Concept
Beyond the Commerce Clause
Authorization of otherwise invalid state action
Beyond the Commerce Clause
Congressional authorization reshapes what states may do beyond the dormant Commerce Clause, but each provision allocates the power differently, and the differences decide cases. Begin with the Commerce Clause itself. In Northeast Bancorp, the Court observed that the dormant Commerce Clause would bar a group of states from creating a regional banking system that excluded out-of-region bank holding companies if Congress had stayed completely silent. Congress had not stayed silent: it had exercised its commerce power by enacting the Bank Holding Company Act and the Douglas amendment. The Court drew the consequence: “When Congress so chooses, state actions which it plainly authorizes are invulnerable to constitutional attack under the Commerce Clause.”1
That sentence names a single clause. The petitioners also argued that the Massachusetts and Connecticut statutes violated the Compact and Equal Protection Clauses, and so were not the valid state statutes the Douglas Amendment required.2 Congressional authorization answers the Commerce Clause objection. Whether it answers any other constitutional objection depends on which government holds the power at issue.
The first provision makes consent a condition rather than a cure. Article IV, section 3 forbids forming a new state by the junction of two or more states, or parts of states, without the consent of the legislatures of the states concerned as well as of Congress.3 The states concerned cannot redraw the map among themselves, and Congress cannot redraw it without them. The act becomes lawful only when both agree, which fits a change that alters the territory of the national government and of the particular states that give up land.
The next two provisions raise the same first question: whose power is at work, and can a state exercise it alone? Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment gives Congress a remedial power that the states lack. The Full Faith and Credit Clause writes Congress’s role into the text of the interstate obligation itself.
Section 5 Enforcement Power
A city that wants the protection of Congress’s power to enforce the Fourteenth Amendment finds, as City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co. shows, that the power does not travel. Richmond defended its race-conscious contracting program by pointing to Fullilove v. Klutznick, which had upheld a federal program. The Court answered that Congress, unlike any state or political subdivision, has a specific constitutional mandate to enforce the dictates of the Fourteenth Amendment.
That mandate comes from section 5, and the contrast with section 1 explains the result. Section 5 empowers Congress to adopt measures that enforce the amendment’s guarantees.4 Section 1 states the guarantees and restrains the states: the Equal Protection Clause, for example, prohibits racially segregated state school systems of its own force.5 One amendment hands a power to Congress and a restraint to the states, and that difference decides whose remedial program the amendment supports.
The reason a city cannot borrow Congress’s power follows from what the borrowing would do. Section 1 checks how states use racial classifications. If a state or city could claim the full section 5 power by describing its program as remedial, its own recital would insulate the classification from section 1 scrutiny, and the government being restrained would decide that the restraint does not apply. Croson noted that section 1 stemmed from distrust of state legislative enactments based on race, while section 5 is a positive grant of power to Congress.
Congress’s own power is broad but bounded. The Court has accepted strong remedial and preventive measures where the deprivation of constitutional rights has been widespread and persisting, as in this country’s history of racial discrimination.6 The means-ends standard of McCulloch v. Maryland frames the review of such legislation: a legitimate end, pursued by means plainly adapted to it and consistent with the letter and spirit of the Constitution. Still, any suggestion that Congress has a substantive, non-remedial power under the Fourteenth Amendment finds no support in the case law.7
The power stays remedial, and that limit marks the difference from commerce. Section 5 gives Congress no power to restrict, abrogate, or dilute the amendment’s guarantees, so an enactment authorizing states to maintain racially segregated school systems would not be a measure to enforce the Equal Protection Clause.8 Congress’s consent removes an objection that arises when Congress is silent. It cannot remove a prohibition the Constitution imposes of its own force. The Court once answered a claim by a state’s Governor and Legislature that they were not bound by its holding in Brown by recalling that Article VI makes the Constitution the “supreme Law of the Land.”9
When a question has a city or state defending a race-conscious measure by pointing to a federal program that survived under section 5, ask first which government is acting. When Congress acts to enforce the amendment, its mandate supports the program, as it did for the federal program in Fullilove. When a city or state acts on its own authority, it remains under section 1, and its recital of a remedial purpose does not take the program outside judicial scrutiny.
Full Faith and Credit
Article IV, section 1 contains two sentences that do different jobs. The first imposes a duty on the states: “Full Faith and Credit shall be given in each State to the public Acts, Records, and judicial Proceedings of every other State.” The second gives a power to Congress, which “may by general Laws prescribe the Manner in which such Acts, Records and Proceedings shall be proved, and the Effect thereof.”11 The power sits in the same clause as the duty and names Congress as the body that shapes it, so no individual state may define the duty for itself.
Congress has used the power. It provided in 1790 that judgments “shall have such faith and credit given to them in every court within the United States as they have by law or usage in the courts of the State from which they are taken.” The clause and that Act of Congress put a judgment, for most purposes, on a different footing from a sister state’s statute.12
The power covers two subjects. The manner of proof concerns how a sister state’s record is established before a court. The effect concerns what the record carries once proved: the weight and binding force it has in the receiving state. A court in the receiving state decides how much a neighbor’s act or judgment counts, with its own state’s policies in view. If each state fixed proof and effect by its own rules, the duty a state owes would be measured by the state that owes it, and the same judgment could carry different force in different states. A single legislature acting by general laws can supply one rule for every state.
The clause also differs from the dormant Commerce Clause cases. There the limit on the states matters when Congress is silent, and congressional authorization lifts it.13 Here the text names Congress’s role, and the Constitution, as the supreme law, binds a state legislature that would trim the duty.14 As with section 5, the first question is which government holds the power, and the answer is Congress. This section claims only what the text says: Congress may prescribe the manner of proof and the effect. How far that power extends is a question this chapter does not address.
The two scenes turn on which government acted. Both involve a rule about the weight of sister-state judgments, and only the rule Congress adopted under the clause’s own grant governs the states. A question that describes a state setting its own terms for honoring a neighbor’s records tests whether you see that the clause gives the shaping power to Congress.