Concept
Article I and Delegation
Nondelegation doctrine
The Nondelegation Doctrine
Article I and Delegation
Article I vests “[a]ll legislative Powers herein granted . . . in a Congress of the United States,” and the Supreme Court has read that text to permit no delegation of those powers.1 Yet the same decisions hold that the separation of powers does not stop Congress from obtaining the assistance of its coordinate branches. In J.W. Hampton, Jr. & Co. v. United States, Chief Justice Taft wrote for the Court that “the extent and character of that assistance must be fixed according to common sense and the inherent necessities of the government co-ordination.”2 A flat prohibition and a broad permission therefore sit side by side, and the rest of the doctrine tries to say where one ends and the other begins.
Two terms carry the analysis. Delegation is the transfer of substantive power from the legislature to an agency, usually through an organic act that also provides for the agency's organization.3 The nondelegation doctrine, also called the delegation doctrine, limits how much legislative power Congress may transfer to another branch, especially the executive. It rests on the separation of powers, and it permits delegation only if Congress prescribes an intelligible principle to guide the agency.4 Separation of powers, the principle beneath the doctrine, governs relations among all three branches and not merely the two political ones.5 Congress delegates all the time; nondelegation is the limit courts place on how far it may go.
That limit is one of degree because the boundary has never been drawn exactly. The first sentence of Article I makes Congress the supreme legislative power, yet Chief Justice Marshall observed in 1825: “The line has not been exactly drawn which separates those important subjects, which must be entirely regulated by the legislature itself, from those of less interest, in which a general provision may be made, and power given to those who are to act under such general provisions to fill up the details.”6 Justice Scalia, dissenting in Mistretta v. United States, drew the modern consequence. Once it is conceded that no statute can be entirely precise, and that some judgments, even policy judgments, must be left to the officers executing the law and the judges applying it, the debate over delegation becomes “a debate not over a point of principle but over a question of degree.”7
Two hypothetical statutes show what degree means. The first bars any plant from discharging more than a stated amount of a named chemical into a river and tells the agency to write the testing procedures and reporting forms. The second tells the agency to “protect the nation's waters as it sees fit” and to set whatever prohibitions and penalties it judges best. In the first, the agency fills up the details. In the second, it decides which conduct is unlawful and what happens to violators, so it chooses the content of the law. Both statutes delegate, but a court asking whether Congress prescribed an intelligible principle would find far more to work with in the first.
The ban exists because Article I makes lawmaking hard on purpose. As the dissent in Gundy v. United States put it, the framers insisted that any proposed law win the approval of two Houses, elected at different times, by different constituencies, and for different terms, and then either secure the President's approval or gather enough support to override his veto. To the framers, those arduous steps were bulwarks of liberty.8 A statute that announces a goal and lets an agency pick the rules skips those steps for every choice the agency makes. It also moves the choice away from the one body that answers politically for it, since only Congress holds the federal legislative power and only Congress is politically accountable for its policy choices.9 Nor can courts count on Congress to protect its own power. Legislators often face rational incentives to pass problems to the executive branch, so the job of confining legislative power to the legislature cannot be left to Congress's self-policing.10 Handing the problem to an agency passes the buck on the important subjects that Marshall said the legislature must regulate itself.11
A practical consideration pulls the other way. The Court's jurisprudence applying the “intelligible principle” test has been driven by a practical understanding that in “our increasingly complex society, replete with ever changing and more technical problems, Congress simply cannot do its job absent an ability to delegate power under broad general directives.”12 History points the same way. The first Congress, dominated by Framers of the Constitution, enacted two statutes that gave other branches power to make legally binding policy decisions, and it seems unlikely that such a Congress would at once act inconsistently with the Constitution.13
The result is a doctrine with a firm rule and a light touch. After invalidating two statutes as excessive delegations in 1935, including A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, the Court has upheld, without deviation, Congress's ability to delegate under broad standards.14 No other federal statute has been struck down on delegation grounds since, and commentators call the intelligible-principle standard remarkably vague and apparently easily satisfied.15 Courts more often interpret a statute so that the delegation becomes acceptable, which avoids a constitutional clash with Congress.16
How one describes the agency's work also affects the analysis. The constitutional text does not settle the question, because an agency's role in implementing a regulatory statute can be regarded as an exercise of executive power, even if the agency plays a lawmaking part along the way.17 On that view, agencies exercise only executive power, and even the adoption of binding legislative rules may be regarded as execution of statutes.18 Courts have nonetheless encountered, and occasionally endorsed, the suggestion that some delegations attempt to transfer “legislative powers” that Congress alone may wield.19
The chapter follows roughly the order in which the doctrine developed. It starts with the traditional categories of permissible delegation, then the intelligible principle test, then the two 1935 invalidations and the leniency that followed. It then considers what else courts weigh besides the statutory standard and how the doctrine now works as an avoidance canon. Next come Congress's efforts to keep control over what it delegates, centered on the legislative veto and INS v. Chadha, and finally the revival of interest in the doctrine through Gundy and the major questions doctrine. The major questions doctrine, like nondelegation, limits the reach of existing statutes by preventing their expansion without new legislation.20