Concept
Windsor and State-Defined Marriage
Fundamental rights
Windsor and State-Defined Marriage
United States v. Windsor (2013) struck down a key provision of the Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA) without declaring any right to marry, so it sits awkwardly in a chapter on fundamental rights and serves well as the step before Obergefell.1 A divided Court, by a vote of five to four, held that the Fifth Amendment's Due Process Clause encompasses an equal protection component, and that the component forbids the federal government to discriminate among lawfully recognized marriages without adequate justification.2 The Equal Protection Clause itself sits in the Fourteenth Amendment, so the federal government owes the same obligation of equal treatment through the Fifth Amendment's Due Process Clause.3
DOMA provided that, in determining the meaning of any Act of Congress or of any ruling, regulation, or interpretation of a federal agency, "marriage" means only a legal union between one man and one woman as husband and wife, and "spouse" refers only to a person of the opposite sex who is a husband or a wife.4 The case arose when a surviving spouse, lawfully married to a same-sex partner under New York law, was refused the federal estate-tax marital deduction because of that definition. New York treated her as married and the federal government did not, and that gap is the situation the holding covers.
Justice Kennedy's majority opinion began with state authority over marriage. By history and tradition, the definition and regulation of marriage has been treated as within the authority and realm of the separate States, and the Court assessed the federal intervention against that background.5 Congress may still make discrete determinations that bear on marital rights and privileges, and the Court accepted that limited federal laws regulating the meaning of marriage to further federal policy are constitutional.6 DOMA differed in reach. It enacted a directive for more than 1,000 federal statutes and the whole realm of federal regulations, and it operated on a class of persons that the laws of New York and eleven other States had sought to protect.7 In the Court's words, DOMA rejected the long-established precept that the incidents, benefits, and obligations of marriage are uniform for all married couples within each State, though they may vary from one State to the next.8
Statute B fits the pattern of Windsor, yet Justice Kennedy did not rest the holding on federalism. He found it unnecessary to decide whether the federal intrusion on state power violates the Constitution by disrupting the federal balance, because the State's power in defining the marital relation mattered here quite apart from principles of federalism.9 The reason lies in what the State had done. New York's decision to give this class of persons the right to marry conferred a dignity and status of immense import, and the State's use of its historic and essential authority enhanced their recognition, dignity, and protection in their own community.10 DOMA, because of its reach and extent, departed from the tradition of reliance on state law to define marriage.11 The state-law background therefore does its work through the dignity the State conferred, and the constitutional violation lies in how the federal law treated the people it reached.
The Court found that treatment in the statute's avowed purpose and practical effect: "to impose a disadvantage, a separate status, and so a stigma upon all who enter into same-sex marriages made lawful by the unquestioned authority of the States."12 The constitutional wrong was demeaning and disadvantaging a subset of state-recognized marriages.13 Windsor is best classified as an equal protection decision, because the Court relied solely on equal protection to strike down the provision. Obergefell later found that state bans on same-sex marriage violate the right to marry under both due process and equal protection.14 Loving v. Virginia shows the difference. There the Court described the freedom to marry as fundamental and held that racial classifications, subversive of the principle of equality at the heart of the Fourteenth Amendment, deprive citizens of liberty without due process of law.15 Windsor drew on equality alone.
Windsor announces no tier of scrutiny, and an exam answer should say so. The majority did not resolve whether laws restricting marriage to a man and a woman are reviewed for more than rationality, and Justice Scalia's dissent, which pointed out that omission, would have reviewed the classification only for its rationality.16 The default rule frames the problem. A right not deemed fundamental draws only rational basis review, and courts use rational scrutiny unless a law makes a suspect or quasi-suspect classification or burdens a fundamental right.17 Under that test the government almost always wins unless the court is convinced that the law rests on animus against a group, typically gays and lesbians, and Windsor is among the decisions that pointed to such animus.18 The earlier model is Romer v. Evans, which found Colorado's Amendment 2 so discontinuous in breadth with the reasons offered for it that it seemed inexplicable by anything but animus toward the class it affected.19 That kind of result stands out because the traditional rational basis standard tolerates measures that are imprecise, illogical, and ill-suited to their purposes, and testing the closeness of the fit is characteristic of heightened scrutiny.20 One reading of Windsor is therefore rational basis review with bite. The opinion also blends federalism, state-conferred dignity, and equality, so it supports other readings, and an answer should present the animus reading as one of them and not as the Court's stated test.
Justice Scalia attacked the majority from the other side. He argued that DOMA served ordinary purposes, such as avoiding the difficult choice-of-law issues that arise when there is no uniform federal definition of marriage, and that a definitional provision with that aim is a classic one. In his view the statute reflected stabilizing prudence and not animus.21 He also doubted the majority's limit on its own holding. The Court confined its holding to couples "joined in same-sex marriages made lawful by the State," and he called that sentence a naked declaration and predicted that the opinion's reasoning would arm every challenger to a state law restricting marriage to its traditional definition.22
Federal courts bore the prediction out. Justice Kennedy's opinion sent mixed messages, but it also sent a stronger one about the equal dignity of same-sex couples and their children and the unacceptability of humiliating them, and it tried to persuade, though not yet to require, federal judges to invalidate state prohibitions. Wielding the individual-rights reading of Windsor as authority, the lower federal courts moved much more quickly than the majority had likely anticipated.23 Obergefell, taken up in the next section, supplied the nationwide holding that Windsor withheld.
Run on the facts of Windsor, step two finds a federal definition that disregards a New York marriage. Step three finds a directive covering more than 1,000 statutes, and step four finds an avowed purpose and effect of imposing a separate status and stigma, so the definition fails.24