Concept
Textualist Objections to Implied Preemption
Supremacy clause and preemption
Textualist Objections to Implied Preemption
Obstacle preemption asks a court to find a federal purpose and then measure the state law against it, and the textualist critic asks where that purpose comes from. Suppose a federal statute regulates a product, a committee report says Congress wanted one national standard, and the text never mentions state law. A state then adds a requirement of its own. The obstacle doctrine reads the report and finds the state rule at odds with the national standard. The critic asks first whether the enacted words conflict with the state rule, and the report cannot answer that question. This section sets out the critique, the competing text-based argument that a plurality made in PLIVA v. Mensing (the generic-drug labeling case), and the dissent’s reply, so that you can argue any side of a debate the Court has not settled.
The Textual Test
The objection begins with the words of Article VI, clause 2. The Constitution, the treaties, and “the Laws of the United States which shall be made in Pursuance thereof” are the supreme law of the land, “any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding.”1 Justice Thomas reads “made in Pursuance” to limit preemption to enacted law. Concurring only in the judgment in Wyeth, he said he could no longer assent to a doctrine that preempts state laws merely because they stand as an obstacle to the full purposes and objectives of federal law “as perceived by this Court,” because such a sweeping approach leads to the illegitimate, and therefore unconstitutional, invalidation of state laws.2
His premise concerns what counts as law. Congressional and agency “musings” do not satisfy the requirements of Article I, section 7 for enacting federal law, so they cannot preempt state law under the Supremacy Clause, and evidence of preemptive purpose has to be sought “in the text and structure of the [provision] at issue.”3 Preemptive effect therefore belongs only to federal standards “set forth in, or necessarily follow from, the statutory text,” produced through bicameral and presentment procedures.4 The point follows from how a bill becomes law. The enacted words are what both houses and the President approved, while a committee report, an agency’s preamble, or the Government’s litigating position never passed through that process. If such a source could displace a state rule, an unenacted statement would override a state law that was itself validly enacted.
The test that results asks whether state law conflicts with the text of the relevant federal statute or with the federal regulations that text authorizes.5 A direct clash between the words of the two laws still preempts. What the test excludes is preemption based on a purpose found outside the text. Thomas objected that the Court “routinely invalidates state laws based on perceived conflicts with broad federal policy objectives, legislative history, or generalized notions of congressional purposes that are not embodied within the text of federal law,”6 and he cited Geier, where the Court relied on regulatory history, agency comments, and the Government’s litigating position to find state law preempted.7
The Arizona litigation shows the test and the doctrine pulling apart. The majority reasoned that section 5(C) of S.B. 1070 would interfere with the careful balance Congress struck on the unauthorized employment of aliens: although the provision pursued one of the same goals as federal law, deterring unlawful employment, it involved “a conflict in the method of enforcement.”8 Justice Thomas found no conflict between the ordinary meaning of the Arizona law and that of the federal laws, and he objected that the Court nonetheless held various provisions preempted because they stand as an obstacle to Congress’s purposes.9 Under the Supremacy Clause, he said, “pre-emptive effect is to be given to congressionally enacted laws, not to judicially divined legislative purposes.”10
Section 6 supplies a second illustration. The Court reasoned that the provision would give state officers even greater authority to arrest aliens on the basis of possible removability than Congress has given trained federal immigration officers, and that state officers could use that authority without any input from the Federal Government about whether an arrest is warranted in a particular case.11 That reasoning compares the state grant of authority with the scope of authority Congress gave federal officers. A textualist would ask a different question: which words of federal law, or of the regulations that law authorizes, does the state authority contradict?
Silence Is Not Law
The objection reaches congressional silence as well, because silence supplies a purpose only by inference. Apply the principle to a statute that regulates one class of actors and says nothing about another. A court could infer that Congress meant to leave the second class unregulated, or that Congress meant to leave it to the states, and each inference is a conclusion about the purposes underlying inaction, not a reading of text. Justice Thomas called that kind of reasoning illegitimate: state law is preempted only by federal law “made in Pursuance” of the Constitution, “not by extratextual considerations of the purposes underlying congressional inaction.”12
The Court itself treats silence as ambiguous, though it draws a different conclusion. When a State inferred congressional intent from Congress’s silence, the Court answered that a failure to provide for preemption expressly “may reflect nothing more than the settled character of implied preemption doctrine,” that the existence of a conflict under the Supremacy Clause “does not depend on express congressional recognition” of it, and that the inference was unwarranted “simply because the silence of Congress is ambiguous.”13 For the Court, ambiguity leaves implied preemption available. For the critic, the same ambiguity is a reason not to rest preemption on inaction at all.
The Non Obstante Argument
A text-first method can also favor preemption. A plurality in PLIVA read the closing words of the Supremacy Clause, “any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding,” as a non obstante provision.14 Eighteenth-century legislatures used such provisions to specify how far a new statute was meant to repeal older, potentially conflicting statutes, and courts had traditionally gone to great lengths to harmonize conflicting statutes in order to avoid implied repeals.15 From that history the plurality drew two instructions. Courts should not strain to reconcile federal law with seemingly conflicting state law,16 and, in the dissent’s account of the plurality, the Clause instructs courts “not to apply the general presumption against implied repeals.” The plurality would have courts “look no further than the ordinary meaning of federal law” before concluding that Congress meant to cast aside state law.17
The plurality and the critic both begin with the words of federal law, but they use that beginning differently. The critic uses it to deny preemption based on purposes outside the text. The plurality uses it to excuse courts from harmonizing the text with state law.
The Presumption Reply
The dissent called the plurality’s reading a “new theory of the Supremacy Clause” and “a direct assault” on precedent.18 It relied on the presumption against preemption taught earlier in this chapter: the Court has “long required evidence of a ‘clear and manifest’ purpose to pre-empt” and has “long presumed that federal law does not pre-empt, or repeal, state law.”19 The plurality’s reading reverses both rules. It tells courts not to apply the presumption against implied repeals, and it has them look no further than the ordinary meaning of federal law instead of demanding a clear and manifest purpose.20
The dissent did not join the critic in rejecting obstacle preemption. It stated that conflict preemption may be found, even absent impossibility, where state law “stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress,” and it used that doctrine to answer the majority’s worry that a narrow view of impossibility would make conflict preemption meaningless.21
Three positions result. The dissent accepts obstacle preemption but demands a clear and manifest purpose, anchored in the presumption against preemption. The critic rejects obstacle preemption for want of enacted text. The plurality reads the Supremacy Clause itself as hostile to strained harmonizing of federal and state law.
A question that pairs a federal statute silent about the state’s chosen target with legislative history showing a rejected proposal is testing which of these positions controls. Compare the ordinary meanings of the two texts first. If they do not collide, present the obstacle argument and the textualist objection to it, and identify the objection as a minority position, because the Court’s majority continues to apply obstacle preemption over it.22