Concept
Sources of Foreign Affairs Power
Treaty and foreign affairs powers
Presidential Foreign Affairs Powers
Sources of Foreign Affairs Power
The Constitution says little about who controls foreign affairs, and it splits what it does say between the President and Congress. The text is relatively inarticulate about the national government’s foreign affairs powers, so doubt arises over where a given authority resides; and because some of the powers it does name belong jointly to Congress and the President, each branch can claim that a particular power is its own.1 Appeals to the framers’ intent help less here than in most areas of constitutional law. A world of instantaneous communications, missiles that cross the globe in minutes, and troops that deploy anywhere within hours differs vastly from the world of 1787.2
Courts have left some of these disputes untouched and others unresolved.3 In Goldwater v. Carter, for instance, the Court held nonjusticiable a challenge to the President’s rescission of the treaty with Taiwan.4 Decisions that define the President’s authority are therefore comparatively few.
Three questions organize the field. First, do foreign and domestic affairs differ under the Constitution, so that the President holds more inherent authority abroad than at home? Second, what limits does the Constitution place on agreements with foreign nations, and may the President use executive agreements in place of treaties? Third, how does the Constitution allocate decision-making over war?5 This unit starts with the first question and asks where a claim of presidential foreign-affairs authority can come from. It works from the text outward: the express grants of Article II; the Vesting Clause and the claim that sovereignty itself supplies inherent power; Justice Jackson’s framework for measuring any claim against the will of Congress; and the recognition power, which the Court has held belongs to the President alone.
Enumerated Presidential Powers
Article II answers the question “who must act?” differently for different foreign-affairs functions. The President is Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy and of the state militias when they are called into federal service, and the text attaches no Senate condition to that grant. Treaties are different: the President may make them only with the Senate’s advice and consent, and only if two thirds of the Senators present concur. Ambassadors, other public ministers, and consuls are different again: the President nominates them, but the Senate’s advice and consent completes the appointment.6 The text thus sorts the functions into three groups: those the President performs alone, those assigned to Congress, and those the two branches must complete together.
Two more functions belong to the President alone, and both appear in Article II, Section 3. The President “shall receive Ambassadors and other public Ministers,” and the President “shall take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed.”7 Neither requires a vote by either house. The wording of the first matters later in this unit. The Reception Clause is phrased as something the President shall do, a duty and not a stated power, and the argument over whether it supports a power to recognize foreign governments begins there.
Congress holds powers in the same field. It regulates commerce with foreign nations;8 it declares war and grants letters of marque and reprisal;9 and it controls the Treasury, for no money may be drawn except in consequence of appropriations made by law, a limit that a treaty purporting to appropriate funds without congressional action would likely violate.10 The President therefore commands the armed forces, but Congress declares war and holds the purse.
Where a function needs both branches, the President starts it and the Senate can stop it. The two-thirds requirement for treaties and the consent requirement for appointments keep the President from completing either function alone. Joint control also invites competing claims, because each branch can point to its share of the text and argue that the rest of the function belongs to it.11
The two halves of that exchange run on different procedures because the text treats them differently. The Reception Clause gives the President the receiving function without qualification; the appointments clause conditions the sending function on the Senate. Students often treat a nomination as an appointment. The cure is to ask, for any international function, which of those two patterns its clause follows.
The Vesting Clause supplies the last textual argument. It opens Article II: “The executive Power shall be vested in a President of the United States of America.”13 Presidents who claim foreign-affairs authority that no specific clause lists usually start there, and the argument traces to Alexander Hamilton. Hamilton reasoned that vesting the executive power in the President gave him, as the organ of intercourse between the Nation and foreign nations, the right to interpret national treaties and to declare neutrality.14 The Supreme Court recounted the argument in Myers v. United States, a case about the removal power. The Court observed that Hamilton followed the reasoning Madison and his associates had used in the First Congress’s decision on presidential removals, and that he cited that decision as authority.15
Hamilton’s premise was that the executive power of the nation is vested in the President, “subject only to the exceptions and qualifications, which are expressed in the instrument.”16 A complete list of executive functions would be hard to compile, he argued, so the framers would naturally use general terms, and it is improbable that listing certain particulars was meant to substitute for them; the different wording the Constitution uses for the legislative and executive powers confirms the inference.17 The exceptions he identified were the Senate’s part in appointments and treaties and the legislature’s right to declare war.18
That reading makes the President’s foreign-affairs authority a residue: whatever the text has not withheld from the executive belongs to it. The theory explains why Presidents invoke the argument and why it draws resistance. If the general clause already carries everything, the specific list in Section 2 seems to do little work, and Hamilton’s answer was that no list of particulars could be complete.19 The argument rests on structure and history. It remains a recognized route to unlisted power and not a holding that fixes the allocation of foreign-affairs authority. When the recognition question reached the Court, the Court found the power in specific clauses and did not need to decide whether the Vesting Clause adds support.20
Curtiss-Wright and Inherent Power
The Court’s most quoted statement on presidential power over foreign relations came in a case in which the President and Congress agreed. In United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., Congress had passed a joint resolution authorizing the President to prohibit arms sales to countries involved in the Chaco border conflict in South America, and the President imposed the embargo by proclamation.22 The defendants, indicted for conspiring to sell machine guns to Bolivia, answered that the resolution unconstitutionally delegated legislative power to the executive.23 That answer had real force in 1936, because the Court was then aggressively enforcing the nondelegation doctrine, the principle that Congress cannot delegate legislative power to executive agencies.24 The Court nonetheless upheld the resolution and the proclamation.25
Justice Sutherland’s opinion for the Court took a different route from the Vesting Clause argument. It started from the nature of national sovereignty and needed no clause at all. Sutherland first asked whether a delegation that might fail in a purely domestic case could stand because its aim was to remedy a condition outside the United States.26 His answer began with the source of federal power. For internal affairs, the Constitution carved a limited set of powers out of the broad authority the states already held, which is why the federal government at home can exercise only enumerated powers and those necessarily implied.27 That picture cannot describe external powers, because the states never possessed them; those powers passed from the Crown to the Union.28 Sutherland therefore concluded that “the investment of the federal government with the powers of external sovereignty did not depend upon the affirmative grants of the Constitution.” The powers “to declare and wage war, to conclude peace, to make treaties, to maintain diplomatic relations with other sovereignties, if they had never been mentioned in the Constitution, would have vested in the federal government as necessary concomitants of nationality.”29
The second step concerned who exercises external power. “In this vast external realm, with its important, complicated, delicate and manifold problems, the President alone has the power to speak or listen as a representative of a nation.” Sutherland added that the President’s authority rested on “the very delicate, plenary and exclusive power of the President as the sole organ of the federal government in the field of international relations—a power which does not require as a basis for its exercise an act of Congress.”30 The label “sole organ” came from John Marshall’s 1800 argument in the House of Representatives, in which Marshall called the President the sole organ of the nation in its external relations.31 An organ in this sense is a channel through which the nation communicates, so the phrase describes the single voice with which the United States speaks to other nations. Treaties illustrate the point: the President needs the Senate’s consent to make a treaty but alone negotiates it, and the Senate cannot intrude into the negotiation.32 Sutherland also stressed that the power, like every other governmental power, must be exercised in subordination to the applicable provisions of the Constitution.33
A practical argument supported the structural one, and it explains why foreign affairs tolerate broader delegations than domestic affairs do. Legislation that must take effect through negotiation abroad often has to give the President discretion and freedom from statutory restriction that would be inadmissible in a purely domestic setting, because the President, not Congress, has the better chance of knowing conditions in foreign countries, through confidential sources and through diplomatic and consular agents whose reports may demand secrecy.34 Congress writes statutes in advance, and the conditions that matter overseas change faster than statutes can. A rule requiring narrowly definite standards would force Congress either to guess about the future or to stay silent. The nondelegation doctrine, already very weak in the domestic sphere, is therefore an even more toothless barrier in foreign affairs.35 Applied to the Chaco resolution, which let the President prohibit arms sales when he found that a ban might help restore peace, that reasoning sustained both the delegation and the proclamation issued under it.36
The opinion has drawn two main objections. If external powers flowed automatically from sovereignty, Articles I and II would have had no reason to list so many foreign-affairs powers, yet they list many. And the historical account on which Sutherland relied has been sharply criticized as inaccurate and as unsupported by the constitutional text or the framers’ intent.37 According to oral tradition, lawyers in the Justice Department’s Office of Legal Counsel describe the practice of citing the case as “Curtiss-Wright wrong but right,” a joke that fits an opinion cited for its result and its sweeping language despite doubts about its reasoning.38
The most important limit on the case comes from its own facts. The President in Curtiss-Wright acted under a joint resolution that Congress itself had passed, so the sweeping statements about exclusive presidential power were not needed to decide the case. A statement not needed to the result is dictum, and later courts may decline to follow it. Justice Jackson made that point in his concurrence in the Steel Seizure Case: Curtiss-Wright dealt with presidential action in harmony with an act of Congress, not with action contrary to Congress.39 Jackson’s reading places a significant limitation on the theory of unrestrained executive plenary power, and Sutherland’s broad language should be read in light of the facts he faced.40
Read narrowly, then, the decision supports two propositions: Congress may delegate wide discretion to the President in foreign affairs, and a President acting on such a delegation stands on strong ground. Read at full strength, it supports the view stated directly in some treatments, that for functional and constitutional reasons the President is “the sole organ of foreign relations, possessed of an inherent power nowhere else manifest in the Constitution.”41 That broader reading is the one a President needs when acting against Congress, and the Court has resisted it. In Zivotofsky v. Kerry, the Court refused to acknowledge unbounded presidential power, noting that the sole-organ description was unnecessary to the holding of Curtiss-Wright, which involved action Congress had authorized.42 Justice Scalia, dissenting, accused the majority of replicating Curtiss-Wright’s reasoning anyway, a sign of how strongly the sweeping language still pulls.43
Both the Chaco embargo and the export order concern foreign relations, and they come out differently because of one fact. The embargo carried out what Congress had asked. The export order overrides what Congress required, and the sole-organ language cannot carry it, because Sutherland wrote that language for a case in which the branches agreed.44 Such an order could survive only if the Constitution gave the President exclusive control over the subject, as the Court later held it does for recognition of foreign governments. The next subsection supplies the framework courts use to sort these situations.
Youngstown’s Three Categories
Curtiss-Wright showed a President on strong ground because Congress had agreed. Justice Jackson’s concurring opinion in Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, the Steel Seizure Case, turns that insight into a framework. The Supreme Court endorsed the framework in a foreign-affairs case, Zivotofsky v. Kerry, by quoting it at length.46 The framework sorts every presidential action into one of three categories according to what Congress has done about the subject. In the first, the President acts under an express or implied authorization of Congress, and the President’s authority “is at its maximum, for it includes all that he possesses in his own right plus all that Congress can delegate.”47 In the second, Congress has neither granted nor denied authority, which leaves a “zone of twilight in which he and Congress may have concurrent authority,” and “congressional inertia, indifference or quiescence” may invite executive action.48 In the third, the President takes measures “incompatible with the expressed or implied will of Congress,” and can rely only upon “his own constitutional powers minus any constitutional powers of Congress over the matter.”49
The three categories follow one idea. The President’s express foreign-affairs powers are few, and Congress holds overlapping powers over commerce, war, and money, so the strength of a presidential claim depends on whether Congress’s lawmaking power is added to the President’s, left idle, or subtracted from it. Under authorization, the President draws on both branches, and a challenger must overcome the combined power of the government on that subject. Under silence, nothing from Congress supports or defeats the claim, so the result rests on the President’s own powers and on practice and necessity, which is why twilight cases are the hardest to predict. Under opposition, every presidential assertion would displace a congressional judgment, and the President is left with only the powers the Constitution gives the executive alone.
The embargo in Curtiss-Wright belongs in the first category. Congress had passed the joint resolution authorizing the President to ban arms sales to the Chaco belligerents, so the proclamation rested on presidential power and congressional power together. That alignment is why the opinion’s sole-organ language carries little weight when the President acts without Congress or against it.
The middle category is where congressional behavior short of a statute does the work. In Dames & Moore v. Regan, the United States and Iran ended the hostage crisis by an executive agreement that committed both sides to terminate litigation between each government and the other’s nationals and to settle the resulting claims through binding arbitration.50 The President implemented the agreement by suspending claims by American citizens against Iran that were pending in United States courts. The Court upheld the suspension because the President acted with at least implicit approval from Congress, shown by a history of congressional acquiescence in executive settlement of such claims. No statute spelled out a power to suspend those particular lawsuits, so the case did not sit squarely in the first category; Congress had not forbidden the settlement either, so it did not fall in the third. Acquiescence pulled it upward toward the strongest category. The Court applied Jackson’s functional approach, and the case is often cited as a step in the gradual conversion of his solo concurrence into the governing method.51 Critics argue that the Court treated congressional silence as approval and should have demanded more specific legislative backing for such far-reaching measures.52
The contrast with Youngstown is instructive. There Congress had considered and rejected giving the President power to seize industries, so the seizure conflicted with Congress’s implied will and the President’s authority was at its lowest ebb.53 In Dames & Moore, Congress had done nothing of the kind, and its long acquiescence tipped the balance the other way.
Medellin v. Texas shows the third category in a foreign-affairs setting. The Court held that the treaties underlying an International Court of Justice judgment were non-self-executing, meaning they had no domestic force as law without implementing legislation, and that the President’s memorandum directing state courts to give effect to the judgment could not supply the missing force.54 The President, the Court held, has no independent constitutional authority to enforce a non-self-executing treaty by directing states or courts to comply, so the state courts could not be compelled to reopen the criminal cases without legislation from Congress. The reasoning tracks the third category. A non-self-executing treaty depends on Congress for its domestic force, so a memorandum that supplies that force without legislation contradicts the structure the treaty created. The President is left with the President’s own constitutional powers alone, and none of them reaches state courts.
Students often quote the sole-organ language, declare the President’s foreign-affairs power complete, and stop. That shortcut skips the question the Court actually asks: what Congress has authorized, accepted, or forbidden. In the central-bank hypothetical the order never changes, and the answer changes only because Congress’s posture changes. A third-category result depends on whether the President’s own power over the subject is exclusive, and the next subsection takes up the one subject on which the Court has said it is.
The Recognition Power
Recognition is the formal act by which the United States acknowledges a foreign state or government as legitimate, and the Constitution never uses the word.56 Its consequences are concrete. A recognized sovereign may sue in United States courts, may claim sovereign immunity when it is sued, and receives deference for its official acts within its own territory under the act of state doctrine; recognition is also the precondition of regular diplomatic relations.57 The previous subsection ended with Youngstown’s third category, where a President acting against Congress prevails only by showing exclusive constitutional control over the subject. Recognition is a subject on which the Court found that control. In Zivotofsky v. Kerry, the Court held that the Constitution gives the recognition power to the President and that the power is exclusive, because recognition is a topic on which the Nation must “speak . . . with one voice.”58
Because the text gives recognition no express home, the Court inferred the power from several clauses. The Reception Clause, standing alone, looks thin: it is worded as a duty to receive ambassadors. But at the founding, international scholars suggested that receiving an ambassador was tantamount to recognizing the sovereignty of the sending state. A clause directing the President alone to receive ambassadors therefore implies a power to recognize other nations, and President Washington acted on that implication when he recognized the French Revolutionary Government by receiving its ambassador.59 The clause supports the power without being its only source.60
The treaty and ambassador powers of Article II, Section 2 supply the rest of the textual case.61 International law permits recognition by receiving an ambassador, by concluding a bilateral treaty, or by formally opening diplomatic relations, including by sending an ambassador, and each of those routes depends on presidential action. The President alone negotiates treaties, and the Senate can neither conclude nor ratify one without presidential action. The President nominates the Nation’s ambassadors, so Congress cannot send one without the President’s involvement, and the President can open diplomatic channels simply by dealing directly with foreign heads of state. Congress holds no constitutional power to initiate diplomatic relations with another nation.62 Because those specific clauses place the means of recognition with the President, the Court did not need to decide whether the Vesting Clause adds further support.63
Finding the power in the President leaves open whether Congress shares it, and the Court answered that it does not, on structural and functional grounds that point the same way. The structural ground is the asymmetry just described: the President has several ways to effect recognition alone, and Congress has none.64 The functional ground is the need for a single national answer. Foreign countries must know, before they enter into diplomatic relations or commerce with the United States, whether their ambassadors will be received, whether their officials are immune from suit in federal court, and whether they may bring suits here, and those assurances cannot be equivocal.65 If the President and Congress could each announce a different answer, a foreign government could not know which to rely on. The Court concluded that the voice must be the President’s, because only the Executive has unity at all times along with the decision, secrecy, and dispatch that delicate diplomatic contacts require.66 History supplied a third support, though a less clean one. From the first Administration forward, Presidents have claimed unilateral authority to recognize foreign sovereigns and Congress has for the most part acquiesced, even though the Court conceded that history is not all on one side.67
The dispute that produced the holding began with a passport. When the United States recognized Israel in 1948, President Truman’s statement did not recognize Israeli sovereignty over Jerusalem, and no President since has acknowledged any country’s sovereignty over the city. State Department policy therefore lists Jerusalem, not Israel, as the birthplace of citizens born there.68 Section 214(d) of a 2002 act of Congress commands the opposite: at the request of a citizen born in Jerusalem, the Secretary of State shall record the place of birth as Israel.69 Menachem Zivotofsky, a citizen born in Jerusalem, sued to enforce the statute, and the case reached the Supreme Court twice. In Zivotofsky v. Clinton, decided in 2012, the Court refused to treat the dispute as a political question, because the courts were asked only to decide whether the statute could be given effect in light of authority the Constitution confers on the Executive.70 Courts do not decide who rightfully governs Jerusalem in such a case; either Congress’s determination or the President’s will in the end control, not any independent judicial one.71 The decision shows that touching foreign relations does not by itself put a case beyond judicial cognizance, in contrast to Goldwater v. Carter, discussed at the start of this unit.72
On the merits, the Court first concluded that recognition resides in the President alone, so the question became whether Section 214(d) infringed the Executive’s consistent decision to withhold recognition from any country’s claim to Jerusalem.73 The statute required the President, through the Secretary, to describe a Jerusalem-born citizen as born in Israel, while the President’s policy was that no country is acknowledged to have sovereignty there. That directly contradicted the Executive’s calibrated position of neutrality.74 The reasoning has several links. Recognition may be effected by a declaration of the recognizing state, so the power would mean little if the President could make the initial determination but could be compelled to contradict it in later official statements. If Congress could dictate those statements, Congress would in effect exercise the recognition power. Congress cannot pass a law, speaking in its own voice, that effects formal recognition, and so it cannot force the President to contradict an earlier recognition statement either.75 The Court treated a passport’s place-of-birth entry as an official executive statement implicating recognition, and that is what brought the statute within the forbidden category. Section 214(d) was therefore unconstitutional.76
The passport statute and the embassy and trade measures differ in what Congress commands. Section 214(d) reached into the Executive’s own voice and made it say something the recognition policy denied. The funding and trade measures leave the recognition statement intact and act on what follows from it. The Court described this division of labor itself. Although the President alone effects the formal act of recognition, Congress’s powers over commerce, naturalization, war, and appropriations, together with its central role in making laws, give it substantial authority over the policy decisions that precede and follow recognition. Recognition may seem a hollow act without an ambassador, eased trade restrictions, and treaties, and those steps require action by the Senate or the whole Congress.77
The holding has a second limit: the Court refused to turn exclusive recognition into exclusive control of foreign affairs. The Secretary of State had invoked the sole-organ description from Curtiss-Wright to argue that the President has broad, undefined power over foreign relations, and the Court declined to acknowledge that unbounded power.78 The description was unnecessary to Curtiss-Wright’s holding, which involved congressionally authorized action, and that case did not hold the President free from Congress’s lawmaking power in international relations.79 The recognition holding therefore rests on the specific clauses and on the function recognition serves, and it does not reach foreign affairs generally. Students err when they reason from the exclusivity of recognition to presidential control of every foreign-affairs question, a step the Court itself declined to take.
Chief Justice Roberts, joined by Justice Alito, dissented.80 The two opinions differ largely in method. The majority read the Reception Clause, the treaty power, and the ambassador power together and gave weight to the need for one national voice. The dissent tested each clause separately for a sign that it excludes Congress. It observed that the Reception Clause is framed as an obligation and sits among the duties of Section 3 rather than the powers of Section 2, and that the treaty and ambassador powers are shared with the Senate, so they hardly support an inference of exclusivity.81 On history, the dissent noted that the majority admitted the record points both ways, that Presidents such as Jackson and Lincoln expressed doubt about a preclusive power, and that congressional acquiescence matters only when the President acts without express statutory authorization, not when the President claims power to disregard a statute.82 The dissent added that even an exclusive recognition power would not decide the case, because an optional passport designation does not alter the recognition position, and it stressed that the decision was the first in which the Court accepted a President’s direct defiance of an Act of Congress in foreign affairs.83 The majority’s reply was that an official passport entry is an executive statement implicating recognition, and the majority’s view is the law.