Concept
Implied Powers of Congress
Other powers
Implied Powers of Congress
Nothing in Article I mentions banks or corporations, yet McCulloch v. Maryland upheld Congress's power to charter a bank. Marshall admitted the gap: among the enumerated powers, he said, there is none for establishing a bank or creating a corporation.1 He closed it with the doctrine of implied powers. Congress holds an implied power because the means serves a power the text names, not because the text names the means. Such a power adds no new subject of legislation; it supplies a way to execute subjects Congress already holds. Marshall built the argument in five steps, and each answers an objection the one before leaves open.
First, the text does not exclude implied powers. The Articles of Confederation required that everything granted be expressly and minutely described, and the Constitution contains no phrase of that kind.2 The Tenth Amendment, framed to quiet excessive jealousies, reserves to the States or the people the powers “not delegated to the United States, nor prohibited to the States,” and it omits the word expressly.3 Marshall inferred that the men who drew the amendment, having felt the embarrassments the word caused under the Articles, left it out on purpose. Whether a contested power was delegated therefore depends on a fair construction of the whole instrument.
Second, a constitution cannot list every means. One that detailed every subdivision of its great powers and every way of carrying them out would partake of the prolixity of a legal code and could scarcely be embraced by the human mind. Its nature requires that only its great outlines be marked, its important objects designated, and the minor ingredients deduced from the nature of the objects themselves.4 Prescribing the means for all future time would have changed the character of the instrument, and it would have tried to provide by immutable rules for exigencies that could be seen only dimly. Declaring that the best means may not be used, and only those without which a granted power would be nugatory, would have stripped the legislature of its capacity to draw on experience, to exercise its reason, and to accommodate its legislation to circumstances.5
Third, the powers Congress holds must be carried out across a vast republic. From the St. Croix to the Gulf of Mexico, revenue is collected and expended and armies are marched and supported, and the treasure raised in the north may have to travel south, or the treasure of the east west. Marshall asked whether a construction that rendered these operations difficult, hazardous, and expensive should be preferred unless the words imperiously require it, and whether the framers, in granting powers for the public good, can be taken to have meant to impede their exercise by withholding a choice of means.6 The argument also fixes the burden of proof. The government that has a right and a duty to act must, in reason, be allowed to select the means. Anyone who contends that it may not select a particular appropriate means takes on the burden of establishing that exception.7
Fourth, the label “sovereignty” does not settle the question. It was said that creating a corporation appertains to sovereignty, and Marshall admitted it. But in America the powers of sovereignty are divided between the Union and the States, each sovereign as to the objects committed to it and neither sovereign as to the objects committed to the other.8 The real question is therefore whether incorporation serves an object committed to the Union.
Fifth, incorporation does serve such objects, because it is a means and never an end. Nobody contributes to charity for the sake of an incorporation; a corporation is created to administer the charity. No seminary is founded in order to be incorporated, and no city is built for the sole object of being incorporated. In Marshall's words, the power of creating a corporation “is never used for its own sake, but for the purpose of effecting something else.”9 It is therefore not a distinct sovereign end but a means of carrying other sovereign powers into effect, and whenever it becomes an appropriate means of exercising a power the Constitution gives to the Union, the Union may use it.10 A corporation is a means commonly used and no more in need of particular specification than other means. Had the framers meant to grant incorporation as a distinct and independent right, they would have enumerated it.11
Marshall drew that boundary himself. If Congress adopted measures prohibited by the Constitution, or passed laws under the pretext of executing its powers to accomplish objects not entrusted to the government, it would become the painful duty of the Court to say that such an act was not the law of the land. But where the law is not prohibited and is really calculated to effect any of the objects entrusted to the government, to inquire into the degree of its necessity would pass the line that circumscribes the judicial department and tread on legislative ground.12 On an exam, then, test an unlisted means by asking which enumerated power it serves. That the text never mentions the means decides nothing.
The postal power shows what implied means look like once the end is identified. The power to establish post offices and post roads is executed by the single act of making the establishment. From it, however, have been inferred the power and duty of carrying the mail along the post road, and from that implied power the right to punish those who steal letters or rob the mail.13 Marshall conceded that neither is indispensably necessary to the establishment of a post office. Each is essential to the beneficial exercise of the power, and that sufficed; a rule demanding indispensability would let Congress establish a post office but not deliver anything through it. The same is true of the penal code. All admit that the government may legitimately punish any violation of its laws, yet the power to punish is not among the enumerated powers.14 The postal power likewise supports issuing postage stamps, which the Constitution nowhere mentions,15 and it permits eminent domain as a means of ensuring that the power to establish post offices is exercised completely and effectively.16
One objection remains. Maryland's counsel argued that the Necessary and Proper Clause, though in terms a grant of power, is in effect restrictive of the general right to select means for executing the enumerated powers.17 That argument depends on reading necessary to mean absolute physical necessity, and Marshall rejected the reading: in common affairs and in approved authors, the word frequently imports no more than that one thing is convenient, or useful, or essential to another.18 The next section takes up that word.