Concept
New York and Legislative Commandeering
State immunity from federal law, including the 10th Amendment
New York and Legislative Commandeering
In New York v. United States, the Court sorted the three incentives in the Low-Level Radioactive Waste Policy Amendments Act of 1985 into two that Congress could enact and one that it could not, and the anticommandeering rule explains the sorting.1 Congress has substantial authority under the Commerce and Spending Clauses to encourage states to provide for disposal of the radioactive waste generated within their borders, but the Constitution does not permit it to compel them to do so by commandeering their legislative processes.2 The monetary incentives and the access incentives were permissible exercises of federal power. The take title provision was not.3
The Act answered a looming shortage of disposal sites for low-level radioactive waste in 31 states. It imposed on the states, alone or in regional compacts with other states, the obligation to provide for disposal of the waste generated within their borders, and it attached three incentives to that obligation.4 Congress passed the 1985 amendments largely on proposals from the National Governors' Association, and they embodied a compromise between states that had disposal sites and states that did not.5 New York and two of its counties sued for a declaration that the three incentives violated the Tenth Amendment and the Guarantee Clause. The District Court dismissed the complaint, and the Court of Appeals affirmed.6 The Court never doubted that Congress could regulate in this field, because space in disposal sites is frequently sold by residents of one state to residents of another, which makes disposal an interstate market.7 The only question was which method Congress could use.
The three incentives were these:
- The monetary incentives authorized sited states to impose surcharges on out-of-state waste, required the Secretary of Energy to collect a portion of the surcharge into an escrow account, and permitted the fund to be distributed to states that achieved certain milestones.8
- The access incentives allowed graduated surcharge increases and eventual denial of access to disposal sites for noncomplying states.9
- The take title provision required a state that had not provided for disposal by January 1, 1996 to take title to and possession of the waste, on request of the generator or owner, and to be liable for damages.10
The case limits how Congress may regulate the states, and it carves out no subject that Congress may not regulate at all. The Court had long rejected immunity for traditional state activities. When California argued that operating a railroad was an exercise of sovereign power, Justice Stone wrote that “[t]he sovereign power of the states is necessarily diminished to the extent of the grants of power to the federal government in the Constitution,” and he rejected California's claim to immunity for “activities in which the States have traditionally engaged.”11 The dissenters in Garcia, Justice Powell joined by Chief Justice Burger and Justices Rehnquist and O'Connor, objected that “[t]he States' role in our system of government is a matter of constitutional law, not of legislative grace.”12 Justice O'Connor spoke for the Court in New York, and she did not answer with a subject-matter immunity.13 As the Court has summarized the principle, Congress has substantial powers to govern the Nation directly, including in areas of intimate concern to the States, but the Constitution has never been understood to let Congress require the States to govern according to Congress's instructions.14 Because the limit concerns method, Congress keeps its full power over radioactive waste. It may use that power by regulating private parties directly, by preempting state law, or by offering states monetary incentives.15 The take title provision supplies the rule, and the funding and access incentives show two lawful ways to induce what Congress may not command.
The Take Title Provision
The take title provision gave a state that had not arranged for disposal by the deadline an apparent choice. The state could regulate the disposal of its waste according to Congress's direction, or it could accept, on demand, title to the waste and liability for the damages its failure caused.16 The Court held both alternatives impermissible. Ordering a state to take title to waste or to assume liability for it would commandeer the state to carry out federal regulatory purposes, and ordering a state to regulate pursuant to federal instruction is likewise a command to state governments that the Constitution does not allow.17 A provision that offers only those two invalid options lies outside Congress's enumerated powers and is inconsistent with the Tenth Amendment.18
The argument has two steps, and the conclusion needs both. First, each alternative is tested alone. An instruction to state governments to take title to waste, standing alone, would be beyond the authority of Congress, and a direct order to regulate, standing alone, would be beyond it as well.19 Second, Congress therefore lacks the power to offer the states a choice between the two, because “[a] choice between two unconstitutionally coercive regulatory techniques is no choice at all.”20 Either way, the Act commandeers “the legislative processes of the States by directly compelling them to enact and enforce a federal regulatory program.”21 The state could pick among paths, but it could not decline to administer the federal program, and whichever path it chose it had to follow the direction of Congress.22
This limit does not come from the text of the Tenth Amendment, which is essentially a tautology.23 The Court's structural analysis was independent of any textual provision. The Amendment itself places no limits on the federal government, and it simply recognizes that other limits, such as those derived from the structure of the Constitution, may reserve powers to the states.24 The Amendment thus directs the inquiry, which asks whether an incident of state sovereignty is protected by a limitation on an Article I power.25 In New York the incident of sovereignty was the state's legislative process, and the limitation is that the Constitution authorizes Congress to regulate directly or to preempt but not to conscript state legislative processes.26 The Commerce Clause follows the same pattern. It authorizes Congress to regulate interstate commerce directly, and it does not authorize Congress to regulate state governments' regulation of interstate commerce.27
Two defenses of the provision failed. The United States argued that a sufficiently important federal interest, or the Framers' intent to give Congress a role in arbitrating disputes among the states, could justify compelling state regulation, and the Court rejected both arguments.28 The immunity of the states from such coercion is so fundamental that it can never be allowed, whatever the strength of the government's regulatory interest.29 State consent fared no better. State officials had helped initiate this legislation, which embodied a compromise among the states, but the consent or support of state officials cannot validate a federal statute that exceeds constitutional limits, because state officials cannot ratify a departure from the Constitution's allocation of authority.30
A dissent resisted the whole approach, writing that it did “not understand the principle of federalism to impede the National Government from acting as referee among the States to prohibit one from bullying another.”31 The majority's answer was that Congress holds tools for that role, direct regulation and preemption, and that the Framers' intent to give Congress a role in interstate disputes does not permit it to conscript state legislative processes.32
The holding leaves generally applicable federal law untouched. Garcia was distinguishable as a case in which Congress subjected a state to the same legislation that applied to private parties, because the Fair Labor Standards Act applied equally to public and private employers. The waste provision, by contrast, imposed legal duties only on state governments.33 The Court also accepted that Congress may require state judicial officials to enforce federal law, but it treated the imposition of duties on state legislatures as differing qualitatively.34 The Printz majority later found that the same principles bar Congress from requiring state or local executive officers to implement federal law, and, like the majority in New York, it left Garcia standing.35 Congress could preempt the field by directly regulating the private activity, or it could try to entice the states into implementing the scheme with monetary incentives, but it could not simply force a state to administer a federal regulatory scheme.36
The two statutes rest on the same findings and differ in one respect, the recipient of the command, and that difference decides which one survives.
The Funding Incentives
The monetary incentives survived the same opinion that struck down the take title provision because they rest on a different source of federal power and operate as an offer rather than an order. The Court reasoned that Congress may encourage state compliance by methods short of coercion, and that under the spending power it may attach conditions to the receipt of federal funds so long as the conditions meet the standards the Court has articulated.38 The Court upheld the financial incentives as within Congress's power under the Commerce and Spending Clauses.39 The statute also contained other incentives, including conditions on federal funding and a threat of federal regulation as a backstop, and the Court upheld those too.40
The monetary incentives worked in three steps, and each step rested on its own power. Congress authorized sited states to impose surcharges on out-of-state waste, which exercises its authority to permit states to burden interstate commerce when it so chooses. The Secretary of Energy then collected a portion of each surcharge into an escrow account, which is a federal levy on interstate commerce resting on the taxing and commerce powers. Finally, the escrowed funds were distributed to states that met the statutory milestones, and only this last step is spending.41 Routing the money through an escrow trust did not take the payments outside the Spending Clause.42
The Court measured the payout against the four requirements of South Dakota v. Dole and found them satisfied.43 Any federal funding offer to a state can be tested the same way.
Conditional spending differs fundamentally from an outright mandate. Congress may encourage the adoption of a favored program by conditioning access to federal funds, and as Justice O'Connor explained for the Court, “[w]here Congress encourages state regulation rather than compelling it, state governments remain responsive to the local electorate's preferences.”44 Congress may entice states with money, though it may not simply force them to administer a federal scheme.45 The Court framed the outer limit as encouragement “short of coercion,” and a later section takes up when a funding condition crosses that line.46
The Access Incentives
The access incentives rest on a principle the Court stated in the same passage that approved conditional spending. Where Congress may regulate private activity under the Commerce Clause, it may offer the states the choice of regulating according to federal standards or having state law preempted, and the Court called this cooperative federalism model one that its cases had repeatedly recognized.48 Congress may, for example, occupy a field with its own regulatory program unless and until the state legislature passes a state law that Congress wants on the books.49 The 1985 Act applied this model to access to disposal sites. For seven years the three existing sites had to accept waste from any source, though sited states could exact graduated surcharges on out-of-region waste, and after that transition approved compacts could exclude out-of-region waste altogether.50 The Court sustained the access incentives as a conditional exercise of the commerce power.51 Two questions follow. The first is why the offer does not commandeer the state that receives it, and the second is why a sited state may discriminate against other states' waste at all.
The first question has a structural answer. A state without a disposal site faced two outcomes. It could attain self-sufficiency in disposal under federal standards, or its waste producers could be subjected to federally authorized denial of access to disposal sites elsewhere.52 Neither outcome is an order addressed to the state. The burden of refusing to regulate falls on private waste generators and not on the state as sovereign, so the choice is real and the incentives are a permissible conditional exercise of the commerce power.53 Cooperative schemes of this shape are familiar. A federal law creates a regulatory program that a state may adopt if it meets federal minimum standards, and a federal program applies in any state that chooses not to submit one, so enforcement rests with the participating states or with federal officials.54
The take title provision shows which fact carries the analysis. It offered a state a choice between regulating as Congress directed and accepting title to waste with liability, and both options were commands to the state itself, so the choice was illusory.55 The access incentives pass where take title fails because of what remains when a state declines the option Congress prefers. If the remainder is federal regulation of private conduct, the choice is genuine, and if the remainder is another command to the state government, the choice is empty. That closed gates also pressure the state's legislature does not make them a command, since the question the Court asked was on whom the burden of refusing falls.
The choice model explains why the access incentives did not conscript the states, but a surcharge on out-of-state waste, or a flat refusal of it, is the kind of state discrimination that the dormant Commerce Clause ordinarily forbids. Congress may consent to state laws that would otherwise violate that clause. New York is the standard example, because the Act authorized states with federally approved waste sites to discriminate against interstate commerce by rejecting waste from states that had not conformed to the Act's guidelines.57 The explanation lies in the judiciary's role, which is essentially to hold the fort for Congress. If the Court strikes down a state law under the dormant Commerce Clause, Congress is free to answer, “Thanks, but no thanks!” and to restore the state's power by legislation.58 The authorization to impose surcharges was therefore an exercise of congressional authority to permit states to burden interstate commerce when Congress so chooses.59 Authorization removes only the dormant Commerce Clause objection. A state law may still be challenged under other constitutional provisions, such as equal protection or the Privileges and Immunities Clause of Article IV.60
Authorization has its own limits. Congress's consent must be clear and unambiguous, and if there is any doubt whether Congress has given its permission, the state's conduct is subject to the normal strictures of the dormant Commerce Clause.61 In South-Central Timber Development, Inc. v. Wunnicke, the Court rejected Alaska's claim that Congress had authorized it to engage in economic protectionism, explaining that congressional intent must be unmistakably clear.62 The Act in New York spoke expressly about surcharges and eventual exclusion of waste from noncomplying states, and that clarity is why the sited states' measures survived.63