Concept
McCulloch and Federal Supremacy
Federal immunity from state law
Federal Immunity from State Law
McCulloch and Federal Supremacy
Federal immunity from state law begins with McCulloch v. Maryland, which answered two questions in order. Could Congress charter a national bank? If so, could Maryland tax a branch of that bank operating within its borders? The Court said yes to the first and no to the second. The first answer, that chartering the bank was a lawful means of carrying out Congress’s enumerated powers, belongs to the study of implied federal powers; here it matters only as a premise. The second answer is the source of federal immunity from state law, and it is the subject of this section.
The Constitution does not say in terms that federal instrumentalities are exempt from state taxes. Marshall found the exemption in structure. Supremacy, he wrote, so removes obstacles to federal action within the federal sphere that its effect “need not be stated in terms”; it is “so involved in the declaration of supremacy, so necessarily implied in it, that the expression of it could not make it more certain.”1 Because the immunity is an inference, later decisions had to draw its edges, and the modern rules on state taxation of federal activity start from the logic of this case.
Three subsections follow. The first sets out the facts and the holding. The next two present the arguments that support it: the first from supremacy, the second from representation. The modern limits on the immunity make more sense once you know which argument each one serves.
The Maryland Bank Tax
Maryland could tax the bank only if Congress had been able to create it, so the Court first settled that point. It held unanimously that the act to incorporate the Bank of the United States was “a law made in pursuance of the constitution” and “a part of the supreme law of the land.”2 That holding supplies the premise for everything after it. A bank Congress validly created is an instrumentality of the United States, a body through which the national government carries out its functions, and the instrumentality is what the immunity protects.
Maryland then acted against that bank. On February 11, 1818, its General Assembly passed “An act to impose a tax on all banks, or branches thereof, in the State of Maryland, not chartered by the legislature.”3 The act spoke generally, but the institution it caught was the Baltimore branch of the national bank, which Congress, not Maryland, had chartered. John James sued for the statutory penalty, for himself and the State, in the County Court of Baltimore County. His defendant was James McCulloch, the cashier of the Baltimore branch, who admitted that the bank was doing business without Maryland’s authority and that he had issued bank notes without complying with Maryland’s law.4 The parties submitted an agreed statement of facts, so nothing remained in dispute but the law.5 Could a state tax a lawful federal bank?
Marshall began by conceding what Maryland could fairly claim. The power to tax the people and their property is essential to the existence of government, and a government may carry it to the utmost extent it chooses on the objects to which it applies.6 The national and state governments tax concurrently.7 But the Constitution is paramount, and it can withdraw a subject from even this power. It expressly forbids the states to lay duties on imports or exports, and the same paramount character restrains a state from any exercise of the taxing power that is “in its nature incompatible with, and repugnant to, the constitutional laws of the Union.”8
From that premise the Court announced the holding at the center of the doctrine: the states have “no power, by taxation or otherwise, to retard, impede, burden, or in any manner control, the operations of the constitutional laws enacted by Congress to carry into execution the powers vested in the general government.”9 This was, the Court said, “the unavoidable consequence of that supremacy which the constitution has declared.” Maryland’s act taxed the operations of the bank, and a tax on those operations was “a tax on the operation of an instrument employed by the government of the Union to carry its powers into execution. Such a tax must be unconstitutional.”10 The words “or otherwise” show that the principle was never confined to taxes, a point that returns when this chapter reaches state regulation.
The breadth of the rule follows from what a tax can do. A government that may tax an instrument may tax it out of existence, and if each state could tax federal operations within its borders, the national government could perform its functions only so long as every state allowed it. The American people did not intend to make the national government dependent on the states.11
The Court also wrote limits into its holding. The holding “does not extend to a tax paid by the real property of the bank, in common with the other real property within the State, nor to a tax imposed on the interest which the citizens of Maryland may hold in this institution, in common with other property of the same description throughout the State.”12 The rule leaves “the power of taxing the people and property of a State unimpaired.”13 Each limit turns on where the levy falls. A property tax at the common rate reaches the bank as one landowner among many, and a shareholder tax reaches a Maryland resident’s investment. Neither burdens what the branch does as the government’s agent. Maryland’s act fell on the operations themselves.
The line to remember is the one a levy crosses: a tax on the branch’s operations is void, while the same state’s ordinary property tax on the branch’s building is outside the holding.
A levy on the branch’s banking transactions as such would reach the operations themselves and fall within the holding.
The carve-outs foreshadow the modern doctrine. The Court never said that a federal instrument escapes every state burden of any kind. It said that the states may not tax the operations of the instrument, and it left them every other resource they had.
The Supremacy Syllogism
Marshall’s first argument starts from what he called a great principle: the Constitution and the laws made in pursuance of it are supreme, they control the constitution and laws of the states, and the states cannot control them. He thought the principle “may be almost termed an axiom.”15 Text and structure both support it. The Supremacy Clause makes the Constitution and federal laws the supreme law of the land, “any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the contrary notwithstanding,” so state law must yield to valid federal law whenever the two conflict.16 And the Union, though limited in its powers, is “supreme within its sphere of action.” It is the government of all, it represents all, and it acts for all, so on the subjects on which it can act it “must necessarily bind its component parts.”17 The phrase “within its sphere” matters. It confines the axiom to the means the national government uses to execute the powers the Constitution gave it, which is why the bank’s lawful creation was the necessary first step.
Marshall deduced three corollaries from the axiom, and each leans on the one before it:18
- A power to create implies a power to preserve, so Congress’s authority to charter the bank carries with it the authority to keep the bank in existence.
- A power to destroy, if wielded by a different hand, is hostile to and incompatible with the powers to create and to preserve, so any other government holding such a power over the bank would hold the very authority that can defeat what Congress built.
- Where that repugnancy exists, the authority that is supreme must control and not yield to the one over which it is supreme.
The chain needs one more premise to reach Maryland’s tax, and Marshall supplied it: “the power to tax involves the power to destroy.”19 He borrowed the line from Daniel Webster’s argument, and the verb matters, for he wrote “involves,” not “is.”20 Joined to the corollaries, the premise produces the holding. A state power to tax the bank would be a power to destroy held by a different hand; that power is incompatible with Congress’s powers to create and preserve; and where the two collide, the supreme authority controls.
Maryland did not argue that a state may directly resist an act of Congress. It argued that states may exercise their acknowledged powers, taxation among them, upon federal measures, and that the Constitution leaves them that right in the confidence that they will not abuse it.21 Marshall described this as an effort to reconcile every inconsistency by “the magic of the word CONFIDENCE,” and he tested it against the structure of the government. No state’s people would trust the people of another state with control over even the most insignificant operations of their own state government. Why would they trust other states’ people with control over the government to which they have confided their most important interests? Only the legislature of the Union represents all, and only it can be trusted with power over measures that concern all.22
The argument also has no stopping point. If a state may tax one instrument the government employs, it may tax every other: the mail, the mint, patent rights, the papers of the custom-house, judicial process, “to an excess which would defeat all the ends of government.”23 The power to tax federal means would in effect transfer supremacy to the states.24 Maryland tried to confine itself to property, but its own theory, that the power of taxation has no limit other than the express prohibitions of Article I, section 10, gave no reason to treat property differently from any other subject, and the distinction would be merely arbitrary.25
For the same reason Marshall declined to measure the tax. The Court was “not driven to the perplexing inquiry, so unfit for the judicial department, what degree of taxation is the legitimate use, and what degree may amount to the abuse of the power.” The attempt to tax the means of the Union “is itself an abuse, because it is the usurpation of a power which the people of a single State cannot give.”26
The difference between the two levies lies in who stands behind the institution taxed; the rate plays no part. When a legislature taxes institutions created by its own constituents, it acts on them, and the ballot is the check. When it taxes the operations of a government created by the people of every state, it acts on an institution that its own voters neither created alone nor control, and the relationship becomes that of a part acting on the whole.29 A question that stresses how small or reasonable the state’s rate is has therefore missed the test.
The syllogism has one weak link: the premise that taxing means destroying. Marshall’s conclusion follows from his premises, but that premise is questionable. The power to tax is not necessarily the power to destroy, especially when courts can review how the power is used, and Maryland’s tax did not in fact destroy the bank.30 Justice Holmes later made the point in a well-known reply: “The power to tax is not the power to destroy while this Court sits.”31 The criticism leaves the result standing, because the holding never depended on proof that a given tax would end the federal instrument. It rests on supremacy and conflict, together with a structural fact: each state keeps all the revenue from taxing federal operations and pushes most of the cost onto the other states, so a regime of state taxation would leave every state worse off than restraint by all.32
The modern doctrine follows the same logic. States may never tax the United States directly, yet they may tax private parties that deal with the United States even when the financial burden falls on the government, provided the tax does not discriminate against the government or those it deals with.33 The line depends on whom the tax is laid on and whether it singles out the federal side; the severity of the burden does not set it. The next subsection supplies the representation argument that explains why the question turns on who is taxed.
The Representation Rationale
Marshall’s second argument asks why a state’s power to tax is ordinarily safe, and his answer is political. The Court conceded that a government may carry the power to tax to the utmost extent it chooses, so “the only security against the abuse of this power, is found in the structure of the government itself. In imposing a tax the legislature acts upon its constituents.”35 The mechanism is easy to trace. The voters who pay a state tax are the same voters who elect the legislators who impose it, so a legislature that taxes harshly or foolishly risks replacement by the people it burdened. That check is “in general a sufficient security against erroneous and oppressive taxation.”
The check disappears when the object taxed is a means of the national government. Those means are not given by the constituents of the taxing legislature but “by the people of all the States,” for the benefit of all, and in theory they should be subject only to the government that belongs to all.36 A state legislature that taxed them would reach beyond its own voters, and the people who bore the burden would have no way to vote it out.
Marshall traced the same point to its source in sovereignty. A state’s sovereignty extends to things that exist by its authority or permission, but it does not extend to the means Congress employs to carry out powers conferred by the people of the United States.37 If a state’s taxing power is measured by the sovereignty that the people of a single state possess and can confer, the result is what Marshall called an “intelligible standard.” A state keeps command of all its own resources, and the means given to carry out the Union’s powers stay beyond its reach.38
Maryland pressed a symmetry argument against this result. Because taxation is a concurrent power, it said, any reasoning that lets the United States tax state-chartered banks lets the states tax a federally chartered one.39 Marshall answered that the cases differ. Congress represents the people of all the states and taxes institutions created by their representatives, while a state that taxes federal operations acts on institutions created by all the people and not by its own constituents. The difference is the one between “the action of the whole on a part, and the action of a part on the whole.”40
The reply explains why the immunity runs in one direction. A state whose institutions Congress taxes has a seat in the body that decides the tax, while the people outside Maryland had no seat in the Maryland legislature. Marshall was invoking, if only implicitly, the principle behind the colonists’ protest to the Crown: no taxation without representation. On that view a part may not tax the whole even when the tax would destroy nothing.41
The structural argument has a second half, and it concerns incentives. A state that taxes a federal instrument keeps all of the revenue for its own voters, while the cost, in the form of impaired federal operations, falls mostly on the other states. Every state therefore has reason to tax federal institutions more heavily than the nation would tolerate.42 This is a collective-action problem: each participant’s best individual choice, repeated by all, leaves everyone worse off than if all had held back.43 A promise of restraint from each state cannot cure it, because the temptation operates on every legislature at once.
This is the stronger of Marshall’s two arguments, because it does not rest on the premise that taxation destroys.44 The syllogism needed that premise, and the premise is open to doubt. The representation argument objects to the identity of the taxing authority, so a gentle tax fails along with a heavy one, which is why the one-tenth-of-one-percent levy discussed earlier is void. An essay applying the rationale should ask who elects the taxing body and who bears the burden. When the burden falls on people the taxing legislature does not answer to, the tax is a part acting on the whole, and the size of the tax does not enter the analysis.
The argument also anticipates a modern theory of judicial review. Marshall suggested that judicial intervention is justified when a state legislature taxes a national instrumentality, because most of the nation’s voters are then excluded from representation and the state has every incentive to soak citizens of other states. John Hart Ely later generalized the idea as “representation-reinforcement”: a central role of the courts is to make up for flaws in representative government and breakdowns in the political process.45
A serious objection remains. Congress could have protected the national interest by enacting a statute that expressly preempted, meaning displaced, programs such as Maryland’s, and Marshall never acknowledged that possibility.46 The objection has force, because it makes a judge-made immunity that appears in no constitutional text look unnecessary.
The opinion’s answer lies in the supremacy on which the whole holding rests. Marshall reasoned that supremacy by its nature removes obstacles to federal action within the federal sphere and modifies every subordinate power so that it cannot reach federal operations, and that this effect “need not be stated in terms.”47 On that reading the immunity needs no statute, because it follows from the Constitution’s ranking of federal law above state law. The representation argument supplies the reason a court may enforce it without waiting for Congress: the legislature that profits from the tax answers to voters who do not bear it, so it cannot be expected to restrain itself.48
The structural rule therefore sets the default in favor of the federal instrument, which is protected from the start. Congress remains free to adjust that default, and a later section shows that it may consent to state taxation of federal instruments.49