Concept
Substantive Due Process Basics
Fundamental rights
Fundamental Rights Under Due Process
Substantive Due Process Basics
The Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments forbid the federal government and the states to “deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law,” and throughout American history courts have used those words to protect fundamental rights, ranging from slaveholding in American territories to same-sex marriage.1 On its face the clause promises process: notice, a hearing, a fair decision maker. Yet process alone cannot explain how the words protect rights. Substantive due process supplies the rest. It asks whether the government has an adequate reason for taking away a person’s life, liberty, or property, and whether the reason is adequate depends very much on the level of scrutiny the court applies.2
The reason to read a process clause this way is that a statute can destroy a liberty in advance, for everyone, and a fair hearing given to one individual later repairs nothing. Justice Harlan made the point in his dissent in Poe v. Ullman: were due process merely a procedural safeguard, it would fail to reach legislation that, “given even the fairest possible procedure in application to individuals,” could nevertheless destroy the enjoyment of life, liberty, and property. The text of the Clause therefore imposes an obligation to give substantive content to the words “liberty” and “due process of law.”3
Once the Clause has substantive content, courts need a way to sort laws, because nearly every statute limits what someone may do. The sorting device is a two-tier structure that traces to footnote four of United States v. Carolene Products Co.. Like the rest of constitutional doctrine, it is a body of rules that comes out of particular cases, where the boundary between individual liberty and government power gets drawn.4 The courts first ask whether the liberty at stake is fundamental. If it is, strict scrutiny applies, and the government action must be necessary to achieve a compelling goal. If it is not, the action need only be rationally related to a legitimate government goal.5
Rational basis review is deferential enough that a court may supply a rationale the legislature never stated. In Williamson v. Lee Optical, the Court upheld a law requiring people to have their eyes checked when their glasses needed replacing, even though it conceded the law was perhaps “a needless, wasteful requirement in many cases” and “not in every respect logically consistent with its aims.” The legislature balances costs and benefits, and it might have concluded that the requirement would improve eye care. A conceivable state interest, even if not the actual one, was enough.6
That deference answers the Lochner era. In Lochner v. New York, a 5-4 Court struck down a New York law that barred the employment of bakers for more than ten hours a day or sixty hours a week, calling it “an unreasonable, unnecessary and arbitrary interference with the right of the individual to…enter into those contracts in relation to labor which may seem to him appropriate or necessary.”7 By 1937, in West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, the Court had changed course in three ways. Liberty to contract still received protection but was no longer a fundamental liberty that triggered strict scrutiny. The Court stopped substituting its judgment for the legislature’s and treated such laws as presumptively valid. And it no longer overturned laws that redressed inequalities of wealth or bargaining power on the ground that they did not further the public good.8 Dobbs v. Jackson Women’s Health Organization later drew the lesson. Rejecting Lochner does not require disavowing implied fundamental rights, but to avoid repeating Lochner’s error of converting personal preferences into constitutional mandates, modern cases stress “judicial self-restraint.” Implied fundamental rights must be “objectively, deeply rooted in this Nation’s history and tradition” and “implicit in the concept of ordered liberty, such that neither liberty nor justice would exist if they were sacrificed,” in the words of Glucksberg that Dobbs quotes.9 The next section takes up those tests.
The two tiers can send laws that look alike to opposite outcomes. A statute capping the weekly hours of bakery employees, attacked by an owner who invokes liberty of contract, is the kind of law struck down in Lochner, yet the same challenge today draws only rational basis review, because economic rights are not fundamental.10 A criminal ban on contraceptive sales sits at the other pole: it would impose an undue burden on the freedom to practice birth control and would draw strict scrutiny.11 That is the kind of law challenged in Griswold v. Connecticut, which a later section develops. Both statutes restrict conduct that the affected people would otherwise choose. The difference in tier follows from whether the Court treats the burdened liberty as fundamental, which makes that the first question after any rights claim.
Fundamental is a label the Court applies, and no liberty carries it on its face. The concept remains vague. The Justices have selected a group of individual rights that have no specific textual basis in the Constitution or its amendments and deemed them fundamental.12 Abortion once appeared on that list, but Dobbs held that procuring an abortion is not a fundamental right, so state abortion regulations receive rational-basis review. The Court called Roe “egregiously wrong from the start.”13 Because the Court makes the selection, some Justices doubt the whole enterprise. Justice Thomas has said that the demise of the Privileges or Immunities Clause contributed in no small part to the disarray of Fourteenth Amendment doctrine, and that the Court should consider whether that Clause should displace, rather than augment, portions of equal protection and substantive due process doctrine.14
Even for a fundamental liberty, strict scrutiny applies only when the law interferes with the liberty directly and substantially. Not every governmental interference is serious enough to impair a constitutional right, and the impingement requirement separates insignificant government actions from those substantial enough to trigger strict scrutiny. A general sales tax on contraceptives would probably not impinge on the freedom to practice birth control, whereas a law criminalizing their sale would.15 The Court has said it weighs “the directness and substantiality of” the interference, though it has said surprisingly little about what makes an interference direct and substantial.16
Because the tiers produce such different results, the classification usually decides the case. Once a right is found to be fundamental, the state has rarely succeeded in justifying an intrusion on it, whereas a law reviewed for rational basis is relatively easy to uphold.17 Litigants and courts can organize every rights case around four questions, which the later sections of this chapter reuse.18
Run the contraceptive ban from the hypothetical through the steps. At step one, the freedom to practice birth control is a liberty the Court treats as fundamental. At step two, a criminal prohibition is as direct a burden as a law can impose, unlike a general sales tax that would probably not impinge on the liberty.20 Steps three and four then require the state to show a compelling goal and means that are necessary to reach it.
The sections that follow apply this sequence to the families of rights the Court has treated as fundamental or has been asked to: parental and family rights, contraception and privacy, private intimacy in Lawrence, marriage in Windsor and Obergefell, and abortion before and after Dobbs. Some of these decisions rest on equal protection as well as due process. Windsor relied solely on equal protection to strike down a key provision of the federal Defense of Marriage Act, while Obergefell found that state laws prohibiting same-sex marriage violate the right to marry under both due process and equal protection.21