Amendment was ratified, at least 28 of the then-37 States and 8 Territories had statutes banning or limiting abortion.26 A test that asks what the Nation's law has protected over time cannot find a protected liberty in that record.
A positive record looks different. In McDonald v. City of Chicago, the Court found the right to keep and bear arms deeply rooted in the Nation's history and tradition because Heller had explored its origins: the 1689 English Bill of Rights protected a right to keep arms for self-defense, and by 1765 Blackstone described the right as one of the fundamental rights of Englishmen, an assessment the American colonists shared.27 For abortion, the same inquiry produces no comparable foundation.
That finding fixes the standard of review. Because the asserted right is not fundamental, Mississippi's ban receives deferential review, and the viability line that would have defeated it no longer controls.28
The third step tests how far the method reaches. Defenders of Roe characterized abortion as similar to rights recognized in past decisions about intimate sexual relations, contraception, and marriage.29 The Court replied that abortion is fundamentally different, as Roe and Casey themselves acknowledged, because it destroys what those decisions called “fetal life” and what the Mississippi law describes as an “unborn human being.”30 The last subsection of this unit returns to the consequences of that distinction.
The joint dissent attacked the method itself. It argued that a test looking to 1868 and common-law practice cannot control substantive due process, because it would freeze constitutional meaning to the nineteenth century and disregard the long sweep of legal development and precedents such as Loving, Griswold, Lawrence, and Obergefell that vindicate individual autonomy and equality.31 The dispute extended to the evidence. The majority was dismissive of amicus briefs from legal historians and constitutional scholars showing that nineteenth-century abortion bans were shaped not only by concern for fetal life but also by gender bias and anti-Catholic sentiment.32 The argument therefore turns less on whether history matters than on which history counts and how much weight it deserves.
Stare Decisis and Reliance
Having found no historical support for an abortion right, the Court still had to decide whether stare decisis, the practice of following earlier decisions so that the law stays predictable, required it to keep Roe and Casey. The majority answered that, because those decisions rested on constitutional interpretation, stare decisis matters but is not an “inexorable command.”37 Five considerations guide the weighing:
- the quality of the precedent's reasoning;
- its consistency with related decisions;
- its workability;
- the reliance interests it has created; and
- changed facts or developments in the law that undermine it.38
Each consideration measures part of what deference is worth. Stare decisis gives citizens, legislatures, and lower courts rules they can predict, so weak reasoning and conflict with neighboring doctrine reduce the confidence a precedent deserves, an unworkable standard defeats predictability directly, and reliance measures what a change of course would cost the people who acted on the rule. A common error is to say that Dobbs set stare decisis aside. The Court applied it, and the weighing favored overruling.
Applying the factors, the majority found that Roe “was egregiously wrong from the start.” Its textual and historical reasoning was weak, and it conjured a trimester framework and a viability line with little justification from the Constitution, history, or precedent.39 Casey did not cure the defect. It kept Roe's result, jettisoned much of Roe's reasoning, and substituted the undue-burden standard, which produced ambiguity and workability problems that courts and legislatures struggled to apply consistently.40 Justice Alito added that difficulties with the test appeared in Casey itself.41 The majority also said that Roe and Casey had distorted other doctrines, generating litigation and anomalies in areas such as standing, facial challenges, and severability, so the cost of keeping them reached beyond abortion.42 The inquiry also asks what a precedent actually held, not what later opinions assumed it held. Justice Black made that point in dissent in a criminal case about the standard of proof, noting that many opinions had assumed that proof beyond a reasonable doubt is constitutionally required although the Court had never clearly held so.43
Reliance drew sharper disagreement. The majority said that the reliance that ordinarily counsels respect for a precedent is concrete, as in property and contract cases, where people have acted on a settled rule and courts can weigh what a reversal would cost them.44
The majority placed Casey's reliance in the second category. It called the reliance Casey described generalized and speculative, and Justice Alito found no tangible reliance on these decisions by women or state governments, rejecting the assertion that women had relied on the availability of abortion to structure their lives in important ways.45 The majority also rejected Casey's separate worry that overruling Roe would lead the public to view the Court as politicized, because that concern cannot justify perpetuating an unprincipled constitutional decision.46 Justice Scalia, dissenting in Lawrence, had questioned the reliance claim on its own terms: overruling Roe would not have made abortion unlawful but would have permitted the States to decide, and many States would have declined to prohibit it.47
The joint dissent of Justices Breyer, Sotomayor, and Kagan weighed the same considerations and reached the opposite answer. It argued that Casey had already performed the stare decisis analysis and reaffirmed Roe after careful consideration, that the majority gave short shrift to women who organized their lives, relationships, careers, and families around the availability of abortion, and that the undue-burden test, though imperfect, is manageable and has guided courts and legislatures for decades.48 Its central objection concerned timing: overruling Roe and Casey because a majority of the Court now disagrees with them replaces principled adjudication with political preference and undermines the Court's legitimacy.49 The concern has a mechanism. If a constitutional rule changes whenever a new majority forms, the rule's authority comes to depend on who sits on the Court.
Two concurrences narrowed or sharpened the majority's position. Justice Kavanaugh called stare decisis the difficult issue in the case.50 Chief Justice Roberts concurred only in the judgment. He reasoned that the Court need not and should not decide more than the case required, which for him meant rejecting the viability line and upholding the fifteen-week law without overruling Roe and Casey completely.51
Lawrence v. Texas ran the same weighing on a different precedent and supplies a useful comparison. Lawrence found that Bowers v. Hardwick had induced no individual or societal reliance of the sort that could counsel against overturning it, and that the precedents before and after Bowers contradicted its central holding, so Bowers itself caused uncertainty.52 The reliance step bites differently in the two settings. Bowers had rejected the claimed liberty: its majority found no resemblance between the family, marriage, and procreation decisions and the claim, and it rejected the argument that those cases insulated any private sexual conduct between consenting adults from state proscription.53 Reversing it therefore disturbed no recognized liberty. Roe and Casey had recognized one, which is where the dissent's reliance argument is strongest and where the majority's answer, that the reliance was speculative and generalized, had to do its work.
Rational Basis After Dobbs
Once Dobbs found no fundamental right to abortion, the standard of review followed. Because procuring an abortion is not a fundamental right, rational-basis review applies: laws regulating abortion carry a “strong presumption of validity” and must be upheld if there is any rational basis for the State to think they further legitimate interests.55 Abortion laws receive the same review as other health and safety measures, so a restriction is constitutional if a rational person might think it serves some purpose.56 The change is complete. Under Roe the State had to show that a regulation was necessary to a compelling interest, and under Casey a regulation failed if it placed a substantial obstacle in the path of a woman seeking a pre-viability abortion. Neither inquiry is made now.
A lenient test follows from what the fundamental-right label does. The label places a right beyond ordinary legislative bargaining, so the State must show urgency and necessity before it interferes. Without the label, a court has no constitutional baseline for weighing the competing moral claims, and weighing them anyway would be a legislative task performed by judges. The majority called abortion a profound moral question that the Constitution leaves to the citizens of each State, and it said that Roe and Casey had arrogated that authority.57 Justice Kavanaugh's concurrence put the same idea as neutrality: the Constitution takes no side, Roe erred by taking sides and imposing a nationwide rule up to viability, and the democratic process becomes the means of resolving the moral and policy questions.58 Two features of the standard follow from that premise. The presumption of validity places the burden on the challenger, and the phrase “any rational basis” asks about reasons the State could have for thinking the law works, so a court need not decide whether the law is wise.
How little the standard demands appears in Williamson v. Lee Optical. The Court there conceded that a law requiring people to have their eyes checked when their glasses needed replacing was perhaps “a needless, wasteful requirement in many cases” and “not in every respect logically consistent with its aims.” It upheld the law anyway, because the legislature might have concluded that the requirement would improve eye care, and a conceivable interest, even one the legislature never stated, was enough.59 Dobbs places abortion regulation in that tier. A challenger must negate every rationale that a rational legislator might have had.
The legitimate interests that can support an abortion regulation are broad, and a law needs to connect to only one of them.60 The interests the majority identified include these:
- respect for and preservation of prenatal life at all stages of development;
- protecting maternal health and safety;
- eliminating gruesome medical procedures;
- preserving the integrity of the medical profession;
- mitigating fetal pain; and
- preventing discriminatory abortions, such as those based on race, sex, or disability.
Two features of the list matter in application. The first interest is tied to no stage of pregnancy, so the interest in prenatal life that the viability line once limited now supports regulation from the start of pregnancy, and almost any restriction that plausibly reduces abortions can claim a rational link to it. The other interests give States further routes, such as a safety rationale for a clinic rule or a professional-integrity rationale for a rule about physicians.
State legislatures acted on that latitude. By the end of 2023, fourteen States had enacted total bans with limited exceptions, and others limited abortion to the first six to twelve weeks of pregnancy.61 The practical effects have been mixed. Women have died in tragic cases because of state bans, yet the overall impact on access has been smaller than expected: in 2023, the first full year after the decision, the number of abortions in the United States reached its highest level in more than a decade, aided by travel to States where abortion remained legal and greater financial support for the procedure.62
Mississippi's fifteen-week Act shows the standard at work. The legislature supported the Act with factual findings about prenatal development, fetal life, commonly used later procedures, and the State's asserted interests. Those findings supplied a rational basis, so the challengers' constitutional claim failed.63 The same statute had lost in the lower courts, because under the viability line a State could not prohibit abortion before viability whatever its findings said. Findings that were legally beside the point under the earlier framework became the evidence that carried the State's case.
Chief Justice Roberts reached the same judgment by a narrower route, and the difference matters for how an answer describes the law. He agreed that the viability line announced in Roe and retained in Casey is not supportable and should be discarded. He reasoned that a woman's right to terminate her pregnancy should extend far enough to ensure a reasonable opportunity to choose, which Mississippi's fifteen-week law provides in most cases.64 Because that conclusion resolved the case, he would have rejected the viability rule and upheld the statute without overruling Roe and Casey completely.65 His question, whether the State leaves a reasonable opportunity to choose, differs from the majority's, whether any rational basis supports the law. The rational-basis standard comes from the majority opinion, and the concurrence offers an alternative that the majority did not adopt.
Step three decides nearly every case, because the interests are broad and the question is only whether a rational person could think the law serves one of them. Run on Mississippi's Act, step one finds a fifteen-week limit attacked as a deprivation of liberty, step two places the burden on the challengers, and step three finds findings on prenatal development and later procedures that supply a rational basis, so the claim fails.
Dobbs and Other Rights
The majority took up the question this chapter has been building toward: does the reasoning that removed abortion from the list of fundamental rights reach the other privacy and liberty decisions? Roe had grouped abortion with personal decisions about marriage (Loving), procreation (Skinner), contraception (Eisenstadt), family relationships (Prince), and child rearing and education (Pierce and Meyer).68 Defenders of Roe characterized the abortion right as similar to rights recognized in decisions about intimate sexual relations, contraception, and marriage.69 The majority rejected the argument that its decision would endanger other precedents involving fundamental rights such as contraception and same-sex marriage, because abortion is distinguishable: only abortion destroys fetal life.70
The distinction has two working parts. The first limits how broadly a liberty may be described. Appeals to a broader right to autonomy and to define one's own concept of existence, the majority said, prove too much, because those criteria, at a high level of generality, could license fundamental rights to illicit drug use, prostitution, and the like, none of which has any claim to being deeply rooted in history. That limit keeps the history-and-tradition test taught earlier in this chapter from being bypassed through redescription. The second part concerns what abortion does: it destroys what Roe and Casey themselves called fetal life, which none of the other decisions involved.71
The two parts show up from either direction. If the question is whether the reasoning that defeated the abortion claim reaches a state ban on contraceptives, the majority's answer is that contraception does not involve the destruction of fetal life.72 If the question is whether a broad right to define one's own existence covers illicit drug use or prostitution, the answer comes from the first part: a right described that generally lacks the history and tradition that would make it fundamental.
Justice Kavanaugh's concurrence repeats the point in more guarded terms. The Constitution is neutral on abortion and leaves it to the people's elected representatives, he wrote, and the decision “does not necessarily threaten unrelated precedents that protect other rights.”73 The word “necessarily” marks the limit of the statement. It reports one Justice's view of the decision's reach and leaves the status of any particular precedent to the case that squarely presents it.
Justice Thomas's concurrence points the other way. He would reconsider the entire body of substantive due process decisions in future cases, including Griswold, Lawrence, and Obergefell, because substantive due process has distorted other areas of constitutional law, elevated judges' policy preferences above democratic choices, and produced harmful consequences.74 He had developed the historical side of that view in his Obergefell dissent. Liberty in the Due Process Clauses most likely refers to freedom from physical restraint, as Blackstone defined it, and even a broader reading would treat liberty as freedom from governmental action, not as a claim to a governmental entitlement.75 The two positions fit together because the majority's rejection of the endangerment argument belongs to the Court's opinion, while the call for reconsideration belongs to one Justice writing for himself.
The joint dissent answered with a warning. It argued that the majority's historical test cannot be the controlling method for substantive due process, because it would freeze constitutional meaning to the nineteenth century and disregard precedents, including Loving, Griswold, Lawrence, and Obergefell, that vindicate individual autonomy and equality.76 The tension is structural. The majority distinguishes the other decisions because abortion destroys fetal life, but the history-and-tradition inquiry asks a different question: what the Nation's law has protected. A challenger to another right would face that historical question, answered by that right's own record, unless a different method, such as the reasoned judgment approach used in Obergefell, governs. The opinions leave that question open.
Sorting the opinions by status keeps an answer accurate. The holding is that the Constitution confers no right to abortion and that abortion regulations receive rational-basis review.77 The majority's distinction of the other decisions explains the holding and does not rule on those cases. Justice Kavanaugh's statement and Justice Thomas's call for reconsideration are concurrences, and the joint dissent's warning is a dissent, so none of the three decides the fate of any earlier decision.
Run on a challenge to a state ban on contraceptive sales, step one finds no abortion regulation, step two states the history-and-tradition test, step three finds a recognized liberty that the majority said its holding does not endanger, and step four records the concurrence and the dissent as competing views. Run on a claim to a right to use illicit drugs, the analysis ends at step two, because the broad autonomy theory has no rooted tradition behind it.