Concept
Preemption by Federal Regulation
Supremacy clause and preemption
Preemption by Federal Regulation
A valid federal regulation preempts inconsistent state law just as a statute does. Article VI makes supreme the "Laws of the United States which shall be made in Pursuance" of the Constitution,1 and a regulation issued by an agency with rulemaking authority counts as federal law for that purpose.2 In Fidelity Federal Savings & Loan Ass'n v. De la Cuesta (1982), the Court gave preemptive effect to federal regulations, and the doctrine now treats administrative rules like any other valid federal law: they supplant state law that is inconsistent with their specific terms or overall objectives.3
The rule follows from delegation. Congress authorizes an agency to fill in the details of a regulatory scheme, and a rule issued within that authority is law that Congress itself empowered. If state law could override it, the delegation would carry less force than a statute on the same subject. The word valid matters, though: a regulation outside the agency's delegated authority is not valid federal law and displaces nothing. The live question in regulation cases is therefore seldom whether a regulation can preempt. It is how readily a court should find that a particular regulation does.
The Court answers that question with restraint. It generally expects an administrative regulation "to declare any intention to pre-empt state law with some specificity," even where only implied preemption is at issue.4 Justice Stevens, dissenting in Geier v. American Honda Motor Co., tied that expectation to the structure of rulemaking: it lets states carry on a dialogue with the agency about preemption in advance, through the notice-and-comment procedures of the Administrative Procedure Act.5 A thick rulebook with no preemption clause is therefore weak evidence that the agency meant to exclude state law, because an agency that wants exclusivity can say so. When a regulation does contain an express clause, the dispute turns on the clause's reach. When it does not, state law gives way only where it actually conflicts with the federal rule, either because compliance with both is impossible or because the state law interferes with the full accomplishment of the federal objectives.6
That expectation of specificity does not control conflict claims. The Geier majority rejected the dissent's demand for a formal agency statement of preemptive intent as a prerequisite to finding a conflict. The cases the dissent relied on did not involve conflict preemption, and conflict preemption "turns on the identification of 'actual conflict,' and not on an express statement of preemptive intent."7 The cases that call for specificity arose under other theories, such as the claim that the volume and complexity of regulations show an intent to displace state law across a whole area.8 To insist on a formal statement after notice-and-comment rulemaking would, in some cases, tolerate conflicts that an agency, and therefore Congress, is most unlikely to have intended, and so the Federal Register's silence about preemption is not determinative.9 The agency's view still matters. In Hillsborough County v. Automated Medical Laboratories, Inc., the Court showed reluctance, absent strong evidence, to find an actual conflict between state law and a federal regulation where the issuing agency had not concluded, then or later, that a conflict existed.10
Geier itself shows a regulatory conflict claim succeeding. The Transportation Department's safety standard, FMVSS 208, sought a gradually developing mix of alternative passive restraint devices for safety-related reasons. The state tort rule the petitioners urged, which would have required airbags, would have stood as an obstacle to that objective, and the Court noted that the statute foresees ordinary principles of preemption in cases of actual conflict. The tort action was therefore preempted.11 Four Justices dissented: Justice Stevens wrote, joined by Justices Souter, Thomas, and Ginsburg.12
The majority also gave the Department's own account of its standard some weight, while adding that the regulation's language and the Department's contemporaneous 1984 explanation were clear enough even without special weight.13 Its reasons show when an agency's explanation deserves respect. Congress had delegated implementing authority to the agency, the subject was technical and the history complex, the agency was likely to understand its own regulation and to judge how state requirements affect it, and it had explained the objectives and the interference consistently over time. In those circumstances, the Court said, the agency's own views should make a difference.14 The weight made sense because the objective was a chosen mix of methods, and the agency that chose the mix is the best source on what a state rule would disrupt.
Wyeth v. Levine turned the argument from specificity to force of law. The Court refused to treat a state tort claim over the warning label on the drug Phenergan as preempted. The dissent described the majority as distinguishing Geier on the ground that the Transportation Department's regulation "bear[s] the force of law" while the FDA's preamble does not.15 The dissent replied that Geier's outcome did not hinge on the agency's choice to promulgate a rule, because the Geier Court relied on materials other than the regulation to explain the conflict.16 Justice Alito, joined by Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Scalia, would not have allowed a state jury to countermand the FDA's considered judgment that the label made Phenergan's intravenous use safe.17 Justice Thomas, concurring only in the judgment, objected to implied conflict preemption generally. He would give preemptive effect only to federal standards "set forth in, or necessarily follow from, the statutory text" enacted through bicameralism and presentment, and he found that "Congressional and agency musings" do not satisfy that requirement, a view taken up in a later section.18
Taken together, the opinions sort agency material into two groups. A regulation adopted with the force of law is federal law that can itself preempt, whether through an express clause or through conflict with its objectives. Commentary about a regulation, such as a preamble statement or an agency's litigating position, is a weaker basis for preemption, though Geier shows it can earn some weight when it explains what a binding regulation was meant to achieve.19 An agency's preference counts for still less against words Congress has already written. In Riegel v. Medtronic, Inc., the Court noted that the FDA had favored preemption since 2002 and that the agency's inclination would have mattered had the preemption provision been ambiguous; because the provision was unambiguous, the agency's preference was irrelevant.20
State law also survives beside federal regulation in national banking. In In re Checking Account Overdraft Litigation, the plaintiffs explained that the banks were not federally authorized to manipulate the transactions as alleged, and the district court agreed that their state-law claims were not preempted.21 The court quoted the Supreme Court's statement that states may regulate national banks where doing so does not prevent or significantly interfere with the bank's or its regulator's exercise of its powers, but that state prescriptions that significantly impair the exercise of authority, enumerated or incidental under the National Bank Act, must give way.22 The line tracks Geier's logic. The Geier tort rule would have defeated the standard's chosen mix of devices, whereas the overdraft claims challenged conduct that federal law did not authorize and so impaired no federal power.
A hypothetical shows how the pieces fit. Suppose an agency's safety standard lets manufacturers choose among several restraint systems, the agency explained at the time that the mix is deliberate, and the regulation says nothing about preemption. A state then allows tort suits premised on the failure to install one particular system. The missing preemption clause does not end the matter, and comprehensiveness alone would not carry the manufacturer's argument. The question is whether the state rule would stand as an obstacle to the chosen mix, and the agency's consistent explanation of that mix is the best evidence on the point. Change the facts so that the state rule adds a requirement the standard neither contradicts nor opposes, and the state rule stands.