Concept
Recess Appointments
Appointment of officers
Recess Appointments
The Recess Appointments Clause, the last sentence of Article II, Section 2, gives the President “Power to fill up all Vacancies that may happen during the Recess of the Senate, by granting Commissions which shall expire at the End of their next Session.”1 It follows the primary method of appointment, in which the President nominates and the Senate gives advice and consent, and the Court calls it a subsidiary method.2 Because its commissions expire at the end of the Senate’s next session, every recess appointment is temporary by design.3
Earlier sections of this chapter treated exceptions to Senate confirmation that depend on the office being filled. Congress may vest the appointment of inferior officers in the President alone, in the courts of law, or in the heads of departments,4 and an inferior officer, in the Court’s account, is one whose work is directed and supervised at some level by others appointed with the Senate’s advice and consent.5 The independent counsel statute shows one such arrangement: it directed a special division of a court to appoint the counsel.6 The recess exception differs in kind. It turns on timing, not on the office, and it reaches “all Vacancies” that happen while the Senate is away.7
The Clause answers a structural difference between the branches. The Executive Branch is perpetually in operation, while the Legislature acts only in intervals separated by recesses, and the Clause lets the Executive keep operating while the Senate is unavailable.8 It is not designed to overcome serious institutional friction; it simply provides a subsidiary method of appointment when the Senate is away.9
NLRB v. Noel Canning gave the Court its first occasion in more than 200 years to interpret the Clause.10 The case began with three appointments to the National Labor Relations Board. The President had nominated Sharon Block, Richard Griffin, and Terence Flynn in 2011. Flynn’s nomination had been pending in the Senate for about a year, and the other two for a few weeks, when the President invoked the Recess Appointments Clause on January 4, 2012, and appointed all three.11
The timing was unusual. The Senate held pro forma sessions, brief sessions held without ordinary business, every Tuesday and Friday until it returned for ordinary business on January 23, 2012, and the appointments fell between the sessions of January 3 and January 6. The distributor challenging the appointments argued that each pro forma session ended the recess before it, so the President had acted during a three-day adjournment, too short to trigger the Clause.12
The Court of Appeals agreed that the appointments fell outside the Clause but gave different reasons. It held that “the recess” does not include breaks within a formal session, so appointments made the day after the second session of the 112th Congress began fell within a session.13 The Supreme Court did not adopt that narrow reading. Because the dispute allocates power between two elected branches, the Court gave weight to history: Presidents have made recess appointments since the beginning of the Republic, and the Court hesitated to upset the working arrangements that the elected branches had reached.14 It answered three questions: which recesses count, meaning breaks within a session as well as between sessions; which vacancies count, meaning only those that first arise during the recess or also earlier ones that persist into it; and how pro forma sessions affect the length of a recess.15 The answer to the third decided the case. The Senate was in the midst of a three-day recess, too short to fall within the Clause, so the President lacked the power to make these appointments.16 Because the Court of Appeals reached the same ultimate conclusion for reasons the Supreme Court rejected, the Court affirmed.17
The subsections below take the three questions in that order and then turn to the concurrence of four Justices, who reached the same result on stricter textual grounds.18
Qualifying Recesses
The Clause permits recess appointments only “during the Recess of the Senate,” and the text leaves two questions open: whether “the Recess” includes a break in the middle of a formal session, and how long a break must be.19 Noel Canning answered both. “The recess” covers breaks within a session as well as breaks between sessions, and the break must last long enough to matter: three days or fewer is too short, and fewer than ten days is presumptively too short.20
An inter-session recess falls between two formal sessions of the Senate, and an intra-session recess falls within a session.21 The Court found the text ambiguous on whether “the recess” includes the second kind, because founding-era dictionaries and usages show that the phrase can encompass intra-session breaks. It resolved the ambiguity by looking to the Clause’s purpose.22
That purpose is to let the President keep the government functioning while the Senate is away. The Senate is equally away during an inter-session and an intra-session recess, and its capacity to take part in the appointments process has nothing to do with the words it uses to signal its departure.23 A rule limited to inter-session breaks would make the President’s power depend on a formalistic distinction of Senate procedure and so frustrate the Clause’s purpose.24 A 1905 report supports the same functional reading. It did not address the inter-session and intra-session distinction directly, but its animating principle, that “recess” should be construed practically as a time when the Senate is unavailable to participate in the appointments process, covers both kinds of break and is inconsistent with the formalistic approach the concurrence endorses.25
Practice points the same way. Since 1929, and particularly since the end of World War II, Congress has shortened its inter-session breaks and taken longer and more frequent intra-session breaks, and Presidents have correspondingly made more intra-session recess appointments; counting military appointments, they have made thousands.26 The President has also consistently and frequently interpreted “recess” to include intra-session breaks and has acted on that interpretation.27 The strongest objection is that the Founders knew only breaks between sessions. The Court framed the question as whether they meant to confine the Clause to the form of recess then prevalent or to let it apply, where appropriate, to changed circumstances, and it concluded that they knew they were writing a document meant to apply to ever-changing circumstances over centuries, a Constitution “intended to endure for ages to come.”28
The broader reading has one visible consequence. An appointment made between sessions lasts about a year, until the end of the next session, while one made at the beginning or in the middle of a session can last a year and a half or almost two years.29 The Court did not find that illogical. A President who makes a recess appointment will often also nominate the appointee for regular confirmation, the Clause guarantees the President and the Senate at least a full session for that process, and the process can take months: from 1987 to 2005 it averaged 236 days for noncabinet agency heads. A recess appointment lasting somewhat longer than a year therefore ensures the President the continued assistance of subordinates while the President and the Senate select a regular appointee.30
The Clause sets no minimum length, but the Court did not read that silence as a reason to confine “the recess” to its narrow meaning. The most likely reason the Framers placed no textual floor under the word is that they did not foresee the need for one; they might have expected the Senate to meet for a single session lasting at most half a year.31 The Court found a floor in the Constitution itself. The Adjournments Clause requires the House’s consent when the Senate adjourns for more than three days, and it reflects the judgment that a three-day break is not a significant interruption of legislative business; the Solicitor General himself called such a break constitutionally de minimis. A Senate recess so short that it needs no House consent is too short to trigger the recess-appointment power.32
Historical practice sets the line higher than three days. The Clause aims to let the Executive Branch function smoothly when the Senate is unavailable, yet Congress has taken short breaks for almost 200 years, there have been many thousands of recess appointments in that time, and the Court found no appointment made during an intra-session recess shorter than ten days. The Solicitor General found none either, and the Office of Legal Counsel once informally advised against making one during a six-day recess. That absence suggests the power is not needed for breaks that short.33 The Court therefore held that a recess of more than three days but fewer than ten is presumptively too short.34
The word “presumptively” leaves room for a very unusual circumstance, such as a national catastrophe that renders the Senate unavailable but calls for an urgent response, which could demand a recess appointment during a shorter break. Political opposition in the Senate would not qualify.35 The exception follows the Clause’s purpose, which is to cover a Senate that cannot act. If opposition counted, a President with a stalled nominee could cite it as the emergency, and the length floor would mean little.
Noel Canning itself fell below the floor. The President made the appointments while the Senate was in the midst of a three-day recess, and three days is too short to bring a recess within the Clause, so the President lacked the power to make them.36 How the Court counted only three days, when the Senate did not return to ordinary business until January 23, is the pro forma question taken up below.37
Qualifying Vacancies
The Clause also limits which offices the President may fill: those vacancies “that may happen during the Recess of the Senate.”39 All agree that the phrase covers a vacancy that first arises during a recess. The dispute concerned a vacancy that arose earlier and still existed when the recess began. The Court held that the phrase covers both kinds, vacancies that first come into existence during a recess and vacancies that arose before it but continue to exist during it.40
The Court conceded that the narrower reading comes more naturally to a modern ear, since a vacancy “happens” when it first occurs.41 The text is nonetheless ambiguous.42 The word “happen” can pair with another word that, like “vacancy,” refers to a continuing state. A statute giving the President authority over “any financial crisis that may happen during his term” is easily read to include a crisis that began before the term and continues during it, and the Oxford English Dictionary defines “happen” in part as “chance to be,” not only “chance to occur.”43 Because the words permit either reading, purpose and practice decide the choice.
The purpose of the Clause is to keep offices filled when the Senate is not available to confirm. Attorney General Wirt, whose advice President Monroe received and presumably acted upon, put it this way: the “substantial purpose of the constitution was to keep these offices filled,” and if the President could not fill a vacancy that opened before a recess, “the substance of the constitution will be sacrificed to a dubious construction of its letter.” The broader construction, he concluded, was the “only construction of the constitution which is compatible with its spirit, reason, and purposes; while, at the same time, it offers no violence to its language.”44 The narrower reading would bar any recess appointment to a pre-recess vacancy, no matter who the official, no matter how dire the need, no matter how uncontroversial the appointment, and no matter how late in the session the office fell vacant.45
The concurrence answered that Congress can provide for acting officers and the President can convene a special session, so a gap in an office would be no catastrophe. The Court rejected that suggestion, and its stated reasons concern acting officers. They may have less authority than presidential appointees, and relying on them would lessen the President’s ability to staff the Executive Branch with people of his own choosing, which limits the President’s control and political accountability.46
The broader reading carries a risk, and the Court said so: both readings risk undesirable consequences.47 The risk is that a President could use recess appointments to sidestep Senate confirmation, and the Court found several checks on it. A recess appointee serves a limited term and lacks Senate approval, which may diminish the appointee’s practical ability to get a controversial job done. Even when the President and the Senate disagree over a politically sensitive appointment, compromise is normally possible, and the 1940 Pay Act amendments are such a compromise: they foresee salaries for recess appointees to vacancies that arose before the recess but not too long before, within 30 days. Finally, where a matter is important enough to the Senate, it can remain in session and prevent recess appointments by refusing to take a recess.48
On balance, the Court judged that the narrower reading “risks undermining constitutionally conferred powers more seriously and more often.”49 The narrower reading’s harm does not depend on any abuse. It follows whenever an office happens to fall vacant at the wrong moment.
Practice supports the broader reading. Wirt advised Monroe that “all vacancies which, from any casualty, happen to exist at a time when the Senate cannot be consulted as to filling them, may be temporarily filled by the President,” and nearly every later Attorney General to consider the question thought the same.50 In a random sample of 21 recess appointments by the two most recent Presidents, 18 filled pre-recess vacancies, and only one filled a vacancy that arose during the recess in which it was made.51 The Senate has accepted the practice as well. By paying salaries to recess appointees whose vacancies existed before the recess, the 1940 Senate and later Senates in effect supported the President’s interpretation.52 The Court was reluctant to upset a traditional practice whose removal would seriously shrink the authority that Presidents have believed they had and have exercised for so long.53
The second scene fails at a different point from the one this subsection has treated. The vacancy holding says which vacancies the power can reach, but the power operates only while the Senate is in a recess of sufficient length. How the Court treats a Senate that holds brief pro forma meetings during a break is taken up next, and that question, not the vacancy question, invalidated the appointments in Noel Canning.54
On an exam, the instinct to ask when the vacancy first arose leads to the wrong test. The date a vacancy opened does not matter so long as the office is vacant during a qualifying recess. A problem featuring an office empty since before the break therefore calls for the same two questions as any recess appointment: was the Senate in a qualifying recess, and was the office vacant during it? The four concurring Justices would have limited the power to offices that become vacant during the recess itself, a view taken up in the last subsection, but the Court’s holding is the broader one.55
Pro Forma Sessions
The recess power exists only while the Senate is in recess, and the earlier subsections set the length floor: three days or fewer is too short, and fewer than ten days is presumptively too short.57 A measurement problem remains. The Senate can divide a long absence into short adjournments separated by pro forma sessions, and the length of any one recess then depends on whether those sessions interrupt it. That question decided Noel Canning, where the Court held that “for purposes of the Recess Appointments Clause, the Senate is in session when it says it is, provided that, under its own rules, it retains the capacity to transact Senate business.”58
The facts show how much turned on that holding. The Senate held pro forma sessions every Tuesday and Friday until it returned for ordinary business on January 23, 2012, and the President’s appointments fell between the sessions of January 3 and January 6.59 If those sessions count, the appointments came during a three-day break, too short to trigger the Clause. The Solicitor General argued that they do not count. The sessions were “sessions” in name only, he said, because the Senate was in recess as a functional matter and remained in a single, unbroken recess from January 3, when the second session of the 112th Congress began by operation of the Twentieth Amendment, until January 23, when it reconvened to do regular business.60 A recess that long would have cleared the length floor.
The Court rejected the functional argument and held that the pro forma sessions count as sessions, not as periods of recess. Its standard rests on the Constitution’s grant of power to the Senate to “determine the Rules of its Proceedings,” and on the holding in United States v. Ballin that “all matters of method are open to the determination” of the Senate, so long as there is “a reasonable relation between the mode or method of proceeding established by the rule and the result which is sought to be attained” and the rule does not “ignore constitutional restraints or violate fundamental rights.”61 The Court also declined to engage in an in-depth factual appraisal of what the Senate actually did during its pro forma sessions.62
Deference to the Senate has a limit, and the Court stated it alongside the rule. The Senate’s own determination of when it is and is not in session receives great weight, but the deference cannot be absolute, and when the Senate lacks the capacity to act under its own rules it is not in session even if it says it is.63 The qualifier follows from the Clause’s purpose of letting the Executive operate while the Senate is unavailable.64 A Senate able to act can give or withhold consent, so nothing calls for the President’s substitute power, but a Senate that could do nothing would be unavailable however it labeled its meetings. The inquiry therefore looks at what the Senate is able to do under its rules, not at what it in fact does at a particular meeting.
The Senate in Noel Canning met the standard.65 It said it was in session, and its rules left it able to act, for example by unanimous consent; it in fact passed a bill by unanimous consent at one of its pro forma sessions.66 The bill is evidence that the capacity existed, and the standard does not demand an act like it at every session. Because the Senate was in session during its pro forma sessions, the President made the appointments during a three-day recess, which is too short to bring a recess within the Clause, so the President lacked the authority to make them.67 The Court affirmed the judgment of the Court of Appeals, which reached the same conclusion on reasoning the Court rejected.68 The majority and the concurrence therefore both found the appointments invalid, the majority on the narrow ground that they were made during a three-day break and the concurrence on much stricter grounds, a view the next subsection takes up.69
The deference carries a cost for the Senate, and the President is not left without recourse. A Senate that wants to prevent recess appointments by this method has to keep meeting and keep its capacity to act, and the Court observed that when a matter is important enough, the Senate can remain in session and refuse to take a recess.70 A President whose nominees are waiting in the Senate may find that frustrating, but the Clause is not designed to overcome serious institutional friction, which the Court treated as an inevitable consequence of the constitutional structure, resolvable through interpretation, compromise among the branches, and the ballot box.71
A problem that describes a Senate absence turns first on how the Senate scheduled its days.
Noel Canning is the mirror image of that scene. The Senate there was also away from ordinary business for weeks, but because it scheduled a session every third day or so and kept the power to act at each one, the longest break the President could point to was three days. A schedule that looks like a long recess on a calendar can therefore yield only short recesses in law, which is why the form of the Senate’s resolution decides the length of the recess.
The usual exam error is to argue that the pro forma sessions should not count because no business was done at them. That is the functional argument the Solicitor General pressed and the Court refused to adopt. The standard asks whether the Senate said it was in session and kept the capacity to act, and the Court would not appraise the Senate’s actual activity. An answer that names those two parts of the standard and then counts the days between meetings follows the Court’s own method.
The Textualist Alternative
The Recess Appointments Clause gives the President “Power to fill up all Vacancies that may happen during the Recess of the Senate, by granting Commissions which shall expire at the End of their next Session.”73 Each phrase raises a question that the Noel Canning majority answered generously: which breaks count as “the Recess,” and which offices count as vacancies that “happen during” it. Justice Scalia answered both much more narrowly in an opinion concurring only in the judgment, joined by three other Justices.74 An opinion that concurs only in the judgment accepts the result but rejects the majority’s reasoning, and because this one drew only four votes it states no binding law. Its value lies in showing how a reader who starts from the words of a structural provision would resolve the same text, and the disagreement it records is the live one on every recess-appointment question.
The concurrence would read the Clause as imposing two textual limits: the power may be used only in “the Recess,” which it understood as the gap between formal sessions, and it may fill only vacancies that arise during that gap. In its view the majority “sweeps away the key textual limitations on the recess-appointment power,” because it lets the President appoint during short breaks in the middle of a session and lets those appointments fill offices that became vacant long before the break.75 The concurrence would hold that “the Recess” is the gap between sessions and that the appointments in the case are invalid because they undisputedly were made during the Senate’s session.76
On the first limit, the concurrence began with the Constitution’s own word. As even the majority acknowledged, the use of “the” in “the [R]ecess” tends to suggest that the phrase refers to the single break separating formal sessions.77 The concurrence called the majority’s reading linguistically unsound and said it yields a strange result: an appointment made during a short break near the beginning of one session lasts until the end of the following session, up to two years. The majority justified that result by observing that confirmation “may take several months.”78
On length, the concurrence said the notion that the Constitution empowers the President to make unilateral appointments every time the Senate takes a half-hour lunch break is “so absurd as to be self-refuting,” and that, in its view, is what the majority’s reading of the text authorizes.79 Avoiding that result, it argued, requires “judicial fabrication of vague, unadministrable limits on the recess-appointment power” that overstep the judicial role, and it found the majority’s reading inconsistent with the Constitution’s text and structure.80 Reading “the Recess” as the gap between sessions avoids the problem, because that reading needs no judge-made limit.
The concurrence’s harshest criticism concerned method. It described the majority’s reliance on practice as an adverse-possession theory of executive authority: Presidents have long claimed the powers in question, the Senate has not disputed the claims with sufficient vigor, and so the Court should not “upset the compromises and working arrangements that the elected branches of Government themselves have reached.”81 It argued that no practice worthy of deference supports the majority’s conclusion, and it dismissed as pure dictum the language the majority quoted from the Pocket Veto case.82 Deferring to the Executive’s broad reading, it warned, conflicts with precedent and “forebodes a diminution of this Court’s role in controversies involving the separation of powers and the structure of government.”83
The majority answered that the Clause’s text, standing alone, is ambiguous. The Clause’s function therefore decides the question, and that function is to let the Executive, which is perpetually in operation, continue to operate while the Senate is unavailable.84 Presidents have made recess appointments since the beginning of the Republic, and the majority hesitated to upset the arrangements that the elected branches had reached.85 The narrower reading, the majority added, would render illegitimate thousands of recess appointments reaching back to the founding era and would basically read the Clause out of the Constitution.86
Two further replies meet the concurrence’s textual points directly. The Founders knew chiefly breaks between sessions, but the question is whether they meant to freeze the Clause at the form of recess then common or to let it reach changed circumstances, and a Constitution intended to endure for ages to come suggests the latter. As for appointments that can last almost two years, a President who makes a recess appointment will often also seek ordinary confirmation, and the Clause guarantees a full session to complete a process that may take months.87 The absence of a textual floor on length does not favor the formal reading either, because the most likely reason the Framers set none is that they did not foresee the need for one.88
Noel Canning itself sits where the two views agree. Both found the appointments invalid, the majority because the Senate was in recess for only three days between its pro forma sessions, and the concurrence because the appointments were made during the Senate’s session and so met neither of its conditions.89 The views part ways only on facts like those in the second scene above, a substantial break inside a session or a vacancy that predates the break, and those are the facts on which an exam answer should flag the disagreement.
On an exam, the majority’s holding is the law, so a recess-appointment problem is analyzed under its rules on the kind and length of the recess, the timing of the vacancy, and the effect of pro forma sessions. The concurrence belongs in the answer as the contrary view where the facts fall in the gap between the two readings. Students sometimes treat it as the holding because its tone reads like a dissent, but it concurred only in the judgment and spoke for four Justices.90 What it contributes is a method. The majority gives great weight to history and purpose where the text is ambiguous, and the concurrence insists on the Constitution’s text and structure.