Concept
The Presentment Clause
The presentment requirement and the president’s power to veto or to withhold action
Presentment and the Veto Power
The Presentment Clause
Article I, Section 7 governs what happens after the House and the Senate both vote for a bill. Its first clause requires revenue bills to originate in the House, though the Senate may propose or concur with amendments as it would on any other bill.1 That rule fixes where one kind of bill begins; it is separate from presentment, and this chapter sets it aside. The second and third clauses carry the requirement that matters here. Before a bill becomes law, Congress must present it to the President, and the same duty reaches every order, resolution, or vote that needs the concurrence of both houses, except a question of adjournment.2
Statutes and the other subordinate sources of law draw their authority from the Constitution, which also imposes structural features on how Congress may make them.3 Presentment is one of those features. It is the step that brings the President into the making of every federal statute.
After presentment the President has three responses, and the text attaches a defined consequence to each. He may approve the bill and sign it. He may return it, with his objections, to the house where it originated, which opens the way to an override by two thirds of each house. Or he may do nothing, and a ten-day clock (Sundays excepted) then decides the bill's fate, subject to a special rule when Congress adjourns and prevents the bill's return.4 Keep this list in view. Later questions in this chapter, from signing statements to the line item veto, ask whether some presidential or congressional device fits anywhere on it.
The subsections below take the responses in turn: approval, veto, and override, then silence and the pocket veto. They next extend the same machinery to orders, resolutions, and votes. Last, they test a signing statement against the list.
Approval, Veto, and Override
Once both houses have passed a bill, it goes to the President before it can become law. If he approves, he signs it. If he does not, he returns it with his objections to the house in which it originated.5 A signature completes enactment. A return sends the bill back into Congress, where the house of origin enters his objections at large in its journal and reconsiders the bill. That return is the veto. Because Congress can overcome it by an extraordinary majority, the President holds a qualified veto, conclusive unless overridden.6 A suspensory veto works differently: it suspends a law only until the legislature reconsiders, and an ordinary majority can revive the law.7
The order of the steps matters on exams. The bill returns to the house of origin, which may be the Senate as easily as the House of Representatives, and that house acts first. If it cannot muster two thirds, the bill goes no further. If it can, the second house must reach two thirds independently, so a lopsided margin in one chamber cannot make up for a shortfall in the other.9
Two features of the text will return when this chapter reaches the line item veto. First, the clause requires presentment before the bill becomes law, so the President acts on a proposal, and his veto prevents enactment; it does not undo an existing statute.10 Second, the object of his action is the bill itself. The clause lets him return the bill and says nothing about returning a part of one. A President who welcomes most of a spending bill but objects to a single item must therefore sign all of it or return all of it.
Three purposes explain the design. In Immigration and Naturalization Service v. Chadha, the Court explained that the Framers were acutely conscious of what bicameralism and presentment accomplish: the President's participation in lawmaking protects the Executive Branch from Congress and protects the whole people from improvident laws.11 The Framers gave him only a limited and qualified power to nullify proposed legislation because they held that the powers conferred on Congress were the ones to be most carefully circumscribed, and because lawmaking is a power shared by both houses and the President.12
Second, the President answers to a nationwide electorate. One opinion observes that on some subjects he may be more representative of all the people than the members of either house, whose constituencies are local rather than countrywide.13 Third, the override guards against the opposite danger. Because two thirds of both houses can overrule a veto, no single person can take final, arbitrary action.14 The journal requirements add a record: the President's objections are entered at large, and each member's vote is recorded by name.15
The veto also works before anyone casts it. One treatment of the executive veto notes that threatening to use it can force amendments the legislature would otherwise reject, although how much the threat matters depends on the executive's personality, the political allegiances of the houses, custom, the independence of the legislators, and the quality of legislative performance.16 That discussion speaks of state governors, but the same dynamic follows from any qualified veto: drafters who cannot count on two thirds of each house have reason to bargain before presentment.
Ten Days and the Pocket Veto
Section 7 gives the President a third response: silence. If a bill is not returned within ten days (Sundays excepted) after presentment, it becomes law as if he had signed it, unless Congress by its adjournment prevents the bill's return, in which case it does not become law.18 The sentence pairs a default with an exception that points the other way. While Congress can receive a returned bill, silence produces a statute. After an adjournment that blocks the return, silence produces nothing.
The default exists because a President who dislikes a bill could otherwise defeat it by letting it sit. An unreturned bill gives Congress no objections to reconsider and no occasion for an override vote, so silence would operate as a veto that no one could overrule. Treating silence as enactment closes that route. During a session, a President who wants to stop a bill must return it with his objections, which puts the veto on the record and exposes it to the two-thirds override. The state rule for governors runs parallel: a bill becomes law without the governor's signature if the governor neither signs nor returns it within a specified number of days.19
Students often assume that withholding a signature stops a bill. During a session it does not. The bill becomes law when the ten days run out, and the President's disapproval counts only if he sends the bill back.
The exception answers a mechanical impossibility. A veto operates by returning the bill to the house of origin, and that house must be able to receive it and reconsider it before an override can occur. When Congress by its adjournment prevents the return, the President cannot veto in the ordinary way and Congress cannot respond. If the ten-day default still applied, every bill presented before an adjournment would become law, and the President would have no means of defeating it. The text instead provides that the bill shall not be a law.20 In the parallel state setting, adjournment precludes an override, so the executive may kill the bill by inaction. That result is the "pocket" veto.21 It behaves like an absolute veto, one "not subject to being overridden," in contrast to the qualified veto described above.22
The two rules allocate the risk of the clock differently. While Congress can receive a return, the ten days run against the President, because delay amounts to accepting the bill. When adjournment prevents return, the same ten days run against the bill's supporters, because the clause treats the bill as failed and gives Congress no chance to answer. The exception is limited by its own words: it applies only when the adjournment prevents the return. If every pause in Congress's schedule opened the pocket veto, the exception would swallow the ten-day rule and hand the President an unreviewable veto whenever Congress took a break. The Supreme Court has addressed where that line falls, as in Wright v. United States.
Orders, Resolutions, and Votes
The third clause of Section 7 carries presentment past bills. Every order, resolution, or vote that needs the concurrence of the Senate and the House, except on a question of adjournment, must be presented to the President. Before it takes effect, he must approve it, or two thirds of each house must repass it over his disapproval under the rules that govern a bill.24 Without that clause, a measure under some other name could have reached the statute books without ever facing his objections. Such a measure now travels the bill's route: both houses pass it, it goes to the President, and his veto stands unless two thirds of each house override it.
The Convention's records show the worry. During the final debate on the second clause, James Madison warned that it might be evaded by calling a proposed law a "resolution" or "vote" rather than a "bill," and the third clause was added as a consequence.25 The Framers also knew that the Pennsylvania legislature had evaded its lawmaking requirements by passing "resolves," a practice the Council of Censors criticized.26 The danger is easy to state. Congress chooses the names of its own measures, so a presentment rule keyed to the name would bind Congress only when Congress was willing to be bound.
Because the clause looks past labels, the working question on an exam is what the measure does. If a resolution is intended to make policy that will bind the nation, it is "legislative in its character and effect," and the full Article I requirements apply. In the Court's words, "the nature or substance of the resolution, and not its form, controls the question of its disposition."27
Chadha supplies the test for what counts as legislative. Action is legislative when its purpose and effect are to alter the legal rights, duties, and relations of persons outside the legislative branch.28 The House resolution in Chadha qualified because it blocked the Attorney General's decision to suspend an alien's deportation.29 Actions that leave every outsider's legal position unchanged fall on the other side of the line: a resolution appointing a special committee, taking up a bill out of order, or recessing until Wednesday morning.30
The line follows the reasons for presentment. A measure that alters outsiders' legal position is lawmaking whatever it is called, so the President's role applies in full: his participation protects the Executive Branch from Congress and protects the whole people from improvident laws.31 A measure that only organizes Congress's own business changes no one's rights or duties, and neither protection is at stake. The express exception for adjournment resembles that category, since when Congress meets is a matter of its own business.32
The second resolution fails even though both houses voted for it. Bicameralism was satisfied; presentment was not. Its purpose and effect were to alter the rights of advertisers and the duties of commission officials outside Congress, so it was legislative action that needed the President's approval or a two-thirds repassage.33 The elk resolution survives because it alters no one's rights or duties. Both measures carried the same label, so function alone separates them.
Signing Statements
Section 7 gives the President three responses to a bill that has passed both houses. He may sign it, return it with objections to the house of origin, or let the ten days run so that the bill becomes law without his signature, unless an adjournment prevents its return.35 The text fixes a legal consequence for each. A signing statement is a fourth thing. The President issues it with his signature to comment on the law, whether to read a provision narrowly, to announce a constitutional objection, or to say how he will carry the law out, and the clause does not mention it.
A signature completes enactment, so the statement comments on a law that already exists. It forms no part of the process the clause prescribes, and it cannot change what the bill provides. A contrary rule would let the President sign a bill and then declare one provision void, which is a partial veto exercised after enactment. The bill would never return to Congress with objections, no override vote could occur, and the line the clause draws between approving a bill and returning it would disappear.36
Compare a President who returns the bill with objections before the ten days expire. That act is a veto under Article I, and it has legal effect: the bill cannot become law unless two thirds of each house repass it.37 The two documents differ in the constitutional act each accompanies. The objections in the first case are the veto itself, and the words in the second are commentary on a signature.
The President shapes law through many channels that Section 7 does not govern. One is the Office of Management and Budget's review of proposed agency rules, most of which occurs before a proposal goes to the public for notice and comment.38 Those channels operate on agency rulemaking. Section 7 controls how a bill becomes law, and a signing statement, which is neither a signature nor a return, stands outside it.
The same textual point returns later in this chapter. In Clinton v. City of New York, Congress by statute tried to give the President a power to cancel particular items in a bill after he signs it. The question there is whether a statute can add to Section 7 a presidential response that the text omits. A signing statement raises the same problem from the narrower side, because the President invents the device himself and Congress has not invited it.