Concept
Arizona's Immigration Law
Supremacy clause and preemption
Arizona's Immigration Law
Arizona v. United States applies the preemption doctrines taught above to one statute, S. B. 1070, and the Court gave a separate answer for each of the four provisions before it. Federal law made in pursuance of the Constitution is the supreme law of the land, and judges in every state are bound by it despite any contrary state law,1 so the question for each provision is whether, under preemption principles, federal law permits Arizona to implement it.2
The federal immigration power does not answer that question by its mere existence. In De Canas v. Bica, the Court upheld a California statute that barred an employer from knowingly employing a non-citizen where the employment would harm lawful resident workers, and it held that the immigration power does not automatically preclude state regulations affecting non-citizens.3 Arizona's statute could not be judged as a single unit for that reason. Each provision had to be sorted by what it regulates and by what Congress has done about that subject. Four provisions reached the Court:
- Section 3 makes it a state misdemeanor to fail willfully “to complete or carry an alien registration document.”4 The Court held it preempted by the federal registration scheme,5 and a dissent confirms that the holding was one of field preemption.6
- Section 5(C) forbids unlawfully present aliens to knowingly apply for, solicit, or perform work in Arizona.7 The Court held it an obstacle to the federal scheme governing unauthorized employment.8
- Section 6 authorizes warrantless arrests on probable cause that the arrestee has committed a public offense making him removable.9 The Court again found an obstacle.10
- Section 2(B) ties checks of immigration status to a lawful stop, detention, or arrest made while enforcing some other state or local law.11 The Court refused to enjoin it before the state courts had construed it and before any showing that its enforcement conflicts with federal law.12
The same discipline serves on an exam stem that describes a statute with several provisions. Identify what each provision regulates, choose the preemption route that fits that provision, and do not let the result on one carry over to the next. Registration comes first because it supplies the field-preemption holding.
Section 3: Alien Registration
Section 3 makes it a state misdemeanor to fail willfully “to complete or carry an alien registration document,”13 and in effect it adds a state penalty to conduct that federal law already proscribes.14 A state that punishes only what Congress has already forbidden seems to contradict nothing, so the first instinct is to find no conflict and therefore no preemption. The United States answered that the state enforcement mechanism intrudes on the field of alien registration, a field in which Congress left no room for the states, and the Court agreed.15
The Court's anchor was Hines v. Davidowitz, which found that Congress intended the federal plan for registration to be “a single integrated and all-embracing system.”16 Because that complete scheme touched on foreign relations, Hines held that the states could not “curtail or complement” federal law or “enforce additional or auxiliary regulations.”17 Justice Alito, who would have upheld section 5(C), saw the consequence for section 3 plainly: if the Court credits Hines, then Arizona's attempt to impose additional state-law penalties for violations of federal registration requirements must be invalidated.18
The word that carries the holding is “complement.” A state that adds its own penalty behind a federal registration rule has not contradicted the federal rule. It has supplemented the federal scheme, and supplementing is what an occupied field forecloses. The tests for field preemption say as much. A federal scheme may be so pervasive as to support the inference that Congress left no room for the states to supplement it, and the federal interest may be so dominant that the federal system is assumed to preclude state enforcement on the same subject.19 Hines's picture of a single, integrated, all-embracing system that touches foreign relations fits both inferences.20 An answer that stops at the observation that the state rule matches the federal rule therefore skips the field question, because a match is exactly what a complementary regulation looks like.
How broadly a court draws the field matters as much as whether Congress occupied it. For express field preemption, the rule of thumb is to define the field as narrowly as the preemptive language permits, so as not to limit unduly the police powers of the states.21 Pacific Gas & Electric shows that rule at work: a state's refusal to license a proposed nuclear reactor for economic reasons survived federal occupation of the field of nuclear safety.22 The field the United States invoked against Arizona was equally specific. It was alien registration, not every state law that touches aliens.23
That narrowness explains why De Canas survives. The Court there upheld a state law fining employers who hired aliens unlawfully present, reasoning that the mere fact that aliens are the subject of a state statute does not make it a regulation of immigration and that states possess broad police-power authority to regulate the employment relationship to protect workers within the state.24 Displacing such a law required a showing that complete ouster of state power was the clear and manifest purpose of Congress.25 Both De Canas and section 3 concern aliens, so that fact cannot separate them. The subject regulated does. Employment is a traditional state concern protected by the clear-and-manifest-purpose standard, while registration is the subject of the integrated federal system that Hines described. De Canas also predates Congress's own restrictions on employers who hire illegal aliens, a change that matters for section 5(C).26
Two Justices would have upheld section 3, and their opinions supply the counterargument. Justice Scalia reasoned that Hines held only that the states may not establish “additional or auxiliary” registration requirements, and section 3 establishes none: it merely makes the very same failure to register and failure to carry evidence of registration a violation of state law as well.27 In some areas of uniquely federal concern, such as fraud in a federal administrative process or perjury in violation of a federally required oath, the Court has held that a state has no legitimate interest in enforcing a federal scheme. Registration is not of that kind, he argued, because states, private entities, and individuals rely on the federal registration system regularly, and Arizona has a legitimate interest in protecting, among other things, its unemployment-benefits system.28 Answering the Government's obstacle argument, he added that “there is no conflict in terms, and no possibility of such conflict, [if] the state statute makes federal law its own.”29 Justice Thomas reached the same result by another path. Section 3 simply incorporates federal registration standards, and nothing in the text of the federal statutes indicates that Congress meant their enforcement to be exclusively federal; that Congress created a full set of standards shows only that it intended the scheme to work on its own. Recent cases, he noted, have frequently rejected field preemption absent statutory language expressly requiring it, and he would read Hines at most to bar additional registration requirements.30
The majority and the dissents agree on what section 3 does: it adds no new registration requirement and only penalizes failure to meet federal ones.31 They split over what it means to occupy a field. The majority reads Hines's bar on state complementing to reach even state enforcement of the federal standards, while the dissents read the bar as aimed at additional or auxiliary requirements and would let a state enforce the standards Congress created.32 The majority's reading is the holding, and the dissents mark the argument that a challenger to the holding would press.
Section 5(C): Unauthorized Work
Section 5(C) makes it a state crime for an unlawfully present alien to knowingly apply for, solicit, or perform work in Arizona, and, as Justice Thomas observed, it operates only on individuals whom Congress has already declared ineligible to work.35 Unlike section 3, it does not echo a federal criminal offense. The Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986 (IRCA) imposes criminal and civil penalties on employers but only civil penalties on aliens who seek or engage in unauthorized employment.36 The Court held that Arizona's criminal penalty on workers is an obstacle to that federal scheme.37
The Court read IRCA's asymmetry as a choice. Proposals to make unauthorized work a criminal offense were debated while IRCA was drafted, and Congress rejected them.38 From the text, structure, and history of IRCA, the Court drew the instruction that Congress decided it would be inappropriate to impose criminal penalties on aliens who seek or engage in unauthorized employment, and it concluded that a state law to the contrary is an obstacle to the regulatory system Congress chose.39 The policy behind the choice, in the Court's account, is that making criminals of workers who already face the risk of employer exploitation because of their removable status would be inconsistent with federal policy and objectives.40
That Arizona and Congress share a goal does not save the provision. Section 5(C) pursues one of the same goals as federal law, the deterrence of unlawful employment, but it involves a conflict in the method of enforcement.41 A statute that decides who answers criminally and who answers only civilly has fixed part of its means, and a state that moves that line alters the federal design while pursuing the federal end. The Court also relied on the principle that where a comprehensive federal scheme intentionally leaves a portion of the regulated field without controls, “the pre-emptive inference can be drawn—not from federal inaction alone, but from inaction joined with action.”42 The detailed employer regime is the action. The omission of criminal penalties for workers is the inaction joined to it.
IRCA's express preemption provision seems at first to point the other way. A court reads an express clause for its reach before it asks what lies outside it; in one case under the Medical Device Amendments of 1976, for example, the question was whether the clause barred common-law claims challenging the design, labeling, and manufacturing of a device that had received premarket approval.43 IRCA's clause displaces “any State or local law imposing civil or criminal sanctions (other than through licensing and similar laws) upon those who employ, or recruit or refer for a fee for employment, unauthorized aliens,” and it is silent about penalties on the employees themselves.44 That silence invites the inference that Congress left worker penalties to the states. The Court declined to draw it, because an express preemption provision “does not bar the ordinary working of conflict pre-emption principles” and imposes no “special burden” that makes it harder to establish the preemption of laws falling outside the clause.45 The Court took that rule from Geier, which arose under a motor-vehicle safety act that contained its own express preemption provision barring any state safety standard different from an applicable federal standard.46 A clause records what Congress chose to displace in so many words. It is not a catalog of every state law that could disrupt the federal scheme.
The same statute produced the opposite result when Arizona regulated employers. In Chamber of Commerce v. Whiting, the Court held, 5-3, that an Arizona law imposing sanctions on employers through licensing laws fell squarely within IRCA's savings clause for licensing and similar laws and did not otherwise conflict with federal law.47 Congress addressed employer sanctions, displaced them, and then saved licensing, so the state law operated inside a space Congress had marked out for it. Both Arizona laws aim at unlawful employment, so the shared goal cannot separate them. What separates them is whether the state's method fits the federal design. A licensing sanction on employers sits within the allocation Congress drew, while a criminal sanction on workers contradicts it.
Three Justices dissented from the section 5(C) holding, and their opinions supply the arguments an answer should be ready to state. Justice Scalia accepted that Congress rejected criminal penalties for unauthorized work but denied that the rejection shows an intent to bar state penalties. It is no more expressive of a desire that there be no sanctions on employees than of a desire that such sanctions be left to the states, and it most likely expresses what inaction ordinarily expresses: nothing at all.48 Congress's intent about state law, he said, is found in the express clause, and under the canon expressio unius est exclusio alterius, a clause that displaces laws punishing “those who employ” implies that laws punishing “those who seek or accept employment” are not displaced.49 He called the majority's reasoning a description not of conflict preemption but of field preemption, which concededly does not occur beyond the terms of an express provision.50
Justice Thomas found nothing in the text of the federal immigration laws that bars state criminal penalties on unauthorized workers. Federal law expressly preempts state sanctions on those who employ unauthorized aliens, he noted, but it leaves the states free to impose criminal sanctions on the employees themselves.51 That is the textual objection to implied preemption raised earlier in this chapter, applied to a concrete case.
Justice Alito granted that federal regulation of unauthorized employment is more pervasive today but insisted that the task is unchanged: to determine whether the federal scheme discloses a clear and manifest congressional intent to displace state law.52 State employment regulation is a traditional state concern, and Congress's decision not to extend its express preemption provision to laws like section 5(C) is more probative of its intent than its decision not to impose federal criminal penalties. Inferences can be drawn either way, no necessary inference points decisively for or against preemption, and so, on his view, section 5(C) must survive.53 Justice Scalia put the same point in terms of time. When De Canas was decided, section 5(C) would have been indubitably lawful, and the only relevant change is that Congress has since enacted its own restrictions on employers.54
The dispute over legislative inaction decides the case. The majority read Congress's rejection of criminal penalties for workers, set beside a detailed enforcement scheme aimed at employers, as a choice. Scalia replied that a failed proposal says nothing either way, and standing alone an inference from inaction is weak. The majority's answer is that it relied on the text, structure, and history of the statute together and on no single failed bill.55 The majority's view is the holding, and the dissents show where a challenger would press to narrow it.
Section 6: Warrantless Arrests
Section 6 authorizes Arizona officers to make warrantless arrests on probable cause to believe that the arrestee has committed a public offense that makes him removable under federal immigration law.58 The United States argued that such arrests would be an obstacle to the removal system Congress created, and the Court agreed.59 The analysis is obstacle preemption again: identify what Congress chose, then ask whether the state provision alters the choice, remembering that federal law prevails over a conflicting state rule.60
The Court began from a premise about removal. As a general rule, it is not a crime for a removable alien to remain present in the United States, so an officer who stops someone on nothing more than possible removability lacks the usual predicate for an arrest.61 Federal practice follows that premise. When an alien is suspected of being removable, a federal official issues a Notice to Appear, an administrative document that does not authorize an arrest and instead gives the alien information about the proceedings.62 Removal runs on notice, and arrest within it is a tool that federal law makes available only in particular circumstances.
Congress specified those circumstances. In some situations the Attorney General issues a warrant for trained federal immigration officers to execute, and absent a federal warrant those officers have more limited authority. They may arrest an alien who is “in the United States in violation of any [immigration] law or regulation,” for example, but only where the alien “is likely to escape before a warrant can be obtained.”63 Section 6 would give state officers more than that. They could arrest on the basis of possible removability even though trained federal officers have not been given that authority,64 regardless of whether a federal warrant has issued or the alien is likely to escape, and without any input from the federal government about whether an arrest is warranted in the particular case.65 The Court's opinion focused on the limits Congress placed on federal officials and on the possibility that state officials would make arrests “to achieve [Arizona's] own immigration policy” and “without any input from the Federal Government.”66
That is why section 6 is an obstacle even though no federal provision commands state officers to refrain. Congress decided who may arrest in the removal process and when. Section 6 hands state officers broader power than trained federal officers hold, exercisable without federal instruction, so a state could undercut the federal limits and the choice of which removable aliens are taken into custody would pass out of federal hands. Sharing the goal of enforcing immigration law does not cure that defect, because what the provision changes is who decides.
Federal law does leave room for state participation, but on federal terms. State officers may “cooperate with the Attorney General in the identification, apprehension, detention, or removal of aliens not lawfully present in the United States,” and the Court held that this does not encompass the unilateral decision to detain that section 6 authorizes.67 Justice Thomas understood the majority to require a prior “request, approval, or other instruction from the Federal Government” before cooperation occurs, and he found no such requirement in the statute.68 Federal law says that state officers may help. Section 6 says that they may decide.
Justice Thomas would have upheld section 6. States, as sovereigns, have inherent authority to arrest for violations of federal law unless and until Congress removes that authority, he reasoned, citing United States v. Di Re in support.70 No federal statute withdraws that authority, in his view: the statutes limiting arrests of removable aliens limit federal officials and do not apply to state officers, and federal law expressly recognizes that state officers may cooperate with the Attorney General in apprehension and detention.71 The Government's primary contention, as Justice Scalia restated it, was that section 6 lets state officials arrest “without regard to federal priorities.”72
The majority and the dissent disagree about the default. As Justice Thomas understood it, the majority treats the federal statutes as an allocation of arrest authority, under which state officers act when federal officials request, approve, or direct their efforts. The dissent treats state arrest authority as the baseline that survives until Congress removes it, and it reads federal law as limiting only federal officials. That disagreement echoes the one over field preemption in section 3, and the majority's allocation view is the holding. An answer should state the holding first and then name the inherent-authority baseline as the counterpoint.
An exam stem that gives state officers arrest power based on suspected removability asks one question: who decides to arrest? Authority exercised in cooperation with federal officials fits the federal design. Authority exercised unilaterally on the officer's own judgment does not.
Section 2(B): Status Checks
Valid federal law outranks a contrary state law, but that rule of priority has work to do only after a court finds a contradiction,75 and on section 2(B) the Court found none it could responsibly assume. Section 2(B) concerns verifying the immigration status of people already lawfully stopped, detained, or arrested for some other offense. It is triggered only when such a stop, detention, or arrest is made in the enforcement of another state or local law, so it comes into play only when an officer already has reasonable suspicion or probable cause that the person committed a nonimmigration offense.76 The Court held it improper to enjoin the provision before the state courts had an opportunity to construe it and without some showing that its enforcement in fact conflicts with federal immigration law and its objectives.77 That outcome separates 2(B) from sections 3, 5(C), and 6, each of which the Court held preempted. It is also a limited ruling. The Court found the provision not shown to be preempted at this stage, and it left later challenges open.78
The provision's own text made a conflict hard to show. Section 2(B) does not expand the authority of Arizona officers to make stops or arrests, and they plainly possessed that authority before the provision took effect.79 The provision also carries three limits. A detainee who provides a valid Arizona driver's license or similar identification is presumed not to be an illegal alien. Officers may not consider race, color, or national origin “except to the extent permitted by the United States [and] Arizona Constitution[s].” And 2(B) must be “implemented in a manner consistent with federal law regulating immigration, protecting the civil rights of all persons and respecting the privileges and immunities of United States citizens.”80 The last limit matters most for preemption, because a provision that must by its own terms be applied consistently with federal law leaves a court little basis for assuming in advance that it will be applied to contradict federal law. The Court found unpersuasive the argument that, even with these limits, 2(B) must be held preempted at this stage.81
Timing matters because obstacle preemption asks whether, “under the circumstances of this particular case,” the state law stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress.82 When a statute's operation is plain, as with a state crime for violating federal registration rules, a court can set the state rule beside the federal scheme. Section 2(B) lacks that plainness. The Court found “a basic uncertainty about what the law means and how it will be enforced,” and whether the provision obstructs federal law depends on what the state courts hold it to mean and on how officers apply it.83 The Court therefore concluded that, “[a]t this stage, without the benefit of a definitive interpretation from the state courts, it would be inappropriate to assume §2B will be construed in a way that creates a conflict with federal law.”84 The same approach applies to any new state law that could be interpreted in ways that reduce or avoid a potential conflict: a federal court may defer ruling until the state courts have had the first opportunity to construe their own law.85
This is the logic of the ripeness discussion in the nuclear-power section above. A court asks whether the issue is fit for decision and what hardship withholding a decision would cause. Fitness is poor here because the answer depends on state-court construction and on enforcement that has not yet occurred. Hardship from waiting is small because the Court did not close the door: its opinion “does not foreclose other preemption and constitutional challenges to the law as interpreted and applied after it goes into effect.”86
Separate opinions agreed with the result for additional reasons. Justice Scalia relied on the Government's concession that, even before section 2 was enacted, state and local officers had state-law authority to inquire of the Department of Homeland Security about a suspect's unlawful status and to cooperate with federal immigration officers, a concession that in his view obviates further inquiry.87 Another separate opinion reasoned that the provision does not authorize or require officers to do anything they are not already allowed to do under existing federal law. It called the Government's alternative theory, that 2(B) is preempted not by any federal statute or regulation but by the Executive's current enforcement policy, “an astounding assertion of federal executive power” that the Court rightly rejected.88 That objection rests on the text on which this unit began: federal law made in pursuance of the Constitution is supreme, and an enforcement preference that no statute or regulation embodies is not such law.89
The preemption holding leaves a separate set of concerns untouched. Justice Alito acknowledged that enforcing 2(B) “will multiply the occasions on which sensitive Fourth Amendment issues will crop up,” that close questions will arise about whether an officer had reasonable suspicion of unlawful presence, and that there is a risk that citizens and lawful residents will be detained. He suggested that Arizona could issue guidance to officers and that the Federal Government could share its own guidelines.90 Justice Scalia noted the Court's extended discussion of the fear that state officers will have to delay the release of some detainees for no reason other than to verify their immigration status. He added that any investigatory detention, including one under 2(B), may become an unreasonable seizure if it lasts too long, but that this is a Fourth Amendment question and not a claim that federal immigration law preempts the provision. He knew of no reason why a protracted detention that does not violate the Fourth Amendment would conflict with any federal immigration law.91
The two scenes differ in what the court has to work with. In Arizona the court had a text and a prediction. In the later suit it would have actual enforcement to measure against federal objectives. A stem that describes a pre-enforcement suit against a new provision with built-in consistency limits, and no showing of how it operates, tests this section. The answer should say that the challenge fails on this record, that the conflict question depends on state-court construction and actual enforcement, and that the result is not a declaration of validity.