Concept
Commanding the National Guard
As commander in chief
Commanding the National Guard
The Constitution splits control of the National Guard between Congress and the President and leaves the states a smaller share of their own. Article II, Section 2, Clause 1 makes the President commander in chief of “the Militia of the several States, when called into the actual Service of the United States.”1 The last phrase conditions the grant: the President commands state militiamen only after someone has called them into federal service, and the clause does not say who. Article I does. It gives Congress the power “to provide for calling forth the Militia to execute the Laws of the Union, suppress Insurrections, and repel Invasions,”2 and the power to provide for organizing, arming, and disciplining the militia and for governing the part of it employed in the service of the United States. The states keep the appointment of officers and the authority of training the militia “according to the discipline prescribed by Congress.”3 Congress thus decides whether state units enter federal service, and the President commands them once they do. What the text leaves open is how far a governor can resist a call-up that Congress has authorized.
Perpich v. Department of Defense answered that question. Minnesota’s governor challenged the Montgomery Amendment, which in 1986 partly repealed the gubernatorial veto established in 1952.4 The question presented was whether Congress may authorize the President to order Guard members to active duty for training outside the United States during peacetime, without a governor’s consent and without a declaration of national emergency.5 The Eighth Circuit, sitting en banc, vacated a panel decision over the dissent of two judges and affirmed the district court. It agreed that “Congress’ army power is plenary and exclusive” and that the state’s authority to train the militia did not conflict with Congress’s power to raise armies for the common defense and to control the training of federal reserve forces.6 The Supreme Court also upheld the Amendment, and its route ran through the Guard’s double identity.
That double identity grew out of a compromise in the Constitution itself. Two conflicting themes, developed at the Convention and repeated in military debates over the next century, pulled in opposite directions. One was fear that a national standing army threatened individual liberty and the sovereignty of the states. The other was recognition that inadequately trained soldiers were a dangerous primary means of providing for the common defense. Congress was therefore authorized both to raise and support a national army and to organize “the Militia.”7 Congress later joined the two. Since 1933, everyone who enlists in a State National Guard unit has simultaneously enlisted in the National Guard of the United States, part of the Army’s Enlisted Reserve Corps, yet each keeps the status of a member of a separate State Guard unit unless and until ordered to active duty.8 A guardsman thus wears two hats, and Perpich asked which one controls when Congress calls for the federal one.
The Court held that Congress may authorize the President to order Guard units into federal service for training outside the United States, in peacetime, without a governor’s consent or a national-emergency declaration.9 Its reasoning began with the premise that the Militia Clauses add to federal power and do not subtract from it. The Selective Draft Law Cases had upheld the World War I draft of Guard members into the Regular Army and had held that the plenary power to raise armies was “not qualified or restricted by the provisions of the militia clause.”10 The Court treated the call-forth clause the same way: Congress’s power to call forth the militia “may in appropriate cases supplement” its broader power to raise armies and provide for the common defense and general welfare, “but it does not limit those powers.”11
The Court conceded one point to the state. It assumed that when a Guard unit retains its status as a state militia, Congress could not impress the entire unit for any purpose beyond the three the call-forth clause names. But Congress had called the entire Guard into federal service in World War I, although the soldiers who fought in France were engaged in none of those three purposes. Membership in the militia exempted no one from a valid order to perform federal service, whether as combat duty or as training for it.12 The decisive variable was the guardsman’s status.
The old tradition against peacetime and foreign service did not change that analysis. Before 1952, Guard members were traditionally not ordered into active service in peacetime or for duty abroad. The Court called that tradition at least partly the product of political debate and compromise. It added that even if the text of the Constitution compelled the tradition, its constitutional aspect would concern only guardsmen who retain their state affiliation while serving. An order to active duty creates a wholly different situation, because the state affiliation is suspended in favor of an entirely federal one for the period of service.13
The second Militia Clause, the Court added, enhances federal power in three further ways.14
- It authorizes Congress to provide for “organizing, arming and disciplining the Militia,” so the formation of citizens into organized units is a congressional choice, and the current dual-enlistment system is as permissible as the 1792 choice to have militia members arm themselves.15
- It authorizes Congress to provide for governing the part of the militia “employed in the Service of the United States.”16
- It limits the states’ reserved authority over training with the words “according to the discipline prescribed by Congress,” so if effective service in the armed forces of a global power requires training “in distant lands, or distant skies,” Congress has the authority to provide it.17
The state’s authority over training is therefore subordinate. It extends to the actual training done before active duty in the federal service, and it does not include a right to edit the discipline Congress prescribes once members are ordered into federal service.18
A structural point stands behind the text. Several constitutional provisions commit foreign policy and military affairs to the exclusive control of the National Government, and Tarble’s Case read that allocation to create a presumption that federal control over the armed forces is exclusive. Without the Militia Clauses, the Court observed, one could argue that the presumption forbids organized state militia altogether. The clauses answer that argument by subordinating any such structural inference to an express permission while subjecting state militia to express federal limitations.19
On this reasoning the governor’s veto was a political choice and not a constitutional entitlement. The Court disclaimed any view on the wisdom of the veto established in 1952 or of its partial repeal in 1986, and it held only that because the veto was not constitutionally compelled, the Montgomery Amendment is valid.20 A governor’s consent and a declaration of national emergency, the condition for active service under the 1933 Act, are thus matters Congress may add or remove by statute.21
Perpich also fits the first of Justice Jackson’s three categories. The President’s authority over Guard units begins only when they are called into federal service, and Congress, which holds the call-forth, organizing, and governing powers, authorized the order, so Article II command and Article I power worked together. The governor’s objection could therefore succeed only if the Militia Clauses took the power away from the federal government altogether. The Court read those clauses to enlarge federal power while leaving the states only subordinate authority.
Take the statute away and keep the title, and the weight Congress carried in Perpich becomes visible.
The clause’s own words answer the question, and Justice Jackson’s concurrence in the Steel Seizure Case makes the same point. He observed that the Constitution expressly left it to Congress to “provide for calling forth the Militia to execute the Laws of the Union, suppress Insurrections and repel Invasions.” He read that limitation on the command power, written when the militia rather than a standing army was the contemplated military weapon of the Republic, as underscoring the Constitution’s policy that Congress, not the Executive, should control use of the war power as an instrument of domestic policy.22 A President who sends state units into federal service for a domestic mission with no statute behind the order stands on Article II alone, and the title cannot supply the call-up that must come first. Perpich shows the same order after Congress has authorized it.