Concept
Military Trials of Civilians
As commander in chief
Military Trials of Civilians
Ex parte Milligan holds that Congress cannot subject an American civilian to trial before a military court when the civilian courts are open and functioning, even if martial law has been declared. The jury-trial guarantees of the Fifth and Sixth Amendments supply the reason, and the holding marks the outer limit of the war powers described earlier in this chapter. This section asks how far a military tribunal may reach people who are not soldiers.
Congress creates military courts under Article I, Section 8, which lets it make rules for the government and regulation of the land and naval forces. They belong to that legislative power and not to the judicial power that Article III vests in the federal courts. Inside the ranks the arrangement is natural, because the people subject to the rules have joined an institution that Congress regulates and the President commands. Applied to a civilian, the same forum changes character. Officers who sit in a chain of command ending with the President as Commander in Chief decide the case, and the defendant has neither a jury nor an independent judge. The executive branch would accuse and judge in a single proceeding, a combination that the jury-trial guarantees exist to prevent. The central question is therefore who may be placed before the military forum, and the answer depends on who the defendant is and whether civilian courts are available to try the charge.
This limit also works differently from those taught in the earlier sections. Jackson's framework asks whether Congress stands behind a presidential act, and a President acting with congressional authority is at maximum power. A limit on Congress's own power to create a tribunal withdraws that support, because no statute can authorize what the Constitution withholds from the federal government as a whole. Milligan states the rule that protects civilians. Ex parte Quirin supplies the counterweight for enemies who fight out of uniform, and the enemy-combatant cases later in this chapter draw on both.
Milligan and Open Courts
Ex parte Milligan ties its rule to a fact a court can verify: whether the civilian courts were open when the military acted. The Government defended the trial by invoking martial law, the replacement of ordinary civil government and courts by military authority within an area, and the Court refused to let that label decide the question.
Lambdin P. Milligan was a citizen who had lived in Indiana for twenty years and had never served in the military or naval forces. In October 1864, General Alvin P. Hovey, who commanded the military district of Indiana, ordered him arrested at his home. A military commission at Indianapolis tried him for conspiracy against the United States, aiding rebels, inciting insurrection, disloyal practices, and violating the laws of war. The commission found him guilty on every charge and sentenced him to death, and the President approved the sentence.1
Milligan then petitioned the federal Circuit Court for a writ of habeas corpus. He alleged that the commission lacked jurisdiction because he was a civilian of a loyal state whose courts were open, and he added that a grand jury had sat in that court in January 1865 and adjourned without indicting or presenting him. The circuit judges divided and certified questions to the Supreme Court, including whether the commission had jurisdiction to try and sentence him.2
Habeas corpus was suspended when the commission sat. The writ is the procedure by which a court orders a jailer to produce a prisoner and justify the detention, and the Constitution permits its suspension only “in Cases of Rebellion or Invasion” when “the public Safety may require it.” The clause appears in Article I, which lists the powers of Congress, and that placement suggests that Congress holds the power to suspend.3 Lincoln acted first. In April 1861, with Congress out of session, he authorized military commanders to suspend the writ along the line between Philadelphia and Washington, and Chief Justice Taney, sitting as circuit judge in Ex parte Merryman, held that only Congress could do so.4 In September 1862 Lincoln suspended the writ nationwide, Union forces arrested and held more than 13,000 civilians, and Congress ratified the suspension by statute on March 3, 1863.5
The suspension governed how long the Government could hold suspected conspirators, and it left open where the Government could try them. The Court drew that line. Suspending the writ, it reasoned, lets the Government hold an arrested person without answering to the writ, but the Constitution nowhere says that a citizen denied the writ may be tried other than in the ordinary course of law. Indiana's safety therefore did not call for martial law: if citizens were plotting treason, arrest could hold them until the Government was ready to try them, and the courts were open and ready to do so.6 The Court then stated its central proposition: “Martial rule can never exist where the courts are open, and in the proper and unobstructed exercise of their jurisdiction.”7
The Court gave a structural reason for so firm a rule. Martial law of the kind the Government claimed “destroys every guarantee of the Constitution” and makes the military “independent of and superior to the civil power,” the very attempt that the colonists listed among their reasons for declaring independence. “Civil liberty and this kind of martial law cannot endure together.”8 Where the officer who accuses a civilian also controls who judges him, the guarantee of an independent court lasts only as long as the officer allows. A declaration of martial law therefore settles nothing by itself, and what the Court examines is the condition of the courts.
The constitutional text points the same way. The Fifth Amendment relaxes its grand-jury requirement only for “cases arising in the land or naval forces, or in the Militia, when in actual service in time of War or public danger.”9 That exception reaches people inside the forces, who joined an institution Congress governs. Milligan had never served, so the guarantee of jury trial in criminal prosecutions applied to him in full.10 No act of Congress had authorized his commission either.11 The majority did not stop at that defect. It held that Congress itself lacks power to authorize the trial of a civilian by a military court where the civilian courts are open.
The rule has one exception, and the exception shows why the rule exists. If, in foreign invasion or civil war, the courts are actually closed and it is impossible to administer criminal justice according to law, then on the theater of active military operations, where war really prevails, necessity requires a substitute for the civil authority that has been overthrown, to preserve the safety of the army and society. Because no power is left but the military, it may govern by martial rule until the laws can have their free course.12 Necessity both creates the rule and limits its duration, and continuing military government after the courts are reinstated is “a gross usurpation of power.”13 The justification for the military forum is the absence of any other forum. Where courts exist, the choice lies between a civilian trial and a military one, and the civilian trial serves the Government's interest in punishment while preserving the constitutional guarantees. Where no court can sit, the choice lies between military justice and none. Once the courts reopen, the need ends, and the authority ends with it.14
Milligan's own case falls on the open-courts side of that line. Indiana's civil courts were open and unobstructed, and the federal Circuit Court there had convened a grand jury in January 1865 that adjourned without any proceeding against him.15 Counsel for the Government argued that neither residence nor nearness to the field of hostilities decides who is subject to martial law, and that the commander in chief must be able to arrest and punish anyone who arms men to join the enemy, corresponds with the enemy, or prepares to seize arsenals and release prisoners of war.16 That was argument, not holding, and it could not satisfy the exception, because the exception asks whether the courts are actually closed and Indiana's were sitting. Threatened invasion, nearness to the war, and the gravity of the charge each describe danger, and none of them closes a courthouse.
Chief Justice Chase, joined by Justices Wayne, Swayne, and Miller, agreed that Milligan had to be discharged but rested the result on narrower ground. In their view Congress had not authorized trying civilians by military commission where the civilian courts were open, and the Act of March 3, 1863, had prescribed procedures that were not followed in Milligan's case. Chase believed that Congress could authorize such tribunals during rebellion or invasion, even in loyal states, and he thought the majority went too far in suggesting otherwise.17 The difference connects to the framework taught earlier. On the narrower view the missing statute is the defect, which places the commission at the lowest ebb of presidential power and leaves Congress free to cure it by authorizing the tribunal. On the majority's view, no statute could cure it.
The later cases test one fact about Milligan: he was a resident arrested at home who had never served in any force. The next subsection and the detention cases that follow turn on whether the person held is a civilian like Milligan or an enemy belligerent whom the laws of war reach.18
Quirin and Unlawful Belligerents
Ex parte Quirin sustained a military commission that tried eight German saboteurs, although the civilian courts where they were arrested were open and functioning throughout.20 The open-courts condition from Milligan therefore did not decide the case. Two facts separate the decisions. The Quirin defendants were enemy belligerents and not civilians, and Congress had sanctioned their commission when it used its power to define and punish offenses against the law of nations and, in the Articles of War, provided rules for the government of the Army.21
All the petitioners except Haupt were admittedly citizens of the German Reich, and Haupt, who came to this country with his parents at the age of five, claimed to be a naturalized United States citizen. After the declaration of war they trained at a sabotage school near Berlin, where they learned to use explosives and secret writing.22 They then came ashore from submarines wearing German uniforms or parts of them only while landing, buried the uniforms and equipment at once, and went inland in civilian dress under orders to destroy war industries and facilities.23
By order of July 2, 1942, the President appointed a military commission to try the eight for offenses against the law of war and the Articles of War, and a proclamation issued the same day denied enemy-affiliated persons charged with sabotage, espionage, or violations of the law of war access to the courts. The charges included violation of the law of war, relieving or corresponding with the enemy, spying, and conspiracy.24 The petitioners answered that nothing authorized the President to try them before a military tribunal and that the Fifth and Sixth Amendments entitled them to civilian courts and juries.25 Two questions followed: whether these defendants were persons a military tribunal could reach, and whether Congress had authorized the tribunal.
On the first question, the Court looked to the defendants' status under the law of war and not to the place of trial. The law of war, it explained, separates the armed forces from the peaceful populations of belligerent nations, and among those who fight it separates lawful combatants from unlawful ones.26 Lawful combatants are subject to capture and detention as prisoners of war. Unlawful combatants are subject to the same capture and detention and may also be tried and punished by military tribunals for the acts that make their belligerency unlawful. The familiar examples are the spy who secretly passes the lines without uniform and the enemy combatant who comes through the lines without uniform to wage war by destroying life or property.27 The uniform explains the line. It lets an opposing force tell a soldier from a civilian, and the law of war extends the soldier's protections to those who accept that burden. A fighter who discards the uniform keeps the cover of the peaceful population while denying the enemy any means of telling the two apart, so the law withholds those protections from that fighter. The saboteurs fit the description exactly, because they wore their uniforms only to reach the beach and then entered the country in civilian dress to attack war facilities.
Haupt's claim to citizenship did not change the analysis. The Court held that an enemy belligerent's citizenship in the United States does not relieve him of the consequences of a belligerency that violates the law of war.28 It was also immaterial that the saboteurs had not yet destroyed anything or reached a zone of active military operations, since the Court found them no less belligerents on that account.29 Their conduct, and the status it created under the law of war, decided the question.
The Court read Milligan the same way. It assumed that some acts would not be triable by military tribunal, either because American courts do not recognize them as violations of the law of war or because they are offenses constitutionally triable only by a jury. Milligan, it said, had been decided on such grounds, while the saboteurs were charged with an offense against the law of war that the Constitution does not require a jury to try.30 The Hamdi plurality later made the same point from the other direction. Milligan's inquiry turned in large part on his being a resident arrested at home and not a prisoner of war, and had he been captured carrying a rifle against Union troops on a Confederate battlefield, the result might well have been different.31 Milligan was also a citizen, so the line between the two decisions runs through belligerent status and cannot run through citizenship.
The second difference is statutory. The Court declined to decide how far the President may create military commissions without legislation, because Congress had authorized the trial of offenses against the law of war before such commissions.32 Article 15 of the Articles of War provided that the provisions giving courts-martial jurisdiction do not deprive military commissions of concurrent jurisdiction over offenders or offenses that by statute or the law of war may be tried by them.33 Congress left the substance to the law of war and did not list each offense, which incorporated by reference every offense the law of war defines and the Constitution allows a military tribunal to try.34 Milligan's commission had no comparable statutory backing, and Quirin pointed to that difference only obliquely, never stating how much weight it carried.35 Read through Jackson's framework, a commission convened by the President with Congress's approval sits in the first category, with Article II and Article I operating together, which is why the Court could uphold it without deciding what the President could do alone.36
Hamdan later read this statutory ground narrowly. It described Quirin as recognizing that Congress had simply preserved whatever power the President held before 1916 to convene military commissions, on the express condition that the law of war be followed, and it declined to revisit Quirin's controversial characterization of Article of War 15 as congressional authorization.37 It also called Quirin the “high-water mark of military power to try enemy combatants for war crimes.”38 A President who departs from what Congress allowed therefore loses the footing Quirin had, as the later section on Hamdan shows.
Whether Quirin can be fully reconciled with Milligan remains debated, since the status distinction rests on Milligan having been a civilian and the saboteurs having been members of a foreign military.39 The Court also decided the case under heavy wartime pressure that may have shaped the result, and the saboteurs were executed before it issued its opinion, a sequence that has not been repeated.40 The Hamdi plurality nonetheless relied on Quirin for the proposition that the capture, detention, and trial of unlawful combatants are important incidents of war, and it read Quirin to make clear that Milligan does not bar a military trial of an American citizen accused of spying for the enemy in wartime.41 Keep the two conditions separate. Milligan asks whether the courts are open, while Quirin asks who the defendant is and whether Congress sanctioned the tribunal, and the courts were open in both cases.