Concept
Myers and Presidential Control
Removal of officers
Myers and Presidential Control
The Constitution describes how officers enter office and, apart from impeachment, is silent on how they leave it. Myers v. United States was the first case in which the Supreme Court had to fill that silence.1 The dispute raised two questions, and the two subsections below take them in turn.
The first question is whether Congress may require the Senate's consent before the President removes an executive officer whom the Senate confirmed. The appointment process pulls toward yes. The Senate helped put the officer in place, and in the First Congress's debate even the opponents of the bill, with only one or two exceptions, agreed that the power of appointment carried the power of removal.2 The second question arises lower in the hierarchy. When Congress has vested the appointment of an inferior officer in a department head, may it regulate the head's power to remove that officer?3
The answers set the baseline from which the later cases on independent agencies, congressional participation in removal, and layered protection depart.
The Postmaster Decision
In Myers v. United States the Court held that Congress may not condition the President's removal of an executive officer on the Senate's consent, and it struck down a postal statute that did so.4 The statute was part of the law of 1876. It provided that postmasters of the first, second, and third classes would be appointed and removed by the President with the Senate's advice and consent, and would hold office for four years unless sooner removed or suspended according to law.5
The case began as a salary dispute. President Wilson appointed Myers first-class postmaster at Portland, Oregon, in July 1917 for a four-year term. In January 1920 Wilson demanded his resignation, and when Myers refused, the Postmaster General, acting under the President's direction, removed him on February 2, 1920.6 Myers protested that the order was illegal, refused to submit, and was ejected.7 He sued in the Court of Claims for the salary from his removal to the end of his term, a claim of $8,838.71.8 The administration had not sought the Senate's consent, so the removal violated the statute. Government attorneys defended it on the ground that the statute itself abridged controlling separation-of-powers principles.9
Chief Justice Taft, himself a former President, framed the question broadly: “This case presents the question whether under the Constitution the President has the exclusive power of removing executive officers of the United States whom he has appointed by and with the advice and consent of the Senate.”10 A 6–3 majority answered yes, held the provision of the 1876 law invalid, and affirmed the judgment against Myers.11 Justices Holmes, McReynolds, and Brandeis dissented.12
Taft rested the holding on text and structure, on the practical needs of executive administration, and on history. Article II, in his reading, grants the President the executive power of the Government, meaning general administrative control of those executing the laws, including the power to appoint and remove executive officers. The President's obligation to take care that the laws be faithfully executed confirms that reading.13 A President charged with faithful execution must, even without express words, be able to select those who act under his direction, and the power to select carries with it the power to remove those for whom he cannot continue to be responsible.14
Taft added a presumption drawn from the separation of powers. The branches are kept separate wherever the Constitution has not expressly blended them, and the Constitution blends them no more than it affirmatively requires.15 Provisions in Article II that blend legislative action into executive work are limitations to be strictly construed and not extended by implication.16 The two Articles confirm the point. Article I grants only enumerated legislative powers, while Article II grants executive power in general terms, adds specific terms where emphasis is appropriate, and states limits where limits are needed. That no express limit appears on removal is, in that setting, a convincing indication that none was intended.17
Taft treated removal as the President's means of discipline. Made responsible for the effective enforcement of the law, the President needs, as an indispensable aid, the disciplinary influence over those who act under him that a reserve power of removal supplies. Taft recognized the contrary argument, that officers appointed with the Senate's consent are bound by statutory law and are not the President's servants to do his will, but he rejected it.18 The Court gave the same reason for cabinet officers. A President who loses confidence in a department head must be able to remove that officer without delay, because requiring charges to be filed and submitted to the Senate might make impossible the unity and coordination that effective executive action demands.19
The Senate's role was the hardest obstacle for the majority. Article II requires the Senate's advice and consent for appointments, and the majority had to explain why the Senate may check appointments but not removals. Taft's answer was that the power of removal is incident to the power of appointment, not to the power of advising and consenting to appointment.20 The Senate's check on appointments is a limitation, and limitations are not extended by implication to removals.21 The Senate may be as well informed about a nominee's fitness as the President. But the defects in ability, intelligence, or loyalty of an officer who has served are facts about which the President or trusted subordinates must be better informed than the Senate, so the power to remove is confined, for “very sound and practical reasons,” to the authority with administrative control.22 Taft also warned that a contrary holding would make it impossible for the President, in case of political or other differences with the Senate or Congress, to take care that the laws be faithfully executed.23
The reasoning was not confined to cabinet officers. The 1789 decision on which Taft relied covered executive officers “whether superior or inferior,” and Taft applied it to postmasters directly. By requiring certain classes of postmasters to be appointed by the President with the Senate's consent, Congress showed that it deemed that form of appointment essential to the public welfare. Until Congress is willing to vest their appointment in the head of a department, they are subject to removal by the President alone, and any legislation to the contrary falls as in conflict with the Constitution.24
Taft's language also reached officers with quasi-judicial duties. The President cannot properly influence or control such an officer's decision in a particular case, but he may treat the decision, after it is rendered, as a reason for removal if the discretion entrusted to the officer has not on the whole been intelligently or wisely exercised. Otherwise, Taft said, the President does not discharge his own duty of seeing that the laws are faithfully executed.25 Commentators severely criticized that suggestion as applied to members of independent regulatory agencies. Read broadly, Myers would give the President unrestricted power to remove any official he had appointed, except federal judges.26 The criticism has force because politics should normally play no role in adjudication, and officials who adjudicate within the executive branch may need to be protected from presidential whim. Even agencies that exercise delegated rulemaking power may need independence to prevent an excessive concentration of lawmaking power in the President.27 The sections on independent agencies show how the Court later limited this language.
History supplied the third pillar. Taft conceded that a congressional conclusion on a constitutional question is not conclusive. He gave the First Congress's decision great weight for three reasons: he agreed with the reasons on which it was avowedly based, the decision came within two years of the Convention on a question of primary importance to the organization of the Government, and the Congress included leaders who had been members of the Convention.28 The vote, he found, was intended as a legislative declaration that the power to remove officers appointed by the President and the Senate vested in the President alone. Until the Johnson impeachment trial in 1868, even those who questioned its soundness did not doubt that meaning.29 From 1789 until 1863, a period of 74 years, no act of Congress, no executive act, and no decision of the Court was at variance with the First Congress's declaration, and each branch had affirmatively recognized it.30 The Tenure of Office Act of 1867 was therefore invalid insofar as it attempted to prevent the President from removing executive officers whom he had appointed with the Senate's consent, and later legislation of the same effect fell with it.31
The dissenters started from the opposite premise. The Court's judgment would go against the United States, Justice Holmes noted, unless the President acted within powers the Constitution confers. He answered: “I think there is no such power. Certainly it is not given by any plain words of the Constitution; and the argument advanced to establish it seems to me forced and unsubstantial.”32 Justice McReynolds could not accept that the President may dismiss at caprice any inferior officer whom he has appointed with the Senate's consent, notwithstanding a positive inhibition by Congress.33 The majority inferred removal power from the general grant of executive power and the Take Care duty. The dissenters demanded a grant in plain words and found none.
The majority left Congress some authority over the qualifications for office. Taft saw no conflict between that power and the President's powers of appointment and removal, provided the qualifications do not so limit selection and trench upon executive choice as to amount to legislative designation.34
The four-year term in the postal statute did not save Myers. The Court affirmed the judgment against him, so the removal stood and the claim for salary through the end of the term failed.35
In Morrison v. Olson the Court later grouped Myers with Bowsher as a case in which Congress itself sought a role in removal beyond its established powers of impeachment and conviction. The Court contrasted a statute that places the removal power squarely in the hands of the Executive Branch, subject to judicial review and with no requirement of congressional approval.36 That contrast marks the line the later sections develop. Congressional participation in removal is condemned. Whether Congress may limit the President's own removal power while staying out of the decision is a different question.
Inferior Officers and Perkins
Article II lets Congress vest the appointment of inferior officers in the President alone, in the courts, or in the heads of departments.38 Myers confronted the argument that this power over inferior officers also lets Congress prescribe how they are removed while leaving their appointment with the President and the Senate. The Court rejected the argument, finding that the language of the Constitution does not justify it.39 The same passage, however, accepts a narrower proposition that qualifies Myers from within.
The chapter takes up Morrison v. Olson to show which officers count as inferior. The classification matters here because the proviso reaches only inferior officers, such as a special prosecutor with limited duties and a narrow jurisdiction.
The qualification is that when Congress vests the appointment of inferior officers in the heads of departments, it “may limit and restrict the power of removal as it deems best for the public interest.”40 Congress's constitutional authority to vest the appointment implies authority to limit, restrict, and regulate removal by laws enacted for the officers so appointed. That authority also carries with it the power to invest department heads with the removal power, which Congress has done in practice and the Court has recognized.41
The Court's example was United States v. Perkins. A naval cadet-engineer was honorably discharged because his services were no longer required, and he sued for his salary under statutes that barred peacetime discharge except by court-martial or by the Secretary of the Navy “for misconduct.”42 Myers read Perkins as recognizing that Congress, in committing the appointment of inferior officers to department heads, may prescribe incidental regulations controlling and restricting the heads in exercising the power of removal.43
The reasoning stops where Congress would take a hand in the removal decision. The Court has never held, and Myers says it could not reasonably hold, that the excepting clause lets Congress “draw to itself, or to either branch of it, the power to remove or the right to participate in the exercise of that power.” Doing so would go beyond the clause and infringe the separation of powers.44 Bowsher v. Synar later named the mechanism. If Congress participates in removal, the officer may feel a need to comply with Congress's wishes, which in practical terms reserves in Congress control over the execution of the laws.45 A limit on the grounds for removal binds an executive-branch remover who still makes the decision. A congressional role hands the decision to the branch that writes the laws.
The Perkins statute differs because it narrowed the grounds for discharge and left the decision with the Secretary or a court-martial. No chamber of Congress held a veto.
Myers attaches a condition to the Perkins principle that students often overlook. The principle depends on Congress's actually vesting the appointment of the inferior officer in a department head. While Congress does not exercise that power, the power of removal remains where the Constitution places it, with the President.46 Postmasters show how this works. For some forty years Congress provided by law that the Postmaster General appointed them. When Congress later required certain classes of them to be appointed by the President with the Senate's consent, they became removable by the President alone until Congress is willing to vest their appointment in the department head.47 Congress thus faces a choice. It may keep the senior appointment route, or it may regulate removal, but the Court said it cannot have both.
One question stays open. Myers asked whether Congress, by removing the Senate's role and putting appointment in the President alone, would make the President's removal power any more subject to congressional legislation than before. The Court said that under the reasoning of 1789 “it might be difficult to avoid a negative answer, but it is not before us and we do not decide it.”48 The sentence leans toward the President, but it reserves the question, so Perkins is confirmed only for appointments vested in a department head.
Later decisions treat Perkins as settled. Morrison observed that the Court has never held that the Constitution bars Congress from limiting the President's power to remove all executive officials simply because they wield executive power, and that Myers itself distinguished cases in which Congress had vested the appointment of inferior executive officials in the head of a department.49 Free Enterprise Fund v. Public Company Accounting Oversight Board noted that Humphrey's Executor did not address inferior officers, that it is ordinarily the department head rather than the President who removes them, and that the Court has upheld for-cause limits on that power.50 Justice Scalia, whose Morrison dissent stressed presidential control, said Perkins was consistent with his view. Inferior officers answer to principal officers whom the President can remove at will, so it is enough, if the President or a principal officer appointed them, that they be removable for cause, which includes failure to accept supervision.51