Concept
Principal Versus Inferior Officers
Appointment of officers
Principal Versus Inferior Officers
Rank decides who may make the appointment. The Appointments Clause has the President nominate, and the Senate confirm, ambassadors, public ministers, consuls, Justices of the Supreme Court, and all other officers of the United States, but it lets Congress “vest the Appointment of such inferior Officers, as they think proper, in the President alone, in the Courts of Law, or in the Heads of Departments.”1 For a principal officer Congress has no choice about the method. For an inferior officer it has four: the same nomination and confirmation, or appointment by the President alone, by a court, or by a department head.2 A statute that hands a post to a department head therefore stands if the post is inferior and falls if it is principal, and the Constitution never says where one tier ends and the other begins.
Whether a post is an office at all is the first sorting question, and the Court has answered it broadly. In the case that struck down congressional appointment of most Federal Election Commission members, it insisted that “any appointee exercising significant authority pursuant to the laws of the United States is an Officer of the United States, and must, therefore, be appointed” as the Clause prescribes.3 In Lucia, administrative law judges at the SEC were officers because they held a continuing position created by statute and exercised significant discretion in presiding over adjudications and issuing decisions.4 A judge there had found Raymond Lucia liable for deceiving prospective clients and imposed $300,000 in civil penalties and a lifetime bar from the investment industry, and Lucia answered that the judge had not been constitutionally appointed.5 This unit starts where those cases stop. It assumes the person is an officer and asks only about rank.
Classification is easy at the poles. Cabinet members who head major departments and answer to no executive officer but the President are clearly principal officers: they exercise enormous power, have great policymaking authority, and are supervised directly by the President.6 The middle ground is much harder, and in Morrison v. Olson the Court admitted that “[t]he line between ‘inferior’ and ‘principal’ officers is one that is far from clear.”7 Without a textual test, the Court has weighed three considerations: the nature and extent of the official’s duties, including any policymaking function; the official’s independence and the source of supervision, meaning whether the official answers to the President, to a principal officer, or to someone lower in the hierarchy; and the tenure of the position, meaning whether it is continuing, temporary, or intermittent, and the circumstances in which the official may be removed.8
Morrison applied those considerations to a court-appointed independent counsel. Edmond v. United States later made supervision by a Senate-confirmed superior the central question, and tenure in particular can still decide a close case.9 The three subsections below follow that development.
Morrison v. Olson
The independent counsel statute worked through a court. If the Attorney General determined that there were “reasonable grounds to believe that further investigation or prosecution is warranted,” the Attorney General had to apply to the Special Division of the court, which then appointed an independent counsel and defined her prosecutorial jurisdiction.10 The Special Division of the United States Court of Appeals, not the President with the Senate’s consent, appointed her, so her appointment was constitutional only if (1) she was an inferior officer and (2) Congress could vest her appointment in a court of law.11 All parties agreed that she was an officer of the United States, so rank was the open question.12
The Court of Appeals had held the Act unconstitutional on several grounds, among them the Appointments Clause, and it had concluded that the counsel was a principal officer.13 If she was, the Act could not stand, because a principal officer must be appointed by the President with the Senate’s consent.14 The Supreme Court reversed.15
The majority declined to draw the line in the abstract. “We need not attempt here to decide exactly where the line falls between the two types of officers, because in our view appellant clearly falls on the ‘inferior officer’ side of that line.”16 Several considerations carried that result. The Attorney General could remove her, though only under strictly limited conditions. Her duties were confined to a single case and ended with it, and she had no authority to formulate policy for the Government.17 The Special Division set her jurisdiction, and her office was temporary.18 Having found her inferior, the Court held that she could properly be appointed by one of the “Courts of Law.”19 Which appointers Congress may choose is the subject of the next section.
Because the majority stated no formula, an answer should compare the position under review with the counsel’s, point by point, and should not recite a test the Court declined to adopt. The dissent contested the majority’s reasons, and its objections appear below beside the points they answer.
Supervision and Removal
An inferior officer is, by the word’s own logic, someone who has a superior. The Morrison majority nevertheless called the independent counsel inferior without finding that anyone directed her work. Its first reason was that the Attorney General could remove her. She was not fully “subordinate” to the Attorney General, the Court admitted, because the Act gave her a degree of independent discretion, but the removal power showed that she was “to some degree ‘inferior’ in rank and authority.”20
The dissent saw no inferiority in that fact. The counsel was removable only for “good cause” or physical or mental incapacity, while the President can remove most principal officers at will, and the dissent could not see how an officer harder to remove than most principal officers helped to show that she was inferior.21 An officer removable at will by the Attorney General would be subordinate to him and properly called inferior, it said, but the majority had essentially admitted that she was not subordinate. If removal for cause by another made someone “inferior,” one would say that the President is inferior to Congress.22
The dissent also offered a test of its own. In the brief discussion that produced the exceptions clause, Madison spoke of “Superior Officers.” One is not a superior officer without supervisory responsibility, the dissent reasoned, and one is not an inferior officer “unless one is subject to supervision by a ‘superior officer.’”23 Subordination to another officer was thus a necessary condition of inferior status, though not a sufficient one, because even an officer who is subordinate to a department head can be a principal officer.24
Edmond made the same idea the starting point of the analysis. The Court held that judges of the Coast Guard Court of Criminal Appeals were inferior officers because the judge advocate general and the Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces supervised them, and they “have no power to render a final decision on behalf of the United States unless permitted to do so by other executive officers.”25 Inferior officers, the Court explained, are “officers whose work is directed and supervised at some level by others who were appointed by Presidential nomination with the advice and consent of the Senate.” It is not enough that other officers “formally maintain a higher rank, or possess responsibilities of a greater magnitude.”26 The Secretary of Transportation, rather than the President, could therefore appoint the Coast Guard judges.27
Morrison had stated no general test, and Edmond supplied one.28 The two cases fit together awkwardly. The Attorney General lacked authority to direct and supervise the independent counsel, which Edmond now seems to require, yet the removal power suggested to the Morrison Court that she was “to some degree ‘inferior.’” The Morrison Court did not rest on removal alone; a check of her powers and duties also convinced it that the office was not principal.29 A sound answer treats removal as one piece of the picture and supervision as the main inquiry.
Removal at will carries the most weight. In Free Enterprise Fund v. Public Company Accounting Oversight Board the Court first held the statutory limits on the SEC’s power to remove Board members unconstitutional and void, so the Commission was treated as holding that power at will, which the Court called “a powerful tool for control.”30 With that power and the Commission’s other oversight authority, the Court had “no hesitation” in finding the Board members inferior officers whose appointment Congress could vest in a head of department.31 Susceptibility to removal without cause is thus an important sign of inferiority, at least when the supervising body also has other oversight authority.32
United States v. Arthrex, Inc. shows what happens when supervision is missing. The administrative patent judges who decided disputes at the Patent Trial and Appeal Board were appointed by the Secretary of Commerce, a department head, an appointment that would suit inferior officers. Yet the statute let them issue decisions that no Senate-confirmed officer could review, and the Court held, building on Edmond, that authority of that kind is principal-officer authority.33 The Court cured the defect without striking the program. It invalidated the statutory shield against review, so that the Director of the Patent and Trademark Office, a presidential appointee confirmed by the Senate, could review the judges’ decisions and the judges became inferior officers.34
Examinees lose points on this strand in two ways. They treat any boss as a superior, when the test asks about an officer appointed by presidential nomination with Senate confirmation who directs or supervises the work at some level. And they treat removal only for cause as if it were removal at will, when Morrison relied on such removal together with narrow duties, a limited jurisdiction, and a temporary office. An answer that looks only at the appointer’s title or the officer’s formal rank misses what these cases ask: whether anyone accountable to the President can direct, review, or remove.
Duties, Jurisdiction, and Tenure
Supervision is the major question, but the doctrine does not end there. The extent and source of supervision weigh most in separating principal from inferior officers, yet the tenure of the position may also be decisive: a temporary post can make inferior an officer who would otherwise be principal.36 The remaining Morrison considerations concern the scope of the office: how limited its duties, how confined its jurisdiction, and how temporary its tenure.
On duties, the Act gave the counsel “full power and independent authority to exercise all investigative and prosecutorial functions and powers of the Department of Justice,” but the majority stressed that the grant “does not include any authority to formulate policy for the Government or the Executive Branch” and gave her no administrative duties beyond those needed to run her office. In policy matters she had to comply, to the extent possible, with the Department’s policies.37 The contrast tracks the cabinet paradigm, in which principal officers exercise great power and make policy.38
Jurisdiction was fixed from outside, because the Special Division defined it after the Attorney General’s application, and her role was “restricted primarily to investigation and, if appropriate, prosecution for certain federal crimes.”39 On tenure, the majority conceded that no time limit applied to a particular counsel. It called the office “temporary” anyway, because a counsel “is appointed essentially to accomplish a single task, and when that task is over the office is terminated,” either by the counsel or by the Special Division. Unlike other prosecutors, she had no ongoing responsibilities beyond the mission she was appointed to carry out.40
Temporary in this sense means task-bound, not short; an investigation that runs for years still ends with its task. Tenure therefore does two different jobs. A position need not be permanent to count as “continuing,” and so as an office at all, which is why special prosecutors are officers.41 Once a position is an office, its limited duration can lower its rank.42
Earlier decisions show the considerations at work one at a time. United States v. Eaton treated a vice-consul who served during a consul’s temporary absence as a subordinate officer, even though the Appointments Clause names consuls among the principal officers: an officer who performs a superior’s duties for a limited time under special and temporary conditions is not thereby transformed into the superior and permanent official.43 Tenure lowered the rank there. Ex parte Siebold held that federal supervisors of elections, who oversaw local congressional elections, were inferior officers, and Go-Bart Importing Co. v. United States reached the same result for United States commissioners, who could arrest and imprison for trial, issue warrants, and institute prosecutions under laws relating to the elective franchise and civil rights.44 Because the commissioners wielded real power over individuals, those cases indicate that substantial coercive authority does not by itself make an officer principal. In United States v. Nixon the Court had also called the Watergate Special Prosecutor, whose authority resembled the counsel’s, a “subordinate officer.”45
The dissent answered the no-policymaking point by observing that the same could be said of every officer except the President, since officers formulate policy only within their own spheres of responsibility, and that the counsel too had to follow Department of Justice policies only “to the extent possible.”46 The exchange shows why duties cannot be judged from a description alone. Read what the statute actually authorizes.
The duties here are too significant for employee status. Removal only for cause gives little real control, and the facts do not say whether the Attorney General may direct the prosecutor’s work at all. Supervision therefore cannot carry the classification, and the scope considerations take on weight. The prosecutor pursues only a narrow range of crimes, and the office must end when the task that created it is finished, so a court could well classify the position as inferior and uphold the Attorney General’s appointment.47 Give the same prosecutor a standing, open-ended mandate to police the Customs Service and the office carries continuing responsibilities, so in a close case permanence may decide the matter in favor of principal status.48 Tenure is the only variable that moved, which is why identical investigative and prosecutorial powers can produce opposite classifications.
The majority offered these points as considerations and disclaimed any exact test, so an answer should present them the same way.49 Morrison stated no general test; Edmond clarified that an inferior officer is one whose work a presidential appointee directs and supervises at some level.50 Scope therefore does its best work after the supervision question has been asked. It can confirm an inferior classification that supervision supports, and tenure in particular may decide a close case.51 Two mistakes cost points here: treating the three considerations as a checklist in which every item must be satisfied, and accepting a statute’s description of an office as narrow without checking the powers it grants.