Concept
Inherent Powers
Other powers
Inherent Powers
Article I, Section 1 vests in Congress only the legislative powers “herein granted.” The preceding sections applied that limit by tracing each statute to a power the Constitution confers: a power the text lists, or the auxiliary power under the Necessary and Proper Clause to carry a granted power into execution.1 That method answers nearly every question about congressional authority. It needs one qualification, because some federal powers do not “depend upon the affirmative grants of the Constitution.”2
The underlying idea is that some areas of governance are “inherently inseparable from the conception of nationality,” so they pass to the federal government as a necessary concomitant of its very existence. Some of these powers flow to the executive branch. Congress holds others because it is the primary law-giving agency of the nation.3
Three explanations account for the congressional ones. On one view, these are powers the states have never wielded in any serious way. On a second, simple logic puts any distinctly national subject in the hands of national lawmakers. On a third, the powers spring from the Necessary and Proper Clause, because using them helps carry into execution “the aggregate of national powers” vested in the federal government.4 Different powers may rest on different explanations. Whichever one applies, the result is a cluster of congressional powers, often called “inherent,” that lack a readily discernible attachment to any specific textual grant.5
The qualification is narrow. For a statute inside the cluster, an answer that stops at “no clause mentions the subject” stops too early, and the next question is whether the statute deals with a distinctly national subject of the kind these explanations describe. Three such subjects follow: foreign affairs, immigration, and national self-preservation.
Foreign Affairs
Foreign affairs shows the qualification at work. Consider a federal statute that requires state courts, over contrary state legislation, to hear child-custody cases brought by noncitizens who reside abroad. Whether the power to “regulate Commerce with foreign Nations” reaches a custody dispute is open to doubt. Even so, Congress may pass the statute, because it deals with a matter of foreign relations.6
The example also shows what happens to the states. Family law is a quintessential police-power field, and state law ordinarily governs it. Because Congress can pass a foreign-relations statute, it can displace state decision-making even there.7 The foreign element supplies the federal power, and the family-law setting does not defeat it.
The classic explanation of the power appears in United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp. The investment of the federal government with the powers of external sovereignty, the Court said, “did not depend upon the affirmative grants of the Constitution.” The powers to declare and wage war, to conclude peace, to make treaties, and to maintain diplomatic relations with other sovereignties would have vested in the federal government “as necessary concomitants of nationality” even if the Constitution had never mentioned them.8 That passage speaks of the federal government as a whole, and some of these powers flow to the executive branch. Congress holds its share because it is the law-giving agency of the nation.9
Three features of the foreign-affairs power matter most to constitutional federalism, and each changes an argument that a challenger would otherwise make for the states.10
- The presumption against preemption, which ordinarily guides courts in deciding whether a federal statute displaces state law, does not operate when a statute concerns foreign relations.
- Some state laws intrude so far on federal authority over foreign affairs that they cannot stand even when no federal statute preempts them.
- The state-protective limits on the commerce power, the anti-commandeering rule and state sovereign immunity from suit, may not apply to laws enacted under the foreign-affairs power.
The first feature removes the usual thumb on the scale for the states. In this domain the Court often seems inclined, if not eager, to find that challenged state laws are incompatible with federal statutory schemes.11
The second feature goes furthest, because it lets a state law fall with no federal statute at all. Zschernig v. Miller is the leading case. The Court there neither could nor did point to any preemptive federal statute. It struck down the challenged state law because it was “an intrusion by the State into the field of foreign affairs which the Constitution entrusts to the President and the Congress.”12 The law fell because of the field it entered, and no federal text had to conflict with it.
The third feature remains tentative. Suppose a federal statute directs state authorities to turn over state-held prisoners to foreign governments whenever the President, acting under authority delegated by statute, determines that doing so is necessary to achieve important foreign-policy objectives. Defended under the commerce power alone, the statute would face a serious challenge under the anti-commandeering principle. Perhaps, though, that principle should give way to choices made by federal decisionmakers who pursue critical national objectives in the “delicate field of international relations.”13
The power has a boundary set by its own rationale. A statute earns this footing by dealing with a matter of foreign relations, and the domestic custody rule above does not. On an exam, a statute on a foreign-relations subject that the commerce power cannot support calls for this analysis before any conclusion that Congress lacked authority. If a state law or a state-protective limit is also in play, apply the three features above.
Immigration
Immigration poses the tracing problem again, because the text speaks directly to very little of what immigration law does. The nearest textual candidate is the power over “Naturalization.” Perhaps it carries with it a companion power to regulate access to permanent resident status, on the theory that the latter is a “first cousin” of the former. But pre-border-crossing diversion, passport control, temporary student and worker visas, refugee status, asylum, and deportation have no comparably close connection to the formal act of granting citizenship.15
The war power, found in Article I, Section 8, clause 11, supports the exclusion and expulsion of enemy aliens, and the Court upheld such provisions in Ludecke v. Watkins. It is difficult, though, to stretch that rationale to the myriad immigration provisions with no apparent relation to national security.16
The Court eventually found the source of the federal power to regulate immigration in a combination of international and constitutional legal principles.17 The Chinese Exclusion Case (Chae Chan Ping v. United States) was the first case to hold that the federal power to exclude noncitizens is an incident of national sovereignty. The Court reasoned that every national government has inherent authority to protect the national public interest, and that immigration is a matter of vital national concern.18 The Justices have since filled the textual gap by insisting that “every sovereign nation has the power, as inherent in sovereignty, and essential to self-preservation, to forbid the entrance of foreigners within its dominions, or to admit them only in such cases and upon such conditions as it may see fit to prescribe.”19
Fong Yue Ting v. United States carried the reasoning from exclusion to removal. The power to expel or deport, it held, rests on the same ground as the exclusion power and is equally “absolute and unqualified.”20 Later cases clarified that the constitutional provisions touching the subject are not the source of an implied federal power to regulate noncitizens. They show only that the federal government is the national government and therefore the keeper of the inherent sovereign power to regulate international affairs.21
That places immigration beside foreign affairs. The power rests partly on the Naturalization Clause, where the subject touches citizenship or permanent residence, and partly on the sovereignty every nation holds, which covers the rest. An answer that hunts for an enumerated clause behind a federal immigration statute and quits when none fits stops one step short.
The Court has gone so far as to say that “over no conceivable subject is the legislative power of Congress more complete than it is over” the admission of aliens.22 The breadth of the power has shaped individual rights. When noncitizens bring rights-based claims, particularly equal-protection claims, they are far less likely to succeed against federal legislation than against state legislation.23 A noncitizen's equal-protection challenge to a state statute therefore starts from a stronger position than the same challenge to a federal one.
Kleindienst v. Mandel shows how little a person outside the country can claim. A nonresident alien has no right to enter the United States, and the Court accepted that such a person may be refused entry even because of political beliefs.24
The deference stops at a procedural line between seeking entry and already living here. A resident alien is entitled to notice and a hearing before being deported.25 The power settles who may enter, and a person who has settled here holds interests in remaining that the power does not erase. A nonresident has no right to enter for a hearing to protect. The line does not narrow the power to choose grounds for removal, which rests on the same footing as exclusion. It governs the procedure the government must follow against a person already here.
An exam stem that pairs a person abroad with a long-term resident is testing this line. The exclusion of the person abroad draws great deference, and the removal of the resident requires notice and a hearing before it takes effect.
Self-Preservation and Symbols
Article I, Section 4 gives Congress a textual power over one kind of election. State legislatures prescribe the times, places, and manner of holding elections for Senators and Representatives, but Congress may at any time make or alter those regulations, except as to the places of choosing Senators.27 The clause says nothing about the election of the President. That gap matters because Article I, Section 1 vests in Congress only the legislative powers “herein granted,” and a statute that no clause supports looks vulnerable.28 Far removed from foreign affairs and immigration, the inherent power recognized in Burroughs v. United States fills it: a power of national self-protection to safeguard the propriety of federal elections for President.29
Burroughs upheld federal campaign-contribution disclosure rules. The Court reasoned that to deny Congress power to safeguard a presidential election from the improper use of money to influence the result “is to deny to the nation in a vital particular the power of self-protection.” Congress, it added, “possesses that power, as it possesses every other power essential to preserve the departments and institutions of the general government from impairment or destruction, whether threatened by force or by corruption.”30
That sentence has two parts. The first names the object protected, the departments and institutions of the national government. The second names the threats, force and corruption. Corruption explains the result in Burroughs. The presidency is filled by election, so money that improperly decides the outcome would capture the office through the very process meant to fill it, and nobody would need to attack the government for it to be impaired from within.
Three kinds of election therefore sort three ways. Congress regulates elections for Senators and Representatives under the text of Section 4 and the presidential election under the inherent power of self-protection. Neither source reaches elections for state offices, so a statute aimed at them needs a different source of power.
The second threat in the Burroughs sentence is force. The same inherent power of national self-protection may support federal legislation that outlaws dangerous action or incitement aimed at overthrowing the federal government by violent means.31 The reasoning parallels the election example, since a government unable to punish violent attempts to destroy it would lack the power to preserve its own institutions. The extension is framed as something the power may support, and an answer should keep that qualifier. Power is also only the first question. Whether a constitutional prohibition, the First Amendment in the case of incitement, bars the statute belongs to the separate no-prohibition step of the McCulloch test.
A third idea is much less settled. Suppose a federal statute bans possession of eagle feathers, and neither a treaty nor the commerce power supports it. One suggestion is that the national government has an implied power to safeguard symbols of its own. The idea proceeds by analogy to the recognition of identity-based interests elsewhere in the constitutional order: perhaps it makes no less sense to recognize an implied power in the federal government to safeguard symbols of its own.32 The suggestion is a possibility and not a holding.
The symbols idea is weaker than the election holding because of the mechanism each relies on. A corrupted presidential election threatens how the government operates, which is the kind of impairment the Burroughs sentence describes. A symbol carries meaning for the nation without performing a function of government, so the link between protecting it and preserving a department or institution is looser. An answer about a statute that protects a symbol should look first to the commerce power or a treaty and should label any inherent-power argument as unsettled.