Concept
Lawrence and Private Intimacy
Fundamental rights
Lawrence and Private Intimacy
Lawrence v. Texas holds that the Due Process Clause protects the liberty of two consenting adults to engage in private sexual conduct, so a state cannot make that conduct a crime.1 The case began when Houston police, dispatched to a private residence on a reported weapons disturbance, entered John Lawrence’s apartment and saw him and Tyron Garner engaged in a sexual act. The opinion notes that the officers’ right to enter does not seem to have been questioned. Both men were arrested, held overnight, charged, and convicted of “deviate sexual intercourse, namely anal sex with a member of the same sex (man).”2 The state court treated Bowers v. Hardwick as controlling and upheld the statute. The Supreme Court held instead that a Texas statute making it a crime for two persons of the same sex to engage in certain intimate sexual conduct violates the Due Process Clause.3 In doing so it overruled Bowers, the 1986 decision that had upheld a Georgia law criminalizing certain homosexual acts.4
Three questions organize the case: whether tradition ends the inquiry, whether a majority’s moral disapproval can justify a crime, and what standard of review the Court actually applied. The contraception cases supply the starting point. Carey held that the right of privacy extends to an individual’s liberty to make choices regarding contraception, though that holding does not automatically invalidate every state regulation. The business of making and selling contraceptives may be regulated in ways that leave individual choices alone, and even a burdensome regulation can stand if a sufficiently compelling state interest supports it.5 Justice Stevens’s dissent in Bowers then stated two propositions that he called “abundantly clear” from the Court’s prior cases. First, “the fact that the governing majority in a State has traditionally viewed a particular practice as immoral is not a sufficient reason for upholding a law prohibiting the practice,” and neither history nor tradition could save a law prohibiting miscegenation. Second, individual decisions by married persons about the intimacies of their physical relationship, even when not intended to produce offspring, are a form of liberty the Due Process Clause protects, and that protection “extends to intimate choices by unmarried as well as married persons.”6 The first proposition denies that tradition alone can defend a law. The second carries protection for marital intimacy to unmarried persons.
Tradition was the center of the dispute. The test for fundamental rights directs judges, who are “not left at large to decide cases in light of their personal and private notions,” to look to the “traditions and [collective] conscience of our people” and ask whether a principle is “so rooted [there] . . . as to be ranked as fundamental.”7 Justice Scalia’s dissent framed that inquiry as whether a right is “deeply rooted in our Nation’s history and tradition.” On that framing, he argued, it is irrelevant whether the old laws targeted homosexual conduct as a distinct matter, because they criminalized it either way, and the Court did not dispute the facts on which Bowers relied.8 The majority answered with more recent developments. The American Law Institute’s Model Penal Code, promulgated in 1955, did not recommend or provide for criminal penalties for consensual sexual relations conducted in private. The Institute gave three grounds: the prohibitions undermined respect for the law by penalizing conduct many people engaged in, the statutes regulated private conduct that harmed no one else, and the laws were arbitrarily enforced and so invited blackmail.9 The twenty-five States with laws prohibiting the conduct at issue in Bowers had shrunk to thirteen, four of which enforced their laws only against homosexual conduct. In the States that still proscribed sodomy, enforcement against consenting adults acting in private had become rare, and Texas admitted in 1994 that it had not prosecuted anyone in those circumstances.10 Justice Scalia replied that an “emerging awareness” is by definition not “deeply rooted,” and that constitutional entitlements “do not spring into existence because some States choose to lessen or eliminate criminal sanctions on certain behavior.”11
The majority conceded the force of the opposing convictions. Condemnation of the conduct has been shaped by religious beliefs, conceptions of right and acceptable behavior, and respect for the traditional family, and for many people these are profound convictions that determine the course of their lives. Those considerations do not answer the question, the Court said, because the issue is whether the majority may use the power of the State to enforce those views on the whole society through the criminal law. It then quoted Casey: “Our obligation is to define the liberty of all, not to mandate our own moral code.”12 The logic is easy to state. If a majority’s belief that private conduct is immoral were enough to support a crime, a minority’s liberty would last only as long as the majority tolerated its choices.
The Court’s own recent decisions had already unsettled Bowers. Romer v. Evans struck down, under the Equal Protection Clause, a Colorado constitutional amendment that named homosexuals, lesbians, and bisexuals as a solitary class and deprived them of protection under state antidiscrimination laws.13 The Court found Amendment 2 “inexplicable by anything but animus toward the class it affects,” and so without a rational relationship to any legitimate state interest.14 The two cases dealt with different issues, but they pulled against each other. Bowers held that a state could criminalize same-sex intimacy based on moral opposition to it, while Romer recast moral opposition as animus and condemned animus against those engaging in the conduct. Romer therefore called the continued vitality of Bowers into question.15 Criticism outside the Court pressed the same point. It was “substantial and continuing,” disapproved Bowers’s reasoning in all respects and not only its historical assumptions, and led the courts of five States to decline to follow it when they read parallel provisions of their own constitutions.16 Dobbs, later in this chapter, lists five factors for deciding whether to overrule a precedent: the quality of its reasoning, its consistency with related decisions, workability, reliance interests, and changed facts or developments of law that undermine it. The criticism of Bowers’s reasoning and Romer’s conflict with it speak to the first two.17
The Court also drew the holding’s boundaries in its own words. It said the case does not involve minors; persons who might be injured or coerced or who stand in relationships where consent might not easily be refused; public conduct or prostitution; or whether the government must give formal recognition to any relationship that homosexual persons seek to enter.18 What the case does involve is two adults who, with full and mutual consent, engaged in sexual practices common to a homosexual lifestyle, and who are “entitled to respect for their private lives.”19 The State “cannot demean their existence or control their destiny by making their private sexual conduct a crime,” and the Texas statute “furthers no legitimate state interest which can justify its intrusion into the personal and private life of the individual.”20 Each exclusion marks an edge of the holding. Adult consent, privacy, and the absence of commerce are the facts the decision stands on, and a claim of harm to another person, of conduct in public, or of payment would change the case. A demand for formal recognition differs in kind, because it asks the government to confer a status instead of asking it to stay out of private life.
The opinion never names its standard of review, and that silence generates most of the debate about the case. Justice Scalia’s dissent points out that the Court never described homosexual sodomy as a “fundamental right” or a “fundamental liberty interest” and never applied strict scrutiny. Having failed to establish a right “deeply rooted in this Nation’s history and tradition,” he says, the Court concluded that the statute fails the rational-basis test.21 He also stressed that the majority applied only rational-basis review, albeit less deferentially than the standard is sometimes employed, and the Court did not need to decide whether the liberty was fundamental if the law failed even that test.22 A dissent that lists what the majority never held is a useful guide to the holding. Justice Black’s dissent in another case, for instance, observed that the Court had never clearly held that proof beyond a reasonable doubt is commanded by any provision of the Constitution.23
Two readings of the silence compete. The first treats Lawrence as rational basis review with real bite. Romer supports that reading. One can view Romer as an enhanced version of the rational basis test, or as one of the rare cases in which a law fails the test because of overwhelming evidence that it was enacted for an illegitimate purpose. On either view the critical factor was the conviction that the measure was inexplicable by anything but animus toward the class it affected.24 The second reading treats the liberty as one that may yet be called fundamental. The Court’s careful delineation of the right, and its failure to resolve the fundamental-right question, may reflect caution about when a state might legitimately infringe this newly recognized liberty, so a later case could hold it fundamental.25 The level of generality of the right drives what is at stake. If Lawrence established a fundamental right to engage in intimate personal relationships regardless of sexual orientation, every classification based on sexuality might trigger strict scrutiny, the most demanding equal protection standard. Judicial nervousness about those consequences may explain why the Court used substantive due process and forwent equal protection analysis.26
Justice Scalia’s dissent shows what he thought rode on rejecting moral disapproval as a justification: “This effectively decrees the end of all morals legislation. If, as the Court asserts, the promotion of majoritarian sexual morality is not even a legitimate state interest, none of the above-mentioned laws can survive rational-basis review.”27 The Court’s stated limits narrow that worry, since the holding covers consenting adults acting in private without commerce or a demand for recognition.28 Because the Court purported to apply only rational basis review, it also committed itself to no position on same-sex marriage and remained free to consider how the country reacted to Lawrence and whether public support for same-sex marriage would grow.29 Later opinions summarize the decision as overruling Bowers because laws making same-sex intimacy a crime “demea[n] the lives of homosexual persons,” and the federal Defense of Marriage Act was later struck down as well.30 The next sections follow that development through Windsor and Obergefell.
Step four carries the weight, because steps two and three only establish that the claimed liberty is the one Lawrence protected. Run on the Texas statute, the steps find two adults acting privately and consensually, no excluded category, and no asserted state interest beyond moral disapproval, so the law fails under either reading of the standard.