Concept
Meaning of Necessary
Other powers
Meaning of Necessary
Maryland read the Necessary and Proper Clause as a ceiling on Congress. Its counsel treated the word “necessary” as controlling the whole sentence: Congress could pass only laws indispensable to a granted power, laws without which the power would be nugatory (worthless). On that reading the clause excludes any choice of means and leaves Congress only the one that is most direct and simple.1
The argument had two parts. The first concerned the kind of provision the clause is. Maryland conceded that it is worded as a grant of power, but urged that in effect it restricts the right, which Congress would otherwise have by implication, of selecting means for executing the enumerated powers.2 The second concerned a single word: on this view “necessary” means indispensable. The parts reinforce each other. If the clause is a restriction, the strict meaning of “necessary” measures how much it cuts away.
The stakes reach well beyond the Bank. It is widely agreed that the clause gives Congress implied powers, yet its scope has been controversial historically and today. The creation of a national bank during the Washington administration had already produced competing views of what connection a federal law needs to an enumerated power.3 In McCulloch v. Maryland, Chief Justice Marshall endorsed the Hamiltonian position.4 He answered Maryland’s two claims separately, and this unit does the same: first the word, then the kind of provision.
Convenient or Useful Means
Marshall tested Maryland’s claim by asking whether “necessary” always means indispensable, and he found that it does not. In the common affairs of the world, and in approved authors, the word frequently imports no more than that one thing is convenient, or useful, or essential to another. To employ the means necessary to an end is generally understood as employing any means calculated to produce the end, not only the single means without which the end would be entirely unattainable.5 Four lines of argument support that reading.
The word has no fixed character of its own; it admits of all degrees of comparison.6 A just construction reads a word that imports something excessive in the milder sense that common usage justifies, and the subject, the context, and the intention of the person using the word decide which sense applies.7 A bare “necessary” therefore tells a court little until the surrounding text shows how strict the drafters meant it to be.
The Constitution’s own drafting points the same way. Article I, Section 10 bars a State, absent the consent of Congress, from laying duties on imports or exports beyond what may be “absolutely necessary” for executing its inspection laws.8 Marshall compared that sentence with the Necessary and Proper Clause and concluded that the convention understood itself to change the meaning of “necessary” materially by prefixing “absolutely.”9 The inference is short. The drafters could demand strictness by adding a modifier, and they did so when they narrowed a State’s power. They added none in the clause that supplies Congress with its means, so the bare word keeps its ordinary, milder sense. A bare “necessary” that already meant absolutely necessary would leave the Section 10 modifier with nothing to do.
The consequences of Maryland’s reading cut against it as well. All admit that the government may legitimately punish violations of its laws, yet punishment appears nowhere among the enumerated powers.10 Marshall pressed the point: if “necessary” may mean needful, requisite, essential, or conducive to in order to let in the power of punishment, why is it not equally comprehensive when required to authorize means that facilitate the execution of governmental powers without the infliction of punishment?11
Finally, the strict reading would disable the legislature. To declare that the best means shall not be used, but only those without which the power would be nugatory, would deprive Congress of the capacity to avail itself of experience, to exercise its reason, and to accommodate its legislation to circumstances. Applied to any of the government’s powers, the principle proves so pernicious in operation that it must be discarded.12
Marshall chose the useful meaning, and the Bank shows what the choice does. Suppose State banks could have done the same work. Requiring Congress to resort to means it cannot control, means that another government may furnish or withhold, would make its course precarious, the result of its measures uncertain, and create a dependence on other governments that is incompatible with the language of the Constitution. A means therefore need not be the only one available: the choice of means implies a right to choose a national bank in preference to State banks, and Congress alone can make the election.13
Courts also stay out of the dispute over degree. Where a law is not prohibited and is really calculated to effect any of the objects entrusted to the government, inquiring into the degree of its necessity would pass the line that circumscribes the judicial department and tread on legislative ground.14 Modern doctrine speaks the same way. In National Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius, the Court said it has been very deferential to Congress’s determination that a regulation is “necessary,” and that it has upheld laws that are convenient, useful, or conducive to the beneficial exercise of a granted authority.15
Convenience must still be convenience for something the Constitution entrusts to the government. Marshall warned that if Congress adopted measures the Constitution prohibits, or passed laws under the pretext of executing its powers in order to accomplish objects not entrusted to the government, it would be the Court’s painful duty to declare that the act was not the law of the land.16
The relaxed meaning widens Congress’s choice among means that serve a granted power, and it adds no power to the list. How a court decides whether a particular means falls inside that choice is the subject of the test McCulloch announced, taken up in the next section.
A Grant, Not a Restriction
Maryland’s strict reading of “necessary” needed a prior claim to carry it: that the Necessary and Proper Clause limits Congress rather than empowers it. Counsel conceded that the clause is, in terms, a grant of power, but argued that it is restrictive in effect of the general right Congress would otherwise have, by implication, to select the means of executing the enumerated powers.18 Marshall rejected that account on three grounds: where the clause sits, what its words say, and how a drafter would have written a restriction.
The clause is placed among the powers of Congress, not among the limitations on those powers. Its terms purport to enlarge the powers vested in the government; it purports to be an additional power, not a restriction on those already granted. Marshall found no reason, and said none could be assigned, for concealing an intention to narrow the national legislature’s discretion under words that purport to enlarge it.19
A drafter who meant to restrain the free use of means would have put the restraint in another place and written it as one: “In carrying into execution the foregoing powers, and all others,” no laws shall be passed but such as are necessary and proper. Had the intention been to make the clause restrictive, Marshall wrote, it would unquestionably have been restrictive in form as well as in effect.20
The conclusion survives even if the wording left doubt. If the clause does not enlarge Congress’s powers, it cannot be construed to restrain them or to impair the legislature’s right to exercise its best judgment in selecting measures to carry the constitutional powers into execution. If no other motive for its insertion can be suggested, a sufficient one is the desire to remove all doubts about the right to legislate on that vast mass of incidental powers which must be involved in the constitution, if that instrument be not a splendid bauble.21 The conclusion also fits what Congress would have held without the clause. Absent the clause, Congress would have some choice of means, and any means adapted to the end, any means tending directly to the execution of the constitutional powers, would itself be constitutional. Maryland’s construction would abridge, and almost annihilate, that right.22 A provision that took away what the government would hold without it would be an odd thing to find in a list of grants.
One more suggestion explains the clause without enlarging anything: that Congress needed it to make laws at all. Article I answers it. Section 1 vests the legislative powers in a Congress of two Houses.23 After allowing each house to prescribe its own proceedings, the Constitution describes in Section 7 how a bill becomes law and in Section 8 enumerates the powers of Congress. No member of the Convention would have thought an express power to make laws necessary to enable the legislature to make them.24
Modern decisions describe the clause the same way. It gives Congress authority to legislate on “that vast mass of incidental powers which must be involved in the constitution,” but it does not license the exercise of any “great substantive and independent power” beyond those specifically enumerated.25 A challenger who treats the word “necessary” as proof that the clause limits Congress has therefore misclassified the provision. It is an additional power that widens Congress’s choice of means, and it creates no new subject of legislation.
Because the clause is widely agreed to supply implied powers, the live question is what kind or degree of connection with an enumerated power makes a law necessary and proper.26 The next section turns to the test McCulloch gave for answering it.