Concept
Independent Agencies and Humphrey's
Removal of officers
Independent Agencies and Humphrey's
The Constitution says who appoints officers and almost nothing about who may remove them. Under the Appointments Clause, the President appoints “all other Officers of the United States” with the Senate’s advice and consent, and Congress may vest the appointment of inferior officers in the President alone, in the courts of law, or in the heads of departments.1 The text does protect the tenure of one group, federal judges, who “shall hold their Office during good Behavior,” but it contains no parallel provision for non-judicial officers.2 Whatever tenure an executive official enjoys must therefore come from Congress, and the question becomes how much Congress may give.
The independent agencies show how much Congress has tried to give. Unlike the “executive agencies,” a category that includes the Cabinet departments and agencies such as the EPA and the Small Business Administration, independent agencies are headed by officials who do not serve “at the pleasure of the President.” Their statutes may give commissioners a fixed term of years that does not match the President’s own, and may protect them from arbitrary removal during the term.3
That arrangement ran into Myers v. United States. The case arose from the dismissal of a postmaster when the Post Office was still a Cabinet department, and Chief Justice Taft reasoned that the President needed the power to fire any public officer at will to fulfill his duty to “take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed.” About a decade later the Court limited Myers, when President Roosevelt tried to remove a Federal Trade Commission member who was unsympathetic to some of the New Deal programs the Commission administered.4
Congress had good reason to want that insulation. Without the ability to limit the President’s removal power, Congress could not create agencies that work free of partisan influence and executive control. The value of that freedom varies with the task. Adjudication is the strongest case, because a person’s rights and duties under the law should not hinge on partisan considerations. Even when an agency exercises rulemaking power delegated by Congress, independence may be needed to prevent an excessive concentration of lawmaking power in the President.5 Justice White tied the same view to the Necessary and Proper Clause in his Bowsher v. Synar dissent: as the administrative state grew, the Court was “virtually compelled to recognize” that Congress may reasonably deem it “necessary and proper” to place some governmental functions in officers “free from the partisanship that may be expected of agents wholly dependent upon the President.”6
Two decisions fix the terms of the debate. Humphrey's Executor v. United States confined Myers to purely executive officers and upheld for-cause protection for FTC commissioners.7 Wiener v. United States then carried that protection to a commission whose statute said nothing about removal at all.8
Humphrey's Executor
The Federal Trade Commission Act allowed the President to remove a commissioner only for “inefficiency, neglect of duty, or malfeasance in office.”9 In Humphrey's Executor v. United States, President Roosevelt removed a commissioner who was unsympathetic to some New Deal programs, and he never claimed that any of those three causes applied.10 The commissioner’s executor pursued the claim for salary, which is how the case got its name.
The Court took the case in two steps. It first read section 1 of the Act to confine removal to the listed causes, and only then asked whether a limit so construed unconstitutionally interferes with the President’s executive power. On that second question, the government’s chief reliance was Myers.11
Myers supplies the contrast. President Wilson appointed Myers a first-class postmaster in Portland, Oregon, for a term of four years, and the Postmaster General removed him at the President’s direction before the term ended. The case arose under a statute that sought to condition the removal of an inferior officer on the Senate’s advice and consent.12 Chief Justice Taft framed the question expansively: whether the President has “the exclusive power of removing executive officers of the United States whom he has appointed by and with the advice and consent of the Senate.”13
Justice Sutherland’s opinion for the Court drew the line between the two offices. It held that Congress could limit the President’s power to remove FTC commissioners to removal for cause, and it confined Myers to “purely executive officers.” The FTC, he wrote, “cannot in any proper sense be characterized as an arm or an eye of the executive”; under the FTC Act its duties were to be “free from executive control,” and it acted “in part quasi-legislatively and in part quasi-judicially.”14 For officers of that character, the President has no “illimitable power of removal.” Congress’s authority to require quasi-legislative or quasi-judicial agencies to act “independently of executive control cannot well be doubted,” and that authority includes, “as an appropriate incident,” the power to fix the officers’ term and to forbid removal except for cause in the meantime. The reason is practical: “one who holds his office only during the pleasure of another cannot be depended upon to maintain an attitude of independence against the latter’s will.”15
Morrison v. Olson later restated the test in terms that make the focus clear. Whether Congress may condition the removal power by “fixing a definite term and precluding a removal except for cause, will depend upon the character of the office.” Whatever some Myers dicta implied, the President’s removal power was not “all-inclusive in respect of civil officers with the exception of the judiciary provided for by the Constitution,” and a power to remove FTC commissioners at will would exert a “coercive influence” that would “threate[n] the independence of [the] commission.”16 Myers himself held a four-year term; what separated him from the commissioner was the character of the office.
The two devices Congress used work together. A fixed term that need not match the President’s own gives the office a life apart from any one administration.17 The for-cause limit keeps that term from being a courtesy the President can revoke at will, since an officer who serves only at another’s pleasure cannot be counted on to resist that person’s wishes.18
The decision has three limits worth fixing in mind. First, it left Myers standing for purely executive officers.19 Second, it protected commissioners through a single layer of tenure: the President, or a subordinate he could remove at will, decided whether an officer’s conduct met the good-cause standard.20 A statute that “withdraws from the President any decision on whether that good cause exists” and vests it in other tenured officers produces “a Board that is not accountable to the President, and a President who is not responsible for the Board.”21 Third, Humphrey’s restricts the President but gives Congress no hand on the removal lever. Congressional participation in removal “would, in practical terms, reserve in Congress control over the execution of the laws,” because the officer might feel a need to comply with Congress’s wishes, in effect giving Congress a veto over executive action. Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714, 726 (1986).22
The classification that made Humphrey’s workable is also its weak point. The Court said the FTC exercised no executive power, yet enforcing statutes and writing rules look like executive work, and the quasi-legislative and quasi-judicial labels overlap with it. Later cases therefore shifted the inquiry from labels to function. Morrison recognized that the independent counsel’s duties were clearly “executive” in nature, yet it upheld a good-cause limit because the limit did not “impede the President’s ability to perform his constitutional duty,” especially given the limited nature of the counsel’s responsibilities and the congressionally perceived need for independence.23 A later section takes up Morrison and the Roberts Court’s narrowing of Humphrey’s in Seila Law LLC v. CFPB.
Wiener and Silent Statutes
The FTC Act in Humphrey’s listed the grounds for removal, and the Court enforced them. The statute in Wiener v. United States listed none, yet the Court still prevented the President from dismissing a member of the War Claims Commission without cause.25 The holding was striking for that reason. The commissioners were appointed by the President with the Senate’s advice and consent, but the statute made no provision for removing them, perhaps because the Commission itself was to have a limited existence.26
The Court found its footing in the work the commissioners did. Because they were expected to “adjudicate according to law,” the Court inferred that Congress meant to protect them from arbitrary removal.27 As in Humphrey’s, Congress had entrusted the commissioners with adjudicatory powers “to be exercised free from executive control,” and it “did not wish to have hang over the Commission the Damocles’ sword of removal by the President for no reason other than that he preferred to have on that Commission men of his own choosing.”28 The Court accordingly rejected an attempt to remove a commissioner “merely because he wanted his own appointees on [the] Commission,” stating that “no such power is given to the President directly by the Constitution, and none is impliedly conferred upon him by statute.”29
The inference follows the logic of Humphrey’s. A commissioner who decides claims and can be dismissed for no reason beyond the President’s preference knows that a ruling the White House dislikes may cost the commissioner the post, so the threat of removal can accomplish what Congress meant to forbid even if the President never touches a single claim. That is the worry the Court voiced in Humphrey’s: “one who holds his office only during the pleasure of another cannot be depended upon to maintain an attitude of independence against the latter’s will.”30
Myers still governs the officers to which Humphrey’s confined it. For purely executive officers, the default of presidential control that Myers announced stays in place.31 What carries Wiener, then, is the function of the body, and no statutory text does.
Wiener decided less than it might first appear. It rejected removal “merely because” the President wanted his own appointees, and the stated basis for its inference was the commissioners’ adjudicatory role.32 A silent statute creating a body that does something other than adjudicate presents a harder case, and the same inference may not stretch to it.